

## CTLB- STRATEGIC RISK ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY IMPACTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

KEY CHANGE / ISSUE	POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS	ASSESSMENT OF RISK (high, med, low)	ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED	RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION
<b>A. ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES &amp; PERSONNEL</b>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Roles, responsibilities &amp; key activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failing to identify fully how existing roles, responsibilities &amp; key safety activities are discharged before removing or changing them</li> <li>Failing to clarify new roles &amp; responsibilities (particularly where whole layers are removed and/or personnel take on substantial new responsibilities)</li> <li><i>Can result in unclear/unfilled safety responsibilities and/or loss of key safety activities</i></li> </ul>	<p>1. This is a current issue for the CTLB. Streamlining was a prime example of change that lead to a loss of SHEP staff and where SHEP was not given sufficient consideration. No evidence that MOD policy was followed (JSP 375 Vol 2 Lflt 58).</p> <p>2. SDSR, the formation of DIO, DSA, DBSO and VERS could are examples of changes that could create new gaps or exacerbate existing problems.</p> <p>3. Assessment: Likelihood: High Impact: Med <b>Overall: High</b></p>	<p>1. Further work is required to map current safety roles and responsibilities. This information should inform future decisions on the number of safety specialist needed and where they should sit.</p> <p>2. Independent Review of SHEP roles within change proposals.</p> <p>3. Generate register of those with Safety responsibilities.</p>	<p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs (with CESO Assistance)</p> <p>If MOD-Wide – SSDC If CTLB only – CESO</p> <p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs</p>

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Training, skills &amp; capability development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A lack of training, skills and capability development for personnel eg staff who are more empowered</li> <li>Inadequate training needs analysis and competence assessment</li> <li><i>Can result in inability to discharge safety roles &amp; responsibilities.</i></li> </ul>	<p>1. This is a current issue for the CTLB. Latest analysis shows 10% SHEF postholders are not suitably qualified and audit evidence shows that many with secondary SHEF duties are not able to carry out their duties.</p> <p>2. Training Needs Analysis done at TLB level and strategy produced showing which posts require which training.</p> <p>3. Audit results show mixed implementation</p> <p>4. Assessment: Likelihood: Med Impact: Med <b>Overall: Med</b></p>	<p>1. Monitor compliance with CTLB Training Strategy.</p> <p>2. Use PADR as monitoring mechanism/prompt.</p> <p>3. Build in time (and funding) for necessary training and development.</p> <p>4. Those planning change will need to undertake a TNA to ensure they have sufficient SQEP to meet their safety needs during and after any change programme.</p>	<p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs, LMs</p> <p>LMs</p> <p>LMs</p> <p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs, LMs</p>

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reductions in personnel with key competencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Excessive reductions in personnel with key competencies</li> </ul> <p><i>Can result in inexperienced staff exposed to safety risks or them exposing others to safety risks.</i></p>	<p>1. Currently there are no gaps in SHEF posts but 10% of key personnel not qualified.</p> <p>2. Larger number gapped or qualified in secondary roles.</p> <p>3. Assessment: Likelihood: Med Impact: High <b>Overall: High</b></p>	<p>1. Further work is required to map current SHEP roles and responsibilities. Some of this is underway as part of DIO fact finding.</p> <p>2. Identify key posts and relevant competence (link to CTLB Training Strategy).</p> <p>3. Monitor for emerging gaps.</p> <p>4. Monitor continuing competence of postholders.</p> <p>5. Consider how TLB might better access competent advice (e.g. by sharing competent staff across the CTLB).</p>	<p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs</p> <p>DCTLB/CESO(CTLB)</p>

B.LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY				
KEY CHANGE / ISSUE	POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS	ASSESSMENT OF RISK (high, med, low)	ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED	RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Leadership, priorities &amp; focus</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to recognise fully the importance of safety leadership and/or how this is achieved or maintained before making changes</li> <li><i>Can result in a lack of safety leadership manifested by eg lack of focus on key aspects of the safety regime, lack of visibility and/or dilution and distraction from the priority on safety, warning signs and trends not being spotted, and an ongoing, overall weakening of the systems and culture supporting safety</i></li> </ul>	<p>1. This is a current issue for the CTLB. There is no TLB level SHEP forum. CTLB Audit Committee monitor SHEP audit reports and TLB annual reports.</p> <p>2. Audits show lack of active promotion to demonstrate commitment by leadership in most areas.</p> <p>3. Assessment: Likelihood: High Impact: Med <b>Overall: Med</b></p>	<p>1. Have a single CTLB SHEP Plan.</p> <p>2. Senior Managers personally active in promoting SHEP</p> <p>3. Senior Managers held to account for performance.</p> <p>3. Reward good SHEP performance.</p>	<p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs</p> <p>CTLB MB</p>

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Operational authorisation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Downgrading levels of responsibility and/or Duty Holders and/or authorising personnel at lower levels without adequate experience, assessment or support, and/or too quickly</li> <li><i>Can result in inability to discharge safety roles &amp; responsibilities and/or loss of focus on, or quality of, key safety mechanisms and processes.</i></li> </ul>	<p>1. . This is a current issue for the CTLB. Examples seen where HLB Holders and HOEs etc are not aware of risks or lack of SHEP resource at lower levels.</p> <p>2. Assessment Likelihood: Med Impact: Med <b>Overall: Med</b></p>	<p>1. Development Duty Holder roles and responsibilities and identify key posts and provide a formal route for risk escalation.</p> <p>2. Ensure Duty Holders able to assess impact of changes.</p>	<p>BTLB MB, HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs</p>

C.SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CORPORATE MEMORY				
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Safety Management System</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to understand the implications of the change on each element of the Safety Management System:</li> <li><i>Policy</i></li> <li><i>Organisation</i></li> <li><i>Planning &amp; Implementing</i></li> <li><i>Monitoring</i></li> <li><i>Audit &amp; Review</i></li> <li><i>Can result in system weaknesses in one or more of the key elements for safety management</i></li> </ul>	<p>1. This is a current issue for the CTLB. Streamlining has resulted in deterioration of safety management systems of HLBs based in Head Office. Current weakness identified in planning, monitoring and review.</p> <p>2. Current Safety Management Systems are diverse and HLB/Agency specific.</p> <p>3. Evidence from Audits show slow reaction to change.</p> <p>4. Assessment Likelihood: High Impact: Med Overall: Med</p>	<p>1. Positive reaction to existing audit report recommendations.</p> <p>2. Oversight of corrective actions</p> <p>3. Continuation of audits and assurance activities post change to ensure no further slippage/measure of continual improvement.</p> <p>4. Adoption of standard audit methodology for internal (HLB) and external (TLB) audits.</p>	<p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs</p> <p>CBAC, HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs</p> <p>CESO</p> <p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs</p>

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Corporate memory</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to recognise that important information (including lessons learned) is lodged with key individuals and is not retained in durable records and/or that systems are not in place to capture and retain information</li> <li><i>Can result in loss of key safety information and recurring incidents that could, and should, have been prevented.</i></li> </ul>	<p>1. TLB is reasonably well served by Functional Safety Boards in terms of high impact hazards/activities</p> <p>2. Proportionate systems in place for learning lessons form more routine activities.</p> <p>3. Retention of redundant Safety Management Systems documentation is a weakness in many areas</p> <p>4. Assessment Likelihood: Med Impact: Low <b>Overall: Low</b></p>	<p>1. Develop a formal process for assessing the impact of Organisational Change post-change.</p> <p>2. Ensure CTLB is included in any MOD-wide lessons learnt and provided with feedback.</p> <p>3. CESO to continue to circulate lessons learnt as appropriate.</p> <p>4. Implement relevant changes from lessons learnt.</p> <p>5. Ensure systems are in place to implement MOD policy on the retention of SHEP documents (JSP375 Vol2 Lflt 55).</p>	<p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs</p> <p>CTLB MB, HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs, CESO</p> <p>CESO</p> <p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs</p> <p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs</p>

D.IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANGE – PROCESS, TIMING, AND COMMUNICATION				
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Speed of change</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The adoption of unrealistic expectations about the speed of change - including failing to take account of the need for transition management and the associated resource implications</li> <li><i>Can result in confusion and declining safety performance and can also compound other effects</i></li> </ul>	<p>1. Current issue. (e.g. formation of DIO, DSA, DBSO, projects eg BAP and SAP)</p> <p>2. Assessment Likelihood: High Impact: High <b>Overall: High</b></p>	<p>1. Adopt an overall Programme Management approach for all Changes within TLB.</p> <p>2. Change planners to engage with SHEP staff to ensure SHEP considerations are included at an early stage.</p>	<p>CTLB MB</p> <p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Large scale redundancies, redeployment or internal staff transfers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to clarify the roles of departing and incoming personnel</li> <li>Hand-over periods insufficient to allow new or transferred individuals to acquire experience, information and skills</li> <li>Inadequate supervision of personnel during their induction period</li> <li><i>Can result in confusion and declining safety performance and can also compound other effects</i></li> </ul>	<p>1. Assessment: Likelihood: High Impact: Med <b>Overall: Med</b></p>	<p>1. Covered by other areas above (e.g. Training, Roles and Responsibilities, key staff etc.)</p> <p>2. Early engagement of SHEP staff</p>	<p>HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs</p>



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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Communications</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to fully explain and justify the change to staff in simple language.</li> </ul> <p><i>Can result in resentment and resistance if the benefits to both Dept and individuals not clearly stated.</i></p>	<p>1. Current issue (e.g. with the formation of DIO &amp; DSA).</p> <p>2. Assessment: Likelihood: High Impact: Med <b>Overall: Med</b></p>	<p>1. Clear, regular and honest communication required. Recurrent theme from MOD Your Say.</p> <p>2. Ensure process in place for implementation.</p> <p>3. Change planners to feed messages into HLBs.</p>	HLB Holders, CEs, HOE, Hds of SABUs

NOTE – some of the above points are clearly related, and in some cases interconnected. But, the aim is to ensure that all are considered one way or another.