Office of Surveillance
Commissioners
OSC/INSP/057
The Rt. Hon. Lord Judge
Chief Surveillance Commissioner
Office of Surveillance Commissioners
PO Box 29105
London
SWlV lZU
25 February 2016
OSC INSPECTION - BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
(TV LICENSING)
1.
Date of inspection 8 February 2016.
2.
Inspector
[REDACTED UNDER SECTION 40(2) OF THE ACT]
3.
Introduction
3.1 The BBC (TV Licensing) (TYL) remains the only organisation permitted to
collect TV Licence fees from all households in which programmes are viewed
on TV sets or by live streaming through computers via broadband connections.
Those who evade the licence fee are guilty of an offence under the Wireless
and Telegraphy Act 1949, as amended.
3 .2 The Head of Revenue Management, and thus of TVL, is Ms Pippa Doubtfire
who held the same position at the time of the last inspection. The address for
correspondence is BBC (TV Licensing), Licence Fee Unit, 1st Floor, The
Lighthouse, 201 Wood Lane, London, Wl2 7TQ.
4.
Inspection approach
4.1 The purpose of the inspection was to examine policies, procedures, operations
and administration in.respect of directed surveillance under the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIP A).
4.2 A meeting was held with
[REDACTED UNDER SECTION 40(2) OF THE ACT],
the Field Operations Lead, who gave me a valuable insight into the workings
and ethos ofTVL.
OFFICIAL SENSITIVE
PO Box 29105 London SWlV lZU Tel 020 7035 8127 Fax 020 7035 3114
Web: https; / lose.independent.gov .uk
email:xxxxxxxxxx@xxx.xxx.xxx. uk
OFFICIAL SENSITIVE
4.3
I then examined the relevant documentation and policy documents and
discussed my findings with
[REDACTED UNDER SECTION 40(2) OF THE ACT]
and his colleagues listed below:
• Ms Pippa Doubtfire, Head of Revenue Management
• Ms Sian Healey, Head of Policy and Communications
• Mr Ian Price, Customer Collections and Operations Manager
•
[REDACTED UNDER SECTION 40(2) OF THE ACT]
4.4
At the conclusion of the inspection I met with
[REDACTED UNDER SECTION
40(2) OF THE ACT] and Ms Healey and shared with them my initial findings.
5.
Review of progress on recommendations
5 .1
Sir David Clarke, in his inspection report in October 2012, did not make any
formal recommendations.
6.
Policies and procedures
6.1
As reported previously, the TVL's policy is a clear and concise document
which is easy to understand and contains a useful flow chart.
6.2
There are bespoke· forms that are used for this unique form of surveillance
which arises from powers under section 27 A of RIP A which was amended as a
consequence of Statutory Instrument (SI) 2001/1057. The forms mirror the
standard RIPA documents in requiring the applicant to specify, in relation to
each premise that is to be put under surveillance, why it is considered
necessary and proportionate to deploy the detection equipment.
6.3
The authorising officer, of which there are now three (an increase of one since
the last inspection), also records his or her reasoning on necessity and
proportionality. Each application is submitted to
[REDACTED UNDER
SECTION 40(2) OF THE ACT] (or a colleague in his absence) who acts as the
gatekeeper before submission to an authorising officer.
6.4
The detection equipment which is operated from a detector van is managed by
a private company 'Capita Business Services'.
.
[REDACTED UNDER SECTION 31 OF THE ACT]
These are categorised as 'WOIRA' (withdrawal of our implied right
of access).
[REDACTED UNDER SECTION 31 OF THE ACT]
OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE
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OFFICIAL SENSITIVE
6.5
[REDACTED UNDER SECTION 31 OF THE ACT]
The TVL has wisely, in my opinion, decided that it would be a better
practice to submit to the authorising officer a number of requests in one
single document but with separate intelligence cases contained, much as in
the same way that members of Trading Standards act when visiting multiple
premises in 'test purchase' operations. This allows the authorising officer to
examine all documentation and grant one authorisation providing that all
of the applications meet the necessary criteria.
In discussions the issue was raised as to whether it would be appropriate for
the authorising officer not to have to write by hand all authorisations, as the
6.6
other documentation, i.e. the application, is processed via secure email. I was
persuaded that a type written authorisation would also be unique and held
within the system in a secure fashion. If the TVL wishes to pursue this change
of working practice I would suggest that it ensures that the new process will
be undertaken in accordance with OSC guidance Note 115 which states
the following:
'The key signature is that of the authorising officer on the authorisation. The
only way it is possible to establish that the authorising off icer has applied his
own mind to the authorisalion is if it is handwritten by him. Typed documents
are open to the suggestion that the authorisation is prepared by another and
simply signed by the authorising officer. If information technology is used to
construct applications and authorisations, it must be capable of
authenticating the author of each version. In the absence of authentication,
hand-written (so called 'wet') signatures are required to avoid accusation
that the authorisation has been altered ex-post facto. If an authorising
officer relies on words prepared by another, his signature signifies
responsibility for those words. Authorisations with wet signatures may
be retained by the authorising officer or centrally, the latter being the
preferred option. It is always open to a trial judge to require evidence
which satisfies him that documents relied on are authentic. All public
authorities must be ready to provide the relevant witness where authenticity
is open to question'.
7.
Related training
7 .1
All relevant personnel . have received refresher trammg since the last
inspection. Training is delivered in-house on a regular basis.
8.
Significant issues arising
Breaches
8 .1
There have been no breaches of the legislation.
OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE
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OFFICIAL SENSITIVE
Directed Surveillance
8.2
I examined a number of applications and authorisations for
[REDACTED
UNDER SECTION 31 OF THE ACT] detections and found that there were
intelligence pictures to support each individual application and the issues
of proportionality, necessity and collateral intrusion were argued cogently.
8.3
The authorisations were detailed and handwritten. In discussions with one
of the authorising officers during the inspection it was evident that as a
group they take their legal responsibilities very seriously.
9.
Conclusion
9.1
TYL continues to uses its RIPA powers both responsibly and to a high
standard. I was pleased to note the high level of knowledge of the legislation
among the group I met, and I am confident that the authorising officers will
ensure compliance with the legislation supported by the excellent record
keeping and administration system managed by
[REDACTED UNDER SECTION
40(2) OF THE ACT].
9.2
I share the view of Sir David Clarke, contained in the conclusion to his
inspection report in 2012, that TVL does not necessarily need to be inspected
on a two year frequency and another timeframe should be considered.
9 .3
I should like to thank all those who participated in the inspection and m
particular
[REDACTED UNDER SECTION 40(2) OF THE ACT] for making all of the
necessary arrangements.
10.
Recommendations
10.1 I make no formal recommendations.
[REDACTED UNDER SECTION 40(2) OF THE ACT]
Surveillance Inspector
OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE
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