Dear British Broadcasting Corporation,

Please provide all recorded information held that was generated by the Director General’s Office in relation to the 2017 security incident that led to the removal of public access the Media Cafe, or in relation to any decisions during 2017 to remove public access to that area.

Again, I believe there is plausible possibility of wrongdoing in relation to this, with regards to the false statements made in the December 2017 deed with Westminster City Council committing to continued public access to this area, and request that public interest tests take this into account, per the code of practice.

Yours faithfully,

Mr Williams

Dear British Broadcasting Corporation,

Please consider FOI2024/00328 and FOI2024/00423 withdrawn and substituted with your suggestion of:

All internal records within the BBC, excluding correspondence (emails or paper correspondence), used to support the BBC’s decision to temporarily close the media café at Broadcasting House in March 2017 and September 2017.

Given the explicit reference to the 2017 security incident, and the involvement of the Director General's Office as a factor that led to that decision, I interpret this to include any information generated by the Director General's Office in relation to the security incident.

Yours faithfully,

Mr Williams

Dear British Broadcasting Corporation,

Please pass this on to the person who conducts Freedom of Information reviews.

I am writing to request an internal review of British Broadcasting Corporation's handling of my FOI request 'Director General’s Office and 2017 security incident'.

1) The response took well in excess of the maximum permissible time. ICO guidance requires that an explanation is given for slow responses, and this has not been done.

2) The request was for copies of the documents matching the request - as such, the entirety of the documents is in the scope of the request, and redactions for the reason of being not necessary for your perception of the reasons for the request is not lawful. No exception has been identified for this redactions.

3) You indicate that the public interest test for section 38 was conducted solely for the two reasons for audience engagement and my “interest”. I have identified and explained a plausible concern of wrongdoing that justifies a much, much stronger public interest in disclosure. You have ignored this, neither applying it nor justifying why you believe it is not engaged.

There remains a serious issue that in December 2017 the BBC agreed, in a deed made with the involvement of senior people, to maintain public access to the Media Cafe, and only to remove access from the Portland Place door, despite full access having been removed, permanently, following this incident earlier in 2017.

A full history of my FOI request and all correspondence is available on the Internet at this address: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/d...

Please ensure all replies are sent to this email address and no other.

Yours faithfully,

Mr Williams

Dear FOI Enquiries,

As an addition to my Internal Review request, I should note that I do not agree with the harm assertion you make with regards to section 38 and wish to challenge that.

These documents are in relation to an incident that took place nearly 8 years ago, since when the BBC has put in place both the mitigations identified in this review, and other restrictions since. There have been, as you have noted, many protests outside London Broadcasting House in the recent years with no successful intrusions, suggesting that the risk is successfully mitigated. Section 38 would only be engaged if this was an extant, unmitigated risk at this current time, which does not seem likely - especially when you have gone as far as to remediate things as anodyne as section headings in the table of contents. I believe there has been fairly clear over zealous redaction, even in the context of the weaker public interest test that you have applied.

Yours sincerely,

Mr Williams

Dear British Broadcasting Corporation,

I am surprised by the statement you included in your response, rejecting the possibility that there was a plausible chance of wrongdoing. I am therefore going to fully lay out here in writing what we have previously discussed privately.

You say:

"I understand you are of the view that in 2017 the BBC had a settled intention never to re-open public access to the media café and therefore committed wrongdoing when it committed to the terms of the 2017 agreement. In my review of the documents, which includes correspondence with the Director-General’s Office and with the security and incidents teams, I have seen no evidence which supports this allegation."

I am surprised, as we discussed this issue at our meeting, and your property solicitor stated that she could see no proper explanation for why the deed was concluded in terms that continued public access, when public access had already discontinued, and was never recontinued. There was no identification of intervening facts that would have indicated that the decision to permanently remove the public access was made at a later state, and it appears that the decision to request the 2024 change was only made after Westminster City Council threatened legal action against the BBC for the persistent breach.

I would suggest that you have not looked far for evidence, and have conveniently forgotten the points that we discussed in our meeting last year:

1. The Security Risk Assessment of 12 March 2017, in recommendations 4 and 6 says the intention is to open dialogue with Westminster City Council to remove all rights to public access from the NBH reception and the Media Cafe. This shows a clear intention of permanently removing all public access, from March 2017. Instead the BBC agreed with Westminster City Council in September 2017 to retain public access, and to only remove access via the door from Portland Place.

2. The justification given by the BBC for removing public access was the security incident in March 2017, considerably before the September 2017 deed of variation was concluded, which committed to continuing public access.

3. On 23 May 2017, Westminster City Council had a complaint about removal of public access, and contacted the BBC in June, to be told that public access had only been removed on that day, due to the Manchester Arena bombings, and had been reinstated. By your own admissions, this was not true: the public access was not reinstated.

4. In February 2019, Westminster City Council (WCC) again contacted the BBC, saying that their planning inspector had visited the site, and had found that access was refused. The BBC again claimed this was only a temporary situation. A formal direction was given by WCC to the BBC that public access was to be reinstated within 7 days. Again, by your own admissions, public access was not reinstated.

5. In 2023, Westminster City Council again contacted the BBC about the continued lack of public access, and were again told it was temporary, as permitted by the terms of the Public Space Access Management Plan. WCC did not accept this explanation, and commenced enforcement action. This, combined with my making freedom of information requests, appears to have prompted the BBC to apply to regularise the situation by a new application (I note this was submitted by the BBC after I started making requests that threatened to reveal the situation).

Whilst you note that the 2024 application succeeded, the application was considered solely on its contemporaneous planning law merits. The WCC planning officer noted that the Westminster planning policy had changed since 2017, so the public access would no longer have been a requirement. Despite your claims that the granting of the policy clears the BBC's previous behaviours, the papers and recording of the session show that this was no point discussed: obviously because it would not be relevant to the planning law matters before the committee.

In summary:
A clear intention is stated in March 2017 to remove all public access rights under the section 106 agreement. All public access is ceased. In September 2017 senior BBC management conclude a formal deed under the BBC's official seal with Westminster City Council, committing to continued public access. The BBC misleads Westminster City Council on multiple occasions into believing that public access continued, whilst at no point restoring public access.

It it not necessary to prove that the was wrongdoing for the enhanced public interest test to be engaged: there must merely be a plausible suspicion of wrongdoing. The above chain of events are evidently suspicious, and could indicate that criminal offences have been committed corporately by the BBC, or by individuals working in the BBC's senior management, legal, or property teams. It is therefore in the public interest to explore that point. At our meeting of last year, the above was put by me to the BBC attendees, and not only was no 'innocent' reason suggested for the behaviours, but your property solicitor actually said that she could not see an explanation for the disjoint between the course of action on the ground and the September 2017 deed of variation. The only mitigation given was that 'it was a long time ago and the individuals concerned no longer work at the BBC'. That is not a reason to sweep the issue under the rug, and does not count against legitimate public interest in wrongdoing by public officials.

Yours faithfully,

Mr Williams