

Wiltshire and Swindon Local Resilience Forum

CBRNe Response Plan Version 2.1 – Draft

0.0 Version control

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Publication

This plan is classified as OFFICIAL due to the nature of the information contained herein. However it should not be publicly accessible.

Freedom of Information Act

This document is not subject to any exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Principal National Guidance Documents

Name	Descriptor
A model response to CBRN events	Home Office document
Initial Operational Response to a CBRN	JESIP
incident	

Thanks to:

Name	Name
Avon & Somerset LRF	Avon & Sc
Hampshire and Isle of Wight LRF	Hampshire

1.0 Introduction

This plan is designed to support multi-agency partners' response to a CBRNe incident, and there are two levels to this response plan

- o Strategic
- Tactical

It should be considered in conjunction with the Home Office document – A model response to CBRN events (restricted) and JESIP Initial Operating Response to a CBRN Incident.

The Wiltshire and Swindon response will be established around the 9 key tasks as outlined in the Home Office document

This plan will **not** cover:

- The generic response arrangements detailed in the EMAP
- Planning assumptions as included in National Risk Assessment and/or National Risk Planning Assumptions
- Interoperability processes as defined by the JESIP programme
- Activation of Multi-Agency Activity, covered by Operation LINK

2.0 Objectives

Strategic Objectives	Tactical Objectives	
 Preserve life Prevent harm Minimise the impact of the incident Warn and inform the public Recovery Identification and investigation 	 Contain the incident Decontamination and treatment of casualties (including worried well) Protect responders Safeguard the environment Decontamination of fatalities Dignified recovery of the dead Preservation of evidence 	

3.0 Access to Advice in Initial Stages

Source	Advice available	Contact details
ECOSA	 Specialist advice before STAC is established 	Via local PHE centre, details in Op Link
STAC	 Public health, science and technical advice will be made available to the SCG by the STAC. 	Established by SCG
	 The purpose of the cell is to ensure that debate is contained within the cell so that the SCG receives the best possible advice based on the available information in a timely, co-ordinated and understandable fashion 	
SAGE	 Scientific and technical advice provided to the national response Scientific Advice to the Government in Emergencies. 	Not accessible to local responders
PHE	 Specialist advice before STAC is established 	Via local PHE centre, use contact details from Op Link
CRCE	 Specialist advice before STAC is established 	Via local PHE centre, use contact details from Op Link
PHE/DSTL Porton Down	 Specialist advice before STAC is established 	Via local PHE centre, use contact details from Op Link
Police National CBRN Centre	 For technical and other advice on use of PPE, working times etc. 	Via Police Control Room, use contact details from Op Link
MetOffice	 Advice concerning weather conditions which may affect the spread of contamination FireMET/CheMET 	Via Fire Control Room, use contact details from Op Link
Government Decontamination Service	 Advice on sources of specialist contractors and resources involved in the decontamination of buildings, transport assets, objects and the environment. 	
Environment Agency	 Advice on environmental issues and run off of contaminated water. Oversight of disposal of contaminated materials and pollution prevention guidance for protection of the water environment¹ Activation of Air Quality Cell - Air Quality monitoring advice and support for Major incidents 	Via EA on call, use contact details from Op Link

¹ The EA and water companies will advise on the disposal of contaminated water in line with the Water UK protocol

Source	Advice available	Contact details
Local Authority Environmental Health Officers	General environmental health advice	Via LA on call, use contact details from Op Link
FRS DIM units	 Decontamination, identification and monitoring units. Need to come from Avon 	Via Fire Control Room, use contact details from Op Link
Police DIM units	 Decontamination, identification and monitoring units. Need to come from Dorset or Avon & Somerset 	Via Police Control Room, use contact details from Op Link
Water companies	 Information on water supply, sewerage and drainage to local areas 	Via on call contacts
MoD	 Technical and scientific advice on the options for the Render Safe of a CBRN threat Advice concerning the provision of military aid in support of the response 	Via JLRO, use contact details from Op Link
	to a CBRN threat	

4.0 CBRNe Specific Roles and Responsibilities

This is not intended to replicate the generic roles and responsibilities of agencies as detailed in the Wiltshire and Swindon Emergency Multi-Agency Procedures (EMAP)

Organisation	Responsibilities
Police	Co-ordination of the overall multi-agency response
	Investigation of the incident Support
	Survivor Management (with LA Support)
Fire and Rescue	 Provision of mass decontamination
Service	Control of health and safety
	Search & rescue of casualties
	 Provision of Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM) Team for substances involved
	for substances involved
Ambulance Service	Assist the FRS search & rescue of casualties within the Hot
(incl. HART)	Zone, only when HART available, providing 'first strike' medical
(,	assistance prior to retrieval for decontamination
	Triage, treatment and transport to hospital of the injured
	Decontamination of injured and disabled
Local Authorities	 Provision of transport to Survivor Reception Centre(s) / Rest
(incl. Public Health)	Centre(s)
	Care and welfare of decontaminated uninjured people (part of
	Survivor Management)
	 Technical and other support to the Emergency Services
	Management of the strategic Recovery Co-ordinating Group
	Provision of Public Health Advice
Public Health	Advice concerning nature of threat from contamination
England	 Monitoring long term effects upon those involved in the incident
	Provision of Public Health Advice
NHS England (incl	NHS England
broader health	 Co-ordination of NHS response and resources
community)	
	Acute Hospitals:
	 Treatment of casualties including those self-presenting
	Decontamination of self-presenters
	111
	Provision of health messages to affected and worried well
	o
	Primary & Community Care
	 Advice/support to self-presenters on decontamination
	··
Fundament	Reassurance of worried well
Environment	Assess the environmental risk

Organisation	Responsibilities
Agency	 Notify stakeholders (affected abstractors etc.) Activate AQC to provide Air Quality advice if appropriate Advise on measures to prevent/minimise environmental impacts including: the location of decontamination facilities; containment techniques and equipment appropriate disposal of wash water and management of waste, including suitable sites for disposal; Specialist contractors available with the support of the GDS clean-up/restoration of the environment
Government Decontamination Services (GDS)	 Facilitation of decontamination of buildings and the environment mitigation of long term impacts through the provision of appropriate advice
Category 2 Organisations (incl. water and transport companies)	Maintenance and restoration of affected services
MoD	 Supporting the civil authorities through the provision of EOD capability including CBRN elements, together with more generalist military capabilities.
Resilience and Emergencies Division South (REDS)	 Provision of a framework for reporting to Central Government Co-ordination of assistance at regional and national levels
Coroner	Determining the cause of death of any fatalities

5.0 Nine Key Tasks

The response to a CBRN incident is designed around 9 key tasks:

These are not discrete tasks and would not be enacted in isolation or sequentially, many will overlap.

Key Task	Activities		
Command, Control and Coordination	 Police will lead the response in line with EMAP Fire would not lead a CBRNe incident, although they would lead a HAZMAT incident. This task should include communication, with multi-agency partners and the public Ensure the early convening of a Recovery Coordinating Group 		
Mobilisation	 Operation Link should be utilised for the mobilisation of multiagency partners Relevant assets should be requested via the national structures of the individual agencies If required Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Areas (MASHA) should be established (see MASHA plan). Locations of these are attached in Appendix 5 Set up tactical holding areas Establish rendezvous points Identify forward control point 		
Arrival at scene	 Police will be responsible for coordination of asset deployment to the scene Arrival of resources will be a continuous process and will need to be managed by individual Agency Command Vehicles. Ensure communication between Operational and Tactical coordinators. Ensure effective management and control of resources and assets arriving at scene Utilise the JESIP principles 		
Scene Assessment	This will uti	lise the METHANE m Major Incident	nnemonic as outlined in EMAP: Major Incident declared
	Е	Exact	Exact location as possible, post code, grid reference
	Т	Туре	Type of incident
	н	Hazard	Hazards present
	Α	Access	Access and egress
	N	Number of Casualties	No of casualties and type of injuries
	E	Emergency services	Emergency services on scene and required.

Key Task	Activities
	 Further utilisation of the dynamic risk assessment and joint decision-making model (JESIP principles) Ensure reference to appropriate powers and procedures are included, specifically the power to set cordons under the Terrorism Act.
Scene Management	 Crowd management. There is added complexity for a CBRN incident. People at scene could be: Contaminated Potentially contaminated Anxious Need to consider psychosocial impacts Crime scene/protection of scene Initial decontamination Dry decontamination – FRS/Ambulance Casualty decontamination – Ambulance Mass decontamination if required will be undertaken by FRS Health and safety of responders Dynamic risk assessments Potentially multiple scenes Implementation of appropriate cordons. Utilisation of military to maintain cordons alongside Police Sampling and investigation (undertaken in response to ID substance) Safe routes in and out of scene (blue routes?) Shelter of people prior to evacuation (stay in etc.) Identification of vulnerable individuals
Deliberate Reconnaissance	 Deploy appropriately trained and resourced responders into the hazardous environment All blue light services have specialist, trained responders – HART/DIM/Police CBRN
Rescue and Triage	 Management of casualties and survivors. Rescue is the responsibility of FRS with support from HART. Triage is the responsibility of the Ambulance service Decontamination of self-presenters – responsibility of health providers which will predominantly be acute hospitals Pre-decontamination triage Post-decontamination triage Casualty clearance Casualty evacuation Decontaminated people evacuation – Survivor Reception Centres Identification of vulnerable individuals
Decontamination	 Mass decontamination – if required First responders Hospital lockdown – self-presenters Hospital evacuation (if required) Casualties Clothes and personal effects Deceased Buildings, vehicles, resources - GDS Environment – GDS CRCE recovery guidance

Key Task	Activities		
	Pets/Livestock/Food chain		
Survivor Management	 Ensure that there is clarity between casualties and survivors Ongoing management of both casualties and survivors Have resources to support the psychosocial response Information collection criminal long term health monitoring 		

6.0 Additional considerations

Area	Additional considerations
Communications	Media managementSocial mediaPublic communications
Spread of CBRN materials	 Availability of specialised modelling available via the Met Office, ECOSA and/or STAC Environment Agency modelling
Management of fatalities	 Decontamination of bodies Dignified recovery Human audit area Involvement of coroner Body storage/emergency mortuary arrangements Body disposal/transportation
Removal and disposal of contaminated materials	 Role of GDS Contact routes Expectations PPE Evidence retention Clothing and personal effects Livestock Contaminated water from wet decontamination (Note: emergency permitting via EA) Role of LA – specialist waste disposal etc.
Response costs	Bellwin and other schemes

7.0 Training and Exercising

The Wiltshire and Swindon LRF training and exercising of CBRNe will be managed via the Training and Exercising sub-group, based on the current training needs analysis. Any support from the Police CBRN training team can be accessed via this route.

Appendix 1 – Sample SCG Agenda Initial Agenda

Membership

- Nominate Chair
- Health and Safety Brief
- o Introductions / Roles / Responsibilities / Capabilities / Assets
- Are other organisations required?

Current Situation Analysis

- o Are there urgent items for attention?
- o Consider Risks/Threats consider SDI (Scale, Duration, Impact) model
- o Are there imminent/potential threats to Critical Infrastructure?
- o Are there imminent/potential threats to Neighbouring Counties?
- Provide organisational updates
- o Implement command and control structure

Aim and Objectives

- Set Tactical Aim and Objectives (in line with SCG Aim and Objectives if set)
- Communicate Aim and Objectives to Bronze Commanders or operational leads
- o Develop tactical plans to meet the Strategic Aim and Objectives.

Supporting Groups

- Consider the need for / access to supporting groups in conjunction with SCG
- Consider Involvement of Category 2 Responders, voluntary agencies

Communications

- Consider Shared Situational Awareness. Communicate relevant information to SCG for inclusion on CRIP.
- Develop communication requirements with SCG / Bronze Cdrs/Operational Leads
- Implement SCG Communications Strategy
- Implement SCG Media Management Strategy
- Identify 'talking heads' at tactical level
- Consider wider warning and informing Issues

Logistics and Administration

- Staff welfare including support groups
- Continuity and resilience of TCG
- Consider tactical logistical issues
- Consider requirement for Mutual Aid

AOB

- Confirm Decisions / Actions
- Date/Time/Venue/Set Agenda of Next Meeting

Considerations for Future Meetings

- Review Actions / Impact
- Review CRIP
- Review Tactical Aim and Objectives
- Updates from Supporting Groups
- Recovery Issues
- Consider further Resource Requirements

Appendix 4 – Risk Assessment Matrix for Tactical Commanders
Risk Assessment Matrix

For use by scene commanders to assist in dynamic and operational risk assessment.			
Additional factors to be considered.			
Additional factors to be considered:			
Location of incident i.e. postbox, commercial premises etc. Any appoint threat received.			
Any specific threat received Provious history			
 Previous history Contaminated casualties and/or presenting symptoms 			
 Contaminated casualties and/or presenting symptoms Weather conditions 			
 Any other significant or relevant details 			
Stage One			
Consider current threat levels from either CBRN-based possibility of attack or the threat from			
international terrorism in the UK; whichever is the highest. (
information)			
,			
Sub-total Stage 1	Max. 5		
Stage Two			
Score one factor from each of the following 1a, 1b, 1c, 2, 3a	and 3b.	No matrix grouping may be	
higher than the maximum shown.			
1. Recipient/Victim/Location (building/facility)			
a) Nationality			
b) Employment status of recipient			
c) Prominence of individual			
c) Prominence of individual			
Sub total Stage Two 1 a) L b) Lc)	May 90		
Sub-total Stage Two 1 a) + b) + c) Max. 80 2. Sender (if package)			
2. Sender (II package)			
Sub-total Stage Two 2	May 20		
3. Package	IVIAA. 20		
a) Origin of package/substance			
a, ong or paolago, oabotanoo			
b) Nature of package			
,			
Sub-total Stage Two 3 a) + b)	max. <u>40</u>		
TOTAL STAGE ONE AND STAGE TWO (m			
If package is received at either an 'at risk' location or by an		dividual then multiply the total	
Stage One and Stage Two score by two.		, ,	
•	•		

TOTAL SCORE (max. 290)

0 - 80 Category 'No Risk'

Undertake suitable waste disposal bearing in mind nature of product

80 – 145 Category 'Low Risk'

Refer to LRF Hazardous Materials Guide and multi-agency response plans

145 – 290 Category 'High Risk'

Consider LRF and national CBRN response plans

Appendix 8 - Glossary of terms

AWE	Atomic Weapons Establishment
CCC	Civil Contingencies Committee
CCG	Clinical Commissioning Group
CCS	Civil Contingencies Secretariat
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
CBRNe	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive
CRIP	Common Recognised Information Picture
DCLG	Department of Communities & Local Government
Defib	Defibrillator
DIM	Detection, Identification and Monitoring
DPH	Director of Public Health
DSTL	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
EA	Environment Agency
ECC	Emergency Communications Centre
ECOSA	Emergency Coordination of Scientific Advice
EMAP	Emergency Multi-Agency Procedures
ERD	Emergency Response Department, PHE, Porton Down
FCC	Force Contact Centre
FCP	Forward Control Point
GLO	Government Liaison Officer
ICS	Incident Command System
IT	Information Technology
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
HF	High Frequency
НМ	Her Majesty's
HQ	Headquarters
JRLO	Joint Regional Liaison Officer
LRF	Local Resilience Forum
MACA	Military Aid to Civil Authorities
MASHA	Multi-Ágency Strategic Holding Area
MERIT	Medical Emergency Response Incident Team
MTPAS	Mobile Telephone Privileged Access Scheme
NHS	National Health Service
PHE	Public Health England
RAYNET	Radio Amateur Network
RED	Resilience Emergencies Division
ResCG	Response Coordinating Group (DCLG RED)
RWG	Recovery Working Group
SAGE	Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies
SCC	Strategic Coordinating Centre
SCG	Strategic Coordinating Group
SDI	Scale, Duration, Impact
SIO	Senior Investigating Officer
STAC	Scientific Technical Advice Cell
STEEPLE	Social, Technological, Economic, Ethical, Political, Legal, Environmental
TCG	Tactical Coordinating Group
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
VASEC	Voluntary Aid Societies
VHF	Very High Frequency