Dear Home Office,

I understand from recent comments of Lord West that the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism has adopted a CONTEST strategy and that as part of that strategy:

"Our efforts include ongoing work with companies, which provide software filtering, to produce a set of URLs that contain potentially unlawful terrorist-related material. The addition of this list to the filtering software used in schools and in many private homes is an important step towards safeguarding vulnerable individuals in support of our second aim."

In accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000 I would be obliged if you could provide the following information.

1. What is the statutory or other legal basis for this activity?

2. Who is responsible for determining what URLs contain "potentially unlawful terrorist-related material"?

3. What criteria are used in making this determination? Please furnish a copy of these criteria.

4. What training is offered to those responsible for making this determination? Please furnish a copy of the training material used.

5. What appeal or other mechanism is available to challenge wrongful inclusion on this list? Please furnish a copy of any documentation relating to same.

6. What liability would be faced by the Home Office or filtering firms in relation to harm caused by wrongful inclusion of a site on this list? Please furnish copies of any documentation relating to same.

7. How many URLs are on this list?

8. Please furnish now a copy of this list.

9. How often is this list of URLs reviewed?

10. To what companies is this list provided?

11. In what filtering products is this list used?

12. How many users within the UK have their internet use filtered by products which use this list?

Those comments of Lord West also indicated that:

"One issue highlighted was confusion about whether individuals could enter into debate online around topics such as jihad or suicide-bombing without being at risk of falling foul of new terrorist legislation. This limited their appetite to challenge what they were reading online or to put forward their own views. This not only erodes communities' ability to voice opinions, but also detracts from the enormous potential for civic challenge to assist in delivery of our third objective. As a direct response to this, OSCT has produced legal guidance for use by communities that clarifies the situation."

13. Please furnish now a copy of that legal guidance.

Yours faithfully,

TJ McIntyre

OSCTFOI, Home Office

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Please see the attached.

 

 

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Dear Mr McIntyre

 

Please see the attached.

 

Thank you

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Dear Home Office

Please pass this on to the person who conducts Freedom of Information reviews.

I am writing to request an internal review of Home Office's handling of my FOI request “Filtering of terrorist material”.

I will first address the general problems with that decision before turning to the individual questions asked.

Wrongful application of section 24

Guidance from the Information Commissioner makes it clear that the section 24 national security exemption cannot be relied on in a blanket fashion. The ICO has stated that:

“The exemption provided by section 24 of the FOIA can only be relied upon when it is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security.

• It does not apply simply because the information relates to national security.
• The word “required” means “reasonably necessary”. It may not be vital to apply the exemption but it must certainly be more than just useful or convenient.
• The exemption should not be applied in a blanket fashion. There must be evidence that disclosure of the information in question would pose a real and specific threat to national security.” (“Guidance Note: Section 24: the national security exemption”)

In this case, however, section 24 has clearly been applied in a blanket fashion. In particular, by rolling up questions 2 and 4-10 collectively and failing to answer each individually (despite the fact that each question asks for very different information) there has been a clear failure to consider the effect of disclosure of the particular information in question.

Wrongful application of section 31

The Act also requires the section 31 law enforcement exemption must be applied on a case-by-case basis, and the ICO has stated that:

“A public authority cannot withhold information, or refuse to confirm or deny that it holds information, unless the disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice any of the purposes or activities listed in the exemption. The prejudice must be genuine and of substance and its likelihood must be decided on a case-by-case basis. A public authority must therefore explain why the disclosure of the specific information requested would, or would be likely to, cause prejudice. It is not acceptable to say that disclosure of that type or class of information would, or would be likely to, cause prejudice.” (“Guidance Note: The Exemption for Law Enforcement”)

Again, however, this requirement has not been met in the current case. The decision, by aggregating together eight very different types of information sought, has failed to consider each on a case-by-case basis as required by the Act.

Evidential burden for prejudice not met

In order to establish a likelihood of prejudice a high standard must be met. Caselaw from the Information Tribunal makes it clear that “it is not sufficient for a public authority to put forward unsupported speculation or opinion; the public authority must be able to provide some evidence from which it can then extrapolate in order to come to a conclusion about what is likely.” (ICO, “Freedom of Information Act - Awareness Guidance No 20”)

In this case no evidence of any sort has been provided and there has been no attempt made to identify any particular type of prejudice, much less any possible causal link between release of the information sought and such prejudice.

Failure to consider Article 10 ECHR

As a final general point I must also note that internet filtering raises an important issue of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Under Article 10 restrictions on freedom of expression must be prescribed by law, which requires that there must be a valid legal basis which is adequately accessible to the citizen. This is not a consideration which is subject to a balancing test but is a mandatory requirement. It is all the more important in the case of internet filtering which is inherently opaque.

In this case, however, the decision fails to consider Article 10 ECHR at all and therefore errs in principle.

I now turn to the individual questions.

Question 2: "Who is responsible for determining what URLs contain "potentially unlawful terrorist-related material"?"

There is no reason given for the refusal to answer this question bar the conclusory and general assertion that: "There is a serious terrorist threat to the United Kingdom and disclosing this information into the public domain could put national security at risk by jeopardising or negating the Government’s efforts to prevent acts of terrorism and terrorist related crime." Furthermore, there has been no attempt made to spell out any possible causal mechanism for this claimed effect.

In any event, it is absurd to suggest that identifying the arm of state responsible for making this determination might have this effect. This is particularly so given that detailed information on how similar decisions are made under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006 has already been made available by the Home Office. (See e.g. "Guidance on notices issued under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006", 9 August 2007, available at http://bit.ly/fOyN0a).

Question 4: "What training is offered to those responsible for making this determination? Please furnish a copy of the training material used."

There is no adequate reason given for the refusal to answer this question and there is again no attempt made to spell out any possible causal mechanism for this claimed effect.

On the other side of the balance, however, there is a clear public interest in knowing that adequate training is made available to units making decisions as to what UK citizens are entitled to read online.

Question 5: “What appeal or other mechanism is available to challenge wrongful inclusion on this list? Please furnish a copy of any documentation relating to same.”

It is hard to see how there could be any law enforcement or national security reason for concealing the existence of an appeal mechanism from those entitled to use it. There is a strong public interest in knowing whether it is possible to challenge wrongful decisions which have the effect of restricting what UK citizens are able to read online. If an appeal mechanism exists then it is clearly in the public interest to publicise it to enable it to be used by those who might be affected by it. If there is no appeal mechanism then it is clearly in the public interest to know that decisions affecting freedom of expression are being made in an unreviewable manner.

Question 6: “What liability would be faced by the Home Office or filtering firms in relation to harm caused by wrongful inclusion of a site on this list? Please furnish copies of any documentation relating to same.”

This question relates to general issues of law presented by this internet filtering system. There is no possible national security or law enforcement issue presented by it.

Question 7: “How many URLs are on this list?”

There is no possible justification for the refusal to provide a simple number identifying how many URLs have been blocked. By way of comparison, the annual report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner provides detailed figures for the number of interception warrants and requests for access to communications data which are made each year.

Question 8: “Please furnish now a copy of this list.”

There is no need to see the list of blocked URLs in order to find sites which promote terrorist activities. Such sites are already publicly accessible and are readily discoverable via search engines. It is therefore absurd to suggest that “Disclosure of the website list could lead to the content being used by violent extremists for radicalisation or illegal operational purposes”.

There is however a strong public interest in being able to review a blacklist in order to see whether sites have been wrongfully blocked. Experience in numerous other jurisdictions has shown that blacklists are commonly inaccurate and block perfectly legitimate sites. Without disclosure of this list it will be impossible to determine whether this is the case with this list also.

It should also be noted that the list of URLs is already made available by the Home Office to third parties in the form of software companies. There is no evidence in the decision to suggest that such companies are under any contractual or other obligation to keep the list secret. If the Home Office has voluntarily chosen to disclose such information on an unrestricted basis to third parties then this fatally undermines any claim that such information is so sensitive that it should be exempt from disclosure in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act.

Question 9: “How often is this list of URLs reviewed?”

As with question 5, there is a clear public interest in knowing what steps are taken to ensure the continued accuracy of a list which effectively restricts what UK citizens can read online. It is hard to see how there could be any possibly law enforcement or national security justification for withholding this information.

Question 10: “To what companies is this list provided?”

The answer states that this list is provided to “filtering companies for inclusion in their parental control software” but surprisingly fails to identify the particular companies involved. If, as the Home Office appears to believe, it is desirable for parents to use software to block against the list then presumably there is a public interest in knowing which providers offer such software.

Question 13: “Please furnish now a copy of that legal guidance.”

In relation to this question it was stated that “ The draft is yet to be agreed by the Home Office as official guidance and as such releasing it now could generate doubt and uncertainty amongst the public prior its final agreement and subsequent publication. It is therefore in the public interest and reasonable in all the circumstances to not release the guidance prior to final publication.”

In the first place it is absurd to suggest that the release of a draft document – properly identified as such – could generate doubt and uncertainty. I note that this novel ground is not referred to as an acceptable basis for delay in the ICO document “Freedom of Information Act Awareness Guidance No. 7: Information Intended for Future Publication”.

In any event, the delay in making this guidance available brings this case outside the scope of section 22. Lord West referred to the legal guidance document in November 2009 in terms which suggested that it was then complete. Now, over a year later, the guidance document is not finalised and the Home Office has not provided a firm publication date or indeed any publication date. In the circumstances, it seems that this is a case which falls within the circumstances alluded to in the Ministry of Justice Document “Exemptions guidance Section 22: information intended for future publication” which states that:

“Public authorities should not be able to avoid putting information in the public domain by adopting unreasonable publication timetables or an 'intention' to publish where there is little prospect of that happening within a reasonable timescale.”

A full history of my FOI request and all correspondence is available on the Internet at this address:
http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/fi...

Yours faithfully

TJ McIntyre

FOI Responses, Home Office

Internal review request – our ref: 16776

 

Thank you for your e-mail of 12 January 2011, in which you ask for an
internal review of our response to your Freedom of Information request of
15 November 2010. 

 

We will aim to send you a full response by 10 March 2011, which is forty
working days from the date when we received your request.

 

Yours sincerely,

 

 

Information Access Team, Home Office

 

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FOI Responses, Home Office

Internal review request – our ref: 16776

 

Dear T J McIntyre,

 

I would like to apologise for the delay in replying to your internal
review request. 

 

I would like to reassure you that your request is under active
consideration. We now aim to send you a full response by 24 March 2011.

 

Information Access Team, Home Office

 

 

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Dear FOI Responses,

Under the FOI Good Practice Guidelines on time limits on carrying out internal reviews a decision in this matter should have issued within 20 working days from the date of the request - that is, by 17 February last.

In those Guidelines the ICO makes it clear that if there is to be any delay past that deadline "the public authority should, as a matter of good practice, notify the requester and explain why more time is needed". I note that no such explanation has been given.

Those Guidelines further provide that "in no case should the total time taken exceed 40 working days. In such cases we would expect a public authority to be able to demonstrate that it had commenced the review procedure promptly following receipt of the request for review and had actively worked on the review throughout that period."

The 40 working day period passed on March 10th last when you apologised for the ongoing delay and stated that a full response would issue by 24 March. That further date has now passed with no response.

In short, therefore, there has been an unexplained and inordinate delay in this case. Unless the internal review is completed by close of business on Wednesday next, the 30th of March, it is my intention to refer the request to the ICO with a view to seeking enforcement by that office.

Yours sincerely,

TJ McIntyre

FOI Responses, Home Office

Dear T J McIntyre

I would like to apologise for the length of time it is taking to provide
you with a reply. I would like to reassure you that your request is
under active consideration and is currently at the final approval stage.

The case officer is aware of your complaint and is dealing with your
request as a priority. We aim to provide you with a response by Monday,
4 April at the latest.

Regards,

Information Access Team, Home Office

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FOI Responses, Home Office

1 Attachment

Dear T J McIntyre,

 

Please find attached our response to your internal review request.

 

Regards,

 

Information Access Team, Home Office

 

 

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TJ McIntyre left an annotation ()

This request is currently under appeal to the ICO.

TJ McIntyre left an annotation ()

The ICO decision on this appeal is now available here:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/83053996/ICO-D...

FOI Responses, Home Office

1 Attachment

Dear Mr McIntyre,

 

Please find attached correspondence regarding your Freedom of Information
request to the Home Office (reference 16776) in light of the determination
of the Information Commissioner’s Office determination FS50407164.

 

 

 

Kind regards,

 

R. Clifford

 

R. Clifford I Information Access Team I Information Management Service
(IMS) I Shared Services Directorate I Financial & Commercial Group
I Ground Floor Seacole I 2 Marsham Street I London I SW1P 4DF

 

 

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Dear Home Office

I am writing to request an internal review of the refusal to disclose the information requested in item 6 of my request (item (iii) in the ICO determination), that is:

"What liability would be faced by the Home Office or filtering firms in relation to harm caused by wrongful inclusion of a site on this list? Please furnish copies of any documentation relating to same."

1. Wrongful narrowing of scope of request

In the first place, I note that this decision proceeds on the mistaken assumption that the request relates only to information regarding the "nature or extent of contractual arrangements entered into by government with third parties". However the request is not limited in this way and there is no basis for so treating it.

The request seeks information regarding any possible liability of either the Home Office *or* filtering firms for wrongful blocking of sites, and it is possible to answer this question without regard to any contractual arrangements whatsoever. For example, suppose that the Home Office were to wrongfully designate Amazon.co.uk to be blocked, with resulting loss of sales. In that case would there be a liability in tort on the part of the Home Office? This question can be answered independently of any contractual relationship with third parties and it is significant that this point is obscured in the decision which relies solely on arguments relating to third parties.

Consequently, in relation to this aspect of the request, the Home Office has failed to supply any reason at all for its failure to answer.

2. s.41 (Information provided in confidence) does not apply to the filtering contracts themselves

I now turn to the claimed s.41 exemption. I note that the decision refers in a misleading manner to "information contained within the context of a confidential contract between the Home Office and third parties". This, however, ignores the jurisprudence of the Information Tribunal and guidance from the ICO.

In particular, it is quite clear that s.41 does not apply to the text of contracts entered into by public authorities. See in particular Derry City Council v. Information Commissioner (EA/2006/0014) the effect of which is summarised by the ICO as follows:

"A concluded contract agreed between a public authority and another party is not generally information being provided by one party to the other. So section 41 in these circumstances cannot apply." (ICO Guidance Note, Information provided in confidence relating to contracts (2008)).

Consequently, to the extent that any contract with filtering firms contains provisions regarding liability for wrongful blocking then such provisions must be disclosed pursuant to this request and such disclosure cannot be avoided under s.41.

3. s.41 (Information provided in confidence) does not apply to information generated by the Home Office

Section 41 provides that it applies only to information "obtained by the public authority from any other person". It has no application whatsoever to any information generated internally within the Home Office which must therefore be disclosed.

4. s43(2) (Commercial interests) does not apply

The justification give for refusal to disclose under this heading does not fall within the scope of section 43(2) which is therefore inapplicable. Section 43(2) provides as follows:

"Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person (including the public authority holding it)."

In this case, however, the Home Office is engaged in censorship, not commercial activity. It has confirmed elsewhere (in the response to FOI 19738) that this is being done on a "voluntary" basis and not on foot of any procurement or other statutory power. Consequently, it is not engaged in commercial activity and therefore has no section 43(2) commercial interest to protect.

5. The s.43(2) balancing test favours disclosure

This request seeks to determine what liability the public purse would face in respect of sites wrongfully blocked under this system. There is a clear and obvious public interest in examining this point which is not considered in the decision.

In addition, the key assertion made under the s.43(2) claim for non-disclosure is that "it is unlikely that third parties would be willing to enter into any future contractual arrangement with the Home Office were details of ... the apportioning of liability ... to be made publically available." From this one must infer that some form of indemnity has been given by the Home Office to the filtering companies against liability. In addition to the possible direct liability of the Home Office, therefore, it suggests that there is a possible additional open-ended liability in respect of wrongful acts carried out by the filtering companies, which demands additional scrutiny. Again, this point has not been considered at all in the decision.

Also, I note that Clause 6.3 of the filtering contracts (revealed under FOI 19738) confirms that "The Company is aware that the Authority is subject to the FoIA and agrees: (a) to cooperate with the Authority to ensure that the Authority is able to meet its obligations under that act." The fact that the contract itself contemplated disclosure via FOI is an important factor in favour of disclosure which the decision failed to take into account.

6. Delay

Finally, I should note that it is now over one year and four months since this request was first filed, and the ICO has already found significant delay in the handling of this request. I would be obliged if you would now confirm that this internal review will be concluded within the statutory time limit.

Yours sincerely,

TJ McIntyre

FOI Responses, Home Office

This mailbox is unable to accept incoming messages and your email has been
automatically redirected to [1][Home Office request email] for a
response. Please use this email address for any further queries.

 

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References

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FOI Responses, Home Office

This mailbox does not accept incoming messages. Any FOI requests or
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Dear Home Office,

I am resending this message to the main FOI contact address as the previous email appears to have bounced.

The full text of the original email follows.

A full history of my FOI request and all correspondence is available on the Internet at this address:
http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/fi...

Yours faithfully,

TJ McIntyre

---

Dear Home Office

I am writing to request an internal review of the refusal to disclose the information requested in item 6 of my request (item (iii) in the ICO determination), that is:

"What liability would be faced by the Home Office or filtering firms in relation to harm caused by wrongful inclusion of a site on this list? Please furnish copies of any documentation relating to same."

1. Wrongful narrowing of scope of request

In the first place, I note that this decision proceeds on the mistaken assumption that the request relates only to information regarding the "nature or extent of contractual arrangements entered into by government with third parties". However the request is not limited in this way and there is no basis for so treating it.

The request seeks information regarding any possible liability of either the Home Office *or* filtering firms for wrongful blocking of sites, and it is possible to answer this question without regard to any contractual arrangements whatsoever. For example, suppose that the Home Office were to wrongfully designate Amazon.co.uk to be blocked, with resulting loss of sales. In that case would there be a liability in tort on the part of the Home Office? This question can be answered independently of any contractual relationship with third parties and it is significant that this point is obscured in the decision which relies solely on arguments relating to third parties.

Consequently, in relation to this aspect of the request, the Home Office has failed to supply any reason at all for its failure to answer.

2. s.41 (Information provided in confidence) does not apply to the filtering contracts themselves

I now turn to the claimed s.41 exemption. I note that the decision refers in a misleading manner to "information contained within the context of a confidential contract between the Home Office and
third parties". This, however, ignores the jurisprudence of the Information Tribunal and guidance from the ICO.

In particular, it is quite clear that s.41 does not apply to the text of contracts entered into by public authorities. See in particular Derry City Council v. Information Commissioner (EA/2006/0014) the effect of which is summarised by the ICO as follows:

"A concluded contract agreed between a public authority and another party is not generally information being provided by one party to the other. So section 41 in these circumstances cannot apply." (ICO
Guidance Note, Information provided in confidence relating to contracts (2008)).

Consequently, to the extent that any contract with filtering firms contains provisions regarding liability for wrongful blocking then such provisions must be disclosed pursuant to this request and such disclosure cannot be avoided under s.41.

3. s.41 (Information provided in confidence) does not apply to information generated by the Home Office

Section 41 provides that it applies only to information "obtained by the public authority from any other person". It has no application whatsoever to any information generated internally within the Home Office which must therefore be disclosed.

4. s43(2) (Commercial interests) does not apply

The justification give for refusal to disclose under this heading does not fall within the scope of section 43(2) which is therefore inapplicable. Section 43(2) provides as follows:

"Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person (including the public authority holding it)."

In this case, however, the Home Office is engaged in censorship, not commercial activity. It has confirmed elsewhere (in the response to FOI 19738) that this is being done on a "voluntary"
basis and not on foot of any procurement or other statutory power. Consequently, it is not engaged in commercial activity and therefore has no section 43(2) commercial interest to protect.

5. The s.43(2) balancing test favours disclosure

This request seeks to determine what liability the public purse would face in respect of sites wrongfully blocked under this system. There is a clear and obvious public interest in examining
this point which is not considered in the decision.

In addition, the key assertion made under the s.43(2) claim for non-disclosure is that "it is unlikely that third parties would be willing to enter into any future contractual arrangement with the
Home Office were details of ... the apportioning of liability ... to be made publically available." From this one must infer that some form of indemnity has been given by the Home Office to the
filtering companies against liability. In addition to the possible direct liability of the Home Office, therefore, it suggests that there is a possible additional open-ended liability in respect of
wrongful acts carried out by the filtering companies, which demands additional scrutiny. Again, this point has not been considered at all in the decision.

Also, I note that Clause 6.3 of the filtering contracts (revealed under FOI 19738) confirms that "The Company is aware that the Authority is subject to the FoIA and agrees: (a) to cooperate with
the Authority to ensure that the Authority is able to meet its obligations under that act." The fact that the contract itself contemplated disclosure via FOI is an important factor in favour of
disclosure which the decision failed to take into account.

6. Delay

Finally, I should note that it is now over one year and four months since this request was first filed, and the ICO has already found significant delay in the handling of this request. I would be
obliged if you would now confirm that this internal review will be concluded within the statutory time limit.

Yours sincerely,

TJ McIntyre

Dear Home Office,

Please pass this on to the person who conducts Freedom of Information reviews.

I am writing to request an internal review of Home Office's handling of my FOI request 'Filtering of terrorist material'. The reasons for that request are set out in my email of 20 March 2012 which is visible on the web page linked to below.

As you will see from that page, there has been no response to my request for an internal review of 20 March, despite that request being sent to the main FOI contact email address.

A full history of my FOI request and all correspondence is available on the Internet at this address:
http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/fi...

Yours faithfully,

TJ McIntyre

FOI Requests, Home Office

Thank you for contacting the FOI Requests mailbox.
Your message has been logged and will be dealt with shortly.
We aim to provide a response to all FOI requests within 20 working days.
If your message is with regard to an existing FOI case or is a general
query please ensure you have left any file references and contact details.
Thank you.

 

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Dear OSCTFOI,

Please pass this on to the person who conducts Freedom of Information reviews.

I am writing to request an internal review of Home Office's handling of my FOI request 'Filtering of terrorist material'. The reasons for that request are set out in my email of 20 March 2012 which is visible on the web page linked to below.

As you will see from that page, there has been no response to my request for an internal review of 20 March, despite that request being sent to the main FOI contact email address.

A full history of my FOI request and all correspondence is available on the Internet at this address:
http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/fi...

Yours faithfully,

TJ McIntyre

TJ McIntyre left an annotation ()

A further follow up reminder has been sent today to info.access@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk:

Dear Sir or Madam

I am writing in relation to my FOI request of 13 November 2010 in relation to Filtering of Terrorist Material, your reference FOI 16676 and ICO determination FS50407164. A full record of that request is available online at http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/fi...

As you will see from that page, following a decision from the Information Commissioner's Office the Home Office was obliged to make further information available to me. This purported to be done by email dated 19 March 2012. That email was, however, inadequate for the reasons which I set out in my request for internal review dated 20 March 2012.

Having received no answer to the request for internal review dated 20 March I submitted a follow up reminder on 8 July. To date I have still received no substantive response. I note that substantive decisions on internal reviews should issue within 20 working days from the date of the request - in this case by 17 April. A response is therefore now three months overdue. While I do not wish to have to bring this matter to the ICO again, should I not receive a substantive response by the end of this week then I will be left with no alternative.

I look forward to hearing from you through the WhatDoTheyKnow system.

Yours faithfully

TJ McIntyre

FOI Responses, Home Office

Dear TJ McIntyre,

 

Thank you for your email of 24 July 2012 about your request for an
internal review of FoI 16776.

 

I can confirm that we did receive your email of 8 July and this is
currently with a case officer who hopes to provide you with a response as
soon as possible.  I apologise for not notifying you of this earlier and
for any inconvenience that this may have caused.

 

I would like to reassure you that your request for an internal review is
currently under consideration.

 

Yours sincerely,

 

S Goddard

Information Access Team

 

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TJ McIntyre left an annotation ()

A further complaint has been sent to the ICO today regarding the continued failure by the Home Office to respond to the request for an internal review.

FOI Requests, Home Office

2 Attachments

Dear Mr McIntyre

 

Please find attached the response to your internal review request. I
apologise for the lengthy delay in providing you with this response.

 

Yours sincerely

 

C Cummins

Information Access Team

Home Office

2 Marsham Street

London SW1P 4DF

 

 

 

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TJ McIntyre left an annotation ()

An ICO decision rejecting this appeal was received on 2nd April and is available here:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/134182762/ICO-...

TJ McIntyre left an annotation ()

I've now appealed this matter to the First Tier Tribunal.

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