

# TEMPLATE FOR STRATEGIC RISK ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY IMPACTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES (FOR CJO TLB)

KEY CHANGE / ISSUE	POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS	ASSESSMENT OF RISK (high, med, low)	ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED	RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION
<b>A. ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES &amp; PERSONNEL</b>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Roles, responsibilities &amp; key activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failing to identify fully how existing roles, responsibilities &amp; key safety activities are discharged before removing or changing them</li> <li>Failing to clarify new roles &amp; responsibilities (particularly where whole layers are removed and/or personnel take on substantial new responsibilities)</li> <li><i>Can result in unclear/unfilled safety responsibilities and/or loss of key safety activities</i></li> </ul>	LOW	Safety competences are to be included in Job Specifications and TORs for both Ops and PJOBS safety posts.	TLB/HLB
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Training, skills &amp; capability development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A lack of training, skills and capability development for personnel eg staff who are more empowered</li> <li>Inadequate training needs analysis and competence assessment</li> <li><i>Can result in inability to discharge safety roles &amp; responsibilities.</i></li> </ul>	HIGH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coherent and funded trg budget and policy for staff</li> <li>Trg programme established for each position which influences safety, beginning with Safety Mgt for Senior managers etc.</li> </ul>	TLB
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reductions in personnel with key competencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Excessive reductions in personnel with key competencies</li> </ul> <p><i>Can result in inexperienced staff exposed to safety risks or them exposing others to safety risks.</i></p>	MEDIUM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review current reductions and recent post losses taken under SDSR and budget reviews.</li> <li>Abandon the practice of 'double-hatting' of safety posts with non-safety trained personnel.</li> </ul>	TLB/HLB

KEY CHANGE / ISSUE	POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS	ASSESSMENT OF RISK (high, med, low)	ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED	RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION
<b>B. LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY</b>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Leadership, priorities &amp; focus</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to recognise fully the importance of safety leadership and/or how this is achieved or maintained before making changes</li> <li><i>Can result in a lack of safety leadership manifested by eg lack of focus on key aspects of the safety regime, lack of visibility and/or dilution and distraction from the priority on safety, warning signs and trends not being spotted, and an ongoing, overall weakening of the systems and culture supporting safety</i></li> </ul>	MEDIUM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Re-introduction of Safety aspects for CJO weekly update would ensure that PJHQ elements are informed on a weekly basis.</li> <li>Production of a fortnightly safety SITREP for all PJOB and Op Theatre Safety FPs which is also distributed to PJHQ Div FPs.</li> </ul>	TLB
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Operational authorisation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Downgrading levels of responsibility and/or Duty Holders and/or authorising personnel at lower levels without adequate experience, assessment or support, and/or too quickly</li> <li><i>Can result in inability to discharge safety roles &amp; responsibilities and/or loss of focus on, or quality of, key safety mechanisms and processes.</i></li> </ul>	HIGH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continue to determine the role of DH and who has responsibility for what aspect on operations.</li> <li>Determine most appropriate level at which safety responsibilities are held and train those responsible in both awareness and competency.</li> <li>Develop Safety staff ethos and TTPs for appropriate management of safety across CJOs TLB.</li> </ul>	DESB/SSD&C/FLCs

KEY CHANGE / ISSUE	POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS	ASSESSMENT OF RISK (high, med, low)	ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED	RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION
<b>C. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CORPORATE MEMORY</b>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Safety Management System</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to understand the implications of the change on each element of the Safety Management System:</li> <li><i>Policy</i></li> <li><i>Organisation</i></li> <li><i>Planning &amp; Implementing</i></li> <li><i>Monitoring</i></li> <li><i>Audit &amp; Review</i></li> <li><i>Can result in system weaknesses in one or more of the key elements for safety management</i></li> </ul>	MEDIUM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Training in awareness and competency will provide a degree of understanding. Currently, where PJHQ staff are exposed to Risk Registers and their use, knowledge and understanding is increased, this is driven from 2*/3* level.</li> <li>The POPIMAR process is a H&amp;S term and may not be widely recognised in an operational context.</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Corporate memory</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to recognise that important information (including lessons learned) is lodged with key individuals and is not retained in durable records and/or that systems are not in place to capture and retain information</li> <li><i>Can result in loss of key safety information and recurring incidents that could, and should, have been prevented.</i></li> </ul>	LOW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Good IM/IX practices are in place in PJHQ, whilst people rotate on a regular basis, appropriate use of the EWP and MERIDIO system should overcome this. In addition, appropriate H&amp;S minutes and meeting RoDs are widely distributed.</li> <li>DLIMs now includes safety lessons and so is broadened beyond the historical approach of pertaining only to tac and Op lessons.</li> <li>CESO (CJO) is embedded within the J7 Lessons process within PJHQ and through assoc lessons org at LWC and wider defence lessons process.</li> </ul>	

KEY CHANGE / ISSUE	POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS	ASSESSMENT OF RISK (high, med, low)	ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED	RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION
<b>D. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANGE – PROCESS, TIMING, AND COMMUNICATION</b>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Speed of change</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The adoption of unrealistic expectations about the speed of change - including failing to take account of the need for transition management and the associated resource implications</li> <li><i>Can result in confusion and declining safety performance and can also compound other effects</i></li> </ul>	HIGH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>We are changing faster than we can cope and transition is incapable of enduring for long enough not to be overtaken.</li> <li>It suggested that this is discussed at regular TLB meeting and DESB.</li> </ul>	SSD&C/TLB
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Large scale redundancies, redeployment or internal staff transfers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to clarify the roles of departing and incoming personnel</li> <li>Hand-over periods insufficient to allow new or transferred individuals to acquire experience, information and skills</li> <li>Inadequate supervision of personnel during their induction period</li> <li><i>Can result in confusion and declining safety performance and can also compound other effects</i></li> </ul>	HIGH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>More study into H&amp;S roles should be undertaken as it now impacts upon a wider footprint and reaches down to a tac level on operations.</li> <li>HOTO periods of 5 days (current prac) or even gapped posts should not be allowed in a safety role.</li> <li>Use of the 'mentoring' process should be widely adopted, but when there are insufficient staff in the first instance, this will not be achievable.</li> </ul>	SSD&C/TLB/HLB
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Communications</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to fully explain and justify the change to staff in simple language.</li> <li><i>Can result in resentment and resistance if the benefits to both Dept and individuals not clearly stated.</i></li> </ul>	HIGH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Change management is instrumental to the success of any organisational change, but more so in Safety as it can have fatal consequences. Senor management should hold regular "Town Hall" briefings for staff.</li> </ul>	

NOTE – some of the above points are clearly related, and in some cases interconnected. But, the aim is to ensure that all are considered one way or another.