

AIR CMD - TEMPLATE FOR STRATEGIC RISK ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY IMPACTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

This template has been completed for Air Cmd using its ongoing Command Structures Review (CSR) programme as the live worked example.

KEY CHANGE / ISSUE	POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS	ASSESSMENT OF RISK (high, med, low)	ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED	RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION
A. ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES & PERSONNEL				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Roles, responsibilities & key activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failing to identify fully how existing roles, responsibilities & key safety activities are discharged before removing or changing them Failing to clarify new roles & responsibilities (particularly where whole layers are removed and/or personnel take on substantial new responsibilities) <i>Can result in unclear/unfilled safety responsibilities and/or loss of key safety activities</i> 	<p>Low</p> <p>Low</p>	<p>The coincidence of manpower reductions (some 261 net by FY14/15) and the implementation of DHs in Aviation have mitigated this risk significantly.</p> <p>The 95 additional roles established under PR11 to implement the Haddon-Cave recommendations are new roles and not products of merged legacy roles. Therefore, not only is this a robust commitment to safety management, but, due to the scrutiny required of any new role, there is a low risk that the duties associated with these roles will be 'unclear'.</p>	TLB
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training, skills & capability development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A lack of training, skills and capability development for personnel eg staff who are more empowered Inadequate training needs analysis and competence assessment <i>Can result in inability to discharge safety roles & responsibilities.</i> 	Medium	While the SQEP concept matures, the training needs for particular safety posts remain sufficiently well defined to be enacted. However, the fiscal climate preventing broader education and the increased potential for other TLBs to remove training under their own cost-saving measures mean this amounts to a medium risk.	MOD Centre/DESB & TLBs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reductions in personnel with key 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Excessive reductions in personnel with key competencies 	Low	Both the Civil Service VERS and the military redundancy process take into account an individual's skills when	TLB

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competencies	<i>Can result in inexperienced staff exposed to safety risks or them exposing others to safety risks.</i>		selecting those who may leave the service. In addition, the HQ Air Cmd CSR programme is taking a broad functionality (including safety) risk-based approach to post reduction.	
B. LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leadership, priorities & focus 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failure to recognise fully the importance of safety leadership and/or how this is achieved or maintained before making changes <i>Can result in a lack of safety leadership manifested by eg lack of focus on key aspects of the safety regime, lack of visibility and/or dilution and distraction from the priority on safety, warning signs and trends not being spotted, and an ongoing, overall weakening of the systems and culture supporting safety</i> 	Low	Recent implementation of the Duty Holder (DH) construct has identified clearly the 'leaders' of Air Safety within the TLB. While this is not a main driver for Air Cmd's organizational change, this has created a significant cultural shift resulting in an explicit understanding in individuals' minds of their personal accountability and responsibility.	TLB
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operational authorisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Downgrading levels of responsibility and/or Duty Holders and/or authorising personnel at lower levels without adequate experience, assessment or support, and/or too quickly <i>Can result in inability to discharge safety roles & responsibilities and/or loss of focus on, or quality of, key safety mechanisms and processes.</i> 	Low	This is not a risk that is peculiar to safety, and is mitigated by the use of clear delegations that detail the level to which a particular authority can be delegated. From a DH-perspective, responsibility/accountability cannot be delegated to subordinates.	TLB

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C. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CORPORATE MEMORY				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Safety Management System 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failure to understand the implications of the change on each element of the Safety Management System: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Policy</i> <i>Organisation</i> <i>Planning & Implementing</i> <i>Monitoring</i> <i>Audit & Review</i> <i>Can result in system weaknesses in one or more of the key elements for safety management</i> 	Low	Similar to the elements highlighted in Section A. The SMS is the framework of reference. The key aspect here is 'failure to understand...', and this is not a function of the SMS.	TLB
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Corporate memory 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failure to recognise that important information (including lessons learned) is lodged with key individuals and is not retained in durable records and/or that systems are not in place to capture and retain information <i>Can result in loss of key safety information and recurring incidents that could, and should, have been prevented.</i> 	Medium	Few organizations in recent years have displayed competency in corporate memory. Indeed, considerable corporate memory will be vested in individuals and this should be managed using a risk-based system during change programmes. Better Information Management and eXploitation will only ever be able to do so much. All change programmes must pay attention to the human side of corporate memory. Notably, MOD CIO's drive to achieve Maturity Level	TLB

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			3 for Information Assurance will go some way to improving the behaviour and cultural piece surrounding corporate memory.	
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANGE – PROCESS, TIMING, AND COMMUNICATION				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Speed of change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The adoption of unrealistic expectations about the speed of change - including failing to take account of the need for transition management and the associated resource implications <i>Can result in confusion and declining safety performance and can also compound other effects</i> 	Medium	Managed within the Air TLB by implementation meetings chaired at 2-star level. The speed of change is not necessarily the unrealistic expectation, but rather the cost drivers, especially if set through a 'wedge' and there is a reliance on external stakeholders.	Mod Centre & TLB
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Large scale redundancies, redeployment or internal staff transfers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failure to clarify the roles of departing and incoming personnel Hand-over periods insufficient to allow new or transferred individuals to acquire experience, information and skills Inadequate supervision of personnel during their induction period <i>Can result in confusion and declining safety performance and can also compound other effects</i> 	Low	Section A refers to the steps being taken to mitigate the risks posed by large-scale redundancies currently being experienced.	TLB
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failure to fully explain and justify the change to staff in simple language. <p><i>Can result in resentment and resistance if</i></p>	Medium	The Air Cmd TLB, in line with most change programmes that have ever been run, will have a propensity to under communicate change. One	TLB

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	<i>the benefits to both Dept and individuals not clearly stated.</i>		can never communicate change enough - see Kotter's fourth step. Consistent and constant communication extolling the virtues of the change activity remain the only remedies to this risk.	

NOTE – some of the above points are clearly related, and in some cases interconnected. But, the aim is to ensure that all are considered one way or another.