

NAVY CMD - TEMPLATE FOR STRATEGIC RISK ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY IMPACTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

KEY CHANGE / ISSUE	POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS	ASSESSMENT OF RISK (high, med, low)	ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED	RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION
A. ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES & PERSONNEL				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Roles, responsibilities & key activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failing to identify fully how existing roles, responsibilities & key safety activities are discharged before removing or changing them Failing to clarify new roles & responsibilities (particularly where whole layers are removed and/or personnel take on substantial new responsibilities) <i>Can result in unclear/unfilled safety responsibilities and/or loss of key safety activities</i> 	<p>Low</p> <p>Medium</p>	<p>A key component of the Navy Safety Improvement Plan (NSIP) is to clarify safety roles and responsibilities. The NCR will ensure these are resourced in a future organisational model.</p> <p>Transfers of roles across TLB boundaries (e.g. DIO formation and potential transfer of H&S posts) require transparent articulation of future responsibilities. A risk exists that the demand to make significant financial savings on MOD estate management may result in the removal of essential advisory posts where activity, rather than infrastructure, is managed.</p>	<p>NCHQ</p> <p>DIO to ensure essential H&S posts are not removed.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training, skills & capability development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A lack of training, skills and capability development for personnel eg staff who are more empowered Inadequate training needs analysis and competence assessment <i>Can result in inability to discharge safety roles & responsibilities.</i> 	<p>High</p>	<p>High staff turnover rates and the time taken to implement changes to training courses create higher risk in this area during a time of organisational change. There is high level recognition and an endeavour under the Navy Safety Improvement Plan to address this as part of a cultural shift to a learning organisation.</p> <p>Safety training historically provided to Navy Command by DE&S has gradually been removed without agreement.</p>	<p>Navy Command</p> <p>DE&S</p>

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reductions in personnel with key competencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Excessive reductions in personnel with key competencies <p><i>Can result in inexperienced staff exposed to safety risks or them exposing others to safety risks.</i></p>	Low	The potential impacts of VERS and RN redundancy programmes are being assessed against the requirement to deliver key outputs.	NCHQ
B. LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leadership, priorities & focus 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failure to recognise fully the importance of safety leadership and/or how this is achieved or maintained before making changes <i>Can result in a lack of safety leadership manifested by eg lack of focus on key aspects of the safety regime, lack of visibility and/or dilution and distraction from the priority on safety, warning signs and trends not being spotted, and an ongoing, overall weakening of the systems and culture supporting safety</i> 	Low	1SL and the NAVB have taken full and visible ownership of the NSIP, with a formal "Launch" planned for the autumn. DCINC personally driving the agenda of the RN Delivery Group with a reinvigorated focus on safety.	NCHQ
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operational authorisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Downgrading levels of responsibility and/or Duty Holders and/or authorising personnel at lower levels without adequate experience, assessment or support, and/or too quickly <i>Can result in inability to discharge safety roles & responsibilities and/or loss of focus on, or quality of, key safety mechanisms and processes.</i> 	Low	The recent development of the Navy Command Duty Holder construct is mitigating this potential risk.	NCHQ
C. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CORPORATE MEMORY				

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Safety Management System 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failure to understand the implications of the change on each element of the Safety Management System: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Policy</i> <i>Organisation</i> <i>Planning & Implementing</i> <i>Monitoring</i> <i>Audit & Review</i> <i>Can result in system weaknesses in one or more of the key elements for safety management</i> 	Low	Part of the NSIP agenda	NCHQ
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Corporate memory 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failure to recognise that important information (including lessons learned) is lodged with key individuals and is not retained in durable records and/or that systems are not in place to capture and retain information <i>Can result in loss of key safety information and recurring incidents that could, and should, have been prevented.</i> 	Medium	This is recognised as a weakness in the current organisation. The fundamentals of a learning organisation are being addressed as a specific workstream in the NSIP.	NCHQ.
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANGE – PROCESS, TIMING, AND COMMUNICATION				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Speed of change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The adoption of unrealistic expectations about the speed of 	Medium	The PR11 savings impose an aggressive implementation timescale.	NCHQ

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	<p>change - including failing to take account of the need for transition management and the associated resource implications</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Can result in confusion and declining safety performance and can also compound other effects</i> 		Formal review will be required before proceeding to implementation.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Large scale redundancies, redeployment or internal staff transfers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failure to clarify the roles of departing and incoming personnel Hand-over periods insufficient to allow new or transferred individuals to acquire experience, information and skills Inadequate supervision of personnel during their induction period <i>Can result in confusion and declining safety performance and can also compound other effects</i> 	Low	The potential impacts of VERS and RN redundancy programmes are being assessed against the requirement to deliver key outputs	NCHQ
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failure to fully explain and justify the change to staff in simple language. <p><i>Can result in resentment and resistance if the benefits to both Dept and individuals not clearly stated.</i></p>	Medium	Importance is already identified in the NSIP. However, the effectiveness of the message gaining acceptance and cultural change is more difficult to assess.	NCHQ

NOTE – some of the above points are clearly related, and in some cases interconnected. But, the aim is to ensure that all are considered one way or another.