

Date: 31 May 2013

Our Ref: IM-FOI-2013-0223

Your Ref:

FOI Central Processing Unit
173 Pitt Street
Glasgow
G2 4JS

Email: xxx@xxxxxxxxx.xxn.police.uk

By email:

mailto:request-160093-7xxxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Dear Mr McLean

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION (SCOTLAND) ACT 2002
SUBJECT: ID SCANNERS AT GLASGOW AIRPORT

I refer to your email dated 2 May 2013, regarding the above which has been handled in accordance with the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002.

Your request for information has now been considered and on 31 May 2013, a decision was made to provide some of the information requested by you. Some of the information requested by you is, however, considered to be exempt in terms of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (the Act). Section 16 of the Act requires Police Service of Scotland to provide you with a notice which: (a) states that it holds the information, (b) states that it is claiming an exemption, (c) specifies the exemption in question and (d) states, if that would not be otherwise apparent, why the exemption applies. Where information is considered to be exempt, this letter serves as a Refusal Notice that information is held and an explanation of the appropriate exemption is provided.

For ease of reference, your request is replicated below together with the response.

Please can you provide the following information?

1. The make and model of the mobile device which scans passports and other form of ID being used at the "border Point" after security at Glasgow Airport?

In response, I have attached an overview document that can be found on the suppliers (APD Communications Ltd) website, this should provide you with a synopsis of the device. It should be noted that this document is freely available online; however, I have considered it appropriate to assist and provide this for your perusal at the end of this response.

2. Does the device provide real time information, is it connected via wi-fi, WiMax or similar?

3. What databases is this device connected with?

Section 31(1) National Security

The information requested is exempt, as its disclosure would or would be likely to endanger national security. Terrorist activity within the United Kingdom is a real and current threat, as the attack on Glasgow Airport serves to prove.

Experience of such attacks has shown that they are well planned and extreme in the level of violence perpetrated. Transport systems have also long been a favoured terrorist target. The aim of terrorist activity in the main is to influence the democratic decision making

process such as that in place in the UK. Thus any such attack is a threat to national security. The Police Service has a duty of care to protect the public they serve and the policing of airports plays an important role in addressing this threat. Therefore, I contend that to elucidate on any of the points above would only serve to allow those persons intent on acts of terrorism vital information that would permit them to gauge with some accuracy, possible or perceived circumvention of the security which could significantly aid in the planning of any further attacks on the airport.

This is a non absolute exemption and requires the application of the public interest test.

Section 35(1)(a) - Law Enforcement

Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to; prejudice substantially the prevention or detection of crime. If I may point out, first and foremost, it is not exceptional for organisations to enquire as to the Information Technologies set out across the Police Service of Scotland. Nonetheless, taking into account the specifics being requested, there is concern that the release of such data could provide attack opportunities.

In response, these systems are secure because they contain a variety of information which relates to policing activities. This information might include data relating to investigations, police intelligence and personal information. The requested information could be used by a hostile party to plan and execute an attack on force systems. Such attacks could take the form of data theft, denial of service or other deliberate disruptions. This could not help but have the effect of reducing the ability of the police to undertake relevant activities.

This is a non absolute exemption and requires the application of the public interest test.

Section 39(1) - Health, safety and the environment

Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, endanger the physical or mental health or the safety of an individual.

I would propose that the disclosure of the requested information could lead to successful attacks on police systems. This has the potential to lead to the disruption of police activities and the disclosure of sensitive information, depending on the database system being attacked. This would have a detrimental effect on the health and safety of officers where personal or operational information is disclosed. Similarly, there would be a detrimental effect on members of the public where the information could be used to target individuals. This might be the case where the details of a witness to or victim of a crime were extracted from police systems. This breach of security would compromise the integrity of police processes as well as placing individuals at risk.

This is a non absolute exemption and requires the application of the public interest test.

Public Interest Test

The above exemptions are subject to the public interest test. I must advise that on applying the public interest test deliberation is given as to whether the information would benefit the wider public by disclosing the information; however, the public interest test should not be misunderstood as to mean information which may be of interest to the public or an individual and not necessarily of any benefit to them.

The disclosure of the requested information would confirm which software is used by the police service and (by way of version numbers) reassure the public that these systems are up to date. However, disclosure would provide those intent on disrupting police activities with enough information to plan and execute a targeted attack. This would be detrimental to the effective operation of police activities. Additional resources would be required to counter the

attack and this would also have financial implications. Where systems were compromised, there is also the potential for sensitive information such as personal data, security information and other data to be made public.

On review, I consider that there is little to indicate that the public interest would be better served by disclosing the information. The public rightly expects the police service to ensure that all of its systems are secure so that the information it holds maintains its value and integrity. Disclosure would be detrimental to these aims, and the balance is weighted heavily in favour of withholding the information.

Taking into account the level of detail being requested, there is concern that the release of such data could provide attack opportunities. There has been a great deal of media coverage of attempts (successful or otherwise) to hack the systems of banks, social networking sites and online retailers. There is, arguably, an increase in this type of activity with groups, such as Anonymous, attacking government and other public sector organisations both in the UK and abroad.

4. What is the cost involved in the unit along with the three officers that appear to be required to use it?

At the outset, I consider it appropriate to provide context to the questions posed and to the answers in respect of each. In terms of the Aviation Security Act 1982, a police services agreement is an agreement between the relevant persons which specifies—

(a) the level of policing to be provided for the aerodrome in accordance with section 26(2A) during the period for which the agreement is in force,

(b) whether any payments are to be made by the manager of the aerodrome in connection with that policing and, if so, the amount of the payments or the manner in which their amount is to be assessed, and

(c) the accommodation and facilities (if any) that are to be provided by the manager in connection with that policing.

Police Service of Scotland does not incur any cost in policing Glasgow Airport as this is incurred by Glasgow Airport Limited. In relation to the details of the cost of providing policing, i.e. associated with the number of officers dedicated to policing Glasgow airport, the specific functions and what numbers of officers are required to undertake specific duties by Police Service of Scotland, and the amount payable against these costs by Glasgow Airport, the exemptions which follow are applicable.

Conversely however, the Police Service Agreement relates only to the uniformed Officers at the Airport. The mobile identification unit (to which you refer) is only utilised by officers formerly known as Special Branch Ports Officers. These officers were funded by the Scottish Government; however, it is my understanding, and I can advise, that this funding arrangement has changed following police reform. The Mobile Identification Unit (MIU) only requires one officer to physically use the scanner, however for officer safety the officers are deployed in pairs.

Section 31(1) National Security

The information requested is exempt, as its disclosure would or would be likely to endanger national security. Terrorist activity within the United Kingdom is a real and current threat as the recent attack on Glasgow Airport serves to prove.

Experience of such attacks has shown that they are well planned and extreme in the level of violence perpetrated. Transport systems have also long been a favoured terrorist target. The aim of terrorist activity in the main is to influence the democratic decision making

process such as that in place in the UK. Thus any such attack is a threat to national security. The Police Service has a duty of care to protect the public they serve and the policing of airports plays an important role in addressing this threat. To disclose the cost of policing Glasgow Airports could allow those persons intent on acts of terrorism vital information that would allow them to gauge with some accuracy, the number of officers deployed within the airport and could significantly aid in the planning of any further attacks on the airports.

This is a non absolute exemption and requires the application of the public interest test.

Section 35(1)(a) & (b) Law Enforcement

The information requested is exempt, as its disclosure would or would be likely to prejudice substantially the prevention or detection of crime and apprehension or prosecution of offenders. To disclose the cost of policing at Glasgow Airport could allow those persons intent on criminality vital information that would allow them to gauge with some accuracy, the number of officers deployed within the airport and could significantly aid in the planning of any further criminal activities within the airports and could assist them in evading justice.

This is a non absolute exemption and requires the application of the public interest test.

Section 39 (1) Health, Safety and the Environment

The information requested is exempt as its disclosure would or would be likely to endanger the physical health or safety of an individual. Experience of previous terrorist attacks, not only in the UK, but in other countries provides that the violence perpetrated in such attacks is extreme, often with the aim of causing death and destruction on a massive scale. The threat from terrorist attacks in the UK is current and real. It follows therefore that the threat to the safety of the general public is high. The police have a statutory duty to protect the public.

As previously stated, to disclose information that closely relates to the airport policing levels into the public domain would allow those persons intent on criminality and acts of terrorism to more accurately gauge the number of police officers deployed within the airport giving greater accuracy to the planning of any future criminal activity and thus increasing the risk to members of the public.

This is a class based exemption and requires the application of the public interest test.

In furtherance, I must also contend that in respect of “*...cost involved in the unit...*” the subsequent exemption applies:

Section 33 (1) (b) – Commercial Interests and the Economy

Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would or would be likely to prejudice substantially the commercial interests of any person (including without prejudice to that generality, a Scottish public authority)

The information requested is specifically in relation to a procurement process: the tendering or procurement process is open to competition and companies are invited to submit a tender bid with details of the costs and processes they would use for the successful completion of the contract. As a result any company who submits a tender is required to give detailed information regarding the capabilities and financial ability of the company to complete a contract. Disclosure of such information is likely to give competitive advantage to other similar companies should it be put into the public domain and as a result would have a damaging impact on the company concerned. Further, fearing that their commercial interests would be adversely affected through the disclosure of financial information in a tender, this may discourage companies from tendering for a contract in the future. The result of this would be to reduce competition and deny companies the opportunity of

considering potentially competitive bids. This would have a significant impact on a companies' ability to attain and sustain best value through the tendering process.

Thus disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice substantially the commercial interests of the company with the winning tender and impact on any subsequent tenders they were to submit.

This is a non absolute exemption which requires the application of the public interest test.

Public Interest Test

Whilst it is acknowledged that there is a clear public interest in the accountability of the Force for the spending of public funds, this has to be balanced against the public safety, the security of the country and the ability of Police Service of Scotland to operate as an efficient and effective Force; this is the principal argument in withholding the requested information.

I would argue that in this instance the public interest, i.e. what is in the interest of the public not what is of interest to the public, in the disclosure of information is outweighed by the harm that could be created by revealing information which may benefit criminals, terrorists and terrorist organisations and the potentially life threatening implications that may arise from such disclosure.

Now, if I may turn to the exemption cited in respect of Section 33: it is accepted the public has a personal interest in the information requested, and in terms of accountability for public funds it may be felt that the Police should disclose full details of the successful tender bid, the grounds for disclosure in this case are outweighed by the interests of third parties, in other words the commercial business interest of the company who submitted a tender bid in confidence. Also, in terms of the flow of information to the service all relevant information supplied by the successful tender company was provided in the full understanding that details within the tender bid will be held by the Police and not disclosed to another organisation who may gain a competitive advantage in receiving this information. Furthermore, as previously explained, if the contract was disclosed this may, in the future, discourage companies from submitting a tender for fear of commercially sensitive information being disclosed, this would reduce the opportunities for the Force to enter into the most efficient and effective tender in the future.

5. Why is it that Special branch officer as so concerned with Glasgow Airport as there is no officers demanding passports at Edinburgh, is there any documentation that support this?

Whilst I appreciate the standpoint, and the perceived differences between airports; I must contend that to elucidate as to whether there are more officers (openly visible) I must advise of the following: accordingly, it is assessed that the public interest lies in favour of maintaining the exemptions and refusing to provide the information requested. In terms of Section 18 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (the Act) Police Service of Scotland can neither confirm nor deny that it holds the information requested by you. However, if the information was held by the Force, it would be considered exempt in terms of one or more of the exemptions detailed in Section 18 of the Act, which are listed below:

Section 31 – National Security and Defence Section 35 – Law Enforcement

Section 18 of the Act also provides that there is no requirement on a public authority, when issuing a Refusal Notice in terms of Section 18, to state why the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs that in disclosure of the information; nor is there any requirement to state why the exemption applies in so far as that statement would disclose information which would itself be exempt information. This should not, however, be taken as conclusive evidence that the information you have requested exists or does not exist.

By way of explanation, the primary functions of the Police Service is enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The security of the country is of paramount importance and disclosure of the information requested could undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is providing appropriate and effective service at Scottish airports, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in this highly sensitive area. As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

Once again, this cannot be taken as confirmation that the information you have requested exists or does not exist.

Terrorist activity within the United Kingdom is a real and current threat. Experience of previous such attacks have shown that they are well planned and extreme in the violence perpetrated with transport networks and infrastructure long being a favoured terrorist target. Thus any such attack is a threat to national security. The police and security services are charged with protecting the public from such attacks. To disclose the information requested or confirm or deny its existence would serve to identify investigative activity and potentially undermine a current ongoing covert investigation. This would adversely affect the ability of offenders. Should the efficiency of the Force be adversely affected in this area of business it follows that the efficiency of the Force in its duty to protect the public would also be adversely affected; therefore, the information requested, if held, would also be exempt from disclosure.

Public safety and the security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service of Scotland will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine national security. Therefore, at this moment in time, it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for disclosure is not made out.

No inference can be taken from this refusal that such information does or does not exist.

By way of assistance, information on terrorist crime can be obtained from the Home Office website at the following link:

<http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/news-speeches/stats-terrorism-arrests.html>

Lastly, in response to question 5, could I draw your attention to the Code of Practice for Examining Officers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000: I consider it is of necessity to advise that an examining officer's decision to exercise their Schedule 7 powers at ports must be based on the threat posed by the various terrorist groups active in and outside the United Kingdom. When deciding whether to exercise their Schedule 7 powers, examining officers should base their decisions on a number of considerations, including factors such as:

- known and suspected sources of terrorism;
- individuals or groups whose current or past involvement in acts or threats of terrorism is known or suspected and supporters or sponsors of such activity who are known or suspected;
- any information on the origins and/or location of terrorist groups;
- possible current, emerging and future terrorist activity;

- the means of travel (and documentation) that a group or individuals involved in terrorist activity could use; and
- emerging local trends or patterns of travel through specific ports or in the wider vicinity that may be linked to terrorist activity.

6. What is the procedure that is in place for domestic passenger that do not require photo id?

I refer to the above question, and request for information in respect of passenger procedures on domestic flights without photographic identification: your request for information has been considered and I can advise you that Police Service of Scotland does not hold any of the information requested by you. In terms of Section 17 of the Act, this letter represents a formal notice that information is not held.

By way of explanation, and to assist, I can advise that on arrival at the airport as one proceeds towards baggage reclaim one will enter the Passport/Border Control Area (United Kingdom Border Agency).

There are two separate queues at passport/border control:

- one for European Union (EU)*, European Economic Area (EEA), British and Swiss nationals,
- and a second for all other nationalities.

At the passport desk a **UK Border Agency** officer will ask to see your passport or travel document and any supporting documentation necessary prior to a visit. For information about entry requirements into the United Kingdom, please visit the UK Border Agency website:

<http://ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/>

Further, with more stringent checks in place at the UK border, you may have to wait a little longer to get into the United Kingdom, especially at peak times. The UK Border Agency uses scanners to ensure that passports, visas and other official documents are genuine. UK Border Agency officers are trained to detect forgeries and check that people have the right to enter the United Kingdom.

**Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. However, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are not members of the European Union (EU) but citizens of these countries have the same rights to enter, live in and work in the United Kingdom as EU citizens.*

Data obtained from UK Border Agency website

Similarly, (this information applies to England, Wales and Scotland) you do not need a passport for travel within the UK. However, some airlines will insist that you present a valid form of identification before you can travel on a domestic flight. This identification may include a passport, but other forms of identification may also be accepted. It is considered necessary to check with the airline before traveling, what identification you will require to display.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, and with direct reference to the MIU, this is typically deployed and used for both outbound international and domestic flights. To advise further, the process

in relation to the MIU is: an officer will stop a passenger and requests that they present some form of identification: the vast majority of passengers present a passport; however, if they are not in possession of their passport their personal details are manually input. Whilst this method, as you will appreciate, is a slightly slower process than scanning the passport, it is therefore why a passport is asked for in the first instance.

7. The number of data protection requests by Police Scotland to airlines/airline handling agents requesting passenger data from the start of January 2013 at Glasgow Airport?

Under the Data Protection Act 1998 Section 29(3), an officer may wish to access information that will assist in the prevention or detection of a crime or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders. If such information is held by an individual, or organisation that does not routinely make disclosures to the police and the information is supplied then particulars of that disclosure should be fully recorded by the enquirer. Requirement for written requests should be met by using a Section 29(3) Enquiry Form. The use of the 29(3) form exempts the organisation disclosing the data from liability and confers that liability to the person requesting the data. It should be noted however, that it does not require the organisation to disclose the requested data simply by the use of a 29(3) form.

Therefore, taking cognisance of the foregoing, and in accordance with Sections 12(1) (Excessive cost of compliance) and 16(4) (Refusal of request) of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (the Act), this letter represents a Refusal Notice.

By way of explanation, given that data may be disclosed by **any** officer that requires it in the progress of an enquiry, and that they may work within **any** office, division or area of Scotland: we therefore cannot provide you with statistics to show the amount of requests made. Request of this nature are not centrally collated and to establish unequivocally would necessitate each officer to respond. As you will appreciate, this would be a significant undertaking, and one which would be considerably in excess of the £600 prescribed by the Scottish Ministers under the Act.

8. The number of arrest made at Glasgow Airport directly related to the mobile unit that is being used by Special Branch?

All incidents which come to the attention of the Force are recorded on the Force's incident management system, STORM. An incident may well not involve recourse to formal criminal proceedings, individuals report varying matters to the police, some of which allege criminality, and others merely report observations. All such calls are recorded on STORM as an incident; however, the recorded incident does not always result in a corresponding recorded crime.

If it is deemed that a criminal offence has been committed a crime or offence is recorded on the Force Crime Management system and a crime report raised. Accordingly, there are two separate processes for the recording of incidents and crimes.

In relation to incidents recorded at the airport specified, I would advise that there is no electronic search on STORM that would extract all the requested information. To provide the requested information, a total of which would return a huge amount of data, would require to be physically examined. To undertake a search **only** for Airport, would return over 28,000 incidents. As you will appreciate this will **not** be directly related to an airport incident, but merely have that keyword in the narrative. Such a task would take in excess of the £600 prescribed by the Scottish Ministers under the Act and in accordance with Sections 12(1) (Excessive cost of compliance) and 16(4) (Refusal of request) of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (the Act), this letter represents a Refusal Notice.

As previously stated, if it is deemed a criminal offence has been committed this is recorded on the Force Crime Management system, a crime report is raised and the crime is classified using the Scottish Government Justice Department (SGJD) crime classification.

In this instance, to be of assistance I have provided a table which includes crimes which were extracted from the Crime Management system where 'AIRPORT' was included in the 'locus line'. This information was then further refined by removing any crime which occurred on the main roads and motorways near to the airports and also those which occurred in hotels located near to the airport but which used the airport address in the locus.

Finally, I would ask that you note that the crime summary does include crimes which occurred on board an aircraft en route to the named airports and crimes which may have occurred abroad but were reported at the airport on arrival. This data was correct as at 14 March 2013.

Crime/Offence Group	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Group 1 - Violence	0	0	2	1	1
Group 2 - Indecency	0	2	1	1	2
Group 3 - Dishonesty	232	170	142	124	105
Group 4 - Vandalism/Fireraising etc.	11	5	5	9	1
Group 5 - Drugs/Weapons etc.	35	19	16	18	19
Group 6 - Misc. Offences	120	115	61	47	108
Group 7 - Motoring Offences	34	70	58	73	78

I trust that the information available is of assistance and should you require any further assistance concerning this matter please contact me on 0141 435 1217 quoting the reference number given.

If you are not satisfied with the way in which your request has been dealt with, you are entitled in the first instance and within 40 working days of receiving this letter to request a review of the decision made by the Force. Should you wish to do so, contact details are; Police Service of Scotland, FOI Central Processing Unit, 173 Pitt Street, Glasgow, G2 4JS.


Once informed of the Review Panel's decision, if you are still not satisfied, then you are entitled to apply to the Scottish Information Commissioner within six months for a decision. Contact details are; 'Office of the Scottish Information Commissioner, Kinburn Castle, Doubledykes Road, St Andrews, Fife, KY16 9DS', telephone 01334 464610.

Yours sincerely

Andrew McCulloch
Information Management
Freedom of Information

Mobile Identification Unit

Overview



With people travelling abroad more frequently than ever before, increasing issues with illegal immigration, awareness of the use of forged or stolen documents, and the ever present threat of terrorism, it is not surprising that the resources of our public safety organisations are being pushed to the limits. In addition many authorities have a need to verify people entering their premises, be it a building site or a sports ground.

Imagine the bottleneck at the airport, construction site or football ground, with officers or security personnel struggling to validate passports or other forms of ID. There is a need for intelligent decision making to be carried out on the spot. Without the information they need at their fingertips, officers are not in a position to ensure that the judgements they make are the right ones.

APD's Mobile ID Unit

APD's Mobile ID Unit is a self contained, portable travel document scanner, smart card reader and fingerprint reader with secure, integrated communications to security databases such as PNC, Voter's Register and other specialist databases holding counter terrorism and homeland security data. It combines APD's successful and proven POLARIS software together with the handheld Datastrip DSVII-PA, using internal rechargeable batteries with an integrated GPRS or TETRA (Airwave) modem.

This highly portable unit includes a 3.2 Mp camera and a magnetic card swipe reader so that additional biometric data held on travel documents can be validated.

Whether being used by Immigration Authorities for inspecting passports, international airline for examining tickets or Border Control Police for validation with international databases, the Mobile ID Unit is quickly becoming an essential tool. Not only does it quickly determine identification, it is also an effective deterrent. Officers working in areas where there are large crowds are able to make immediate spot checks of documents or fingerprints which have been proven to curb irresponsible behaviour. In addition, in the aftermath of a major incident, the units can be deployed for rapid "people processing", saving valuable time and logging vital information.

Applications for the APD Mobile ID Solution include:

- Checking Passports and Visas
- Checking Driving licences
- Performing checks against central databases using secure over air communications
- Checking against a watch list stored on the device
- Monitoring travel patterns
- Reading and displaying information held on magnetic stripe cards
- Checking biometric data (photographs or fingerprints) against data held on travel documents and against central databases



About the Mobile ID Unit

The APD Mobile ID Unit is based on a family of rugged devices which boast a significant track record in mobile identity verification for Homeland Security, military and commercial applications in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, India, and North America. It is specifically designed to read and validate a variety of documents and to assist with the identification of individuals.

Its applications meet a specific set of needs for border control, counter-terrorism and policing special events such as international football matches. Using the motorised document scanner, the photograph page of passports is read to obtain the bearer's full name, date of birth, gender, nationality, document issuing state, document number and expiry date. This information is formatted into a PNC name query, either automatically or at the request of the user, with the query results being presented on screen within seconds.

Additionally, the user can perform a check of an individual against the electoral register of voters, and can carry out PNC checks of vehicle details and of a driver's licence to return details of offences, vehicle insurance and MOT.



The Mobile ID Unit reader can be used to read cards with magnetic stripes and display the information on its screen. The details embossed on the card can then be checked with the coded information held on the magnetic stripe.

The hardware is also ready for numerous additional future applications.

Contact APD

- APD Communications Ltd, Head Office Newlands Centre, Inglemire Lane, Hull, HU6 7TD, United Kingdom
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