Preliminary Examination in Philosophy, Politics and Economics
Trinity Term and Long Vacation 2013
Report of Chair of Examiners
BASIC STATISTICS
250 candidates sat the examination in Trinity Term 2013. One additional candidate re-
sat the Economics paper only and another sat the Politics and Economics papers only
with permission to take the Philosophy paper in the Long Vacation.
The results (not including the two additional candidates above) were as follows:
Category
Number
Percentage
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2013 2012 2011 2010
2009
Distinction
46
61
43
47
63
18.4
24.6
18.0
19.2
28.0
Pass
198
179
193
183
155
79.2
72.2
80.8
75.0
68.9
Fail 1 paper
4
7
2
12
6
1.6
2.8
0.8
4.9
2.7
Fail 2 or 3
2
1
1
2
1
0.8
0.4
0.4
0.8
0.4
papers
Total
250
248
239
244
225
100
100
100
100
100
*The figures in this table and the tables below do not include these additional candidates or the
candidate re-sitting the Economics paper in June 2012).
6 candidates failed one or more papers: 2 failed Politics and 6 failed Economics, and 2
failed both Politics and Economics. The number of failures decreased from last year,
when 8 candidates failed one or more papers: 2 failed Philosophy, 7 failed Economics,
and 1 failed both Philosophy and Economics.
Of the 6 failing candidates who retook one or more papers in September, 5 passed the
examination and 1 failed. A candidate who took the Politics and Economics papers
but withdrew from the Philosophy examination in Trinity Term 2013 for personal
reasons, sat the Philosophy paper for the first time in the Long Vacation and was
awarded a Distinction.
ADMINISTRATION
Excellent administrative support was provided by the PPE Administrator, Wendy
Wilkin, and in general the examination process ran smoothly. There was a technical
problem however with the spread sheets. When the final results data was transferred
from the administrator’s computer to the central exam computer in the Politics
department, changes were introduced which resulted in the award of distinctions to 4
candidates whose marks fell short of the threshold. The Proctors were informed as
soon as the mistakes were discovered, and advised the Chair as to the correct
procedure for revision. The Chair is very grateful to Margaret Stevens and Wendy
Wilkin who worked hard to double-check the data and to ensure that the spreadsheet
had not generated further errors.
Presumably for timetabling reasons, the Politics Prelims paper was sat on Wednesday
afternoon this year rather than, as has normally been the case, Wednesday morning.
This placed the politics examiners under more pressure than normal to meet the final
1
marks deadline the following Thursday. This is an issue beyond the Examiners control
but it is worth noting that the Wednesday morning slot is preferable.
The timetable for marking and reporting was extended this year in line with last year’s
recommendation. It removed considerable pressure from the PPE Administrator who
was entering both FHS and Prelims marks. It was also the first year of having an extra
assessor for the Theory section of the Politics Prelim. This removed a considerable
burden from the Theory examiner (who was also Chair) particularly in the light of the
extra marking and exam setting that has arisen with the new Theorizing the
Democratic State paper in the History and Politics prelim. There are no
recommendations for next year.
Prof Lois McNay (Chair, PPE Prelims Examiners)
PPE Prelims Examination Board Members:
Dr Nicholas Owen, Dr Timothy Power, Prof Margaret Stevens, Dr Brian
A’Hearn, Prof Cecile Fabre, Dr Paul Lodge
2
DISTRIBUTION OF MARKS
Distribution of Marks for June 2013 [2012 figures in brackets]
Politics
Philosophy
Economics
Average
61.0 [61.3]
62.0 [63.2]
60.7 [59.8]
Standard Deviation
5.8 [5.9]
6.8 [9.2]
10.6 [10.7]
75+
0.0% [1%]
2.8% [10.7%]
7.2% [10.5%]
70-74
3.2% [6.5%]
9.6% [22.2%]
11.2% [16%]
60-69
62.8% [64.3%]
54.4% [40.9%]
41.6% [33.5%]
50-59
30.8% [26.0%]
28.8% [21.0%]
26.4% [25.9%]
40-49
2.4% [2.2%]
4.5% [4.7%]
11.2% [12.6%]
37-39
0.0% [0%]
0.0% [0.5%]
0.0% [0.5%]
Less than 37
0.8% [0%]
0.0% [0%]
2.4% [1%]
Total
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
The average marks for Economics were higher, and the average mark for Politics and
Philosophy was lower than in 2012. Economics had the lowest mean score.
3
GENDER BREAKDOWN
Category
Female June 2013
Male June 2013
[2012 figures in brackets]
[2012 figures in brackets]
Number
Percentage
Number
Percentage
Distinction
10 [15]
11.6% [18.5%]
36 [46]
22.0% [27.5%]
Pass
73 [63]
84.9% [77.8%]
125 [116]
76.2% [69.5%]
Fail 1 paper
2 [3]
2.3% [3.7%]
2 [4]
1.2% [2.4%]
Fail 2 or 3
1 [0]
1.2% [0%]
1 [1]
0.6% [0.6%]
papers
TOTAL
86 [81]
100%
164 [168]
100%
Gender distribution of Marks June 2013
[2012 figures in brackets]
Politics
Philosophy
Economics
Female Average
60.9 [62.0]
61.3 [63.6]
58.5 [57.6]
Male Average
61.0 [61.1]
62.3 [63.1]
61.9 [60.8]
Overall Average
61.0 [61.4]
62.0 [63.2]
60.7 [59.8]
Female Standard
5.6 [5.0]
5.6 [8.4]
10.3 [10.9]
Deviation
Male Standard
5.9 [6.3]
7.4 [9.6]
10.6 [10.6]
Deviation
% of Female Cohort
2.3% [6.3%]
3.5% [25.0%]
14.0% [16.3%]
achieving >=70
% of Male Cohort
3.7% [6.5%]
17.1% [29.8%]
20.7% [23.8%]
achieving >=70
4
PAPER REPORTS
1. Report on INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY (June 2013)
SECTION A: LOGIC
Unsurprisingly, the two "elementary and straightforward" questions were
overwhelmingly the two most popular questions, and generally attracted answers of a
good standard, with well over a third of attempts receiving first-class scores and a
very low proportion of failing scores.
(1) (148 answers; average: 16.0) A number of candidates mistakenly attempted to
formalize "because" in (b.ii) with a conditional. The formalization in part (c) was
generally well done, although some candidates became unstuck by the occurrence of
"unless" in the first premiss. Genuine points of interest were not always forthcoming.
A small minority of candidates displayed clear confusion over the correct use of truth
table methods to establish validity. Translation from predicate logic into English was
usually well done.
(2) (103 answers; average: 16.3) The part of the question concerning syntax attracted
answers of varying quality: part (a) on the Bracketing Conventions was usually
answered correctly, but part (b) on metavariables caused more trouble, and attracted a
few very confused answers. Surprisingly few candidates were able to reproduce the
definitions asked for in part (c) with complete accuracy. Part (d) on functions was
usually well done. Part (e) was less well done; only the strongest candidates observed
that the subject-specific set-theoretic vocabulary in the conclusion is open to
reinterpretation.
(3) (33 answers; average: 13.8) This question was the least well done. Most
candidates were able to offer a partially correct answer to part (b) on the semantics of
the language of predicate logic, but few candidates gave completely correct answers.
Part (c) often appeared to prove difficult, and attracted a few highly incomplete
answers.
(4) (19 answers; average: 15.0) The application of Russell's theory of descriptions in
part (a) attracted answers of mixed quality. But most candidates were able to correctly
formalize the argument in part (b) and correctly supplied the tacit premiss that nothing
is both a cat and a dog.
(5) (41 answers; average: 15.8) The question on Natural Deduction was the most
popular and best answered of the non-"elementary and straightforward" questions.
Many candidates had little difficulty with the first proof, and were able to give at least
partially correct proofs in the second and third case, with a small number of perfect
solutions to part (b). Most candidates gave correct answers to parts (c) and (d); the
accompanying explanations varied in quality.
5
SECTION B: GENERAL PHILOSOPHY
General comments
Overall the standard of answers was reasonably good, given the fact that the majority
of students would have had little formal exposure to material of this kind. Most
showed an understanding consistent with 2.1 marks in the FHS, and some were
clearly indicative of 1st class potential. There was relatively little difference in the
mean score (ranging between 60.88 and 64) or standard deviation (ranging between
1.0 and 1.4) for each of the questions that was answered by more than 5 candidates.
The most frequent weaknesses that were found were the perennial ones: failure to
engage with the details of the question asked; the tendency to try to include superficial
discussion of as much material as possible rather than selecting material that would
help with the particular foci of the questions; and failure to display a firm grasp of key
concepts. Another common negative feature of answers was candidates’
unwillingness to come down on one side of the argument or another, preferring
instead conclusions which had the form: if one thinks approach x is correct then yes,
if one thinks approach y is correct then no. Whilst it is clearly possible to reach the
well-argued conclusion that one was not in a position to provide a determinate
answer, it was rarely the case that candidates did this.
It is also worth noting, given recent syllabus changes, that few students chose to
answer questions in ways that displayed any significant acquaintance with historical
material. However, since the questions that were explicitly concerned with historical
figures were answered by a very small number of candidates, this did not seem to
have a serious impact on performance.
Comments on particular questions
Please note that, to ensure anonymity, comments are not provided where the number
of candidates answering the question was 5 or fewer.
6a (46 answers)
Do you know that you are now sitting a philosophy exam? Are you certain?
The better answers used this question as an opportunity to consider different accounts
of knowledge and their relationship to the question asked in light of skeptical
challenges. However, many candidates simply considered standard skeptical scenarios
and possible responses to the challenges provided by them. The very best answers
were sensitive to the difference between knowledge and certainty. However, many
candidates failed to engage with the second sentence in the question to any great
degree, if at all. Very few candidates made any mention of historical material, despite
the fact that the question invited those who had studied Descartes’ 1st Meditation to
engage with it in this way.
6b (11 answers)
If it was 20 degrees Celsius in a room and there was a thermometer in the room
that believed that it was 20 degrees Celsius in the room, would that thermometer
know that it was 20 degrees Celsius in the room?
Most, though not all, answers to this question appreciated the direct allusion to David
Armstrong’s conception of knowledge, or, at least the fact that this question was an
invitation to consider the viability of externalist accounts of knowledge. Those that
6
did appreciate this fact generally produced good answers. Some candidates did not
pick up on this at all and answered with reference to their understanding of the
concept of knowledge in ways that did not engage at all well with the question.
7a (5 answers)
What appeal does Hume make to custom in his discussion of induction, and does
he appeal to it in an appropriate way?
7b (43 answers)
Should we be disturbed by the claim that our beliefs about the future cannot be
established deductively?
Most candidates were able to provide good to very good discussions of a range of
positions addressing the ways in which one might justify induction, given the view
that it cannot be justified deductively. However, explanations of the problems
surrounding deductive justification were typically quite weak, often making reference
to Hume’s distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, but without
explaining the connection between these notions and deduction.
8a (14 answers)
‘I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of
being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it.’
(DESCARTES) How does Descartes rely on this claim to try to establish that he
is really distinct from his body, and can exist without it’, and does he succeed?
Candidates fared poorest in general on this question, with answers often showing a
superficial understanding of Descartes’ argument and lapsing into discussion of
whether one could establish dualism using an argument from conceivability. The
poorest answers were also marred by including irrelevant discussion of the standard
problems with substance dualism (e.g., the problem of mind-body interaction).
8b (29 answers)
Does Frank Jackson’s thought experiment concerning Mary show us anything
about the relationship between the mental and the physical?
Candidates who answered this question typically had a good understanding of
Jackson’s thought experiment. However, problems arose when candidates tried to
articulate the standard responses clearly, and only the very best were able to use the
material to provide a focused answer to the actual question.
9a (16 answers)
‘But is not a man drunk and sober the same person? Why else is he punished for
the act he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it?’
(LOCKE) Discuss.
Many of the answers to this question made very little reference Locke’s own answer
and drifted into discussions of the responses that different approaches to personal
identity might sustain along with critiques of those approaches. Whilst this did not
prevent candidates from achieving reasonable marks, the very best answers were
sensitive to the original context and the way in which Locke navigated this prima
facie objection to his own account.
7
9b (57 answers)
Could you survive having half of your brain transplanted into one body and half
into another?
Most candidates were able to provide adequate discussion of the ways in which
different accounts of personal identity might accommodate fission and the problems
that it poses for the numerical identity of persons. However, a significant number of
candidates seemed unaware of the way in which the notion of survival has taken on a
technical meaning in these debates and answered by relying on their own
understanding of the term.
10a (42 answers)
Could there be freedom in a world where everything was necessary?
Answers to this question generally consisted of a discussion of the viability of
compatibilist accounts of freedom, often starting with an account of Van Inwagen’s
argument for incompatibilism. Only some of the answers were attentive to the
relationship between determinism and the claim that everything is necessary, and even
then almost all of these assumed that the former reduces to the latter without further
consideration. Despite the allusion to Hume’s discussion of the relationship between
liberty and necessity, very few candidates mentioned Hume’s views at all.
10b (65 answers)
Is a person free only if she can do otherwise?
The weaker answers to this question degenerated into discussions of the relative
merits of compatiblist and incompatibilist approaches to freedom. However, most
candidates were able to bring in Frankfurt’s thought experiment and the main
differences consisted in accuracy of presentation of Frankfurt’s ideas and the
sophistication of the discussion of how they bore on the question.
11a (1 answer)
Was Descartes right to think that his understanding that existence belongs to the
nature of God was no less clear and distinct than his understanding that having
three sides belongs to the nature of triangles?
11b (23 answers)
Is the existence of horrendous evil inconsistent with the existence of God
Candidates fared best in general on this question. Most were able to state the problem
of evil clearly and to survey a number of responses in a critical way. In the best
answers, candidates also considered whether there might be a difference between evil
and horrendous evil, but even where this was lacking answers were generally well-
constructed and contained relevant discussion.
SECTION C: MORAL PHILOSOPHY
General remarks
Overall, the scripts were of reasonably high quality for the most – both with respect to
content, and with respect to style. It is worth stressing, in fact, that there were no fails
this year; moreover, some of the scripts were of extremely high quality.
In last year’s report, four complaints were made regarding candidates’ writing style:
(a) overlong introductions; (b) excessive use of rhetorical questions; (c) overuse of the
verb ‘to feel’ in lieu of ‘to think’; (d) an overly familiar writing style. The examiner is
8
pleased to report that the overwhelming majority of candidates wrote good
introductions, avoided rhetorical questions, perceived themselves as
thinking about
philosophy as opposed to having feelings about, e.g., the importance of saving lives,
and generally wrote in a suitably academic way. Candidates made an effort to
develop their own (sometimes idiosyncratic) examples, thereby displaying a firmer
grasp of the material.
On more substantive matters: weaker candidates made the following common
mistakes
- failing to analyse the questions properly, in their own terms (see e.g. my final
comment on q.12 and q. 18).
- failing to define terms properly, or at all (see, e.g., comments on q. 15 and q. 16).
Stronger candidates did not make either mistake. The most impressive scripts were
those which not only displayed a very good grasp of familiar material, but also
perceived and explored (deliberate) ambiguities in the question titles (e.g., q. 17),
and/or drew interesting distinctions between different possible cases (e.g., q. 13, q.
18).
q. 12. ‘Can the fulfilment of his sadistic impulses make a sadist genuinely
happy?’ (31 answers. 10.2%.1) The question invited candidates to reflect on the constitutive components of a happy
life, from a utilitarian and non utilitarian perspective. The word ‘genuinely’ warranted
attention, which the best scripts did. Generally, good answers examined different
theories of happiness, and made some interesting points about first order and second
order desires. Competent scripts examined the question in the light of Mill’s
distinction between higher and lower pleasures, but did not go much further beyond
that. Too few scripts focused on
sadism and averted to the perceived immoral nature
(by common sense morality) of this particular preference: the question was not asking
about the satisfaction of, for example, a preference for eating chocolate. A couple of
scripts confused the sadist with the masochist, which resulted in very muddled
argumentation.
q. 13. ‘Can a utilitarian account of the badness of death?’ (13 answers. 4.2%). The least popular question by far. Too many of those who attempted it engaged in a
long discussion to the effect that death is not necessarily a bad thing (e.g. the long
suffering terminally ill might think, plausibly, that death is preferable to life.) True,
but they would have been better inspired to accept, for the sake of argument, the
common sense intuition that death is bad, and to scrutinise utilitarianism’s ability to
account for that intuition. Another mistake consisted in conflating the question of
whether death is bad and the question of whether killing is wrong. The very best
answers distinguished between death and the process of dying, between death being
bad for the person who dies versus death being bad for that person’s relatives and
friends, versus death being bad impersonally.
q. 14. ‘Is it possible to prove a moral theory?’ (25 answers. 8.2%) A relatively difficult question, which invited candidates to think beyond the details of
Mill’s ‘proof’ and consider what the latter tells us about how to do moral philosophy.
The weakest answers went through Mill’s moves and standard objections to those
1 Rounded percentage of the total number of answers in moral philosophy (303).
9
moves, without giving much thought to what can or cannot be regarded as a proof.
The very best answers used Mill’s proof and its various claims as ‘heuristic devices’
to do precisely that. All candidates averred that a moral theory, unlike theoretic
scientific arguments, cannot be proved deductively since it rests on first principles
which can only be discerned by intuition or observed empirically. It would have been
useful to say something about mathematical proofs in this context, since the latter also
rest, it seems, on nondeductively provable assumptions (e.g. Euclid’s’ axiom of
parallels.)
q. 15. ‘Does rule-utilitarianism provide a good alternative to act-utilitarianism?’
(134 answers. 44.2%). The most popular question by a very long shot. On the whole it was done competently
enough. Weaker answers did not define act-U and rule-U properly and/or did not
clearly explain why rule-U is thought by some to remedy some of the flaws of act-U.
The best answers set the problem clearly, identified several of those flaws well,
engaged in a thorough study of the extent to which, if at all, rule-U succeeds where
act-U fails,
and addressed weaknesses of rule-U. The question of what constitutes a
‘good alternative’ was discussed by the better scripts, as was the distinction between
rule-U and multilevel act-U. Competent scripts went through familiar moves and
counter-moves, which they illustrated with equally familiar examples (e.g. the sheriff
and the innocent man.)
q. 16. ‘Can a utilitarian be genuinely committed to promoting justice?’ (25
answers. 8.2%). Far too few candidates made the effort of defining justice, which considerably
weakened their answers. The best scripts distinguished between distributive justice
and retributive justice, and examined utilitarians’ putative commitment to both. On
the whole, candidates who chose to focus their answer on justice in
Utilitarianism
displayed a good understanding of Mill’s own conception of justice and its connection
with rights.
q. 17. ‘If you see a person drowning, what matters is that you save her life; it
does not matter what your intentions for doing so are.’ (37 answers. 12.2%). The question focused explicitly on the view that only consequences matter, not
intentions. Yet, some scripts (the weakest) spent a considerable amount of time
defending the view that, for consequentialists, it is important to save people’s life
generally but not always: candidates should be aware that a two-statement question
should be read carefully, to establish whether it is apposite to analyse each statement
in isolation from each other, or (as was the case here) whether the two statements
taken together yields a contrastive view.
The best scripts distinguished between several different interpretations of ‘it matters’,
and two meanings of the word ‘intentions’ – in this case, the intention to save the
person’s life, versus one’s deeper intentions (or motives) for doing so. Interesting
points included: the view that motives and intentions matter not for establishing the
rightness or wrongness of actions but for assessing agents’ characters; the view that
they do matter for the rightness and wrongness of actions (a couple of candidates
deployed the doctrine of double effect intelligently); the view that they matter as a
predictor of one’s tendency to do the (consequentially) right thing.
10
q. 18. ‘If the only way to save a human being is by killing a cat, a utilitarian is
committed to the view that one must kill the cat.’ Do you agree? (38 answers.
12.5%).
This question enabled candidates to use both what they had learned about
utilitarianism as an account of happiness (is a human being necessarily happier than a
cat) and what they had learned about it as an account of the rightness and wrongness
of actions. The very best scripts managed to do both, to very good effect. They also
noted that the question does not give any indication as to (inter alia) (a) whether the
human being is nearing the end of her life, (b) whether the cat is a source of happiness
for very many people. Whether the integrity objection works in this context exercised
quite a few candidates. The weaker scripts deployed Mill’s distinction between higher
and lower pleasures to argue that, from a Millean point of view, one should prima
facie kill the cat – but they spent so much time discussing the distinction that they lost
sight of the specific conflict between those two lives. Similarly, a common mistake
was to discuss the integrity objection at some length in its own right (with long
disquisitions on Jim and the Indians) without relating that discussion clearly to the
specific issue at hand.
Cecile Fabre Paul Lodge
James Studd
11
2. Report on INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS: The Theory and Practice of
Democracy (June 2013)
There were a number of impressive scripts which showed an ability to combine
comparative analysis with detailed empirical knowledge of particular institutions and
political processes. Most candidates were able to display a reasonable knowledge of
aspects of the political systems they were studying and to apply some of the insights
of comparative politics.
As in previous years, students were notably conservative in their question choices,
gravitating toward a small number of popular options. Question 9 (John Stuart Mill)
and Question 23 (UK party politics) were each answered by approximately half of all
candidates. Question 11 (freedoms and poverty) and Question 27 (US Supreme Court)
were also answered by further 36-37% of all candidates each, meaning that there was
relatively little diversity beyond these four.
Overall, there were few really poor performances, with only two failures among the
251 candidates in June 2013. The average mark for the Politics exam was 60.8, fully
in line with the typical mean of 61 over the past few years.
On Section A, as in previous years, the standard of answers for the theory questions
was satisfactory if a little disappointing. Apart from a few notable exceptions, most
candidates showed little direct knowledge of the primary texts, stuck to a narrow
range of secondary sources and tended to rely on rehearsed and predictable answers.
In general, the theory assessors felt that students could improve their performance
dramatically by thinking harder about what the question is asking, by setting out their
answers more carefully and analytically, and by having read the primary texts and
explored some of the interpretative disagreements.
On Section B, our impression was that candidates took the new rubric very seriously.
The best answers tried to introduce insights drawn from comparative work even when
answering ostensibly ‘single-country questions’. By contrast we were concerned
about the ability of students to use any other country examples beyond the UK, US,
France and Germany when answering the ‘thematic’ questions on presidentialism, on
federalism and on democratic consolidation in the developing world. To be answered
satisfactorily, these questions required other country cases to be considered. We
suggest that the course providers consider whether (i) the value of comparative
perspectives in addressing the ‘single country questions’, and (ii) the value of
appropriate case studies in the thematic questions are indicated sufficiently clearly in
the reading-lists and lectures. As in previous years, we also found the answers to the
specific methodological questions rather thin.
Comments on Specific Questions
Section A (Questions 1-12)
1.
‘Political theory is concerned with how the world ought to be rather than how it is’.
Discuss. (10 takers; popularity rank 22/28).
12
There were very few takers for this question but the answers were of a good standard.
One was outstanding. The question was dealt with thoughtfully and in an imaginative
fashion. Rather than answer in general terms, candidates drew on knowledge of
particular thinkers and extrapolated outwards to discuss the nature of political
thinking with regard to the relation of fact and norm. Textual detail gave the answers
focus and depth.
2.
Is the law-giver consistent with Rousseau’s idea of popular sovereignty? (48 takers;
popularity rank 7/28).
As ever, this was one of the most popular questions. Answers fell into two opposed
camps, arguing either that the lawgiver was an anomalous figure or that it was
consistent with Rousseau’s general republican logic. On the whole, perhaps because
of the way the question was formulated, answers seemed to be more thoughtful and
less descriptive than those of last year. The best answers showed detailed knowledge
of
The Social Contract and of a range of secondary texts. Weaker answers relied on
standard secondary interpretations only.
3.
‘Deliberative democracy is a nice idea in principle, but unfeasible in practice’. Discuss. (19 takers; popularity rank 16/28)
Answers were thoughtful and even-handed. Some even made connections between the
set reading on deliberative democracy and the primary classical texts, notably
Rousseau and Mill. Thinking across reading list topics in this way is to be
encouraged.
4.
Why does De Tocqueville regard equality as a threat to democracy? What, in his
view, can be done to counteract this threat? (7 takers; popularity rank 24/28).
Of the four classical thinkers, De Tocqueville has obviously been the least studied this
year, judging from the number of answers. This is a shame because his work offers an
introduction to the important ideas of civil society, associational life and intermediate
institutions. This might also explain why there were so few takers for question 7. On
the whole, answers were of a good standard but mainly descriptive in nature. Few
took the opportunity to evaluate whether De Tocqueville’s views on equality and its
detrimental effects on liberty were warranted.
5.
Should the representatives in a democracy represent the gender balance in a
population? (12 takers; popularity rank 20/28)
Few candidates answered this question but in general they were of a good standard.
There was a tendency to answer this through empirical material about gender
participation rather than focus more sharply on the theoretical issues involved in
representation. It is not that such material is not relevant, but rather it is important for
candidates to bear in mind the general orientation of the question.
6.
‘What the bourgeoisie…produces, above all, are its own gravediggers’ (Communist
Manifesto). Why did Marx and Engels believe this? Were they right? (29 takers;
popularity rank 11/28).
13
As in previous years, one of the most popular questions. The best answers were those
that showed a nuanced understanding both of Marx’s theory of exploitation and of the
continuing relevance of this thought for a contemporary audience. The best scripts
referred both to his political economy and also to his theories of ideology and
alienation. Stronger candidates also showed knowledge of both functionalist and
dialectical interpretations of Marx rather than just the former (e.g. Cohen). Weaker
answers relied on loose, at points, inaccurate renditions of Marx’s claims and
simplistic assessments of the overall value of his thought.
7.
What is civil society and why is it important for democracy? (11 takers; popularity
rank 21/28).
This question drew few answers — and the standard of those was mixed. Candidates
tended to treat ‘democracy’ as unproblematic and failed to identify what components
of democracy were likely to be most affected by the quality of civil society. And few
candidates showed much knowledge of the literature on civil society or social capital,
or their relationship.
8.
Is it sufficient to define power as the ability of some individuals to make others act
in ways that they would not otherwise do? (17 takers; popularity rank 18/28).
Unsurprisingly, answers focused mainly on Lukes’ three-dimensional analysis of
power with reference to Dahl’s pluralism and the mobilization of bias critique. Few
candidates considered other important approaches to the issue of power such as
Arendt’s idea of collective empowerment or Foucault’s idea of normalizing
disciplinary power. This is disappointing because, after Berlin’s distinction between
positive and negative liberty, Lukes’ work on power must be one of the most
frequently regurgitated texts in exams. Inevitably, credit is given to those candidates
who do not confine their answers to just rehearsing its key points. There is a lot that
can be said about power without going through Lukes at all although he is valuable as
an initial starting point.
9.
Is Mill’s defence of individual liberty compatible with his utilitarian beliefs? (128
takers; popularity rank 1/28).
As ever, extremely popular. Most candidates argued that liberty and utility were
compatible if one took account of Mill’s understanding of man as a progressive being.
John Gray was a heavily cited secondary text. Pleasingly, many candidates also
showed a detailed knowledge of
On Liberty.
10.
Is there a case for elites in democracy? (20 takers; popularity rank 14/28).
Answers were nuanced, in general, most making a qualified case for the functional
necessity of elite rule. There were one or two Schumpeterian answers which were
refreshing insofar as they made a bold case for absolute superiority of elite rule over
rule by the people. One candidate used Rousseau’s idea of participatory democracy to
answer the question in the negative. Again, such thinking across reading list topics is
to be welcomed.
11.
If I am so poor that I cannot afford to travel, is my freedom to travel of any value
to me? (93 takers; popularity rank 4/28).
14
As is always the case with questions on liberty, very popular. Overall, answers were
of a satisfactory standard, including several outstanding ones. Rather refreshingly,
Berlin and MacCallum was mentioned very little, candidates drawing instead on
Swift’s distinction between effective and formal freedoms and citing also Waldron’s
discussion of the putative freedom to sleep under the bridges of Paris. Most
candidates took a sensible middle course, arguing along the lines that the formal
freedom to travel had a certain value in itself but that it only became truly meaningful
in the absence of poverty. However, the more unorthodox answers (either a defense of
the formal freedom in itself or a denunciation of it as illusory) were also good and
sometimes more original.
12.
Given that it makes unrealistic assumptions about individual motivation, what, if
anything, can rational choice theory tell us about politics? (4 takers; popularity rank
27/28).
The few answers to this question were of a high standard. They displayed detailed
knowledge of rational choice theory and arguments ranged between strong defences
of its analytical power to conceding that, beyond explicitly instrumental types of
political behaviour, it has limited purchase.
15
Section B (i) (Questions 13-20)
13.
Is presidentialism inherently more unstable than parliamentarism? (48 takers;
popularity rank 8/28).
Answers to this question were rather weak. Many candidates interpreted the question
as being about governmental instability rather than regime instability, which would
have been fine had they chosen obvious cases of frequent cabinet collapse (e.g.
postwar Italy) to illustrate the concept of instability at work. However, it was puzzling
to see many candidates use the USA and the UK in their answers. This USA-UK
strategy suggests a fundamental misreading of what instability is, both absolutely and
relatively to other political systems. It is also a missed opportunity, by failing to
engage with the classic critique of presidentalism by Linz.
14.
What factors best explain democratic consolidation in developing countries? (7
takers; popularity rank 25/28).
The handful of takers here showed some promise in contrasting economic and cultural
explanations of democratic diffusion in the developing world. However, almost all of
the answers were very abstract, with no application to concrete cases.
15.
‘To understand political institutions, it is necessary to compare across countries’.
Discuss. (10 takers; popularity rank 23/28).
The better answers developed critiques of the question. They focused on ways to
exploit within-case political change over time or to engage in rich contextual
understanding of countries and polities.
16.
‘In any given political system, the number of political parties is simply a reflection
of prevailing electoral laws’. Discuss. (79 takers; popularity rank 5/28).
The answers to this question were routinely competent, comparing sociological
(cleavage structures) and institutional (electoral law) explanations of the number of
parties. At the same time, this approach was so common that the answers were among
the most formulaic we encountered. In discussing cleavages, candidates tended to
stick to the classic 19th-century dimensions proposed by Lipset and Rokkan, failing to
note new cleavages that have emerged in recent decades.
17.
Why do countries adopt federalism? (17 takers; popularity rank 19/28).
Some candidates opted for a descriptive inventory of federal structures, and others
mixed in some consequences of federalism. However, the question itself was about
causes of federalism. The stronger answers approached the question as one of
institutional design and carefully considered the alternative (unitarism).
18.
‘A democratic legislature can be either representative or efficient, but not both’.
Discuss. (37 takers; popularity rank 9/28).
The best answers here took some time to offer working definitions of efficiency and
representativeness before applying the question to concrete cases. Weaker answers
16
tended to read ‘democratic legislature’ as a synonym for ‘democracy’, thus avoiding
the specific institutional terrain of legislatures. Some candidates seemed to be holding
this question in reserve as an opportunity to discuss a country case that they had not
yet covered elsewhere, with predictably superficial results.
19.
Is judicial review a prerequisite for a functioning democracy? (29 takers;
popularity rank 12/28).
This question produced some rather good discussions of whether unelected judges are
compatible with liberal democracy. Some candidates reviewed only positive cases
(countries where judicial review is established) and failed to include any negative
cases, which would have strengthened their argumentation concerning ‘prerequisite’.
20.
What accounts for the varying policy influence of different bureaucratic
structures? (4 takers; popularity rank 28/28).
As in previous years, bureaucracy and administrative structures were avoided by the
candidates.
Section B (ii) (Questions 21-28)
21.
What can political scientists learn from studying the failure of the French Fourth
Republic? (19 takers; popularity rank 17/28)
A few weaker answers focused narrowly on the death spiral of 1958 rather than on
underlying problems plaguing the regime during the previous 12 years. Stronger
answers catalogued these problems and went on to show how the constitution of the
Fifth Republic ‘corrected’ them. It was gratifying to see some examples of vivid
historical writing here.
22.
‘The variable that matters most in determining presidential power in France is the
presence or absence of a supportive legislative majority’. Do you agree? (58 takers;
popularity rank 6/28).
Virtually all answers used this question as an opportunity to describe how French
semipresidentialism worked in practice. The descriptive material was competent, but
the best answers went beyond the institutional mechanics of cohabitation to discuss a
few concrete historical episodes featuring real personalities (presidents and prime
ministers in their various configurations). Some candidates were unaware of recent
developments, such as changes to the electoral cycle, and their implications for the
presence or absence of supportive legislative majorities.
23.
How much have constitutional reforms since 1997 dispersed political power in the
UK? (121 takers; popularity rank 2/28)
This was a very popular question. Better answers defined ‘dispersion’ clearly,
considered how it might be measured, and used it as the test of the various reforms.
Weaker answers tended to describe the various reforms, usually accurately, and
offered views of their merits according to less well-defined criteria.
17
24.
Are there significant ideological differences in UK party politics? (22 takers;
popularity rank 13/28).
There was some confusion about what ‘ideological differences’ were, and only a few
candidates focused their answers sufficiently closely on them. Many answers simply
traced policy differences between the Conservative and Labour parties, often going
back to 1945 or stopping in 1979 despite the present tense of the question.
25.
What did the constitutional design of the Federal Republic of Germany owe to
understandings of why the Weimar Republic had collapsed? (33 takers; popularity
rank 10/28).
This question was generally well done, with a good mix in the best answers of
historical analysis and the theory of constitutional design. Some candidates failed to
distinguish adequately between the understandings of the constitution-makers, and
present-day understandings.
26.
Why are political parties so privileged in the German political system? (7 takers;
popularity rank 26/28)
This was not a popular question, but was also well done, although one or two
candidates offered overly descriptive accounts of the party system rather than
engaging with the question of privilege. This was one example where comparative
perspectives might have been especially useful.
27.
Does the US Supreme Court set agendas or ratify consensuses? (95 takers;
popularity rank 3/28).
A very popular question which was generally clearly and accurately answered. Most
candidates engaged fully with the terms in the question, and were pleasingly well-
informed about recent cases decided by the Court. Candidates reached a wide variety
of conclusions, with many of the best answers disputing the proposed alternatives as a
false choice.
28.
Are US political parties becoming more polarised? If so, why? (20 takers;
popularity rank 15/28).
This question was not as well done as the other US question. Most answers did not
make it clear in what dimension they were judging polarization, and few offered deep
or sophisticated explanations of why any polarization had occurred. Here again, a
comparative perspective on party systems would have helped many candidates to
improve their answers.
Politics Recommendations for 2013-2014
One year ago in the 2012 report, the Politics assessors recommended that an
additional assessor be appointed for Section A (political theory questions) in 2012-
2013. In June 2012, over 70% of the candidates had chosen two theory questions, but
there had been only one assessor (L. McNay) marking Section A, while Section B had
two markers (G. Peele and T. Power). For 2012-2013, a more balanced approach was
18
taken: the scripts were marked by four assessors, with two from theory (L. McNay
and M. Philp) and two from comparative government (N. Owen and T. Power). This
allowed for not only a more equitable distribution of the work, but also for far easier
shifting of scripts within pairs of markers. We recommend that this arrangement be
maintained in the future.
For 2013-2014, we would again recommend some reconsideration of the rubric for
Section B. We are concerned that the rubric does not only allow single-country
questions in Section B(ii) (which is fine) but also allows, or even encourages,
candidates to use single-country examples to answer questions in Section B(i), where
to do so may not always be sufficient for a good answer. We recommend that the
Department consider this issue in its review of the course.
Overview of Politics Results
(Data for the 251 candidates who sat the exam on 19th June 2013;
does not include resits)
Mean Score: 60.8
Maximum:
71.8
Minimum:
20.3
Std Dev:
5.8
Breakdown of Results
Percentage of Total Candidates and (N)
70 and Above:
3.19 (8)
67-69:
9.16 (23)
63-66:
20.72 (52)
60-62:
33.07 (83)
57-59:
15.54 (39)
53-56:
9.96 (25)
50-52:
5.58 (14)
49 and Below:
2.79 (7)
Total:
100.0
Lois McNay
Nick Owen
Tim Power
19
3. Report on INTRODUCTORY ECONOMICS (June 2013)
The
Introductory Economics paper was taken by 376 candidates (252 PPE, 90 E&M,
13 H&E, 21 E(M)EM).
All of the economics examiners were concerned by the poor grasp of economic
concepts and apparent lack of intuition shown in a large majority of scripts. As was
also noted in last year’s report, most candidates demonstrated competence in carrying
out standard calculations, but those parts of questions that required explanation and
exposition of economic ideas were poorly done. This criticism applies across the full
range of scripts: even those who achieved first class marks relied more on technical
competence than economic insight; candidates who were technically weaker could
have compensated for this by intelligent exposition but did not do so.
As was emphasised both in last year’s report, and in the document “Advice for
Students Preparing for Examinations in Economics”, answers to problem questions
should include full explanations, and economic interpretation. Disappointingly, this
advice was ignored by most candidates.
Part A (candidates must answer three out of six multipart questions).
1. Competitive Industry (47% of candidates)
This question was mainly bookwork, but the standard of answers was dismally
low, revealing serious confusion about the behaviour of competitive firms. A
significant minority of students confused microeconomic and macroeconomic
concepts – asserting, for example, that supply is vertical in the long-run, or prices
fixed in the short-run. Another common mistake was to claim that “in the long-run
there are no fixed costs”, leading to confusion in part (ii); this claim is true only in
the sense that fixed costs may be avoided by exit from the industry. Few
candidates were able to provide a complete analysis of the effects of fixed costs
and taxation in part (ii), although some had intuitive insight. For part (iii)
candidates generally noted that less efficient firms would leave the industry, but
did not realise that this implied an upward-sloping industry supply function,
affecting tax incidence in the long-run.
2. Consumer Demand (82% of candidates)
This was by far the most popular Part A question. It was relatively
straightforward, and not very discriminating. Most students can solve a
constrained optimisation problem competently, and achieved good marks on the
mechanical parts of the question, but demonstrated little economic intuition. Most
did not distinguish between the budget set and the budget constraint, or consider
whether preferences were well-behaved to justify their solution to the optimisation
problem. In part (vi), few mentioned equivalent variation, or income and
substitution effects.
3. Monopoly (45% of candidates) There was considerable variation in the quality of
answers, but most candidates were able to make progress with parts (iii) and (iv),
covering standard material, even if they did not make accurate use of the data
given in the question. In part (i), intuitive explanations were weak. In part (v) few
candidates realised that if the elasticity had been different the marginal cost would
also have been different. (Some may have interpreted a “higher” elasticity as a
less negative one, without making this clear in the answer.)
20
4. AS-AD Model (47% of candidates)
This was a textbook question, and generated competent answers: candidates
understood what was wanted. In part (i) the majority chose to describe the sticky
price model, but demonstrated a rather shaky grasp of it; explanations of other
models were better. For part (ii) many candidates who understood the basic
effects of a demand shock lost marks for answers that were too brief and
mechanical. Some assumed horizontal SRAS, instead of applying the model in
part (i) to explain how prices adjust. In part (v) most candidates recognised that
the Phillips Curve may have shifted, but failed to explain why in any detail –
either in theoretical terms or by referring to recent events.
5. Classical Model (30% of candidates)
This was the least popular macro question in Part A and was poorly answered. Use
of the classical model requires an understanding that output can change only as a
result of changes in factor supply or technology. Even candidates who explained
correctly how output is determined in part (ii) tended to forget this later. Only a
minority were able to derive the result in part (i); others simply claimed that
competitive firms make zero profits. Circular flow diagrams were inaccurate, and
rarely tailored properly to the question – for example, by including the
government. The role of the interest rate in bringing about equilibrium was often
omitted. Some students provided a Keynesian rather than classical explanation in
parts (iii) and/or (iv) (where a supply shock is required for consistency with the
classical model). Answers to part (v), on money, were scrappy and incomplete.
6. Mundell-Fleming Model (47% of candidates)
A surprising number of students had difficulty with parts (i) and (ii) on the
(Keynesian) multiplier: common mistakes were to assume it was 1/(1- ), ignoring
imports, and/or to answer (ii) with respect to a
different multiplier incorporating
interest rate effects. Answers to parts (iii) and (iv) demonstrated some
understanding, albeit superficial and insecure, of the Mundell-Fleming model. The
interpretation of the data in part (iv) was challenging; candidates obtained some
marks by describing the changes in the data accurately (for example, recognising
that the Zloty depreciated).
Part B (candidates must answer one out of four essay questions).
7. Perfect Competition and Intervention (39% of candidates)
This was the most popular essay, and reasonably well answered. Most candidates
referred to the welfare theorems, but (as examiners have noted in previous years)
failed to explain how competition results in an efficient allocation. The most
coherent answers challenged the quotation by considering whether markets existed
for all goods, and discussing the role of government with respect to externalities;
others did so by simply challenging the premise of perfect competition.
8. Oligopoly (27% of candidates)
Most candidates could describe the main oligopoly models, but explanations were
often thin and superficial, and/or failed to establish what is meant by “an efficient
level of output” in the context of the model. Few answers went beyond the basic
theory to discuss real-world markets.
9. Fiscal Austerity (22% of candidates)
This was quite a difficult question, which elicited some good and well-informed
answers making a genuine attempt to apply macroeconomic theory, and many
mediocre ones in journalistic style. Relatively few considered the question of
21
whether, after several years of poor growth, we should still think of the economy
as being below potential output.
10. Natural Rate of Unemployment (11% of candidates)
This was the least popular essay, and attempts were almost uniformly poor. A
common (and unfortunate) beginning was a tautological definition of the natural
rate as the rate corresponding to the natural rate of output. This was typically
followed by some confused discussion of frictional unemployment. Having failed
to identify the determinants of unemployment, candidates were unable to answer
the question.
Margaret Stevens Brian A’Hearn
22
