Dear Durham Constabulary,

Under FOIA please provide me with the following information.

1) total cost of operation Seabrook and how was it funded
2) What was the highest and lowest numbers of police officers that worked on operation Seabrook
3) How long did operation Seabrook take
4) Were any witnesses statements obtained over the telephone or any other forms of communication. For example Zoom. If so how many.
5) The total number of victims that reported any type of abuse.
6) please provide me with the policies and procedures (and any other background information) that you followed regarding this investigation.
7) what data base was used to log the information generated by operation Seabrook.

I look forward to your response

Yours faithfully,

Mark Armstrong

Dear Durham Constabulary,

Please pass this on to the person who conducts Freedom of Information reviews.

I am writing to request an internal review of Durham Constabulary's handling of my FOI request 'Operation Seabrook'.

What the ICO states:

Sensible and realistic’

A sensible and realistic estimate is one that is based on the specific circumstances of the case. In accordance with Fees Regulations, it must only include amounts for tasks that you reasonably expect to perform. The amounts you attribute to carrying out those tasks also have to be reasonable, as laid out in Reuben Kirkham v Information Commissioner [2018] UKUT 126 (AAC) 11 April 2018.

The estimate should not be based on general assumptions, for example, that all records would need to be searched, as such an approach would inevitably inflate the estimate, meaning that many requests could be refused under section 12. Estimates produced on such a basis are not reasonable.

Where you are considering whether it would exceed the appropriate limit just to determine whether you hold the information, you should remember that in disputes over whether information is held, the test is whether you hold it on the balance of probabilities. Therefore you should base your estimate on the necessary searches to satisfy that standard of proof. Again, you would not be required to search through all your records to prove absolutely that you did not hold the information.

An estimate that includes the cost of searching in places where you are unlikely to hold the information would not be reasonable. As explained in the closing paragraph of Muttitt v IC and the Cabinet Office (EA/2011/0036, 31 January 2012):

In addition I believe that the information I requested is in fact easy to provide. For example, it has already been provided to the Home office as part of a special grant application, or provided to the HMICFRS as part of a inspection or been provided in review/ investigation of operation Seabrook or in previous FOIA requests or audit information.

I do not accept that you would have to search every single file to extract this information. I believe this to be a dishonest answer and a dishonest use of section 12.

You stated:

“That said, it may be possible to provide the start date of Operation Seabrook,
operating systems used, financial details over a defined period of time as well as
current policies / procedures / briefing documents, redacted as necessary, if held on
Operation Seabrook. “

However, you failed to provide any information.

It is for these reasons that I request a internal review

A full history of my FOI request and all correspondence is available on the Internet at this address: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/o...

Yours faithfully,

Mark Armstrong

Dear Freedom of Information,

With regard to the response that I received in relation to the request I made for a internal review.

To clarify:
1) Please confirm or deny if the Durham Police has ever made a special grant application to the Home Office with regard to Operation Seabrook.

2) Please confirm or deny if the Home Office then instructed the HMICFRS to review the special grant application that the Durham Police made to the Home Office

3) Please confirm or deny if the Durham Police have submitted evidence to the PPO as part of the new investigation into Medomsley detention centre.

4) I now put you on notice that it is a criminal offence to knowingly and wilfully conceal and/or block information that should have been lawful disclosure.

It is my understanding that most, if not all, the information that I have requested is readily available. A well funded department with well trained staff could locate and retrieve most, if not all, the information that I have requested within minutes rather the hours.

I will refine my request.

If you confirm that you do hold the above (1-3) information under section 1(1) please provide all the information that you do hold.

Yours sincerely,

Mark Armstrong

Dear Freedom of Information,

You lied and got caught red handed. It is a criminal offence to lie to you ICO.

Yours sincerely,

Mark Armstrong

IC-334982-N6K3

Dear Durham Constabulary,

This was a very professional response. I thank you for the time taken.

That said, we still have a difference of opinion with regard to the following matters.

2. In relation to your request - Confirm or deny if the Home Office then instructed the HMICFRS to review
the special grant application that the Durham Police made to the Home Office. Please provide al the
information that you do hold.
Response- I can confirm the information requested is held by The Force.

HMICFRS was engaged on behalf of the Home Office to carry out an efficiency inspection of Operation
Seabrook. Documents relevant to the efficiency report held by The Force are:
• HMIC Review – Seabrook Presentation
• SARC Budget Report 16-17
• Email from HMIC regarding visit to The Force, 15/02/2016
• Email from Temp Force Knowledge Manager, dated 18/02/2016
• HMIC Review – Seabrook Timetable
• HMIC Special grant application review Operation Seabrook – PPC debrief 10/03/2016

Redacted copies of these documents are attached to the covering email.

The request has been considered in full and I am not obliged by statute to provide any further information
relevant to this request by virtue of the following exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act

Section 40(2) (a)(b) – Personal information
Section 31(1) (a)(b) – Law Enforcement

Section 40(2) of the FOIA , the Personal Information exemption, is specific this law enforcement Part 3 DPA,
. held to third party personal data and applies where disclosure to a third party and/or to the world at large,
would breach one of the data protection principles, in this case the First principle of the DPA (lawful and fair
processing) is relevant.

The Force considers where individuals are named or where information provided may result in data matching
identification, there is sufficient risk that individuals would be identified. On this occasion, disclosure would
constitute a breach of the first data protection principle, fair and lawful processing as set out in Article 5(1) of
the UK GDPR and section 34(1) of the DPA 2018.

In reaching this conclusion the Force is mindful of the conditions for fair and lawful processing and has judged
that individuals have a reasonable and legitimate privacy and confidentiality expectations that their personal
details are processed accordingly. The individuals concerned have not consented to disclosure of data in this
context (and it is unfair and not reasonable to contact them to seek their consent in a FOIA context) and have
a legitimate privacy expectation and also a confidential expectation that their personal details would not be
disclosed.

Section 31 a qualified Prejudice based exemption which require the ham in releasing information to be
provided and the public interest to be considered.

Harm – Section 31

To provide the locations of Sexual Assault Referral Centres (SARC) used in Operation Seabrook would place
into the public domain knowledge to those intent on criminality by seeking to interfere with or intimidate victims
and witnesses of sexual abuse. Such interference or intimidation would undermine the ability of the Force to
protect victims and witnesses and would deter them from reporting crime. Further it would undermine the
ability of the Force to detect crime and apprehend and also prosecute offenders . Further providing
information which would have a detrimental effect on individual victims and witnesses would undermine their
confidence in the police to keep them safe from their perpetrators. This would further impact the ability of the
police to conduct future investigations into sexual abuse (and all other crimes) making victims or witnesses
reluctant to come forward.

Factors favouring disclosure

Providing the information in full would add to the levels of transparency surrounding the Force biggest ever
investigation. It would add to public understanding of how victims and witnesses are treated by the Force
with understanding of their vulnerability following what has often been traumatising events. It would reassure
others who may be nervous or frightened to come forward and report abuse experienced that provisions are
in place to help them provide evidence or access support.

Factors favouring non-disclosure

Providing details of the locations of SARC centres would allow those intent on interfering or intimidating
victims and witnesses with a place they would have access to in order to provide evidence of the abuse they
have been subjected to. Such interference and intimidation are crimes and providing the knowledge for
perpetrators or suspects to commit more crime. Victims and witnesses would be placed in fear of seeking the
support that SARC can offer making them more vulnerable to their abusers. This would impact police
resources.

Balance Test

There is considerable public interest in the transparency around policing and protection of the vulnerable.
There is greater public interest in ensuring vulnerable victims and witnesses are not placed danger of
intimidation by identifying locations where those persons would be. Or that evidence interfered with so that
the police cannot apprehend perpetrators and suspects and, where appropriate, charge them with crime. It
is therefore my view that in this instance the information requested is not disclosed in full.

In accordance with Section 17 of the FOIA, this letter acts as a Refusal Notice for any further information in
relation to the documents released under the request.

And:

3. In relation to your request – Confirm or deny if the Durham Police have submitted evidence to the
PPO as part of the new investigation into Medomsley detention centre. Please provide all the
information that you do hold.
Response - I can confirm the information requested is held by The Force.

Evidential law enforcement Information held by the Force has been provided to the Prison & Probation
Ombudsman (PPO) Investigation Team. This Team is an external and independent law enforcement body
making special investigation enquiries on behalf of the last Government’s Lord Chancellor. The PPO
Investigation findings wil provided ahead to the present Government’s Lord Chancellor.

In addition, the current Government ahead, are expected to publish a report in this subject area, following the
PPO producing their special investigation report to them. Whilst the PPO investigation is not a ‘public enquiry’,
it is a confidential law enforcement special investigation. A Government commissioned special investigation
is one step down from a public enquiry. The PPO’s lead senior investigator team member has been consulted
in relation to any FOIA requests received by the Force, in relation to Operation Seabrook and the response
received in January 2025 is as follows: “The Force have supported the PPO investigation, but the release
of any information beyond that would have a detrimental effect on the objectives of the report.”
9

The Force directly supplied information to the PPO investigation team only relates to information sent prior
to the PPO investigation team being granted direct access to the HOLMES database by the Home Of ice to
enable them to directly view original documents required for their investigative purposes as held on the
HOLMES system. The number of documents sent directly by the Force, were:

Victim and Witness statements and Officer reports and totalled 5831 documents.

I have considered the request for all the evidential information given to the PPO in full and am not obliged by
statute to provide the information by virtue of the fol owing exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act:

Section 30 - Investigations and Proceedings Conducted by Public Authorities
Section 31 - Law Enforcement
Section 38 - Health and Safety
Section 40(2)- Personal Information
Section 41 - Information provided in confidence

Sections 31 and 38 are prejudice qualified exemptions which require evidence of harm to be provided and
the public interest to be considered.

Sections 30 and 41 are qualified class-based exemptions which require the public interest to be considered.

Section 40(2) is an absolute class-based exemption.

Section 40(2) of the FOIA, the Personal Information exemption, is specific to third party personal data and
applies where disclosure to a third party would breach one of the data protection principles, in this case the
First principle is relevant i.e. lawful and fair processing.

The Force considers where individuals are named or where information provided may result in identification,
and data matching, there is sufficient risk that individuals would be identified. On this occasion, disclosure
would constitute a breach of the First data protection principle, fair and lawful processing as set out in Article
5(1) of the UK GDPR and section 34(1) of the DPA 2018.

In reaching this conclusion the Force is mindful of the lawful conditions for fair and lawful processing and has
judged that individuals have both a reasonable and legitimate confidentiality and privacy expectation that
their personal details are processed accordingly. The Force also alongside these members of the public
expectations, also owe duties of confidentiality and privacy protection to those individuals. The individuals
concerned have not consented to disclosure of data in this context and have a legitimate privacy expectation
that their personal details would not be disclosed. It is not reasonable to contact them to seek their explicit
consent for disclosure to the world at large., Please refer to the supporting Police Service leading test case
law in this subject area at Appendix A of this letter.

Harm (Sections 31 and 38)

Whilst every effort is made to release information under FOIA, public authorities have to be mindful of the
implications of doing so, as release is not just to the requester but to the world at large. A law enforcement
case, which the Operational Seabrook case is, contains personal data, special category data and also
criminal offence data, and must be very carefully considered and risk assessed prior to any release outside
of the normal policing/law enforcement and criminal justice disclosure avenues.

Releasing core operational policing/law enforcement personal data and also any other information gathered
for the purpose of detecting crime, apprehending and prosecuting offenders would provide knowledge to
those intent on criminality enabling them understand lines of enquiry and alert suspects. Such knowledge
would provide understanding of police tactics and capabilities relating to the investigation of crimes. Together
the information would be sufficient as to allow suspects to evade detection, apprehension and prosecution.

10

Further the nature of the evidential material would expose witnesses and victims to threat of further crime
against them, further similar crime or intimidation to pervert further enquiries or court proceedings. Additional
criminality would impact on the Police Service and public funds.

Policing in the United Kingdom (UK) is by consent and this requires trust on the part of the public and the
police. The public expect the police to use their powers to protect them and ensure that criminals are
accountable for their crimes. The public have expectations of both confidentiality and privacy that information
given to the police is used only for policing purposes. or for an associated criminal justice reason i.e. for Court
trials or for disclosures to statutory Regulatory/Professional Authorities. Alongside, these expectations, police
forces also have a duty to always keep supplied personal information or any other information provided safe
and confidential and not provide it for any secondary or collateral purpose other than those for which it was
first provided i.e. policing/law enforcement. Therefore, the public do not envisage police forces would release
their supplied evidential material to a FOIA requester and also to the world at large, where to do so would
undermine their expectations of confidentiality and also of privacy, and would also breach the Police
Service’s duties owed to respect their confidentiality and privacy. This would also erode/undermine the ability
of the Force and the wider Police Service to detect crime, apprehend and charge and prosecute suspects
and in doing so bring offenders to justice and also to keep the community safe.

The police have a duty of care towards victims and witnesses as well as any other third-party member of the
public who provide information, personal or otherwise, to the police to enable crimes to be detected and
offenders to be apprehended and prosecuted. Part of that duty entails the health and safety those persons.
In cases of abuse of vulnerable children and adults the impact of releasing information relevant to their case
would be detrimental to mental and physical health of not only those abused or who witnessed such abuse
but also their families and friends. It would place the vulnerable in positions which may result in them being
identified by those perceiving them to be easy targets for more criminal behaviour or expose them to intrusive
press or media enquiries and reporting and unwanted social media postings.

Public interest test

Factors Favouring Disclosure - Section 30

Operation Seabrook is a high-profile major investigation into allegations of historical abuse, both physical and
sexual abuse, at HM Medomsley Detention Centre. The information being sought has been in part used in
trials and is held for the purpose of policing or law enforcement and criminal justice continuing enquiries.
Releasing information gathered by the police for the investigations would provide transparency on the manner
in which The Force has and is conducting enquiries in relation to this major investigation. Further disclosure
would provide accountability by the Force on the expenditure of public funds on this major investigation.
Releasing information may have the effect of encouraging other victims and witnesses to come forward to
assist the ongoing investigation.

Factors Favouring Non-Disclosure – Section 30

It is a matter of fact, and on public record, that the Force has already recognised the public interest
considerations in this major and high-profile investigation case, which has greatly impacted so many victims’
lives, by making some investigative and prosecution details available to the public via media/press releases.
The Force did this in order to satisfy the public interest in this Operation, albeit these public releases by
exception were necessarily limited and were disclosed by the Force in a very carefully managed way, so no
detriment would be caused to the Operation Seabrook processes. These Force releases can be openly
sourced online, via a Google (or other type) web-based search. To evidence this, I produce three (of several
more) at the weblinks below.

Evidential law enforcement Information held by the Force has been provided to the Prison & Probation
Ombudsman (PPO) Investigation Team. This Team is an external and independent law enforcement body
making special investigation enquiries on behalf of the last Government’s Lord Chancellor. The PPO
Investigation findings wil provided ahead to the present Government’s Lord Chancellor.

In addition, the current Government ahead, are expected to publish a report in this subject area, following the
PPO producing their special investigation report to them. Whilst the PPO investigation is not a ‘public enquiry’,
it is a confidential law enforcement special investigation. A Government commissioned special investigation
is one step down from a public enquiry. The PPO’s lead senior investigator team member has been consulted
in relation to any FOIA requests received by the Force, in relation to Operation Seabrook and the response
received in January 2025 is as follows: “The Force have supported the PPO investigation, but the release
of any information beyond that would have a detrimental effect on the objectives of the report.”
9

The Force directly supplied information to the PPO investigation team only relates to information sent prior
to the PPO investigation team being granted direct access to the HOLMES database by the Home Of ice to
enable them to directly view original documents required for their investigative purposes as held on the
HOLMES system. The number of documents sent directly by the Force, were:

Victim and Witness statements and Officer reports and totalled 5831 documents.

I have considered the request for all the evidential information given to the PPO in full and am not obliged by
statute to provide the information by virtue of the fol owing exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act:

Section 30 - Investigations and Proceedings Conducted by Public Authorities
Section 31 - Law Enforcement
Section 38 - Health and Safety
Section 40(2)- Personal Information
Section 41 - Information provided in confidence

Sections 31 and 38 are prejudice qualified exemptions which require evidence of harm to be provided and
the public interest to be considered.

Sections 30 and 41 are qualified class-based exemptions which require the public interest to be considered.

Section 40(2) is an absolute class-based exemption.

Section 40(2) of the FOIA, the Personal Information exemption, is specific to third party personal data and
applies where disclosure to a third party would breach one of the data protection principles, in this case the
First principle is relevant i.e. lawful and fair processing.

The Force considers where individuals are named or where information provided may result in identification,
and data matching, there is sufficient risk that individuals would be identified. On this occasion, disclosure
would constitute a breach of the First data protection principle, fair and lawful processing as set out in Article
5(1) of the UK GDPR and section 34(1) of the DPA 2018.

In reaching this conclusion the Force is mindful of the lawful conditions for fair and lawful processing and has
judged that individuals have both a reasonable and legitimate confidentiality and privacy expectation that
their personal details are processed accordingly. The Force also alongside these members of the public
expectations, also owe duties of confidentiality and privacy protection to those individuals. The individuals
concerned have not consented to disclosure of data in this context and have a legitimate privacy expectation
that their personal details would not be disclosed. It is not reasonable to contact them to seek their explicit
consent for disclosure to the world at large., Please refer to the supporting Police Service leading test case
law in this subject area at Appendix A of this letter.

Harm (Sections 31 and 38)

Whilst every effort is made to release information under FOIA, public authorities have to be mindful of the
implications of doing so, as release is not just to the requester but to the world at large. A law enforcement
case, which the Operational Seabrook case is, contains personal data, special category data and also
criminal offence data, and must be very carefully considered and risk assessed prior to any release outside
of the normal policing/law enforcement and criminal justice disclosure avenues.

Releasing core operational policing/law enforcement personal data and also any other information gathered
for the purpose of detecting crime, apprehending and prosecuting offenders would provide knowledge to
those intent on criminality enabling them understand lines of enquiry and alert suspects. Such knowledge
would provide understanding of police tactics and capabilities relating to the investigation of crimes. Together
the information would be sufficient as to allow suspects to evade detection, apprehension and prosecution.

10

Further the nature of the evidential material would expose witnesses and victims to threat of further crime
against them, further similar crime or intimidation to pervert further enquiries or court proceedings. Additional
criminality would impact on the Police Service and public funds.

Policing in the United Kingdom (UK) is by consent and this requires trust on the part of the public and the
police. The public expect the police to use their powers to protect them and ensure that criminals are
accountable for their crimes. The public have expectations of both confidentiality and privacy that information
given to the police is used only for policing purposes. or for an associated criminal justice reason i.e. for Court
trials or for disclosures to statutory Regulatory/Professional Authorities. Alongside, these expectations, police
forces also have a duty to always keep supplied personal information or any other information provided safe
and confidential and not provide it for any secondary or collateral purpose other than those for which it was
first provided i.e. policing/law enforcement. Therefore, the public do not envisage police forces would release
their supplied evidential material to a FOIA requester and also to the world at large, where to do so would
undermine their expectations of confidentiality and also of privacy, and would also breach the Police
Service’s duties owed to respect their confidentiality and privacy. This would also erode/undermine the ability
of the Force and the wider Police Service to detect crime, apprehend and charge and prosecute suspects
and in doing so bring offenders to justice and also to keep the community safe.

The police have a duty of care towards victims and witnesses as well as any other third-party member of the
public who provide information, personal or otherwise, to the police to enable crimes to be detected and
offenders to be apprehended and prosecuted. Part of that duty entails the health and safety those persons.
In cases of abuse of vulnerable children and adults the impact of releasing information relevant to their case
would be detrimental to mental and physical health of not only those abused or who witnessed such abuse
but also their families and friends. It would place the vulnerable in positions which may result in them being
identified by those perceiving them to be easy targets for more criminal behaviour or expose them to intrusive
press or media enquiries and reporting and unwanted social media postings.

Public interest test

Factors Favouring Disclosure - Section 30

Operation Seabrook is a high-profile major investigation into allegations of historical abuse, both physical and
sexual abuse, at HM Medomsley Detention Centre. The information being sought has been in part used in
trials and is held for the purpose of policing or law enforcement and criminal justice continuing enquiries.
Releasing information gathered by the police for the investigations would provide transparency on the manner
in which The Force has and is conducting enquiries in relation to this major investigation. Further disclosure
would provide accountability by the Force on the expenditure of public funds on this major investigation.
Releasing information may have the effect of encouraging other victims and witnesses to come forward to
assist the ongoing investigation.

Factors Favouring Non-Disclosure – Section 30

It is a matter of fact, and on public record, that the Force has already recognised the public interest
considerations in this major and high-profile investigation case, which has greatly impacted so many victims’
lives, by making some investigative and prosecution details available to the public via media/press releases.
The Force did this in order to satisfy the public interest in this Operation, albeit these public releases by
exception were necessarily limited and were disclosed by the Force in a very carefully managed way, so no
detriment would be caused to the Operation Seabrook processes. These Force releases can be openly
sourced online, via a Google (or other type) web-based search. To evidence this, I produce three (of several
more) at the weblinks below.

https://www.facebook.com/durhamconstabul...
2017/1485451684866777/?rdid=CAmB8UtCVDQTOsW3

https://www.facebook.com/durhamconstabul...
assaulting-young-men-a/2144825678929371/

11

https://www.facebook.com/durhamconstabul...
physically-abusing-young-m/2178863128858959/

Providing the information means releasing to the world at large evidential material pertinent to an ongoing
investigation and such release would be prejudicial to that investigation. The requested information is
carefully protected and confidentially held evidential material and releasing it to the world at large would
undermine public confidence in the Force’s handling of such information and erode the privacy expectations
and duties owed to the public and individuals directly involved in the investigation.

During the course of the investigation so far, some offenders faced trial. This fact alone does not undermine
the ongoing investigation being conducted by the police is into whether a person or persons should be
charged with an offence. The information gathered in relation to trials which have taken place remains
relevant to the current ongoing investigations.

There is a general recognition that public interest lies with safeguarding the policing investigation and law
enforcement processes. The right of access to personal or other information must not prejudice any
investigation or the prosecution of criminal mat ers to deliver justice for victims nor dissuade individuals from
coming forward to report wrongdoing. Please see again Appendix A of this letter for supporting police service
leading test case law relevant to this subject area.

Factors Favouring Disclosure – Section 31

Providing information would demonstrate transparency regarding the police investigation and enhance public
understanding of the way the Force has carried out Operation Seabrook. Further it would show accountability
for the use of police resources and public funds on a major investigation. As referred to above the Force has
released some information in a controlled way into the public domain.

Factors Favouring Non-Disclosure – Section 31

The material requested is fundamental to the investigation of crimes and the apprehension of suspects in a
case of serious historical abusive behaviour. If evidential material were to be placed in the public domain it
would undermine the ability of the Force to carry out all current and future investigations. Further the release
of the information would provide knowledge to suspects in the case which would enable them to evade
detection and apprehension. It would place victims and witnesses in danger of intimidation and further
criminal activity. In addition, they could face intrusive press and social media coverage. These matters would
impact on the Force and the ability of officers to conduct current and future investigations into criminal activity.
It would impact on the community as policing resources would be further used in crime which could be
avoided. Increasing crime would impact on the Force’s finite public financial resources.

Factors Favouring Disclosure - Section 38

Providing the requested information would reassure the general public that the Force utilises the information
it has regarding victims and witnesses for proper policing purposes. Such understanding would improve
public perception of the police and encourage more public engagement with the police.

Factors Favouring Non-Disclosure – Section 38

Throughout Operation Seabrook’s processes the vulnerability of victims and witnesses has been recognised
by both the Force and Crown Prosecution Service and efforts have been made and are still in place to
safeguard and support them. The Force refers to the victims of HM Medomsley events, as survivors and in
one public domain media release as supplied to you in this letter, Detective Chief Superintendent A. Green,
states and reassures the victims of events at Medomsley that – “we (the Force) wil continue to support the
survivors through this time and on into the future”. Victims in this case have suffered harm, including physical,
sexual, mental and emotional harms and also economical loss caused from the serious events at HM
Medomsley Detention Centre. It is noted that *The Government’s/Ministry of Justice’s Statutory ‘Code of
Practice for Victims of Crime in England and Wales (Victims’ Code)’ – (last updated January 2025),
12

acknowledges that the victim terms of “complainant’ and ‘survivor’” are often used in the criminal justice
systems to describe a person who has made a criminal allegation to the Police”.

Providing the requested information would undermine the work already undertaken and would adversely
impact the ongoing investigations by not demonstrating the support given and ignoring the vulnerability of
those the Force and wider Police Service are charged with protecting. Ignoring the impact of releasing
information to the world at large would impact on the health and safety of the victims of crimes at Medomsley
Detention Centre and their families and friends who have supported them.

The impact to officers and their families cannot also be ignored. Of icers who had interaction for long periods
with traumatised and damaged victims and witnesses of abuse at Medomsley Detention Centre have required
specialised assistance, in the same way as the victims and witnesses have.

Releasing information which by its very nature details both physical and sexual abuse endured would have
adverse health and safety (physical and mental) consequences to all who have been involved in the
investigation. This would be unfair, unreasonable and disrespectful of individual confidentiality and privacy
rights and expectations.

Factors Favouring Disclosure - Section 41

Here there no suggestion made regarding the requester’s motives for seeking the information is anything
other than honourable. However, responses under FOIA Act are not a private communication with the
requester alone. Any release of information is unfettered disclosure to the world at large.

To release the information to the world at large would in this instance show the nature and scale of alleged
abuses against individual victims and witnesses. It would add to the public discourse on historic abuse in
institutions of the State which were publically funded.

Factors Favouring Non-Disclosure – Section 41

The information being sought was provided on the strict understanding that the person providing it was doing
so only for the purpose of the investigation into historic abuse at HM Medomsley Detention Centre. That the
information would be only used for policing purposes and would be kept strictly confidential unless required
to be used in Court as evidence in a case brought properly to ascertain the guilt or otherwise of an accused.
Disclosure would be a major breach of the confidentiality under which the information was gathered.

The Information Commissioner’s Freedom of Information Act guidance on section 41 at paragraph 22 advises
public authorities to use the test of confidence set out by Judge Megarry at the High Court of Justice in Coco
v A N Clark (Engineers) Limited [1968] FSR 415 as a framework for assessing whether a disclosure would
constitute a breach of confidence. Judge Megarry suggested three were usually required to bring an action
for breach of confidence:

 the information must have the necessary quality of confidence,
 it must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, and
 there must have been an unauthorised use of the information to the detriment of the confider.

It is acknowledged that case law has developed since the above case, but this stil remains one of the leading
(general) breach of confidence test case law judgments, and the above however the above principles are
appropriate here.

The second limb of Judge Megarry test is concerned with the circumstances of in which the confider of
information passed it on. Here I refer to the second circumstance:
• The confider hasn’t set any explicit conditions, but the restrictions on use are obvious or implicit from
the circumstances.

13

The Force is undoubting in its view that it would be reasonable for a person giving information to the police
as a statement (or any other type of evidential account or report of an incident or a crime etc) to expect this
provided information would, and must only to be used for policing purposes and would at all times be kept
private and also confidential. The Courts have both recognised and endorsed this reasonableness of
expectation of confidentiality and also of privacy protection for members of the public who provide information
to the Police Service. The only exception to this being if the victim or witness were to provide evidence to
Court and their written statements be disclosed in strict and carefully controlled manner in accordance with
judicial disclosure rules or if Statutory Regulatory/Professional bodies required the information for
safeguarding needs or via service of a mandatory Court Order or a Court direction. Again, please see
Appendix A below.

The police for their part have both statutory and common law obligations only to use criminal investigative
information for policing i.e. core law enforcement purposes. Thus, to ensure that no detriment is caused to
the core or ancil ary policing processes. Releasing information under FOIA Act is not for a core, nor for an
ancillary policing purpose but is a disclosure into the public domain i.e. to the world at large. .

Further to release personal information without the express consent of the person providing the information
under both their privacy and confidentiality expectations, is covered above under Section 40(2) of the FOIA.
To release the requested information without the express permission of each victim and witness would be
both an unexpected and an unauthorised and an unlawful use of the information.

It is not a reasonable action for a police force, following a request received from a member of the public
under FOIA, to then ‘out of the blue’ contact any person who has given their account, or a statement or
evidence of any kind pertaining to a criminal matter. This contact would be to seek their consent to release
their personal data (and any other supplied information) to an unknown/unconnected member of the public
FOIA requester, which would also equate to the release of their personal information and other information
to the world at large. It is very reasonable to assume refusal at all times would be given.

The Force is undoubting in its professional view that no person providing their account, or information or
evidence to the Force would think or expect that their documented account (even in a redacted format) would
then to be released to an unknown person and by association also to the world at large. The Force is also
undoubting in its professional view that they would be upset, shocked, annoyed or furious and very concerned
by such an action, that is releasing their information to an unknown person under FOIA and also to the world
at large. I am certain, that if you had ever provided any statement or evidence or personal account of a
criminal matter to a police force or had reported an incident etc, that you would feel exactly the same. It is
essential at all times that the Force ensure people are not deterred from making statements or reports, by
fear their accounts might then be later publicised or published. Please refer again to Appendix A of this letter.

As already stated it would have an adverse ef ect on the individuals, many of whom are stil traumatised, and
damaged by the historical events and abuse that they have given information about. This information is very
sensitive and has often evidenced life changing impacts upon them and also their families. Unrestricted
release of such personal information would have the ability of giving rise to civil actions against the Force
for personal distress and damage claims arising from the releases and also claims for monetary damages.

Balance test

I have considered all the arguments set out above. There is public interest in understanding and seeing
accountability by those who have perpetrated historical abuse when they were in a position of trust. However,
in this case there are ongoing investigations which would be jeopardised if evidential material were released
into the public domain. It is essential that the Force has the space to determine the course of the continuing
investigations, uninterrupted. It is also essential and in the public interest to preserve the criminal court as
the sole forum for determining guilt or otherwise of those prosecuted and that the criminal court processes
are not prejudiced in any way.

As detailed earlier, the Force has already recognised the public interest in this case via giving carefully
controlled media statements and interviews, in order to securely protect the integrity of the processes for how
victims’ and witnesses’ give their personal data (and other information) evidence. The ramifications of such
14

release outside of this method, would impact on the ability of the Force to conduct present and future
investigations which would erode public confidence in the police and public funding. It is essential to protect
all Operation Seabrook personal data evidence held (and also all other information held), to ensure people
are not deterred from making statements and other reports to the Force, by fear their personal data (or other
information) might be public domain published.

Further, and significantly, there would be implications regarding the breaching of principles of expectation of
confidentiality and privacy and also the associated duties owned by the Force to protect confidentiality and
privacy rights between the public and the police which reassures the public when providing information to the
police. This is clearly shown in the leading test case law extracts details at Appendix A. In this case breaching
that trust and principle would cause harm to individuals, many of whom are still traumatised and damaged
by their experiences and erode public confidence in the Police Service. It is my view that the public interest
is best served by not releasing the requested information into the public domain via a FOIA request, so as
not to cause detriment to law enforcement and associated criminal justice processes.

In accordance with Section 17 of the FOIA, this letter acts as a refusal notice for this request.

I seek a internal review of these decisions for the following reasons:

With regard to Section 31 Exemptions relevance is placed on the following decisions:

Section 31 of the FOIA relates to “law enforcement” and allows public authorities to withhold information if its disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice:

- “(a)” The prevention or detection of crime.
- “(b)” The apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

However, these exemptions are “not absolute”. Even if the exemption applies, the public authority must still consider whether the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

ICO Decision Notices Favouring Disclosure

The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has issued several decision notices where disclosure was favoured despite the application of Section 31. Here are some key examples:

1. ICO Decision Notice IC-108040-X9B6:

The ICO ruled that the public interest in transparency and accountability outweighed the potential prejudice to law enforcement. The case involved information about police investigations, and the ICO emphasised the importance of public scrutiny of police conduct.

2. ICO Decision Notice FS50628917:

The ICO ordered the disclosure of information about police operations, stating that the public interest in understanding how public resources are used and ensuring accountability was significant.

3. ICO Decision Notice FS50572166

The ICO found that the public interest in disclosing information about police decision-making processes outweighed the potential harm to law enforcement.

These cases demonstrate that the ICO often favours disclosure when there is a strong public interest in transparency, accountability, and the proper use of public resources.

First-tier Tribunal (FTT) Rules Favouring Disclosure

The FTT has also ruled in favour of disclosure in cases involving Section 31 exemptions. Key principles from FTT rulings include:

1. Public Interest in Accountability:

The FTT has consistently held that there is a significant public interest in ensuring that public authorities, including the police, are held accountable for their actions. This is particularly true in cases involving serious allegations of misconduct or systemic failures.

2. Transparency in Investigations:

The FTT has ruled that transparency in police investigations, especially those involving historical abuse, is crucial to maintaining public confidence in law enforcement.

3. Balancing Prejudice:

The FTT has emphasised that the potential prejudice to law enforcement must be “specific and real”, not merely hypothetical. Vague or general claims of prejudice are not sufficient to justify withholding information.

Public Interest Test Arguments in Favour of Disclosure

I would argue that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in maintaining the exemption. Here are my arguments:

1. Accountability and Public Confidence:

There is a strong public interest in ensuring that the police are held accountable for their handling of Operation Magnolia, particularly given the gravity of the allegations and the number of victims involved.

Disclosure would help restore public confidence in the police and demonstrate that the investigation is being conducted effectively and transparently.

2. Transparency in Public Resources:

The public has a right to know how public resources are being used, especially in a high-profile investigation that has been ongoing for 11 years.

Disclosure would allow the public to assess whether the investigation is being conducted efficiently and whether resources are being used appropriately.

3. Victims’ Rights and Justice:

Victims of historical abuse have a right to know the progress and outcomes of investigations into their cases.

Disclosure would help ensure that victims are not further marginalised or denied justice due to a lack of transparency.

4. Public Scrutiny of Police Conduct:

There is a significant public interest in scrutinising the conduct of senior police officers involved in the investigation.

Disclosure of email addresses (or other relevant information) would enable victims and the public to hold these officers accountable for their actions.

5. Lack of Specific Prejudice:
I would argue that the police have not demonstrated how disclosing the requested information would cause “specific and real prejudice” to law enforcement.

The exemptions under Section 31 cannot be used as a blanket justification to withhold information without clear evidence of harm.

Moreover:

ICO Decision Notice FS50892545 (2020)

A request was made for information about police operations and investigations. The public body refused the request under Section 30(1)(b), arguing that disclosure would prejudice the prevention or detection of crime.

The ICO found that the public body had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate how disclosure would prejudice law enforcement. The Commissioner emphasized that public authorities must provide “specific and tangible evidence” of harm, rather than relying on general assertions.

ICO Decision Notice FS50677678 (2019)

A request was made for information about the use of surveillance techniques by a public authority. The public body refused the request under Section 30(1)(b), claiming that disclosure would undermine law enforcement efforts.

The ICO ruled that the public body had not demonstrated how disclosure would prejudice law enforcement. The Commissioner noted that the exemption requires a “real and significant risk of harm”, not just a hypothetical possibility.

ICO Decision Notice FS50828930 (2021)

A request was made for information about the outcomes of internal investigations into police misconduct. The public body refused the request under Section 30(1)(b), arguing that disclosure would undermine public confidence in law enforcement.

The ICO found that the public body had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate how disclosure would prejudice law enforcement. The Commissioner emphasized that the exemption is not intended to protect public bodies from “embarrassment or reputational damage”.

Guardian News and Media Ltd v Information Commissioner and Metropolitan Police Service (EA/2011/0080)

This case involved a request for information about police operations and investigations. The public body refused the request under Section 30(1)(b), arguing that disclosure would prejudice law enforcement.

The FTT ruled that the public body had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate how disclosure would prejudice law enforcement. The Tribunal emphasized that the exemption requires a “real and significant risk of harm”, not just a general assertion.

Dr Sarah Wollaston MP v Information Commissioner and Devon and Cornwall Police (EA/2017/0126)

This case involved a request for information about police operations and investigations. The public body refused the request under Section 30(1)(b), arguing that disclosure would prejudice law enforcement.

The FTT ruled that the public body had not demonstrated how disclosure would prejudice law enforcement. The Tribunal noted that the exemption is not intended to protect public bodies from “embarrassment or reputational damage”.

Evidence of Prejudice;

The ICO’s guidance on Section 30(1)(b) emphasizes that public authorities must provide “specific and tangible evidence”of how disclosure would prejudice law enforcement. General assertions or hypothetical risks are not sufficient.

Public Interest Test

Even if the exemption applies, public authorities must consider the “public interest in disclosure”. The ICO’s guidance highlights the importance of transparency in law enforcement, particularly in cases involving public accountability or the use of public resources.

Balancing Test

The ICO’s guidance emphasizes the need to balance the “public interest in disclosure” against the “public interest in maintaining the exemption”. Factors such as the sensitivity of the information, the timing of the request, and the potential harm to law enforcement must be considered.

Exemption 40(2). Relevance is placed on the following decisions:

ICO Decision Notice IC-108040-X9B6

This case involved a request for the names of police officers involved in a specific operation. The ICO ruled that while the names were personal data, the public interest in transparency and accountability (given the nature of the operation) outweighed the officers' privacy rights.

ICO Decision Notice IC-125040-Q8J7

A request was made for the names of senior officials involved in a high-profile public inquiry. The ICO found that the officials' senior roles meant their actions were of public interest, and their names were not exempt under Section 40(2).

This supports the argument that senior officials' roles are inherently public, and their names may not be exempt if their actions are of significant public concern.

ICO Decision Notice IC-139082-L4T9

This case involved a request for the names of individuals involved in a historical investigation. The ICO ruled that the passage of time reduced the privacy concerns, and the public interest in historical accountability justified disclosure.

First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) ruling.All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition v Information Commissioner and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (EA/2011/0049)

The FTT ruled that the public interest in transparency regarding the actions of public officials (in this case, related to extraordinary rendition) outweighed the privacy concerns under Section 40(2).

Guardian News and Media Ltd v Information Commissioner and Metropolitan Police Service (EA/2012/0107)

The FTT ruled in favor of disclosing the names of senior police officers involved in a high-profile operation, stating that their roles were public in nature and that transparency was in the public interest.

Dr Evan Harris v Information Commissioner and University of Oxford (EA/2012/0069)

The FTT ruled that the names of individuals involved in a controversial decision-making process should be disclosed, as the public interest in transparency outweighed their privacy rights.

John Slater v Information Commissioner and Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust (EA/2018/0204)

The FTT ruled that the names of individuals involved in a historical investigation should be disclosed, as the public interest in understanding past events outweighed privacy concerns.

Public Interest in Transparency

In cases involving senior officials or high-profile investigations, the public interest in transparency and accountability often outweighs privacy concerns.

Individuals in senior public roles have a reduced expectation of privacy, as their actions are inherently of public concern.

The passage of time can reduce privacy concerns, especially if the investigation is of historical significance and public interest.

For all the above reasons I request a internal review.

A full history of my FOI request and all correspondence is available on the Internet at this address: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/o...

Yours faithfully,

Mark Armstrong