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Dr Emma L Briant
17 November 2020
Dear Dr Briant,
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Army Field Manual (AFM) Tactics for Stability Operations
is the primary source of doctrine for the
UK land contribution to stability operations from 2017 until the early 2020s. Building on the
foundations laid by higher-level NATO and Defence doctrine, it provides the philosophy and
principles that guide land forces’ approach to stability operations.
AFM Tactics for Stability Operations
is required reading for all staff officers and land force
commanders from sub-unit upwards. They must explain the doctrine to their subordinates and
ensure that the whole land force operates in accordance with its principles. It is also useful for
allies, joint staffs, civil servants, contractors and civilians working alongside land forces.
Unless otherwise specified, all definitions used in AFM Tactics for Stability Operations
consistent with those of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Land Operations 2017
and NATO Al ied
Administrative Publication (AAP) 06, NATO Glossary of Terms
This publication stems from ADP Land Operations
and forms the overarching guidance for the
span of stability operations. The different types of stability operation wil be covered in detail in
Parts 1 – 5 as outlined in the schematic below. Delivery of the Parts wil follow the publication of
this AFM in 2017/18. The Stability Tactics Handbook
wil be held as a live publication on the Army
Knowledge Exchange (AKX) and wil comprise a number of tactics, techniques and procedures
Structure of the AFM
. As the overarching publication, AFM Tactics for Stability Operations
three parts, A-C.
establishes the context in which stability operations take place and informs on the
fundamentals of land doctrine.
describes the role of the state in maintaining its own stability within the wider
context of the international system. This includes examining the elements of a stable
state and what causes them to break down. It also discusses how instability can lead to
violent intra-state conflict and the need to understand the causes to frame a successful
addresses the Full Spectrum Approach and the role of Government. It
provides commanders at all levels with a bridge to Joint Doctrine Publication 05 – Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution
(JDP 05). This is required because
deployments on stability operations wil generally require a higher level of
understanding than the standard ‘two up’ on more conventional combat operations.
examines the UK military approach to stability operations.
summarises the relationship between combat and stability operations.
describes the fundamentals of land doctrine for stability operations.
covers the ten principles of stability operations.
explains the four operations themes, warfighting, security, peace support
and defence engagement (DE) and provides a framework for understanding the
context and dynamics of conflict.
gives an overview of the types of stability operations. They are not mutually
exclusive and are often executed concurrently with other types of operation within the
mosaic of conflict.
provides generic guidance on how stability operations can be planned and executed.
Detailed coverage of the specific types of stability operation can be found in Parts 1-5 of this
describes the operating environment in which stability operations are likely
to occur with implications for the application of Integrated Action.
provides a detailed description of the stability activities.
concerns the orchestration and execution of the stability activities across
the corps, divisional, brigade and battlegroup levels of command. The annexes offer an
overview of the land response to immediate threats to human security likely to be
encountered on stability operations.
This manual continues the evolution in land forces’ doctrine, using ADP Land Operations 2017
framework. The AFM complements joint doctrine through reference to JDP 05. Where possible, it
also complements NATO doctrine and while not exhaustive, the linkages to key NATO and joint
publications are shown overleaf.
Stability Operations Doctrine Hierarchy
AFM Tactics for Stability Ops (TFSO)
AFM Warfighting Tactics
AFM TFSO Part 1
AFM TFSO Part 3
AFM TFSO Part 2
AFM TFSO Part 4
AFM TFSO Part 5
– Joint Concept Note
– Civil-Military Cooperation
– Army Doctrine Publication
Joint Doctrine Note
– Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
Army Field Manual
– Joint Doctrine Publication
Allied Joint Publication
– Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
PART A – STABILITY OPERATIONS: CONTEXT
CHAPTER 1 – DELIVERING STABILITY
Governance and the Rule of Law
Social and Economic Development
Regional and External Influences
CHAPTER 2 – THE GOVERNMENT APPROACH
The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security
Building Stability Overseas Strategy
Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
Relationship between Stability, Stabilisation and Stability Operations
HMG’s Approach to Stabilisation
The Full Spectrum Approach and the Combined, Joint, Inter-agency,
Intra-governmental and Multinational Environment
The Stabilisation Unit
The Role of the Military
CHAPTER 3 – THE UK MILITARY APPROACH
UK Defence Doctrine
Defence Joint Operating Concept
JDP 05 Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution
ADP Land Operations 2017
Operations Themes and Types of Operation
CHAPTER 4 – COMBAT AND STABILITY OPERATIONS
The Application and Threat of Force
PART B – FUNDAMENTALS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS
CHAPTER 5 – PRINCIPLES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS
Principles of War
Principles of Stability Operations
CHAPTER 6 – OPERATIONS THEMES AND STABILITY
ANNEX A: THE LAND CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENCE ENGAGEMENT
CHAPTER 7 – TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS
Types of Stability Operations
PART C - DELIVERY
CHAPTER 8 - THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
Building Stability Overseas
Transition and Stability Operations
The Security-Development Nexus
Threats to Stability Operations
Legitimacy and Force
Audiences, Actors, Adversaries and Enemies
Local, Regional and National Authorities
International Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and
CHAPTER 9 – STABILITY ACTIVITIES
Security and Control
Support to Security Sector Reform
Support to Initial Restoration of Services
Support to Interim Governance Tasks
ANNEX A: DEMOBILISATION, DISARMAMENT, AND REINTEGRATION
CHAPTER 10 – ORCHESTRATING AND EXECUTING STABILITY
The Corps and the Division
ANNEX A: WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND GENDER
Definitions and Descriptions
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
The International Response
Improving Operational Effectiveness by Mainstreaming a Gender
Gender Balance on Operations
Operational Planning and Preparation
Disrupting and Reporting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A: REPORTING WITH A GENDER
ANNEX B: CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT
Schools in Conflict
ANNEX C: HUMAN TRAFFICKING
ANNEX D: CULTURAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
Military Infrastructure and Cultural Property
PART A – STABILITY OPERATIONS: CONTEXT
Part A – Context
► Delivering stability
A-01. Part A provides the context from which flow the
► The Government approach
► The UK military approach
fundamentals of stability operations. Central to Part A is the
► Combat and stability operations
idea that stability operations, as conducted by land forces,
represent only a fraction of the ways supporting the ends of
Part B – Fundamentals of
Principles of stability operations
A-02. Part A describes in detail the other actors land forces
Operations themes and stability
must understand, partner or support to promote the ends of
Types of operation
stability, not least those involved in political processes
Part C – Delivery
promoting stability. Implicit, is the importance of land forces
being able to operate efficiently among the people as well as
Orchestrating and executing
on the battlefield.
A-03. Part A complements AFM Warfighting
that both combat and stability operations may be required within a particular operations theme.2
Stability operations should not be seen as distinct from combat because enemies and adversaries
may seek to block the path to stability or may hold a different vision as to what stability entails.
Crucially, executed well, stability operations can help to prevent and reduce violent conflict
threatening stability before, after or during the conduct of combat operations.
A-04. Chapter 1 describes the role of the state and its government in maintaining stability. This
includes examining the elements of a stable state and what causes them to break down. It also
discusses how instability can lead to violent intra-state conflict and the need to understand the
causes to frame a successful intervention. Chapter 2 addresses the Full Spectrum Approach and
the role of Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) in promoting stability. It provides commanders at all
levels a bridge to JDP 05, as deployments on stability operations will generally require a higher
level of understanding than the standard ‘two up’ on more conventional combat operations.
Chapter 3 examines the UK Military Approach while Chapter 4 summarises the relationship
between combat and stability operations.
I cannot envisage a conflict where there wil be no role for stabilisation
operations, but equal y, stabilisation is highly likely to involve combat.
General Richard Dannatt
1 State stability is defined in para 1-01 and stability operations in para 2-14.
2 The operations themes are: warfighting, security, peace support and defence engagement. See page 3-2, para 3-16.
Chapter 1. Delivering Stability
1-01. HMG defines a structurally stable state as that which
possesses ‘political systems which are representative and
legitimate, capable of managing conflict, change and other
• Governance and the Rule of Law
pressures (both internal and external) peacefully. This means
• Social and economic development
societies in which human rights and rule of law are respected,
• Political settlement
basic needs are met, security established and opportunities for
• Regional and external influences
social and economic development are open to all.’3 In the realm
• Societal relationships
of stability operations, however, it is important to understand that
• Achieving stability
this is but one view of the stable state. This will be discussed in
• State resilience
more detail below.
1-02. Security, governance and the rule of law, and social and economic development
inextricably linked – stability is generally determined by how they interact. Critically, this interaction
is held together by societal relationships
, influenced by regional and external factors and enabled
by an overarching political settlement as outlined below:4 So stability can be maintained within a
functional national state or polity (see p 1-3); but is also built from people with resilient communities
and businesses, and a regional and global community that addresses transnational issues which
impact a country’s stability and development. An effective approach for external intervention is one
which engages at each of these levels where relevant, underpinned by regular contextual
The stable state model (JDP 05)
1-03. Security is part of the foundation on which stability is built, alongside economic and
infrastructure development, political settlement, societal relationships, governance and the rule of
law. Security has traditionally been understood as national security, concerned with territorial
integrity and the protection of the institutions and interests of the state from both internal and
external threats. Increasingly, however, the understanding of security has broadened to include the
notion of human security, emphasising the protection of individuals, their communities, and their
resources for survival.6
1-04. Human Security
. Human security is the collective expression of legitimate individual and
group needs required to maintain authority and stability in democratic states. Characteristics are
3 Building Stability Overseas Strategy
, dated 2011, page 5.
4 JDP 05, para 2.17.
5 Department for International Development (DFID) Building Stability Framework,
6 For example, see Barry Buzan’s People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations
described in Table 1-1 below and selected themes and land tactical responses are discussed in
the annexes to Chapter 10. Part 2 to this AFM covers the protection of civilians in detail.
Human security is characterised by:
Human security is threatened by:
The availability of essential commodities such
Political/ ideological tensions
as water, medical aid, shelter and food
Broader environmental security
Freedom from persecution, want and fear
Racial, ethnic or religious tensions
Protection of cultural values7
Poverty, inequality, criminality and injustice
Responsible, representative and transparent
Competition for, and/or access to, natural
Corrupt and inept governance
Human security: characteristics and threats
1-05. The Security Sector
. A poorly managed or dysfunctional security sector hampers
development, discourages investment and may perpetuate poverty and corruption.8 Similarly, it
may act as a serious cause of popular grievance as well as undermining the legitimacy of the state.
1-06. In liberal democracies, the security sector is typically employed to protect the basic survival
needs of both the state and its population. In addition to securing territory, borders, key
installations and legitimate sources of revenue, the state can meet the legitimate political,
economic, societal, religious and environmental needs of individuals and groups. An effective
security sector underpins the state’s ability to govern and maintain law and order. This supports the
stability necessary to encourage essential investment required for economic growth and the
prevention of poverty.
1-07. Alternatively, a government may choose to use the security sector to protect its own interests
and position. The security sector may also be used as a matter of deliberate policy, to forcibly
exclude groups from positions of political power or compel them to submit to the existing political
status quo. This may fuel discontent, but balanced against other elements, may still create a stable
state in the sense that it is not subject to immediate turmoil and change. This situation is common
within autocratic states.
1-08. A weak security sector and the loss of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force
has wide implications, not least an increase in the freedom of action offered to enemies and
adversaries.9 In some cases these groups may be able to convince the population that they offer a
better source of security, as was managed by the Taliban in certain areas of Afghanistan or Boko
Haram in Nigeria. In some cases, the UK may choose to favour certain non-state actors in
contravention of a state's wishes, especially if that state is threatening stability and the UK's
interests. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
Defining State and Non-state Actors
Understanding the construct of a state is important when understanding how land forces can
support efforts to promote state stability. The state
is the principal unit for exercising public
7 Note that some cultural values and practices may be at odds with International Human Rights Law. Commanders
should seek mission specific guidance on how to approach/report these issues. Examples include Female Genital
Mutilation and forced marriage.
8 The subject of corruption is covered in detail in Part 1 of this AFM.
9 There is increasing understanding and evidence supporting that over 80% of a population's security and justice needs
are in fact provided by non-state actors, certainly in more 'traditional' societies, and arguably even in Western liberal
countries (neighbourhood watch, shopping mall guards, train attendants, all supported increasingly by technology rather
than people) - see e.g. Albrecht, P et al (eds) Perspectives on Involving Non-State and Customary Actors in Justice and
(2011, p3). Western support upsetting this intricate web of social contracts threatens the societal
relationships noted in Figure 1-1.
10 Building Peaceful States and Societies
: a DFID practice paper 2010, page 12.
authority in defined territories in modern times. It is also the central structure in international
relations. The state consists of:
(a) institutions or rules
which regulate political, social and economic engagement across a
territory and determine how public authority is obtained and used (e.g. constitutions, laws,
customs). These may be formal or informal.
at the national and the sub-national level which operate within those rules
(e.g. the executive, legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, ministries, army, tax authorities).
refers to the specific administration in power at any one moment (the governing
coalition of political leaders), while the state is the basis for a government’s authority, legality, and
claim to popular support. The state provides the edifice [complex system of beliefs] within which a
government can operate.
include civil society organisations (CSOs)11 and the private sector, as well as
traditional authorities, and informal groupings such as social networks and religious communities.
In some cases, non-state actors may oppose governments through both violent and non-violent
means. They may even challenge the notion of a particular state. Non-state actors are an
important factor in the rule of law system as part of the checks and balances, and governance of
state-centric power Governance and the Rule of Law
1-09. A stable state has a sustainable political structure that permits the peaceful resolution of
internal contests for political power. It sometimes provides public goods, which may, in some
polities, even include the provision of welfare, education or healthcare, but always, at a minimum,
the resolution of disputes which parties themselves cannot resolve. This is achieved by the state
exerting effective control or influence over its population and territory in a manner that is viewed as
broadly legitimate by the overwhelming majority of those governed.12 This may not always be the
case; it is important to recognise that governance can be applied through persuasion;
administration; and compulsion. The level of economic investment within and into a country relies
heavily on legitimate government and good governance to enforce the rule of law, securing private
property and contracts and guarding against corruption.
A polity is any kind of political entity that is organised. It is a group of people who are collectively
united by a self-reflected cohesive force such as identity and who have a capacity to mobilise
resources. Like a state (which is also a polity), it does not need to be a sovereign unit. For
example, a militia in Libya or a tribe in Somalia may perhaps be said to be polities, just as much as
Afghanistan is, but the Pashtun people may not be.
Public goods are those things that are in the collective interest of all in a society. Public goods tend
to be services, such as state education or justice, common infrastructure such as roads and utilities
grids, or a condition, such as the rule of law or a regulated market. Public goods may be provided
by the state, the private sector or civil society organisations.
11 Civil society organisations (CSOs) include such groups as registered charities, NGOs, community groups, women’s
organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, social movements, business
associations, and advocacy groups.
12 The concept of legitimacy is explored in: Weigand, Florian, "Investigating the Role of Legitimacy in the Political Order
of Conflict-torn Spaces
" , ERC and LSE International Development paper, April 2015.
1-10. While the rule of law has no universally agreed definition,13 it is nonetheless fundamental to
what the UK deems to be ‘good’ government. Rule of law is essentially the principle ‘that all
persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled
to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the
courts.’14 In the context of interventions overseas, it is also important to consider that rule of law
may be upheld through informal societal mechanisms and behaviours.
1-11. The precise form and practice of the rule of law will vary from polity to polity depending on
the social, cultural and political context of a particular society and may include informal societal
mechanisms of dispute resolution, of association and rules of behaviour. For HMG and the United
Nations (UN), but not necessarily all states, the rule of law includes human rights and also refers to
the ends that a society values that are generally agreed to be desirable in a fair, open and
1-12. ‘Good’ rule of law systems will tend to abide by the following four principles:-
The laws are clear, publicised, stable and just; are applied evenly and protect
fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.
The government and its officials and agents, as well as individuals and private entities,
are accountable under the law.
The process by which the laws are enacted, administered and enforced is accessible,
fair and efficient.
Justice is timely, and delivered by competent, neutral and fair processes and people.16
1-13. The opposite of the rule of law is the ‘rule of man’, where arbitrary and unpredictable rule is
in force, individual rights are not respected and those with power are above the law. While it is very
often violent, chaotic and repressive, a ‘rule of man’ state can also be viewed as broadly legitimate
by those it governs, as long as it maintains general order and is capable of engendering in the
governed the belief that such a rule and its institutions are appropriate and proper for that society.
Minimal rule of law allows, however, an elite to capture wealth and power, make laws in their own
interests and corrupt public goods to private ends with impunity. Rule of law is thus intimately
related to the legitimate use of force in society as people must obey the law because there is a
credible threat of enforcement. Equally, the law must be seen to deserve their respect because of
its legitimacy and fairness.17 A concept of the rule of law is a necessary precondition for a definition
13 Keene, S. Afghanistan UK Rule of Law Interventions: Lessons Identified
, Stabilisation Unit, 24 March 2016, para 1.4.
14 Lord Bingham of Cornhil ’s The Rule of Law
, (London, 2010).
15 DFID Rule of Law Policy Approach
, 12 July 2013.
16 Adapted from principles set out by the World Justice Project and Lord Bingham of Cornhil ’s The Rule of Law
17 DFID Rule of Law Policy Approach
, 12 July 2013.
An understanding of the many different models that exist internationally for internal security,
policing and criminal justice is essential. But those models cannot be considered in isolation
because what works in one country will not necessarily work in another which may have
different traditions. It is therefore critical for SSR strategy to take full account of the history,
culture and inherited practices of the country or region in question. The strategy also needs to
be informed by the views and aspirations of the local population.
Sir John Chilcot, The Iraq Inquiry (2016)
1-14. Governance generally refers to 'all of processes of governing, whether undertaken by a
government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization or
territory and whether through the laws, norms, power or language.18 A government that is founded
upon a theoretically stable political settlement can still be undermined by poor governance and
good governance can theoretically exist without a fair political settlement. The more inclusive a
state’s political settlement is, the more resilient it is likely to be in the face of maladministration. A
sustainable political structure will not be completely free of corruption or significant governance
inefficiencies. Corruption or inefficiency may not become causes of instability if the population
considers them as either acceptable or inevitable. Poor governance, which is often characterised
by corruption and contributes to weak rule of law, provides a significant opportunity for both internal
and external actors to a state to exploit the failings in its political settlement. Such exploitation
erodes wider societal relationships and can destabilise the state.
Supporting Formal and Informal Justice Systems in Nigeria
In Nigeria, the rules governing people’s daily interactions are established through formal and
informal institutions and at various levels (international, federal, state, community, religious and
tribal). The majority of Nigerian citizens tend to rely on traditional leaders, customary courts or
community-based security providers as their first port of call.
Department for International Development (DFID) Nigeria is working with a range of different
security and justice service providers. These include the formal court system and alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms (such as citizen mediation centres) to promote access to justice,
the Nigeria Police Force, and selected informal policing structures (such as ‘neighbourhood watch’
arrangements). Improving the capacity of informal policing structures has enabled them to work
within the law, and increased their respect for human rights. Integrating their roles within the
operations of the formal police has helped them become more accountable to the communities
they serve. DFID also supports the training of traditional rulers and customary court judges in the
use of simplified procedural guidelines to help guarantee fair hearings.
Social and Economic Development
1-15. A stable state is likely to have the necessary economic and industrial base, to keep pace with
societal demands and withstand unexpected changes in circumstances. Many so called
‘developing countries’ are confronted by enduring economic problems, despite holding natural
resources, such as: failing infrastructure; rising unemployment; insecurity; and competition from
illicit (criminal) economies.20 These factors also make them more vulnerable in the event that
natural disasters occur.
18 Bevir, Mark (2013). Governance: A very short introduction
. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
19 Building Peaceful States and Societies
: a DFID practice paper 2010, page 30.
20 A developing country, also called a less developed country or underdeveloped country, is a nation or sovereign
state with a less developed industrial base and a low Human Development Index (HDI) relative to other countries.
1-16. The way in which economic opportunity and benefit is distributed across identity groups can
also have a key impact on stability. States and communities are more stable when different groups
are included in the benefits of economic growth. Economic exclusion can worsen grievances which
fuel violent conflict, especially when combined with other group inequalities.21
1-17. In developing and unstable countries, unemployment and underemployment are likely to be
high. Many of the basic social service delivery functions provided by the state in developing
countries - such as health, education, water and sanitation - may increasingly be delivered by civil
society organisations and the private sector, or rely upon substantial international aid. Such aid can
be both financial and functional, with international and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
directly delivering public services which, wrongly presented, can further degrade the legitimacy of
the state. In extreme circumstances, even non-state armed groups may directly deliver such
services (e.g. Daesh), constituting an even more direct challenge to state legitimacy and the basic
expected of the state may depend upon substantial international aid.
1-18. Fragility in the economic sector impacts in the decisions of international and domestic
commercial investors, from the multinational corporations to the modest market stall holder.
Investors lose confidence when they are unable to make financial decisions based on calculated
Economic Development in a Crisis: Providing Opportunities for Displaced Populations.
Jordan has assumed a heavy burden through hosting refugees from the conflict in Syria, which has
imposed severe stress on its economy and host communities. A new paradigm to promote
economic development was needed for both Jordanians and refugees.
The 2016 Syria Conference established a new approach to support Jordan’s growth agenda while
maintaining stability. This included improved EU market access, creating jobs for Jordanians and
refugees while supporting the post-conflict Syrian economy. It enabled Syrian refugees to apply for
work permits and set up new businesses.
1-19. A stable state delivers security, governance and economic development through a legitimate
political settlement. A political settlement is best summed up as the forging of a common
understanding, usually between political elites, that their best interests or beliefs are served
through consent to a framework for administering political power.23 This common understanding
may take the form of an accepted process for brokering power as wel as being an end-point.
Political settlements are often subject to constant renegotiation and may even tolerate a low level
of violence as part of their working. In essence, political settlements are in place wherever those
with the power to threaten state-structures [or social structures] forego that option either for reward
(which may simply be personal security), for the sake of belief, or to wait for an opportunity to
become the government overseeing the existing structures.24 Like the rule of law or governance, it
can be achieved through informal agreements as well as formal institutions.
1-20. While formal and informal power-sharing mechanisms can make an important contribution to
ending conflicts and creating short-term stability, they are often difficult to sustain. Understanding a
political settlement requires an understanding of the incentives that encourage elites to abide by
the political settlement. Intervening armed forces, despite their intentions, can often influence or
21 DFID Building Stability Framework
23 See Bell, C 2015 'What we talk about when we talk about Political Settlements: Towards Inclusive and Open Political
Settlements in an Era of Disillusionment'
Political Settlements Working Papers, no. 1, Political Settlements Research
24 States in Development: Understanding State Building
, DFID working paper, 2008, p.7.
destabilise a local or national political settlement unintentionally by virtue of their latent ability to
apply violence. Their actions or their presence can also impact elite incentives, without the force
1-21. In theory, the more open and inclusive the settlement, the less likely it is that conflict will
arise from political, ethnic or ideological tensions. For this to be the case, however, a settlement
has not only to be inclusive but to be perceived to be fair. Social identities play an important role in
a political settlement- see Societal Relationships, para 1-24. If the social identity of the area
encompassed by a political settlement is too weak or has to contend with too many strongly-held,
local identities, then its very inclusiveness may damage it. Agreeing unified strategies when actors
have different political and ideological perspectives is problematic and can lead to population
groups demanding change. Primacy of political purpose
is a fundamental principle of stability
operations and will be covered in detail in Part B, Chapter 5.
The Evolution of the Political Settlement in Kenya
With a mandate from the African Union and the support of the UN, Kofi Annan mediated a post-
election agreement in Kenya in early 2008 to rearticulate the political settlement and make it
broader and more inclusive. The agreement led to a coalition government based on power sharing
among different ethnic groups. This is proving to be a coalition under strain, built on a stagnant
political settlement which has yet to address the underlying grievances within Kenyan society. In
the long run, the fundamental fault lines in Kenyan society (e.g. ethnicity, regional identity, the
distribution of land ownership) will need to be accommodated in the underlying political settlement
if peace is to be sustained. Regional and External Influences
1-22. States are more stable when they are able to benefit from external opportunities and
peacefully manage regional threats and shocks. Conversely, fragile states are particularly
vulnerable to transnational threats. Violent extremist and terrorist ideologies, transnational
organised crime, illicit financial flows and international corruption challenge the stability of both
state and regional-level institutions. Climate change is a “threat multiplier”, accelerating pressures
on fragile states and challenging their capacity to manage change. Significant commodity price
shocks, or major flows of ‘hot’ money, can also have destabilising effects.
1-23. A country’s regional environment can reinforce or undermine its stability. Migratory and
refugee flows can generate instability and trigger conflict as they increase competition over
resources and economic opportunities. Arms flows are a significant indicator of conflict risk. In
contrast, regional integration, trade bloc accession and the diffusion of institutional norms through
regional organisations can be powerful stabilising factors.
Burma: a Regional Perspective
Burma has suffered from decades of conflict. Ethnic armed groups fight with the government for
rights and autonomy, but also for control over the illicit jade, timber and drugs businesses. In this
context, external drivers of conflict are extremely powerful. Neighbouring countries provide:
markets for illegal trade (e.g. $30 billion of mostly illicit jade export); shelter for armed groups; arms
and; facilities money laundering.
25Building Peaceful States and Societies
: a DFID practice paper 2010, page 24.
26 DFID, Building Stability Framework
1-24. A stable state has a population that is bound together by a combination of social, cultural,
economic and ideological factors
. This evokes a sense of loyalty to the state and to each other
and provides the shared identity that is fundamental to achieving a political settlement.
1-25. The societal status quo can be challenged by many things, including; perceived inequalities
in political power, economic opportunity, and access to services (including security and justice),
based on identity (ethnicity, religion, caste, geography, gender, etc.); large scale migration; and
inter-state tension where religion or ethnicity spans the borders. Any such break down of this
societal bond risks undermining the political settlement and disrupting the security, economic and
State Legitimacy and State-society Relations
Issues of legitimacy lie at the heart of state–society relations. States are legitimate when elites and
the public accept the rules regulating the exercise of power and the distribution of wealth as proper
and binding. States can rely on a combination of different methods to establish their legitimacy,
including international recognition, performance (e.g. economic growth, service delivery), ideology,
procedural forms (e.g. democratic procedures), or traditional authority. Building legitimacy is a
primary requirement for peace, security and resilience over the long term.
For example, the authoritarian Suharto regime in Indonesia was tolerated by citizens as it delivered
on basic services (primarily health and education) and the development of rural constituencies. As
soon as it became apparent that personal politics and advancement began to replace these
concerns, the government began to lose legitimacy, which ultimately brought about its downfall. Achieving Stability
1-26. 'Structural stability' (as defined in para 1-01 above), in a given state, is the longer-term goal
to which all stability operations contribute. It is important to understand that such operations cannot
deliver this longer-term stability in themselves. They can, however, play an important role in
countering different elements of instability that a state or region may be facing at any given time.
1-27. In the short term, external coalitions and alliances may take significant responsibility for
delivering security, essential services and economic opportunity. But central to the success of
stability operations is the extent to which they support the emergence - through non-violent political
processes - of legitimate authorities capable of doing this themselves, leading societies on the
longer-term journey to structural stability.
1-28. The transition of responsibility to these partner-nation political authorities may be a lengthy
process. Ideally, transition should be conditions based and not simply based on political timelines;
there is no value in handing over responsibility for a state function if it cannot be sustained and
developed further. Transition across the state is therefore likely to vary as it will be dependent on
the adversary threat, mix of actors and availability of resources.
1-29. There will be situations where transition is accelerated due to the political imperative. This
may come from the partner state as it starts to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the population or from
external governments keen to see the contribution scaled down. For example, the withdrawal
timelines from Iraq and Afghanistan were largely set by political direction and were not necessarily
based on operational level conditions. For such reasons, coalitions should be planning for
transition right from the start of all military operations.
27 Building Peaceful States and Societies
: a DFID practice paper 2010, page 16.
1-30. One of the key indicators of a genuinely stable state is the ability to anticipate, and
contend with, strategic shocks
– in other words, its level of resilience. Shocks generally result in
degradation or collapse of one, or more, of the elements required for stability (as illustrated in
Figure 1-2) putting the remaining elements under increased pressure.28 Shocks could come about
through events such as:
violence (either from within that state itself or from external intervention/contagion);
a major natural disaster, including a health emergency;
mass inflows of refugees or migrants;
economic crisis; or
contests for the transition of power.
1-31. Weakness in any one element could lead to the erosion and subsequent failure of another.
Where insecurity and conflict are not already present, this erosion can set the conditions for it to
occur and may result in a fracture of the political settlement that regulates key societal and state
relationships. Contextual variations notwithstanding, a fragile state could rapidly break down as
shown in Figure 1-2.
1-32. No single measure of state resilience exists. Instead, metrics tend to be developed by
organisations with interests by sector. For example, DFID has created mechanisms for measuring
state resilience to food shortages.
28 Shocks are described in detail in DCDC. (2014) Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045
Shrivenham, Ministry of Defence.
Breakdown of the stable state model (JDP 05)
Type of shock
Examples and Impact
Violence – internal or
. In 1990, member republics of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, such as Slovenia and Croatia, demanded
greater autonomy. When this was refused by Serbia, violence broke
out across the region leading to a decade of instability.
. On 12 Jan 2010, a devastating earthquake with a magnitude
Disaster – including a of 7.0 struck Haiti, killing more than 160,000 and displacing close to
1.5 million people. Six months after the quake an estimated 20
million cubic metres remained, making most of the capital
impassable with thousands of bodies left in the rubble. The number
of people in relief camps after the quake reached 1.6 million, and
almost no transitional housing had been built. Most of the camps
had no electricity, running water, or sewage disposal. Crime in the
camps was widespread, especially against women and girls.29
29 See United Nations. (22 Feb 2010). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in
Haiti, New York, United Nations.
Mass inflows of
. As of 1 Mar 2016, 4.7 million people had fled the war in
refugees or migrants
Syria as refugees. In Lebanon, this meant that one in five people
were Syrian refugees. By fleeing the violence in their own country
refugees destabilised neighbouring countries.30 This destabilisation
can lead to other shocks, such as violence.
. The collapse in the price of oil in 2015 created
economic shocks in a number of oil-producing states. Venezuela
was particularly badly affected with export revenue greatly
diminished. The government was unable to import as much food
leading to increasing violence on the streets.
Contest for the
. Following the removal of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, Libya
transition of power
was plunged into violence as rival militias and armed factions vied
for control. This led to a breaking down of the functions of the state,
greatly impacting upon human security.
Types of shock with examples
30 See Mercy Corps. https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-what-you-need-
Chapter 2. The Government Approach
2-01. This chapter outlines how HMG uses stability
The Government Approach
operations as a tool to support its strategic objectives. It
• NSS & SDSR
identifies the key strategies and policies and provides the
• Building Stability Overseas Strategy
foundation for the use of land forces conducting stability
• Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
• Relationship between stability,
stabilisation and stability operations
The National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic
• HMG’s approach to stabilisation
Defence and Security Review (SDSR)
• Full Spectrum Approach
• Stabilisation Unit
2-02. The combined NSS and SDSR
(2015) serves as a
• Role of the military
strategic framework document
that looks at security
• Graduated response
holistically, enabling cross-Government policy to reflect the
• Conflict sensitivity
UK’s security priorities and objectives. It considers the UK’s
place within the international order, outlining the strategic thinking required to underpin its actions
over the next five years. Although the UK remains relatively secure, international events, many
unexpected, have led to greater insecurity and uncertainty.
2-03. There are three high-level, enduring and mutually supporting National Security Objectives
(NSO) listed within the NSS and SDSR
. Protect our people
– at home, in our overseas territories and abroad, and to
protect our territory, economic security, infrastructure and way of life.
. Project our global influence
– reducing the likelihood of threats materialising
and affecting the UK, our interests, and those of our allies and partners.
. Promote our prosperity
– seizing opportunities, working innovatively and
supporting UK industry.
2-04. These objectives are threatened by amongst others:
International terrorism affecting the UK or its interests.
An international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK and its allies as well
as other states and non-state actors.
Risk of major instability, insurgency or civil war overseas.
A significant increase in the level of organised crime affecting the UK.
Short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources essential to the
2-05. The eight missions given to the Armed Forces in the NSS and SDSR
are the ways
achieve the three NSOs and prevent the aforementioned risks undermining the UK’s wider
security. Three of these might involve land forces participating in stability operations:
Reinforce international security and the collective capacity of our allies, partners and
Support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR), and conduct rescue
31 NSS and SDSR 2015 – A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom
, dated Nov 2015.
32 See Part 3 to this AFM.
Conduct operations to restore peace and stability.
2-06. Land forces will, however, rarely operate in isolation
. Seamless cooperation between the
military and civilian agencies
is essential in stabilising fragile states, using all the tools of
national power available, coordinated through the National Security Council (NSC). Building Stability Overseas Strategy
2-07. Sitting beneath the NSS and SDSR
, the Building Stability Overseas Strategy
(BSOS) is an integrated cross-Government strategy
to address instability and conflict overseas. It focuses on
strengthening cross-Government cooperation and improving performance through three mutually
through the anticipation of instability and potential triggers of conflict.
Rapid crisis prevention and response
through appropriate and effective action to
prevent a crisis or stop it spreading or escalating.
Investment in upstream prevention
to help build robust, legitimate states capable of
managing tensions and shocks and lower the likelihood of instability and conflict.
2-08. The 2010 SDSR
committed the Government to produce the Building Stability Overseas
, which is one of several strategies stemming from the 2010 NSS. It is aligned with related
strategies, notably the Counter Terrorism Strategy
(CONTEST), the Organised Crime Strategy
, the Cyber Crime Strategy
, and the International Defence Engagement Strategy
(IDES). It takes into
account the Government’s strategies in areas such as proliferation and arms control, energy
security, and climate change and resource competition, which it complements. The 2015 NSS and
also promoted the role of Defence in building stability overseas.
Review 2010 (SDSR
Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 and complementary strategies
Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
2-09. The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) replaced the Conflict Pool in April 2015, as
part of a new, more strategic approach to enhancing the delivery of our national security
. The CSSF is one of two funding instruments (along with the Prosperity Fund), which
operates on a similar cross-Government basis overseen by the National Security Advisor
2-10. The Fund is shaped by a reformed strategy and prioritisation process which produces a more
streamlined, less layered, structure with a clearer line of sight from NSC decisions and to
programme priorities, and greater alignment between UK security interests and conflict prevention
goals. The Fund contains a blend of Official Development Assistance funding and Non-Official
Development Assistance resources. These programmes can fund a range of activities, from SSR
and training to projects implemented by grassroots NGOs and civil society organisations, so long
as they are aligned with a NSC strategy.
2-11. The CSSF is now one of the world’s largest mechanisms for addressing conflict and
.33 Its programmes deliver against over 40 cross-Government strategies set by the NSC.
Together, these activities help to secure the UK, promote peace and stability overseas and
contribute directly to the NSS and SDSR’s
objectives. The fund is designed as a flexible resource
and supports peace processes for example; supporting Colombia by tackling organised crime
(counter-narcotics) in the Caribbean, helping Ukraine to build its resilience to withstand external
threats, funding the deployment of British personnel on UN peace support operations, and has
supported reforming of police forces and militaries in some of the world’s most chal enging
environments. CSSF allocation of funds
• Peacekeeping & Multilateral
• Regional/Country Strategies
• Security & Defence
• Delivery Support, including the Stabilisation Unit & National School of 13.5
CSSF allocation of funds for 2016/17 totalling £1.13Bn34
Relationship between Stability, Stabilisation and Stability Operations
2-12. The term stabilisation has varying meanings and connotations depending on different
perspectives within national and international communities. UK and NATO definitions vary, as
shown in the below box. Nonetheless, the variations are minimal; both focus on the promotion of
legitimate political authorities using integrated civilian and military actions to set the conditions for
(but not achieve) longer term stability. Where our shared interests and values coincide, we will act
with others using NATO doctrine as a common reference. The definition of stabilisation, therefore,
for all UK military doctrine should be consistent with that used within Allied Joint Publication-3.4.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Support to Stabilization and Reconstruction
. The civilian definition
is taken from HMG’s Approach to Stabilisation, dated 2014. Note that the term stabilisation in a UK
context is equivalent to stabilization and reconstruction in a NATO context. NATO definition (military)
UK national perspective (HMG)
Stabilization is an approach used to
Stabilisation is one of the approaches used in
mitigate crisis and promote legitimate
situations of violent conflict which is designed to
political authority, using comprehensive
protect and promote legitimate political authority,
civilian and military actions to reduce
using a combination of integrated civilian and military
violence, re-establish security, end social,
actions to reduce violence, re-establish security and
economic, and political turmoil…and set
prepare for longer-term recovery by building an
the conditions for long-term stability.35
enabling environment for structural stability.36
33 It should be noted too that half (approximately £6bn per year) of DFID’s aid expenditure is now spent in unstable and
conflict affected states, contributing directly to the NSC strategies for those countries. Note that DFID’s budget is distinct
from the CSSF.
34 Conflict Stability and Security Fund 2015 /16 and settlement for 2016 /17
: Written statement - HCWS123 delivered by
Ben Gummer (Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General) on 21 Jul 2016.
35 Allied Joint Publication-3.4.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Support to Stabilization and Reconstruction
36 The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation,
dated 2014, page 1.
2-13. Stabilisation is, however, not an end in itself. To bring about structural stability, stabilisation
needs to be applied with other approaches, including longer-term state building and peacebuilding
as described by DFID.37 The stabilisation approach is intended to provide sufficient stability to
initiate an inclusive political settlement and begin to address the primary drivers of violent conflict.
Stabilisation is the first step towards progress in state building and peacebuilding in very insecure
2-14. Stability Operations
. Stability operations can be described as multifunctional operations
that encompass those military activities contributing to conflict prevention and resolution and crisis
management, or serve humanitarian purposes, in the pursuit of strategic objectives.
2-15. In a land context, stability forms the ends, the different types of stability operations the ways
and land forces the means. HMG’s Approach to Stabilisation
2-16. The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation
and explains why and
when the UK engages in stabilisation and sets out how the stabilisation approach links to other
tools and approaches used in situations of violent conflict. 39 Stabilisation is applied in politically
messy, violent, challenging and often non-permissive environments in which the legitimacy of the
state and political settlement is likely to be contested, and in which other types of stability
operations are unfeasible. The central challenge of stabilisation is to bring about some form of
political settlement in a pressured and violent context, to create an environment where longer-term
peacebuilding and state building processes may have a chance of success.40 JDP 05 identifies
three pillars of stabilisation:
P1 – Protect political actors, the political system and the population
stabilisation approach explicitly enables the deployment of land forces to generate and
maintain security through the application and threat of force. This may require coercive
(military) as well as political intervention, whilst working towards addressing the causes of
underlying tensions. This may also involve active pursuit of groups who refuse to take part in
a non-violent political process. In some contexts, for example if the UN judges that a state is
in breach of its international commitments or poses a threat to wider peace and security, an
external military presence can be deployed to reduce the threats posed by unaccountable
state security forces, whose actions can undermine a political settlement and the security of
the population. Stabilisation is not about stopping violence and restoring the status quo, it is
about shifting incentives, capabilities or opportunities for an inclusive political settlement to
P1 – Likely Military Tasks
of key sites and infrastructure; e.g. market places, government
buildings, military depots, power stations, strategic bridges,
media outlets, refugee camps, natural resources, airports,
in areas secured and held; e.g. intensive patrolling and check
against adversaries; e.g. search or strike operations.
for example, curfews and vehicle restrictions.
Protection of specific
of key politicians/government functionaries, civilian
reconstruction and stabilisation personnel (international and
domestic), aid workers, etc.
37 Building Peaceful States and Societies
: a DFID practice paper, 2010, page 14.
., page 36, para 86.
39 The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation,
dated 2014, page 1.
40 While NATO refers to 'Stabilization and Reconstruction' operations, the UK government's position is to call this type of
intervention Stabilisation, and to prioritise the political aspect of the challenge.
both State and non-State
P2 – Promote, consolidate and strengthen political processes
. The stabilisation
approach focuses on incentivising agreements between political actors and finding workable
alternatives to violent contest. When there is a political imperative to act, particularly to
protect civilians, there may be insufficient knowledge or entry points to influence the political
process in the immediate term. Failure to subsequently incentivise and support political
processes is highly likely to undermine the chances of overall mission success.
NATO Operation to Protect Civilians in Benghazi, Libya
While this intervention altered the balance of power, the ability of new political players,
including the National Transitional Council was overestimated. Despite elections, a political
settlement remained elusive and there was no monopoly on the use of force within the
country following the end of Gadhafi’s rule.
Activities to foster a political process will be carried out in partnership with other governments
and multilateral partners. In some instances, comparative advantage will lie with those
external actors who have the ability to persuade or compel local actors to come to the table.
In other contexts, the neutral ‘good offices’ of multilateral bodies such as the UN wil be
sought out to facilitate. Priorities include the de-escalation of conflicts through the negotiation
and facilitation of ceasefires, the establishment of conflict management and resolution
structures; support for peace processes, including political outreach and negotiated
reconciliation; and support for interim constitutional processes.
P2 – Likely Military Tasks
Provision of a secure
Protection and freedom
for those engaging in political processes
where political processes take place, e.g. polling stations.
interlocutors and spoilers
of ceasefires, peace agreements, etc.
P3 – Preparing for longer-term recovery
. At whatever stage of a crisis stability
operations are conducted, the focus must remain on supporting political processes which are
inclusive and robust enough to negate the need for violent contestation, and the
corresponding emergence of legitimate political authorities. Any support to infrastructure
repair, service delivery, economic development and other longer-term recovery objectives
should only be conducted to the extent that they directly support these political processes
and authorities, are based on a deep understanding of the conflict dynamics (see para 2-30),
and incorporate planning for transition to local authorities. Conducting such activities directly
may seem like a good way of demonstrating good will and progress, but they are unlikely to
be sustainable in the absence of a broader political settlement, and may well prove
counterproductive. For example, direct military delivery of essential services, infrastructure
repair and humanitarian assistance is fraught with risk and the chances of doing harm are
Militarising humanitarian assistance can significantly undermine the
independence, neutrality and impartiality associated with humanitarian aid that civilian
agencies rely on for their security and access.41
41 Note that the military can also suffer from association with NGOs perceived to be performing badly by local
Substituting state service delivery is unsustainable and may directly undermine
the legitimacy of the state/local authorities.
Delivering projects (including Quick Impact Projects) can frequently be
destabilising and create divisions within and between communities, for example
undermining the local economy through over-pricing.
Those who win contracts may well be the representatives of the corrupt
elites/criminals/warlords/old regime who ostensibly, we aim to confront.
Institutional governance transformation takes time. 42
In a stabilisation context, early engagement in the security sector is unlikely to produce
sustainable arrangements, but it can provide time and space for a political authority to gain
legitimacy or acceptance. Security Sector Stabilisation (SSS) helps to provide a basis for
other stabilisation activities and a bridging activity towards longer-term recovery including
SSR.43 SSS is also important for transforming relationships between different actors,
particularly between different armed and unarmed groups. The process by which new
temporary security arrangements are designed and implemented can be used to build or re-
set relationships between different groups.
P3 – Likely Military Tasks
ensure freedom of movement and protection of key actors,
locations and infrastructure to allow others to deliver
humanitarian assistance and basic services, and create the
space and confidence for economic activity to restart
water, sanitation, health, power etc.
Support repair of key
hospitals, schools, clinics, bridges, markets etc.
Support delivery of
medical, logistic, protection
can be summarised by four key characteristics:
Stabilisation is planned and implemented with an overtly political outcome in
. All activities in fragile and conflict-affected states need to have a clear political
purpose and underpinned by a shared understanding of how the planned activity is to deliver
a shift away from the current instability.
Stabilisation is an integrated, civilian led approach, which unifies effort across
. Even when there are military-led and implemented tasks, their application should
occur in the context of an operationally civilian-led, politically engaged, stabilisation
Stabilisation is both flexible and targeted
. Any support to infrastructure repair,
service delivery, economic development and other longer term recovery objectives should
only be conducted to the extent that they directly support political processes and authorities.
They should be based on a deep understanding of the conflict dynamics ('conflict sensitive',
see paragraph 2-30), and should incorporate planning for transition to local authorities.
42 A mechanism for coping with all these challenges is covered under the subject of conflict sensitivity later in the
43 See Security Sector Stabilisation
, Stabilisation Unit, 2014.
Stabilisation mandates will be transitory but cannot be short-term in outlook
. It is
important to ensure that opportunities to build local capacity and promote local ownership
during stabilisation interventions are taken, given the clear advantages these will bring during
and after transition from violent conflict.
2-18. These four characteristics are reflected in the principles of stability operations
for the land
environment described in Part B, Chapter 5 of this publication. The Full Spectrum Approach and the Combined, Joint, Inter-agency, Intra-governmental and
Multinational (CJIIM) Environment
2-19. Successful strategy requires an inter-agency approach to integrate the application of the
military, economic and diplomatic instruments of power
, at all levels of command and
throughout the campaign. Ultimately, states resort to the use of force when diplomatic and
economic power cannot achieve the outcome required. When military power is used, it is in
conjunction with the other two. It is, therefore, important to understand which agencies function at
the operational level, how they will affect the tactical level, and the impact they will have on the
conduct of operations. The CJIIM environment
includes supranational organisations, for example
the UN; Government departments other than the MOD; national intelligence agencies; partner
nation or other indigenous partners; NGOs; humanitarian groups; private security companies; other
contractors; and commercial organisations. Usually, a single department will be nominated to lead
the effort, based on the nature of the crisis or intervention. AFM Command
describes how land
forces should operate within multinational command structures and the CJIIM environment more
2-20. The 2015 NSS and SDSR
describes our UK response to crisis, conflict and instability as one
which wil use all the tools of national power available (diplomacy, defence, development,
intelligence, etc.), coordinated through the NSC. It describes this variously as an ‘integrated’,
‘whole-of-government’, and ‘full spectrum’ approach. This is complemented by our intent to 'invest
more in our alliances, build new stronger partnerships, and persuade potential adversaries of the
benefits of cooperation, to multiply what we can achieve alone’. In this publication we wil use the
term Full Spectrum Approach
to describe this concept. Similarly, NATO doctrine describes a
comprehensive approach in which military and non-military actors contribute with a shared
purpose, based on a common sense of responsibility, openness and determination. This is
facilitated by civil-military cooperation, which applies at the strategic, operational and tactical
2-21. Essentially the above terms describe the same method; that of the UK using the full
spectrum of civil-military, whole-of-government, levers of power in an integrated manner in pursuit
of a common (NSC approved) strategy, in collaboration with international al iances. It recognises
that using the full range of knowledge, skil s and assets of government departments in a mutual y
reinforcing manner wil have far greater impact than departmental priorities being delivered in silos.
2-22. Today, a wider array of government departments than ever before is engaged in delivering
the UK’s Ful Spectrum Approach to conflict and instability. Not least, this is driven by the ever
increasing link between overseas instability and domestic UK stability (through radicalisation,
terrorism, migration, cyber, organised crime, and threats to energy security). But for any overseas
stability operation, the presence of these government departments at what the military terms the
strategic, operational and tactical levels varies enormously (note that civilian departments do not
refer to or generally recognise these levels). To understand how to best work with partners to
deliver the Ful Spectrum Approach, land forces need to understand this reality.
2-23. On overseas operations, the key government departments in theatre tend to be the FCO
(diplomacy/politics), MOD/British Armed Forces (defence/security) and DFID (development).
Intelligence agencies are of course also present, and where migration, radicalisation and organised
crime are major issues of UK concern, the Home Office and National Crime Agency are
increasingly present (largely at the capital level). Regarding the three major departments, presence
and working practices are as follows.
2-24. The FCO is focused on promoting British interests overseas and works primarily at the state-
to-state level. It employs around 14,000 personnel, of which just one third are UK citizens, spread
around 160 countries (and London). Most embassies contain only a handful – sometimes just one
or two – UK staff, bolstered by locally employed staff. They focus on national capitals and largely
on the formal political systems that exist within each country. Most decision-making and planning
sits with policy makers in London, whilst ambassadors and high commissioners enact those
2-25. DFID is focused on poverty reduction and humanitarian assistance. It has around 3,000
personnel (about half of which are based in London). Half of its £12bn (in 2016) annual budget is
spent in unstable and conflict-affected states. In these contexts much of its work is focused on
building stability, as without this platform it recognises that poverty reduction is exceptionally
difficult to achieve. Decision making in DFID is largely devolved to country level, with the DFID
Country Head having a great deal of autonomy. DFID is primarily a funding agency (a ‘donor’), and
hence most of its implementation is conducted through partners; IOs (such as the UN), NGOs
(both international and national), private contractors and, where considered feasible, through host
national governmental bodies. From a UK staff perspective, permanent presence tends therefore
to be concentrated at the capital level. DFID has a strong network of influence and knowledge
down to the tactical level, but this is through third parties who wil likely have very different attitudes
towards cooperation with UK land forces. In contested environments this ambivalence may well
stem from a need to appear neutral, for both security and access reasons.45
2-26. The MOD/British Armed Forces are focused on the use or threat of force. Of the three key
overseas-facing departments/organisations it is by far the largest with wel over 200,000 personnel
(including military and civilians). It has, theoretical y, a very strong presence at the strategic,
operational and tactical levels: in particular, the military represents the only UK department in
which personnel are dedicated to operating at the tactical level.
2-27. In terms of resources at the strategic level, therefore (Whitehall and in-country capital level),
all relevant departments are well represented. But at the operational (sub national) and tactical
levels in particular, the UK system struggles to resource a fluently balanced political, economic and
security approach. The security resources (the military) are less than comfortably aligned with the
economic/development resources (DFID’s implementing partners); and there are no formal political
means (FCO) at this level at all. Furthermore, in terms of unity of command, at no level does the
mechanism exist for formally subordinating personnel from one department to another. This means
that decision-making at every level must be driven by consensus, and is why inter-departmental
integration is won or lost in term of relationships – which is a high risk approach to C2.
2-28. In some theatres (Afghanistan) we have responded to this chal enge by establishing sub
national integrated teams (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, for example). PRTs have been the
exception, not the rule, and it should not be assumed they wil exist in new theatres. Another
response has been the increasing introduction of civilian staff into military headquarters (HQs) on
operations and exercise (Stabilisation, Humanitarian, Political, Gender, Strategic Communications,
Cultural, and Security and Justice advisers, to name but a few). Sometimes these staff are direct
representatives of key government departments. More usually they are experts (see para 2-32)
with a strong working knowledge of political, economic and security dimensions of the environment
and good links with Other Government Departments (OGDs) and international and national
2-29. Physical presence is not the only constraint to integrated working. Time horizons and
approaches to planning are very different too. The FCO does not have a strong planning culture;
44 For further info on the FCO see https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/foreign-commonwealth-office.
45 For further info on DFID see https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development.
core work tends to be driven by short-term priorities driven by fast changing political realities. In
contrast DFID tends to adopt a much longer time horizon, using multi-year programmes and
projects to nudge what might need to be generational change. The military is the only part of the
UK system that studies campaigning, but operational y wil often focus on gains achievable in a six-
2-30. At the operational and tactical level, integrated working means all personnel having a true
understanding of: the UK’s ‘operational system’; integrated strategies and campaign plans; how
each department operates and how to liaise effectively. For the military, one consequence of this in
the context of stability operations may be that appropriate limits of exploitation may well need to be
defined by non-military means. For example, if success relies on military progress being aligned
with political and developmental input, the military may need to advance operationally at no greater
speed than other departments (or their international and national partners) can follow.
Key departments supporting the Full Spectrum Approach
UK’s Humanitarian Assistance Response to the Ebola Virus Disease
HMG’s humanitarian response to the Ebola Virus Disease was led by a DFID 2* supported by an
Army 1*. The MOD deployed 750 personnel to help with the establishment of treatment centres
and an Ebola Virus Disease Training Academy. Royal Fleet Auxiliary ARGUS was also deployed to
provide crucial aviation support to the region enabling manoeuvre of medical teams and aid
experts. The UK committed to delivering more than 1,400 treatment and isolation beds to combat
the disease, protect communities and care for patients.
The Training Academy achieved its mission of training over 4,000 healthcare workers, logisticians
and hygienists including Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces and prison staff. The military had
the capacity and resources at high readiness able to react in a timely manner, in the view of DFID:
‘No contractor could have undertaken this role.’ Over 1600 National Health Service (NHS) staff,
deployed to West Africa to help those affected by Ebola. Deploying NHS personnel were trained at
the Army Medical Services Training Centre in York.
The UK continues to play a leading role, particularly in Sierra Leone where, due to its strong
bilateral links, it chose to focus its efforts as the framework nation. A $664.65 million package of
direct support was committed to help contain, control, treat and ultimately defeat Ebola.
The Stabilisation Unit
2-31. The Stabilisation Unit is an operational cross-departmental agency whose purpose is to help
HMG respond to crises and address the causes of instability overseas. It is a uniquely integrated
civil-military operational unit, with core staff members from ten government departments, including
serving military and police officers. It is the Government’s centre of expertise and best practice for
stabilisation, conflict, security and justice, and is designed to be agile, responsive and well
equipped to operate effectively in high-threat and high-risk environments. It supports the NSC
departments but does not take ownership of individual crises or policies. Humanitarian and
consular crises remain the preserve of DFID and the FCO respectively. The Stabilisation Unit is
funded by the CSSF, and is answerable to the NSC (Officials).
2-32. The NSS and SDSR
2015 recognises the Stabilisation Unit’s role in supporting more
effective cross-Government crisis response, stabilisation and conflict prevention in fragile states. In
this capacity, the Stabilisation Unit may engage in:
a rapidly evolving crisis where the NSC and Cabinet Office is driving coordination and
the pace of activity is frenetic;
an ongoing crisis where our Government’s activity, though high profile, is at a more
normal pace or until central coordination mechanisms are established; or
upstream prevention, in respect of ‘watch-list’ type countries, where there is cross-
departmental interest and the potential for focused support.
2-33. The Stabilisation Unit supports the Full Spectrum Approach to stabilisation, conflict and
instability in a number of different ways:
. Supporting the Government’s analysis at a regional, national or sub-national
level (including joint analysis of conflict and stability).
Crisis planning and developing strategy
. Participating in crisis planning processes
and developing response strategies.
Programme development, review and evaluation
. Supporting programme
development, scoping, review and evaluation. Where strategically important and practically
feasible, conducting detailed programme and project design.
. Providing direct support to Government officials or key
multilateral partners. This includes being the UK’s hub for international policing support
to fragile and conflict-affected states.
. Finding the right people, with the right experience, and deploying
them safely, with the right equipment, to the right place at the right time.
Lesson learning and knowledge
. Capturing, analysing and sharing across
government evidence of what works, to inform future conflict and stabilisation planning and
. Delivering cross-Government training on: conflict, stability and security;
security and justice; women, peace and security; conflict sensitivity and monitoring and
evaluation. Participate in departmental/military training courses and exercises.
46 JDP 05,
paras 3.34 to 3.38.
. Providing surge capacity and backfilling support to departments
working in, or on, fragile and conflict affected states.
2-32. The Stabilisation Unit also controls the Civilian Stabilisation Group – a pool of over 1,000
civilian experts drawn from the public and private sectors. The Civilian Stabilisation Group has
experts in stabilisation, governance, rule of law, livelihoods, communications, infrastructure, public
finance, SSR and a myriad of other critical areas who work with local partners to assist a country’s
recovery. The Group is made up of some 800 independent consultants (deployable civilian experts
or ‘DCEs’), as well as over 200 civil servants, from over 30 departments, across all grades. The
Stabilisation Unit can also call on a pool of serving police officers when required.
The Role of the Military
2-33. The military contribution to stability will be covered in the next chapter, but an explanation of
where it fits into the Full Spectrum Approach is prudent within the context of the Government’s
2-34. In support of NSOs and rarely on a unilateral basis, the military provides critical capabilities
that can support stability, tackle threats at source and respond to crises overseas. Examples
Regional and International Security Cooperation
. In many circumstances, instability
within a state or region can be reduced by partner governments and regional organisations
with limited external support from the wider international community.
Counter Weapons of Mass Effect Proliferation
. Instability may be the catalyst for
weapons of mass effect technology to fall into the hands of belligerent states or armed non-
state groups. In these cases land forces may become involved in counter-proliferation
Deterrence or Containment
. Instability within a state may provide a haven for non-
state actors intent on attacking the UK, its allies or its interests.
Building Stability in Support of Wider State building
. In some circumstances, state
instability engages the UK’s interests or obligations to such a degree that deterrence alone
will be ineffective.
2-35. This variety of roles and capabilities offers HMG choices for how to use the military
instrument of power in support of national security objectives. The scale of military commitment
can range from providing a solitary advisor, a single unit, an aircraft or a ship to conduct
international security cooperation, to deploying a sizeable joint force (see Figure 2-3). The least
intrusive form of response, consistent with achieving national objectives and policy imperatives, will
ordinarily be the goal.
47 JDP 05, paras 3.30 to 3.31.
The graduated range of military commitment48
means acting with the understanding that any initiative
conducted in a
conflict-affected environment will interact with that conflict and that such interaction will have
consequences that may have positive or negative effects
2-36. The UK recognises that international interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states,
including those specifically targeted at addressing conflict and instability, have the potential to
inadvertently worsen the situation or cause harmful consequences. As such, in order to maximise
the positive impact of its engagement on conflict and stability, the UK is committed to pursuing a
conflict sensitive approach to its interventions. Land forces’ application of Integrated Action directly
promotes conflict sensitivity by linking understanding to actions, effects and outcomes.50
2-37. Key elements of conflict sensitivity are:
Understanding the context (see JDP 04);
Understanding the interaction between land forces’ engagement and the context;
Acting upon understanding to avoid negative impacts (risks) and maximise positive
2-38. 'Do No Harm' (a term commonly applied in the field of sustainable development) is the
minimal application of conflict sensitivity, where we simply aim to identify and minimise the
negative effects of our interventions. Wherever possible, we should be aiming for a fuller
application of conflict sensitivity, where we equally focus on maximising our positive impacts on
existing conflict dynamics.
2-39. Interventions can inadvertently exacerbate conflict or undermine prospects for stability by, for
example, deepening divisions between groups, creating economic dependencies, entrenching war
economies or by supporting elites with limited popular support. This tends to happen where there is
a lack of in depth understanding of the context, inability to adapt approaches to a rapidly-changing
situation or failure to identify and effectively manage the trade-offs between different objectives. In
48 Ibid., page 70.
49 Stabilisation Unit, Conflict Sensitivity – Tools and Guidance
50 ADP Land Operations 2017
, Chapter 4.
the context of stability operations, we might even be conflict actors ourselves when providing
military support with actions which can, over the short term, be inherently destabilising as we seek
to promote stability.
Potential Negative Impacts of Intervention
Selective support reinforces or creates grievances
. Programmes where the distribution of
assistance mirrors cleavages in a conflict (geographically, politically, and socially) can fuel
grievances and deepen the conflict (e.g. in Nepal, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka). Conflicts between
communities may be fuelled over locations of projects and the hiring of labourers. Elite capture, diversion of resources to particular groups
. Where leaders directly benefit from
assistance, taking credit for it, or seeking to control who benefits, inequalities and patronage can
be reinforced and inclusivity undermined (e.g. in Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, South
Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka). Reinforcing corruption, competition over aid resources, distorting the economy
can reinforce corruption through multiple layers of subcontracting, or generate competition and
conflict over aid resources, often along factional, tribal or ethnic lines. A quick increase in aid can
generate an aid economy that distorts the local economy. (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, South Sudan and
Nigeria). Supporting political processes that are not inclusive
. Striking a deal may be a priority in the
short term, but the exclusion of key groups, such as women, may enhance grievance and lay the
foundation for future conflict (Libya, South Sudan). Working with or bypassing the state
. Working through a government or military that is (or is
perceived to be) exclusionary, corrupt, or a party to the conflict can cause resentment and
reinforce conflict actors. Not working through state can in some contexts be equally harmful (e.g.
Mali, Lebanon, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo).
2-40. Conflict sensitivity does not mean being risk averse. Instead, it entails adopting a deliberate
and systematic approach to ensuring policy and intervention decisions are made on the basis of a
robust and credible analysis of the context. It involves adopting a critical lens, testing and
challenging assumptions about how we contribute to stability, identifying key trade-offs and
dilemmas inherent in our actions and seeking the right balance between different objectives and
approaches, benefits and harms, and categories of risk.
2-41. Women, Peace and Security
. The Women, Peace and Security agenda has, in recent
years, emphasised the contribution women can make to the stabilisation process in conflict-
affected areas. Understanding the impact of a conflict on women and girls should be part of the
effort to be conflict sensitive. The UK Government has committed to putting 'women and girls at the
centre of all our efforts to prevent and resolve conflict, to promote peace and stability, and to
prevent and respond to violence against women and girls. Building equality between women and
men in countries affected by war and conflict is at the core of the UK’s national security and that of
the wider world - it is necessary to build lasting peace'.51
2-42. This commitment stems from the international community's increasing recognition of the
different vulnerabilities to conflict experienced by women and girls, the impact on a society's
prospects for post-conflict recovery and long-term stability caused by all forms of sexual and
gender-based violence (against men as well as women), and the positive role women can play in
building sustainable peace. This was articulated in 2000 through the UN's Security Council
Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security, and has subsequently been strengthened
51 UK National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security, 2014-2017.
through many additional resolutions. The UK's National Action Plan
for implementing our
commitments related to this agenda includes many commitments specific to the military. But in
parallel to these formal commitments, there is also a growing recognition across NATO, the UN,
and the British military that adopting a gendered lens on stability operations can directly improve
our operational effectiveness. It can improve our understanding of the context, our intelligence and
our force protection, and impact directly on how we interpret our mandate and translate this into
action at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Annex A to Chapter 10 provides more detail
on this agenda.
Chapter 3. The UK Military Approach
3-01. This chapter identifies
The UK Military Approach
doctrine that enables land forces
• UK Defence Doctrine
to conduct stability operations and
• Defence Joint Operating Concept
contribute to HMG’s strategic
• JDP 05 – Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution
objectives (see stability operations
• ADP Land Operations
doctrine hierarchy, page iv).
• Operations themes and types of operation
• Integrated Action
UK Defence Doctrine
3-02. Conforming to the 2015 NSS and SDSR
, UK Defence Doctrine outlines the broad philosophy
and principles underpinning how Defence is employed, and is the foundation from which all other
national doctrine is derived.
3-03. It outlines the shape of the military instrument, it reinforces the combined, joint, inter-agency,
intra-governmental and multinational (CJIIM) character of most operations and highlights the
significance of Campaign Authority.53 Defence Joint Operating Concept
3-04. The Defence Joint Operating Concept
(DJOC) provides the high-level vision and unifying
conceptual thinking to help develop and employ the Armed Forces effectively in support of national
policy and strategy; it will shape the next iteration of UK Defence Doctrine
. It focuses on resetting
them for engagement, deterrence and contingency. In the short term it provides a conceptual
framework for the International Defence Engagement Strategy
3-05. The DJOC
emphasises that the Armed Forces must retain their warfighting excellence as
the foundation for credibility and utility
. But must also be better able to contribute to the NSS
through actions short of war
. This, amongst other ways, will be achieved by building
partners’ capacity to tackle emergent threats at source and dissuading potential adversaries from
pursuing undesirable courses of action.
3-06. This resetting is achieved by introducing the concept of the Engaged Force to deliver the
required increase in strategic understanding and the intended broader contribution to the NSS and
. These are forces forward engaged overseas to understand and shape the strategic context
and operating environment. Alongside the Committed Force, they deliver the IDES
and provide the
strategic orientation required by the Responsive Force (i.e. Joint Expeditionary Force) to be
JDP 05 Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution
3-07. The purpose of JDP 05, Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution
is to provide
context and guidance on how, and why, the military instrument of power can be used in support of
national strategies for addressing instability, crisis and conflict overseas.55
3-08. It explains how the military contributes to the core components of stabilisation described in The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation
, providing the context for stability activities as a
subset of tactical activities (see Figure 3-1 ).
3-09. JDP 05 outlines how the UK seeks to help shape a more stable world as part of our national
strategy and examines the military role within this. The publication recognises the deliberate shift
52 JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine
, dated Nov 2014.
53 Ibid, para 2.65.
54 Joint Concept Note 1/14, Defence Joint Operating Concept
, dated Mar 14, para 1.
55 JDP 05, para 1.
away from recent campaigns towards a more forward leaning and engaging approach. The need
for cross-Government cooperation and understanding as part of the Full Spectrum Approach is
3-10. JDP 05 was developed concurrently with several new doctrinal and other, related Joint
publications. In 2018, JDP 05 will be reviewed, consolidated and merged with a number of related
Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). The primary focus of JDP 05 remains stabilisation (responding to
situations of conflict and instability) but also considers the wider subject of stability.
3-11. A variety of stakeholders were consulted in the publication including the FCO, DFID, the
MOD and the Stabilisation Unit. It is important to understand, however, that JDP 05 is principally a
military publication intended for a military audience. It is both consistent and coherent with the
position of other stakeholders and, in particular, with The UK Government’s Approach to
produced by the Stabilisation Unit. ADP Land Operations 2017
3-12. ADP Land Operations
builds on the foundations laid by UK Defence Doctrine
to provide the
philosophy and principles for the British Army’s approach to operations. As ‘capstone’ doctrine it
provides an overview and a framework for understanding, which reinforced by this publication,
establishes the doctrine for land forces delivering stability activity.
3-13. The document outlines the NATO codification of operations themes, types of operation and
tactical activities. This enhances and aids interoperability with allies and aiding understanding of
the mosaic of conflict. Those relevant to land operations are shown in Figure 3-1 and will be
expanded upon in Parts B and C.
Operations Themes and Types of Operation
3-14. Operations may be assigned or described in terms of particular contextual themes. These operations themes
allow the general conditions of the operating environment to be understood,
informing the intellectual approach, resources available (including force levels, rules of
engagement (ROE) and force protection measures), likely activities required and levels of political
appetite and risk. There are four themes, aligned to the functions of land power: warfighting
, peace support
.56 These themes provide a framework for understanding, in
general terms, the context and dynamics of a conflict. A theme may be set at the strategic level and
forms part of the narrative for operations, but this wil not necessarily happen. As a conflict evolves,
the thematic designation may change. It is important for the operational and strategic levels of
command, informed by tactical commanders, to anticipate the need for any change. Within a single
operations theme more than one type of operation wil often occur simultaneously.
56 AJP-01. Note that UK doctrine refers to DE which is largely the same as NATO doctrine’s description of peacetime
, but is not constrained to peacetime situations. United States doctrine use the term ‘security
Operations themes, types of operation and tactical activities
3-15. Within the operations themes, certain types of operation
exist. They are not mutually
exclusive and are often concurrent with other types of operation within the mosaic of conflict. As
doctrinal definitions, they are neither designed nor do they necessarily correspond to UK Defence
planning tools or assumptions.57 Rather, they aid analysis and articulation of complex missions and
provide the essential gearing required to sequence a series of tactical activities to achieve
operational objectives. Note that unlike NATO doctrine, ADP Land Operations
additional, discrete type of operation described as capacity building. Types of operation and
operations themes are covered in more detail in Part B.
3-16. Within all types of operation, land forces conduct all or some of a range of tactical
, often concurrently. The balance between the different activities varies from one
operation to another over time. The four stability activities are described in Part C.
3-17. Integrated Action describes how land forces orchestrate and execute operations in an
interconnected world, where the consequences of military action are judged by an audience that
extends from immediate participants to distant observers. Integrated Action requires commanders
and staff to be clear about the outcome that they are seeking and to analyse the audience relevant
to the attainment of their objectives. They then identify the effects that they wish to impart on that
audience to achieve the outcome, and what capabilities and actions are available. These lethal and
non-lethal capabilities may belong to the land force itself, or to joint, intergovernmental, inter-
agency, non-governmental, private sector and multinational actors involved in the operation. What
is important is for commanders and staff to work out how to synchronise and orchestrate all the
relevant actions to impart effects onto the audience to achieve the outcome.
3-18. Where stability operations are concerned, land forces face the challenge of identifying all
actors affecting the path to stability. Identifying the correct actions and effects to promote stability is
dependent on creating a network of understanding within the operating environment.58 This can be
57 ADP Land Operations 2017
, para 2-16.
58 JDP 04 – Understanding and Decision Making
achieved through the intelligent application of tools and resources and a careful approach to the
allocation of supporting and supported roles.
3-19. Throughout the phases of combat we understand the roles and hierarchy of the levers of
Integrated Action and the capabilities to employ and orchestrate them are, largely, available to the
Division. In stability operations it is more likely that information activity and capacity building will
have greater primacy and that the capabilities will be available at lower levels of command. Consequence Management
3-20. Consequence management is a process by which a headquarters plans for, and reacts to,
the consequences of incidents and events which have a direct physical and psychological effect on
people [audiences]. Headquarters must consider consequence management throughout the
planning process and execution of operations. In the context of Integrated Action, consequence
management provides a reactive mechanism to maintain progress towards desired outcomes
following incidents. 59
59 See ADP Land Operations, Chapter 9, Annex A – Understanding Risk.
Chapter 4. Combat and Stability Operations
The Application and Threat of Force
Combat and Stability Operations
• The application and threat of force
4-01. The primary role of land forces is to fight and
therefore delivering lethal force is the purpose for which
• Stability operations
they should be most prepared. Campaigns and operations,
• Operating environment
however, generally rely on more than simply combating the
enemy to be successful. While land forces can contribute
to successful conflict resolution through the application of force or the threat of it, they must also be
prepared to support non-lethal civilian-led initiatives. This can be achieved by supporting the Full
Spectrum Approach, combining the three instruments of national power; diplomatic, economic and
4-02. Combat cannot be considered in isolation from the other types of operation. It is vital, when
preparing for combat, to consider how it might impact on other, perhaps subsequent, activities. It is
also important that the build-up to combat does not gain unstoppable momentum. Conflict
prevention, for example, through deterrence, is usually preferable to the consequences of
committing to battle. Nonetheless, a force will only deter if it is militarily credible and this means
being capable of combat. Combat occurs, or is liable to occur, in most of the operations described
below. It is the intensity of the combat that varies. Intensity can be measured in terms of scale (size
and numbers), longevity, rates of consumption and degrees of violence and damage. 60 Stability Operations
4-03. Stability operations may be conducted prior to, after, or during combat, supporting the ends
of stability. While the military instrument may lead in combat operations, albeit within the Full
Spectrum Approach, in stability operations the military instrument is typically a supporting element.
This distinction is reflected in the principles of stability operations.61 These apply to all land stability
operations, the balance of emphasis reflecting the nature of the specific task. While combat
operations are largely enemy-centric, stability operations tend to involve the influencing of a wider
range of actors.
4-04. Given the significant complexity and challenges involved during stability operations, land
forces often play a crucial role because they possess unique capabilities and capacities designed
for such environments. Their key function is to provide a safe and secure environment for other
actors to operate within. When other actors are unable to operate due to non-permissive
environment it falls to the land forces to consider the broader aspects of stability activities.
4-05. In stability operations the military should generally be employed in a supporting role, helping
to resolve a violent chal enge to peaceful politics, usually by providing security. Most of the Army’s
operations since 1945 have been stability operations, ranging from capacity building through UN
peacekeeping to complex counter-insurgency (COIN). In higher-intensity stabilisation campaigns,
although enemy force elements are small, for some force elements combat may be more or less
continuous, and sometimes intense. Doctrinally, the use of force against adversaries in stability
operations intends to gain and maintain, and deny the enemy, popular support.
4-06. The nature and character of conflict are different. The fundamental nature of conflict does not
change; it is adversarial, human and political. The character of conflict changes continuously, as a
consequence of a number of factors, including the politics and technology of the age, and each
60 ADP Land Operations 2017
, Chapter 8, Annex C.
61 These are the same as joint doctrine’s stabilisation security principles, with minor differences in wording to reflect the
requirements of land operations See JDP 05, Shaping a Stable World
conflict’s unique causes, participants, technology and geography. When the UK is a participant, our
particular political, economic, geographic and historical position becomes a factor in the character
of the conflict that we experience. A single description of the character of contemporary conflict is
not possible due to the variations described. Nonetheless, success on stability operations is
dependent on understanding the factors that influence the conflict’s character and their
implications. Parts 1-5 to this AFM provide guidance of the characteristics of the operating
environment in which the different types of stability operations occur.
4-07. Although land forces are inherently versatile, they must be adaptable to deal with new and
changing situations. Future conflict cannot be predicted accurately, so land forces must prepare for
the most complex and demanding operations but be able to adapt rapidly to specific operational
requirements. Having adjusted to deal with the new situation, the force must adapt during conflict.
Adversaries and enemies seek to deceive and surprise us, and themselves adapt: if we are to
succeed we must adapt more quickly than they do.
PART B – FUNDAMENTALS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS
Part A – Context
B-01. Part B provides the fundamentals of stability operations. The
The Government approach
ten principles of stability operations are covered in detail in Chapter
The UK military approach
5. In Chapter 6 the four operations themes, warfighting, security,
Combat and stability operations
peace support and DE are described from a stability perspective.
Chapter 7 gives an overview of the types of stability operations
Part B – Fundamentals of
which are not mutually exclusive and are often executed
► Principles of stability operations
concurrently with other types of operation within the mosaic of
► Operations themes and stability
► Types of operation
Part C – Delivery
Orchestrating and executing
Chapter 5. Principles of Stability Operations
Principles of Stability Operations
5-01. The principles of war constitute the fundamental basis
for military activity and doctrine. They are pre
apply across all campaigns and operations. The principles of
Principles of War
stability operations provide additional guidance to promote
Principles of Stability Operations
the ends of stability.62 The two sets of principles are not
exclusive and wil often be applied concurrently, across the operations themes, types of operation
and tactical activities.
Principles of War
5-02. The principles of war are listed below. With the exception of the master principle, which is
placed first, the relative importance of each principle may vary according to context; their
application according to judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation:
Selection and maintenance of the aim.
Maintenance of morale.
Concentration of force.
Economy of effort.
Principles of Stability Operations
5-03. In enemy-centric combat operations the military is likely to be the supported element. The
principles listed below provide a guide for understanding the supporting, population-centric role of
the military when conducting stability operations.63 Note that at all times the primacy of political
purpose provides the context for activity.
Primacy of political purpose.
Unity of effort.
Understand the context.
Foster partner nation governance and capacity.
Prepare for the long term.
62 ADP Land Operations 2017
, pages 8C-5/6.
63 Note that this role aligns with the support
functions of land power.
Provide security for the population.
Gain and maintain popular support.
Anticipate, learn and adapt.
Operate in accordance with the law.
5-04. Primacy of Political Purpose
. This principle informs all others and dictates the desired
outcome, planning and conduct of the campaign. Military actions must always be subordinate to
and aligned with the overall inter-agency, politically-led campaign. The political authority, which
may be a UN Special Representative to the Security General, another international appointee or
the partner nation government, wil usually have overall responsibility for military operations.
Depending on the operation, lower level representatives of the authority may play an important role
in operations, even to the point of authorising military action. From a UK perspective, the in-theatre
political lead is likely to be the ambassador or High Commissioner. The relationship between the
UK political lead and the in-theatre military commander is therefore crucial, and can have a major
impact on mission success.
5-05. Primacy of political purpose necessitates that all tactical actions are aligned with the desired
political end state. This is achieved by land forces understanding the context
, maximising the
benefits of unity of effort
and preparing for the long term
. In both combat and stability
operations, land forces operate in support of legitimate political objectives. The campaign plan wil
be rooted in the political narrative and as such should be at the forefront of the commander’s
planning, implementation and assessment efforts, noting political direction can change course.
Land forces are guided by political processes by means of the Ful Spectrum Approach.
5-06. While a campaign plan maps the critical path, conflicting pressures and the daily frictions of
operating at the tactical level wil be significant and should not be underestimated. Stability
activities may meet their military objectives but if they are conducted in isolation and at odds with
political objectives, the results may be counter-productive.
5-07. Unity of Effort
. Al agencies, military and civilian, international and partner nation must be
encouraged to co-operate if stability is to be successfully achieved. In a military context, the latter
provides the desired outcome for Integrated Action. The need to cooperate means that within the
security line of operations, the activities of the other actors, particularly those with intelligence and
security responsibilities, should be coordinated down to at least unit level. Coterminous military,
police and government boundaries, with cooperation committees at each level of authority, are
commonly used to achieve unity of effort. From a UK perspective, the in-theatre political lead is
likely to be the Ambassador or High Commissioner. The relationship between this UK political lead
and the in-theatre military commander is therefore crucial, and can have a major impact on mission
5-08. Unity of effort
reinforces the primacy of political purpose
and supports prepare for the
principles. Stability activities are characterised by their cross-Government and inter-
agency nature but relationships between organisations have no agreed template. The unity of
command experienced in warfighting is unlikely to pervade in stability missions. If the organisations
operating within the CJIIM environment achieve unity of effort
, their collective progression
towards the desired political end-state stands a greater chance of success.
5-09. Coherence in planning resulting from Integrated Action at both operational and tactical levels
offers a number of advantages: effective analysis and shared understanding of a situation;
deployment of national resources (including civilian expertise) and focused use of military
5-10. Stability operations wil therefore provide extra challenges to the tactical commander as
disparate organisations with a variety of philosophies, motivations and cultures operate in the
same battlespace. Unity of effort
seeks to corral this expertise and ensures all efforts and activity
work toward a common end. While a commander may wish to coordinate these efforts, some
organisations may be reluctant to comply with the military for reasons of impartiality and force
protection. Uncoordinated activity and disagreement wil present structural and conceptual gaps –
opportunities adversaries wil exploit.
5-11. Understand the Context
. To ensure that the military campaign, operations and tactical
activities are consistent with the political purpose, the historical, regional and political context of the
situation must be understood. Without an adequate understanding of the physical, threat, human
and information environments land forces wil be unable to influence effectively the relevant
audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies (A3E). Understanding, and the intelligence networks
and cultural expertise that underpin it, has to be built over time, and involve significant cooperation
with other agencies. Understanding the gender relations at play in the operating environment
(relative power and influence of women and men, both formal and informal, and vulnerabilities) is
becoming an increasing focus for NATO and UN militaries, as we increasingly recognise how such
understanding can improve our operational effectiveness.
5-12. Contributions to wider political, security and economic development activity wil be grounded
in our understanding of the context, underpinning our Integrated Action. To influence actors’
behaviour we must first understand their motivations. There are clear operational imperatives to
understanding the physical terrain (manoeuvre) and the enemy (application of force) in a
warfighting context. In stability operations the need to understand the broad range of actors
affecting stability is equal y vital.
5-13. Any opportunity to immerse in relationship-building should be exploited.64 Once deployed, the
engage function of land power wil promote a firm knowledge and understanding of the context.
This is a continuous collection process managed and integrated in the same way
information/intelligence is maintained on the adversary. Deployed units, commanders and staff
officers wil become more adept at understanding the broad and complex nuances of sociology,
regional influences, geography, local politics, local economic pressures and language.
5-14. Engaging with key local leaders, tribal or societal groups wil foster good relations, avoid
misunderstandings and reduce the consequences of conflict amongst the people. Accessing the
knowledge and influence of women must not be overlooked (they generally constitute 50% of the
population), and may require additional approaches to harness, such as the use of engagement
teams. At the tactical level it is likely there wil be more opportunities to collect information on the
population in which we operate than an adversary who may wish to remain covert. Both groups
must be understood and this should not be left to ‘cultural specialists’. Understanding the context is
every soldier’s responsibility. Partner nation security forces and the population wil also need to
understand British soldiers and build positive relationships. This may be over short periods of
deployment and under stressful conditions.
5-15. Foster Partner Nation Governance and Capacity
. The force must help to develop the
partner nation’s ability to govern effectively, as demanded by the campaign plan. In the security
sector this is likely to include the capability needed to conduct effective and appropriate security
and stability operations.
5-16. Governments function by maintaining their monopoly on the use of force. In fragile states this
authority may be eroded or non-existent in the eyes of partner nation audience. To develop
governance capacity, commanders and soldiers must first understand the context
partner nation governance and capacity wil also mean providing security for the population and
gaining and maintaining popular support. Governance is undermined by the perception or reality of
64 Examples include upstream capacity building activity, DE or pre-deployment reconnaissance.
corruption, greed, incompetence, bias disregard for the rule of law and disenfranchisement.65
Therefore, one aim of a campaign should be to foster indigenous authority and capacity, through
military and other capacity building, economic support and diplomatic activities.
5-17. The approach commanders and soldiers take to foster authority and build indigenous
capacity is vital to success. Indeed, campaign authority is dependent on it. Opportunities and
activity wil range across the stability activities (see Part C). At all times, commanders should seek
sustainable local solutions to issues affecting stability. Information activities should convey the
growing capacity of partner nation organisations, building legitimacy and authority for the partner
nation government. Cultural differences and attitudes towards local methods should not be allowed
to fester but understood and accommodated. Corruption or behaviour which threatens the authority
of the partner nation (such as sexual violence conducted by its armed forces) should be actively
discouraged. The approach should therefore be honest but firm with every opportunity taken to
connect the audience to the legitimate government.
5-18. Prepare for the Long Term
. Attaining stability in conflict-affected states is likely to be a slow
and difficult process. Planning must be objective and long-term in outlook based on a thorough
understanding of the operating environment. Following combat operations, land forces may only be
permitted to conduct stability operations for a short period. Enemies and adversaries may exploit
this weakness by emphasising their own enduring presence. Not all deployments are preceded by
a crisis or combat operations. Part 5 to this AFM describes how security capacity building (a part of
DE) can provide persistent engagement in support of long-term SSR projects and stability.
5-19. In a security context, given the limited duration of interventions, land forces must aim to
support developments on which successor international and partner nation authorities and forces
can build. At the tactical level, this can be enabled through the development of effective
relationships with actors supporting long-term stability, especially partner nation personnel. The
disruptive effect of limited operational tour lengths should be overcome through well constructed
handover plans, staggered postings and, where possible, continuity staff.
5-20. Provide Security for the Population
. The first duty of any government is to provide security,
including human security, for its people. Where the partner nation is unable or unwil ing to protect
the population, land forces may be called upon to intervene as part of the Ful Spectrum Approach.
If not, enemies and adversaries can exploit this weakness for their own ends.
5-21. Typically, land forces can deliver security through security and control activities (short-term)
and through support to SSR (longer-term). Land forces support to the restoration of essential
services and interim governance wil also benefit the security of the population, albeit less directly.
In the context of Integrated Action, actions taken to improve security, and their effects, have the
potential to influence the behaviour of the population for the better, reducing the influence of
enemies and adversaries. In turn, enhanced security is likely to improve the prospects for long-
term stability. Selecting the correct security actions and effects relies entirely on gaining a thorough
understanding of the population (see JDP 04: Understanding
5-22. Neutralise Adversaries
. The neutralisation of adversaries, and their supporters, can occur
in a number of ways including deterrence, defeat, dispersal, disarmament or absorption into
legitimate security forces, political movements and society. Armed forces play a significant role in
neutralising adversaries. Depending on the circumstances this can include combined arms
manoeuvre operations, raids, patrols, searches, precision attacks and through a contribution to
demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) efforts. To be effective and to avoid
undermining the security of the population, the military contribution to the neutralisation of
adversaries requires considerable understanding of the operating environment, including accurate,
5-23. The principles of understand the context
and anticipate, learn and adapt
guide us in
undermining adversaries and weakening their resolve. Neutralisation then paves the way for
65 Note that corruption may be part of the fabric of some societies.
maintaining popular support, providing space to develop partner nation security forces. This may
ultimately lead to the transition of security responsibility to partner nation government structures.
History suggests security cannot be achieved solely through the presence of military forces. The
stability activities do not focus on the destruction of the enemy. Set in the context of Integrated
Action, their collective pressure (over time) aims to isolate and neutralise enemies and adversaries
who prevent us from achieving our mission, giving space for political processes that may
5-24. While significant combat operations may take place in the physical domain, we may see a
powerful contest for domination of the information environment. The adversary wil employ
information activity in a similar way to land forces in order to influence the behaviour of the
population. The extensive use of social media sites to attract recruits, publicise events and
dissipate their message across international boundaries is one example. The adversary must not
be allowed to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The military force wil therefore be
required to kill or capture those individuals who cannot be reconciled and neutralise the remainder
such that they become irrelevant (attack the network). There must be no safe havens or locations
where the adversary can prepare and regenerate fighting power. In the context of insurgency, safe
havens often exist across international boundaries and may be difficult for the tactical commander
to influence from within his own resources. Armed forces must operate in accordance with the law
and the upmost care taken not to be drawn into actions which may be counterproductive or
undermine the credibility of the mission.
5-25. Gain and Maintain Popular Support
. In stability operations, the state, its security forces
and intervening external actors (civil and military) are in competition with adversaries for the
support of the people. The side that succeeds in gaining the support of the people, and denies that
support to the other side, is likely to win in the long term. Gaining and maintaining support depends
in part on providing security, but it also depends significantly on the day-to-day conduct of the
authorities, their security forces and international partners, and their impact on people's daily lives.
5-26. The application of this principle is made possible by understanding and providing security for
the population. Nonetheless, security by itself is not enough to make the population support its
government. The simplest way military units can lose popular support is by operating outside the
law. Any erosion of legitimacy for the mission is damaging, be that caused by collateral damage,
maltreatment of prisoners, or sexual exploitation. At best, the loss of support may be irreversible
but in the worst instance it can serve as motivation to armed adversaries.
5-27. On entry to theatre, land forces may not be popular, credible or particularly well understood.
Those actors it wishes to influence such as the population, partner nation security forces, key
leaders and reconcilable adversaries must be given the opportunity to assess our actions and
motivations in a positive way. Information activities wil underpin this effort by imparting an effective
narrative which appeals to the population. But in the end, in stability operations it is our daily
conduct which must remain exemplary. With the power of social media, misdemeanours by
individual soldiers can have a profound effect on our wider legitimacy in the eyes of the population,
but also in the eyes of the international community and our domestic audience at home. On
stability operations, every soldier is an ambassador as well as a soldier.
5-28. While the land force commander’s approach may be to ‘under-promise and over-deliver’ in
the initial stages of a mission, the pace of transition demands support for the partner nation
security forces. It is this popular support that generates consent amongst the population and
support for the narrative. With positive momentum commanders can expect spins-offs such as a
flow of actionable intelligence, increased recruiting for the partner nation security forces, reduced
violence and a rising acceptance of a legitimate government.
5-29. No operation is without unexpected or negative incidents. In these instances commanders
must attempt to mitigate the loss of popular support by employing rehearsed and credible
consequence management procedures which must include expeditious information activity. While
the definition of this principle has focused on in-theatre support, tactical actions have the potential
to adversely impact on popular support at home. There is potential scope for conflict between
national security priorities and maintaining public support for operations that require sustained
effort over a protracted period. This is often the case in peace support or counter insurgency
operations. The longer such an operation endures the more information activities remain on the
5-30. Anticipate, Learn and Adapt
. The effective force improves all aspects of its performance
throughout the campaign. This requires formal systems to look for new ways of doing things, and
learn lessons from effective and ineffective practice. The ideas and lessons must be disseminated
to benefit the whole force, which requires the capacity to adjust doctrine, training, equipment and
other aspects of capability. The Operations Process supports this effort (see AFM Command
The Operations Process
5-31. Land forces’ ability to react to dynamic threats and emerging tactics of our adversaries is
underpinned by understanding. To successfully neutralise those individuals or groups who oppose
the mission requires a mind-set that is prepared to question, inquire and review all tactical actions.
At the operational level a campaign plan wil identify key decision points and risks to the operation.
It wil establish the critical information needed to inform progress and robust measures of
performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE).66 This flow of information to
commanders allows the combined force to adapt (at the operational level) to changing
circumstances. Deployed civilian support from Operational Analysts (OAs) and Scientific Advisors
(SCIADs) reinforces our ability to accurately identify ‘success and risk’. The process is entirely
scalable and applicable at the tactical level and reflects human nature to assess what works and
where a change of approach is required. Subconsciously or through more formalised processes
our adversaries wil be reviewing their own actions and take every opportunity to reinforce success
and capitalise on our mistakes; their survival depends upon it.
5-32. Anticipation at all levels inculcates a culture of initiative and provides the time and space to
operate one step ahead of our adversaries. We wil not always outwit our enemies but the speed at
which UK and partner nation forces change their behaviour to mitigate threats wil help maintain
the pace of transition and progress towards the desired political end state. Types of stability
operation such as counter-irregular activities, demand we constantly review and capture the
lessons identified then refine our training and education both at the tactical level (adapting TTPs)
through to force generation (individual and collective mission-specific training events). Anticipate,
learn and adapt is command-led but all soldiers must be actively engaged.
66 Other Government Departments may use the term ‘Monitoring and Evaluation’.
5-33. Operate in Accordance with the Law
. The armed forces and the other agencies involved in
stability operations must abide by the law and be seen to do so. This is more than a matter of the
standing requirement to act lawfully. As the armed forces of a country which adheres strictly to the
rule of law, our moral authority to intervene and conduct stability operations depends on our lawful
conduct: it is about our integrity. This also applies to any alliance or coalition we are part of, and
the partner nation. It is a critical aspect of gaining and maintaining popular support, and of
undermining any perceived legitimacy of adversaries. It is often the case that adversaries commit
serious crimes and therefore our lawful conduct sets us apart. If members of the security forces are
accused of breaking the law, legitimacy is maintained by visible and effective investigations and
where necessary, prosecutions. In the end, cover-ups destroy legitimacy.
5-34. It should be self-evident that professional, well-trained and wel -led armed forces must
operate in accordance with the law. Operating outside international, national or partner nation law
wil lose us popular support, eroding the chances of stability. Operating in accordance with the law
not only fosters the rule of law, which is an important end in itself, but it is a crucial part of
maintaining legitimacy of the partner government and of the security forces. Land forces may find
themselves operating with coalition partners and/or other allies, including partner nation security
forces. Combining the military capabilities of different nations brings depth, breadth and legitimacy
to a military force. It also generates complexity and frictions associated with interoperability. The
difference in interpretation of national law is one example which must be overcome. For
multinational operations or ad hoc coalitions, national caveats are usually declared reflecting the
law and policy of each respective nation in areas such as the interpretation and application of ROE
for offensive force, targeting and detention.
5-35. The application of coalition or combined force fighting power wil generate specific legal
considerations for tactical commanders. Particular laws and practices may be at odds with our
own. Where, for example, partner nation security actors are known to abuse or torture detainees
then UK land forces may be unwil ing to transfer detainees in their custody until political agreement
and assurances are made. There have been instances in the recent past where it was alleged and
occasionally subsequently proven that British forces broke the law. Irrespective of whether the
allegations are proven or not, the consequences of the allegations or crimes have major
implications for the conduct of the campaign and the overall reputation and standing of the UK. No
matter what tactical circumstances a soldier or commander may find themselves in, expediency is
not an excuse to operate outside the law.
Chapter 6. Operations Themes and Stability
6-01. Operations may be assigned or described in terms of
Operations Themes and Stability
particular contextual themes. These operations themes allow
the general conditions of the operating environment to be
understood, informing the intellectual approach, resources
available (including force levels, rules of engagement and
force protection measures), likely activities required and levels
of political appetite and risk. There are four themes, aligned to
the functions of land power: warfighting, security, peace support and DE. Ultimately, the
purpose of all these themes is to promote stability benefiting the UK (see Figure 3-1).
6-02. The themes provide a framework for understanding the context and dynamics of a
conflict. A theme may be set at the strategic level and form part of the narrative for operations,
but this will not necessarily happen. As a conflict evolves, the thematic designa tion may
change. It is important for the operational and strategic levels of command, informed by
tactical commanders, to anticipate the need for any change. Within a single operations theme
more than one type of operation will often occur simultaneously.67 Warfighting
6-03. In warfighting (also referred to as major combat operations), most of the activity is directed
against a significant form of armed aggression perpetrated by large-scale military forces belonging
to one or more states or to a well-organised and resourced non-state actor. These forces engage
in combat operations in a series of battles and engagements at high intensity, varying in frequency
and scale of forces involved. The immediate goal is to ensure freedom of action at the expense of
their opponents. The rhythm of operations is often high with high logistics consumption. Enemy
armed forces may also use irregular and CBRN capabilities to support conventional forces’ military
objectives. Operating in a context where warfighting is the predominant theme may be further
exacerbated, perpetuated or exploited by irregular actors seeking to benefit from instability,
whether through insurgency, terrorism, criminality or disorder. These themes are collectively known
as irregular activities.
6-04. The transition from combat operations to multi-agency stability operations (to re-establish
stability and prosperity, underpinned by the rule of law) is important to establish a perception of
security.68 It is likely to be characterised not by the attainment of specific end states (such as
absolute victory) but by incremental conditions-based outcomes (albeit they may reflect political
direction to achieve particular goals according to a rough timetable). The mix of actors, and their
respective motivations, wil be highly dynamic. Conventional opponents, even once defeated, may
re-appear as or be reinforced by irregular forces; the threat they pose may need to be countered at
the same time as re-establishing legitimate indigenous governance and authority. Pursuing the
gradual transition towards stability, land forces are likely to support the activities of other actors in
protecting, strengthening and restoring civil society, governance, rule of law and the economy.
Operating in a context where security is the predominant theme requires an increasing number of
stability activities together with offensive and defensive activities.
6-05. The peace support theme describes an operating environment following an agreement or
ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and
67 ADP Land Operations 2017
, Chapter 8, Annex C.
68 Most notably, human rather than state-centric security will be crucial in gaining the trust and confidence of local
compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. Where peace support is the predominant
theme, land forces may expect to conduct almost exclusively stability activities, even if ready for
offensive and defensive activities. The purpose is to sustain a security situation that has already
met the criteria established by international mandate; the use of force by peacekeepers is normally
limited to self-defence. Peace support activities include peacemaking, peace enforcement,
peacekeeping and peace building. Peace support activities are most often mandated and
coordinated by the UN, but may be delegated to a military alliance such as NATO.
Defence Engagement (DE)
6-06. DE is the means by which we use our Defence assets and activities, short of combat
operations, to achieve influence. It includes state-to-state military dialogue, bilateral or
multinational training and exercises, and capacity building in which UK forces train, advice, assist
and accompany partner nation security structures. DE spans the mosaic of conflict and types of
operation; it is most effective when initiated in peacetime, continuing if necessary through conflict
and into post-conflict stability operations. Its purpose is to sustain the UK’s position and influence,
protect and promote prosperity and security, build capacity and establish comprehensive
relationships and understanding.
6-07. Early, effective and enduring DE within the Ful Spectrum Approach can help to avert
instability and, if not, reduce the likelihood of it being prolonged. It is a necessary theme of all
operations. The land contribution to DE is covered in detail in Annex A to this chapter, being an
emerging area of doctrine with limited coverage in other land publications.
Annex A to Chapter 6: The Land Contribution to Defence Engagement
. Joint Doctrine Note 1/15 Defence Engagement
provides a detailed
description of DE at the joint level. The land contribution to DE should be focused on establishing
relationships, increasing access and influence, developing and enhancing understanding, and
building capability and capacity for specified partner nations. It is not about conducting activity, but
the achievement of UK effects or objectives; it therefore needs to be coherent, coordinated and
prioritised across Defence and Government. Those involved in DE activity need to have an
understanding of the UK strategic plan for the partner nation in which they are deployed and what
their part in the plan is. Context
. DE is cross-Government business. The NSS and SDSR
15 explicitly direct
that the nation should use its capabilities to build prosperity by extending the UK’s influence in the
world, and strengthen security. Key documents are Building Stability Overseas Strategy
and the joint MOD/ FCO International Defence Engagement Strategy
(IDES). International Policy
and Planning (IPP) and the Euro-Atlantic Security Policy (EASP), European Bilateral Relations &
EU Exit (EBRX) and Wider Europe Policy (WEP) teams own the MOD’s regional strategies,
informed by the global network of Defence Attaches.
Al Army DE (otherwise known as Army International Activity (AIA)) is subordinate to
and guided by the regional and country strategies which are owned by the MOD international
The unbroken chain linking higher-level strategy to delivery
National Prosperity Agenda
The 2015 SDSR
clearly states the role Defence has in
our nation’s economic security and prosperity. The Prosperity Agenda is the golden thread which
runs through all Army DE.
. The IDES
describes how DE supports HMG strategy through the Full Spectrum
Approach. Developed by the MOD and FCO, it brings together all the levers available to achieve
the NSS objectives. The 2017 IDES
sets out five DE objectives, nested under the three NSOs of SDSR
Capability and capacity building.
Access and influence.
In devising DE strategy, the MOD follows a similar approach to other cross-
Government work that uses a logical framework to link inputs to aims through activities, outputs,
and objectives and this is shown at Figure 6A-2.69 Each category in the logical framework is
described in detail in JDN 1/15.
The DE logical framework (JDN 1/15)
While a large element of DE is conducted at the operational and strategic levels,
tactical-level activity has the capacity to deliver strategic effect. The Army therefore has a key role
to play. The Army DE Sub-Strategy provides high-level direction on the execution of Army
International Activity (AIA).
. DE activities include the following:
High Level International Engagement (HLIE) Chief of the General Staff (CGS).
Senior Level International Engagement (SLIE) (1* – 3*).
Formal staff talks.70
Liaison Officers (LO) and Exchange Officers (EO).
69 Joint Doctrine Note 1/15: Defence Engagement
, para 2.7.
70 Army Staff Talks (AST) are undertaken annually, and complement Defence Staff Talks (DST).
Training and Education (including Overseas Training Exercises (OTX) and International
Defence Training (IDT).71
Regimental affiliations and alliances.
Army International Activity (AIA)
. AIA supports the achievement of UK effects and
objectives by pursuing the following outcomes:
Achieving high levels of cross-DLOD72 interoperability with our allies to sustain our
position of influence and leadership with our strategic partners.
An army persistently engaged overseas to understand and shape while becoming a
reference army which other army’s view as their primary partner and a capability benchmark
within the international military community.
An army that maintains our status and leverage abroad and one that seeks to establish
comprehensive relationships with emerging powers and other emerging states if significant to
To support wider Defence efforts to prevent conflict, protect and encourage stability in
priority regions through capacity building and enhanced persistent engagement.
To support the UK Prosperity Agenda through support to industry and defence exports
while training our forces for contingency in diverse and austere conditions around the world.
AIA sees the Army persistently and actively engaged overseas, international by design.
Through AIA we enhance our ability to understand, shape and respond to emerging opportunities,
threats and trends. Regional alignment to specified countries and regions drives much of this
interaction. This allows the Army to develop understanding, establish relationships, increase
access and gain influence to better coordinate Army activity and deliver DE effect. There are three
areas of AIA:
b. Security Cooperation.
c. Capacity Building.
None of these exclusively supports or replaces any one DE activity although there are
varying degrees of overlap between elements. They are the Army’s ways to achieve the ends of
. Interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, effectively and
efficiently to achieve Al ied tactical, operational and strategic objectives.73
This broad definition can
be broken down into three dimensions:
. NATO divides interoperability into Human, Procedural and Technical. Human
interoperability is the mutual trust and shared understanding generated through shared
experience. Procedural interoperability covers national policy as well as SOPs, TTPs, and
71 Prioritisation of training will be driven by: commitments to allies; political/military prioritisation; the Prosperity Agenda;
partner nation pull; and resources.
72 Defence Lines of Development.
73 AAP-06 – NATO Glossary of Terms
doctrine. Technical interoperability is predominantly focussed on equipment capability
solutions, but is underpinned by the need to communicate and share data.
. ‘Fight tonight’ interoperability mitigates gaps through warfare development to
ensure that contingent forces can operate effectively at high readiness in multinational
coalitions. ‘Fight tomorrow’ interoperability designs multinational solutions into the Funded
and Future Force through capability development. ‘Fight in the Future’ aligns multinational
ideas for the Conceptual Force.
Level of Ambition
. Interoperability requires nations to allocate resources and cede
sovereignty. Strategy must align interoperability outcomes by agreeing an achievable level of
ambition. Defence Strategic Guidance 2008
and Defence Strategic Direction 2016
three levels of interoperability ambition: ‘Integrated’ - forces able to merge seamlessly and
are interchangeable; ‘Compatible’ - forces able to interact with each other in the same
battlespace in pursuit of common goal; and ‘Deconflicted’ - forces can co-exist but not
operate in the same battlespace.
This area of DE focuses on the development of capability in order to allow the UK to
work alongside close allies, including alliances. It enhances the credibility of the military deterrent
and at the operational and tactical levels it provides a more flexible and dynamic capability to the
theatre commander. It encompasses near, mid and far-term activities, and can include training and
education. Interoperability can reduce risks in multinational operations, but it requires nations to
compromise in order to agree common standards, and to accept risk in sharing military information
and pooling capability.
Integrated Action requires significant cooperation between all elements of the CJIIM
force. The key enabler for military cooperation is interoperability. The purpose of professional study
and working and training together with other forces and nations is to build interoperability.
Interoperability strengthens and amplifies the unique contributions of all forces and agencies at
every level. Multinational and inter-component interoperability is usual y more chal enging and
needs more effort and resources than interoperability within UK land forces, but even this requires
conscious effort. The exact requirement for interoperability is determined according to operational
need and political ambition.74
6A-015. Security Cooperation
.75 This promotes close bilateral Army-to-Army relationships with
specified partner nations: fostering exchanges; developing insight and understanding; and growing
capability. Annual staff talks are the usual method of maintaining these relationships, and this is
supplemented with a steady drum beat of activity conducted through the Liaison Officer (LO) and
Exchange Officer (EO) networks. Security cooperation can also be achieved through training and
education. This activity is focused on countries where the UK aims to have a positive long-term
relationship, a short-term security interest or a political/military requirement to engage. Equally, the
generation of insight and understanding with countries where there is a less developed relationship
leads to increased combat effectiveness and better regional understanding.
Capacity building concerns efforts to optimise indigenous security
forces, build institutional capacity and provide support to institutional reform and/or gain greater
local, national or regional influence. It leads to better regional understanding and is often
conducted with countries on the fringe of areas of potential conflict. Closer cooperation leads to
better ‘day one’ understanding should conflict arise, and provides land forces with better situational
awareness, a network in place, and linguistic and cultural expertise.
Specialised Infantry Group (SIG)
. The SIG oversees and commands the Specialised
Infantry Battalions (SpIBs). SpIBs are geographically aligned to specific regions to provide
74 See ADP Land Operations 2017
, Chapter 7 and British Army Interoperability Policy and Country Plans
dated 13 Feb 17 for further details.
75 Note that Defence Engagement broadly equates to Security Cooperation in US doctrine whereas Security Cooperation
is a sub-set of DE in UK doctrine.
long-term, enduring partnerships that are culturally and linguistically attuned to the detailed
needs of that country or region. They offer a tailor made, credible, connected, persistent and
agile ‘understand and train, advise, assist, mentor and accompany’ capability that wil
complement the existing and continued work of regionally-aligned brigades. They wil be the
first echelon of UK DE capability; designed principal y to operate in the more demanding
higher risk/higher threat areas.
Measurement of Effectiveness (MOE)
. In the conduct of capacity-building tasks
overseas, MOE indicators are necessary in order to provide both quantitative and qualitative
assessments. MOE also provides evaluation of project progress, to determine value for
money and to confirm projects are achieving outcomes (against objectives) supporting
desired impacts or effects. Detail on MOE is provided in Part 5.76
. The alignment of the 1 (UK) Div brigades, and selected Force
Troops Command (FTC) brigades to priority regions of the world, allows the Army to deliver
command-focused defence engagement that wil contribute to national and defence policy. This is
to be achieved by the commanders and staffs of each formation working on behalf of the MOD,
using land delivery plans (LDPs), to build relationships and regional expertise that wil , in turn, lead
to prioritised engagement tasks. For the Army, this wil maximise the opportunities for regional
engagement, and wil contribute to the development of regional expertise within aligned formations.
. Persistent engagement is often delivered through capacity
building. Commander Field Army (CFA), through GOC 1(UK) Div, wil continue to develop capacity
building activity, to develop regional understanding and establish relationships and influence, while
supporting the Government’s Prosperity Agenda. CFA wil ensure that the understanding generated
by the regionally-aligned brigades and SpIBs is shared across land forces, both during routine
peacetime engagement and in the event of contingent operations. 1 (UK) Div wil be made
available to inform operational design as appropriate and to assist in the operational gearing during
transfer of responsibility from a regionally-aligned brigade to a deploying force. The regionally-
aligned brigades, in support of Defence Attaches, wil shape demand from countries in their regions
which land forces can support and which is beneficial to the UK’s interests in terms of regional
security, influence and prosperity. Land delivery plans (LDPs) wil be used to plan, cohere and
coordinate all AIA within each region/ country. IDES regional strategies activity-output mapping,
owned by IPP, wil inform the shaping process. 1 (UK) Div wil maintain the proponency for capacity
building within the Field Army and wil coordinate with the Army Directorate of Operations and
Commitments (ADOC) to ensure a coherent, persistent effect in the delivery of capacity building
through short-term training teams and, where appropriate, overseas training exercises.
DE in Relation to Crisis
. DE wil be conducted during the build up to a crisis, as a
minimum by providing early warning via Defence's Global Network. At that stage it may be possible
to help avert the crisis (and instability) through upstream engagement. During a crisis, DE can be
used to guarantee access to a theatre and basing and overflight rights. Capacity building activities
may also be possible. After a crisis DE can contribute to stability through capacity building activity
as occurred in Sierra Leone following Operation PALLISER and during Operation TORAL in
Figure 6A-3 il ustrates this for a hypothetical situation, it is not intended to be viewed as
linear. We must accept that it is possible that our intervention may destabilise a state if conflict
sensitivity is not applied. At all times, the overall military response wil involve DE activities, not
least because those activities make a major contribution to our understanding of the operating
environment or theatre in question.77
76 Ibid, Annex C.
77 Joint Doctrine Note 1/15: Defence Engagement
, dated Aug 2015, para 1.7.
DE activities in relation to crisis.
Chapter 7. Types of Stability Operations
Types Stability of Operations
7-01. This chapter provides an overview of the different types
of stability operations with full detail being provided in Parts 1-
Types of Stability Operations
5 of this AFM. Each type of stability operation must be
understood in terms of how it supports the ends of stability. Types of Stability Operations78
7-02. Counter-irregular activity (see Part 1)
. Counter-irregular activity comprises three
overlapping and interrelated categories: counterinsurgency (COIN), counter-terrorism and counter-
. COIN is defined as: comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat
an insurgency and to address any core grievances. It encompasses those military,
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken by a government or
its partners to defeat insurgency. The approach involves neutralising insurgents by killing,
capturing, marginalising or reconciling them. COIN is characterised by controlling the level
of violence and securing the population through instances of combat, normally conducted at
relatively low tactical levels. Consumption of resources and violence are low (relative to
focused combat operations), but the nature of violence is likely to be more shocking
because of its context, where normality is sought or actually appears to exist. See Part 1
to this AFM for further detail.79
Counter-terrorism describes all preventive, defensive and
offensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and infrastructure
against terrorist threats and/or acts. Counter-terrorism operations may be conducted against
state-sponsored, internal or transnational, autonomous armed groups who are not easily
identified, and who may not fall under the categories of combatants defined in international
law. Measures taken include those activities justified for the defence of individuals as wel as
containment measures implemented by military forces or civilian organisations. Land forces
have a greater contribution to creating and maintaining effective protective measures to
reduce the probability and impact of terrorist attacks against infrastructure or people.
Counter-criminality is the action focused on preventing organised
criminal groups from escalating their activities to the point where they become a threat to
allied forces. The character of conflict is such that insurgency, terrorism and criminality wil
often feed off each other. Land forces’ contribution to counter-criminality wil be very much in
support of specialist agencies, requiring deep contextual understanding to inform and assist
these agencies as necessary.
7-03. Military contribution to peace support (see Part 2)
. Peace support activities concern the
impartial use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes
and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Fol owing an intervention, land forces’ freedom to
operate wil be determined by the wil ingness of the opposing parties to seek resolution. Any
reluctance may result in combat, either directly or in the protection of other agencies and the local
7-04. The distinguishing factor of peace support operations is that land forces are impartial,
supporting an international mandate rather than a partner nation government necessarily. Peace
support efforts include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and
peacebuilding. DE is intrinsic to all. This categorisation does not represent a sequential process
78 ADP Land Operations 2017
, Chapter 8, Annex C.
79 Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency
is extant, but will be revised in 2018, becoming Part 1,
where one necessarily leads to the next; for example, peacekeeping wil not necessarily be
preceded by peace enforcement. Land forces must understand how the different types of efforts
relate to, complement or overlap each other so that their actions support, rather than undermine,
an on-going political process. Figure 7-1 provides a basic conceptual framework to visualise how
these activities may relate to each other.
The military contribution to peace support. Note the position of the types of peace support
activities in relation to conflict. The political process must have primacy throughout all peace support
activities as illustrated by the arrow. All tactical activities may apply at any stage although non-lethal variants
are more likely once a peace agreement is in place.
. A range of activities, including DE to keep inter and intra-state
disputes from escalating into armed conflict.
. Conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or
peaceful settlement involving primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by
direct or indirect use of military assets.
. Designed to end hostilities through the application of a range of
coercive measures, including the use of military force. It is likely to be conducted without the
strategic consent of some, if not all, of the major conflicting parties.
. Designed to assist the implementation of a ceasefire or peace
settlement and to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace. It is conducted with the
strategic consent of all major conflicting parties.
. Designed to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by addressing the
underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a
commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace
7-05. Military contribution to humanitarian assistance (see Part 3)
. Military support to
humanitarian assistance is the use of available military resources to assist or complement the
efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or specialised civil humanitarian
organisations in fulfil ing their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering. They may occur in
response to both natural and man-made disasters, and result from conflict or flight from political,
religious or ethnic persecution. Military support to humanitarian assistance is limited in scope and
duration. In a NATO context, it includes disaster relief, dislocated civilian support, security,
technical support and CBRN management. For UK humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations, joint doctrine should be consulted.80
7-06. Military contribution to stabilisation (see Part 4)
. Stabilization and Reconstruction is the
NATO term used to cover what the UK defines as Stabilisation. It is applied in politically messy,
violent, chal enging and often non-permissive environments in which the legitimacy of the state and
political settlement is likely to be contested, and in which other types of stability operations are
unfeasible. The central chal enge of stabilisation is to bring about some form of political settlement
in a pressured and violent context, to create an environment where longer-term peacebuilding and
state building processes (including reconstruction) may have a chance of success. It requires
protecting and promoting legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and
military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security and prepare for longer-term recovery.
7-07. Capacity Building (see Part 5)
Capacity building, a component of Integrated Action, is
used to maintain or change the capability, wil , cohesion and perceptions of friendly, neutral and
even hostile actors. It includes land forces’ support to SSR, support to initial restoration of essential
services and to interim governance tasks. Capacity building can be a discrete type of operation,
occurring across the mosaic of conflict, as well as a tactical function. As an operation, it may be
conducted discretely or alongside other operations; it may form part of DE (AIA) or in less benign
circumstances, including in combat situations. Capacity building concerns those actions taken to
improve security and, when necessary, civil and infrastructure capability. The military’s contribution
is but one element of the Ful Spectrum Approach, which requires cooperation among all agencies
80 JDP 3-52, Disaster Relief Operations
; the Military Contribution, 3rd Edition.
PART C: DELIVERY
. Part C provides an overview of land forces’
Part A – Context
tactical contribution to stability operations. Detailed guidance in
the context of the specific types of stability operations is provided
The Government approach
in Part 1-5 and the supporting TTPs in the handbook to this AFM.
The UK military approach
Combat and stability operations Part B – Fundamentals of
C-02. Chapter 8 explains the nature of the operating environment
into which land forces might deploy. Chapter 9 describes the
Principles of stability operations
stability activities in detail while Chapter 10 provides general
Operations themes and stability
guidance on the orchestration and execution of stability
Types of operation
operations across divisional, brigade and battlegroup levels of
Part C –Delivery
C-03. Success in applying Integrated Action across the
Orchestrating and executing
operations themes requires a military mind capable of
understanding the nuances and subtleties of stability operations.
This part draws out those elements.
Approaching Stability Operations
‘At the root of the problem lies the fact the qualities required for fighting conventional war are
different from those required for dealing with subversion or insurgency; or for taking part in
peace-keeping operations for that matter. Traditional y a soldier is trained and conditioned to
be strong, courageous, direct and aggressive, but when men endowed with these qualities
become involved in fighting subversion they often find that their good points are exploited by
General Sir Frank Kitson GBE, KCB, MC*. (1971), Low Intensity Operations.
Faber, London, p 200.
Chapter 8: The Operating Environment
Building Stability Overseas
8-01. Land forces are directed to conduct stability operations
• Building stability overseas
overseas in anticipation of, during, or following a crisis.81
While a broad range of actors can contribute to stability,
• Transition and stability
including Other Government Departments (OGDs), Non-
governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International
• The security-development nexus
Organisations (IOs), land forces offer unique capabilities.
• Threats to Stability operations
These capabilities allow them to promote stability using
• Legitimacy and force
operational art.82 The primary chal enge is to understand how
• Human Terrain
tactical activities might support long-term stability.
• International organisations
8-02. The following sections, derived from NATO doctrine,
develop understanding of the operating environment commonly encountered during stability
operations.83 The operating environment can be described as a “composite of the conditions,
circumstances and influence that affect the employment of military capabilities and bear on the
decisions of a commander”.84 Understanding the complexity and interrelationships between
elements of the operating environment is fundamental to the efficient conduct of stability activities.
8-03. While this chapter isolates aspects of the operating environment, land forces should be
cognisant that the operating environment is dynamic, interconnected and constantly evolving. The
operating environment may also be shaped deliberately and unintentionally by external factors
which may both support or frustrate the execution of stability activities.
“Never walk into an environment and assume that you understand it better than the people
who live there."
Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General.
8-04. Knowledge, Understanding and Respect for Local Culture
. As the support of the
population is a key factor in long-term success in stability activities, the way land forces behave in
that context is crucial. While stability activities are demanding and time consuming, ignoring local
norms wil isolate the force from the population. Furthermore, lack of local support and
understanding can stimulate popular support for the adversary’s ideas. Academic and partner
nation expertise should be employed before and during deployment to enhance understanding.
The following measures should be implemented with support from the Defence Cultural Specialist
Unit (DCSU) and unit cultural advisors (CULADs):
. Basic notions about local language and culture (religion,
traditions, ways and customs, antagonisms) should be taught. This includes explaining
appropriate rules of behaviour once deployed. Focus should be on personnel who wil
encounter the population on a regular basis. A single disrespectful or humiliating act
perpetrated by any one of them could disrupt or eliminate progress towards encouraging the
population to support the government and land forces’ wider efforts. Additionally, a
disrespectful act could make a whole community rally to the insurgents. Guidance should be
provided and explored on potential cultural dilemmas that may be faced. For example, when
, Chapter 2.
82 ADP Land Operations 2017
, Chapter 8.
is gender-based 'abuse' considered a cultural issue to be tolerated, and when is it considered
a violation of rights?
. Once deployed, all personnel must behave in a manner which gains
the confidence of the local population. This wil reinforce legitimacy and help the force
maintain situational awareness.
. Some simple ideas should always be remembered: be aware
that today’s enemies and suspicious civilians could be tomorrow’s partners and vice versa.
For example, the way prisoners or civilians in combat areas are treated, or even the way a
patrol is conducted wil impact on how the population perceives us. Al opportunities should
be seized to talk with locals to demonstrate genuine interest in their plight. Dismounted
patrols should be preferred over mounted as they enhance interaction with the population
and facilitate intelligence gathering.
. Progress in civil relations may be put in jeopardy by frequent rotations.
Land forces must make every effort to ensure the preservation of public confidence despite
the disruption caused by rotations. A proactive Key Leader Engagement (KLE) plan wil
assist in a successful handover transition, along with effective employment of continuity staff.
. A lack of language skills within the deployed force can hamper interaction with
the local population. Having a basic understanding of the languages used in a theatre of operations
is important to the understanding of the adversaries, bel igerents, neutrals and the locals’ agenda.
Land forces should have at least a basic knowledge of local languages and how to use interpreters
Transition and Stability Operations
8-06. Operations themes describe the general conditions of operating environments. These
conditions may necessitate standalone stability operations, where no enemy is present, or at the
other extreme, transition from major combat operations within a mosaic of conflict. This section
emphasises stability activities in the context of transition from major combat operations while Parts
1-5 to this AFM describe the specifics of the five types of stability operations.
8-07. The need for transition from major combat operations to stability operations is not always
apparent. Nonetheless, planning for stability operations is inherent to any campaign plan and
should be conducted concurrently to warfighting, rather than once it is clear transition has begun.
This is a key lesson from the invasion of Iraq in 2003 in which insufficient planning for transition
enabled enemies and adversaries to seize the initiative.
8-08. The boundaries between combat and stability operations wil be blurred at the tactical level
and may occur sporadically and unexpectedly across the area of operations. Indicators are likely to
a. A ceasefire or surrender of enemy forces.
b. An increase in population movements and requests for assistance.
c. A reduction in violence or the threat of violence directed at land forces by an enemy
8-09. There wil not necessarily be a reduction in other forms of violence, for example criminal or
8-10. Command Compression
. The boundaries between the tactical and operational levels of
command are likely to be compressed during transition in several ways. Joint capabilities such as
ISTAR, Aviation and Offensive Support may even be placed under land forces’ command or control
for specific operations. Interagency activities to initiate development, governance and rule of law
programmes or deliver strategic or political objectives may also require support by land forces.
Command responsibilities and demands wil both compress and may also broaden concurrently.
Land forces wil increasingly become the supporting rather than the supported component. Note
that command compression can work both ways. While this might mean joint capabilities
supporting a battlegroup, it might also mean elements of a battlegroup being tasked directly by the
Joint Commander (or higher).
8-11. Legal Ambiguities
. During transition, the legal framework of the state may not have re-
asserted itself sufficiently and there may be a judicial vacuum or a state of legal uncertainty which
may be fil ed by a combination of national, international and local laws. Land forces can overcome
this friction through a clear understanding of the legal basis of their own intervention. The legal
basis can and does change over time, as occurred during operations in Iraq.
8-12. Establishing a Secure Environment
. Establishing a secure environment in which other
stability and development activities can flourish is likely to be the primary role of land forces. This
wil require a change from an enemy to a population-centric approach. Restraint and a more
centralised control of fires wil characterise such operations. Given land forces’ capabilities, they
wil be more focused on security than other equally important components of the rule of law. The
exact approach wil differ per the circumstance but is likely to include tasks such as:
Supporting the Rule of Law
. Stability Policing may be required in the absence of a
viable indigenous or international police force or other forms of implementing law and order
which are accepted by the population, for example tribal law. This wil require clarification of
the legal framework under which land forces wil operate and a continuous appreciation of
the national legal balance of power. It wil be crucial that support to one part of the criminal
justice chain, such as stability policing, is equal y matched by development support to other
parts of the criminal justice chain, such as pre-trial detention centres, access to legal aid,
judicial independence, court infrastructure, and correction services among others. Without
balance throughout the chain, efficiencies in one part can cause overload in other parts
leading to a multiplication of human rights abuses, miscarriages of justice, and increase in
impunity, all the while undermining legitimacy of national forces. Curfews and riot control
measures should be considered where violence is in danger of escalation.
Separation of Forces
. Regular or irregular forces may seek to settle their differences
through violence, threatening the security of local nationals and civilian agencies. Land
forces may be required to separate such forces by a mix of interposition, deterrence,
interdiction and negotiation. Communication and coordination wil be required with all parties.
Marking of boundaries and arrangements for dealing with intentional and unintentional
infringements wil be required.
Protection of Critical National Infrastructure
. A breakdown in the rule of law leading
to increased criminality may require urgent local responses to protect critical national
infrastructure until rule of law can be re-imposed. Defending or guarding communications,
power and waste installations may be necessary in the short term. The generation and
organisation of local security forces to relieve our own troops from static guarding tasks wil
be necessary to avoid becoming fixed and unresponsive because of such tasks.
Commanders should note that the overt presence of UK land forces may increase the threat
to critical national infrastructure if our forces are targeted by enemies and adversaries. The
same considerations should be applied to cultural property protection
(see Annex D to
. Attacks against civilians are a favoured tactic by an enemy
force seeking to undermine the legitimacy of state-sponsored forces. Early opportunities may
be present during transition to gather significant amounts of intelligence on organisations and
individuals who might present a threat to the mission. Opportunities to gather, process, and if
necessary act on intelligence should be taken to disrupt the formation of opposition groups to
deny them the opportunity to thrive. The intelligence that can be garnered from men or
women should be actively sought (by appropriate means), and their capacity to influence
both 'friendly' populations and adversary groups should be explored.
Civil-Military Operations Centres (CMOCs)
CMOCs serve as a meeting place for
military and civilian entities involved in stabilisation, governance, humanitarian relief and
construction activities in an area of operations. It is normally located outside a military area
and establishes an interface between military and civilians, providing a conduit for
coordination of activities and advice for the populace on the availability and mechanics of
. Where possible, military areas of operation should be established with
contiguous boundaries aligned to existing national, regional, government and police boundaries
which wil help the re-establishment of normality. If boundaries must be different then consider
using tribal/ ethnic boundaries or ceasefire lines. Advice from local authorities and civil society,
from Political Advisors (POLADs), Legal Advisors (LEGADs), Stabilisation Advisors (STABADs)
and Cultural Advisors (CULADS), as well as well as IOs and NGOs wil be required to ensure that
all boundaries support the long-term stability of the region or campaign.
The Security-Development Nexus
8-14. The term security-development nexus introduces the idea that there cannot be security
without development and vice versa, a theme reflected in the principles of stability operations. The
same idea indicates that security and development are rarely achieved sequential y. So, if pursued
concurrently, land forces wil encounter and wil have to engage with development actors. In this
context, commanders must be mindful of the risks associated with the securitisation of the
humanitarian and developmental space.85 Equally, the routine execution of non-lethal stability
activities does not exclude the possibility that land forces might have to conduct offensive activities
in response to threats.
8-15. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Consent Winning Activity (CWA)
. QIPs are short-term,
small-scale initiatives designed to deliver an immediate and focused impact on target audiences,
primarily civilian. They are commonly associated with support to the initial restoration of services.
CWA is a tactical-level tool aimed at forming economic relationships, establishing communication
channels and enhancing cooperation with a local community. CWA has the potential to overcome
the ‘consent gap’. This is the period after the ‘honeymoon’ of initial defeat of an enemy during
which QIPs might be employed that endures until longer-term, large scale development projects
are delivered. QIPs and CWA should also be supported by a baseline study, project managed
throughout, with clear and measurable objectives, and defined measurements of effectiveness.
This subject is covered in detail in Part 5 to this AFM. Threats to Stability Operations
8-16. There are five major categories of threat which might be encountered on stability operations.
These may appear in isolation or as a combination:
a. Traditional threats
emerge from states employing recognised military capabilities and
forces in conventional forms of military competition and conflict.
85 Described in detail in Part 3 to this AFM, due to published in 2017.
b. Irregular threats
are those posed by an adversary employing unconventional,
asymmetric, and often il egal, methods and (not exclusively irregular) means to counter
traditional military advantages.86
c. Catastrophic threats
may involve for example, the acquisition, possession, and use of
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons (potentially by irregular
activists), also called weapons of mass destruction and effects.
d. Disruptive threats
involve an adversary using new technologies that reduce land
forces’ advantages in key operational domains. For example, information activities using
social media or cyber-attacks. Cyberspace in particular presents significant opportunities
and threats in the context of stability operations. Integrated Action is enhanced by
cyberspace’s ubiquitous, interconnected and dynamic nature. These same factors,
however, also enable threats such as espionage, sabotage and subversion. CJIIM
interoperability is particularly challenging. However, since the effects of actions taken in
cyberspace and the electromagnetic environment are not necessarily geographically
bounded, de-confliction and mutual understanding are imperative.87
e. Environmental and natural threats
are described in detail on page 81 to JDP 3-52
Disaster Relief Operations
and in Part 3 to this AFM. These threats often trigger the
international community to provide humanitarian assistance which may involve a military
contribution. Al types of stability activities might be used in a humanitarian operation.
8-17. Enemies and adversaries wil seek to gain an advantage over land forces by exploiting
threats. For example, adversaries may seek to interdict land forces attempting to enter a crisis
area. If land forces successfully gain entry, the adversary (in the case of an insurgency) may seek
engagement in complex terrain and urban environments as a way of offsetting land forces’
advantages. Methods used by adversaries include dispersing their forces into small mobile combat
teams – combining only when required to strike a common objective – and becoming invisible by
blending with the local population.
8-18. Threats that occur from an internal conflict in a region may necessitate the deployment of
land forces to perform stability activities in the framework of peace support (peacekeeping, peace
enforcing, peacemaking and peacebuilding). These types of threat wil possibly be a combination
of traditional and irregular threats. 88
8-19. Conflicts are much more likely to be fought ‘amongst the people’ instead of ‘around the
people.’ This fundamentally alters the ways in which military units can apply force to achieve
success in a conflict, since collateral damage should be avoided wherever possible.
Legitimacy and Force
8-20. Campaign Authority
. Campaign authority is the authority established by international forces,
agencies and organisations within both combat and stability operations. Campaign authority
comprises four interdependent factors:
The perceived legitimacy of the mandate.
The perceived legitimacy of the way those exercising that mandate conduct themselves
both individually and collectively.
86 See Warfare Branch. (2016) Irregular Adversaries: Land Component Handbook
87 See ADP Land Operations 2017
, Chapter 7.
88 See Part 2 to this AFM, due to be published in 2017.
The extent to which factions, local populations and others consent to, comply with, or
resist the authority of those executing the mandate.
The extent to which the expectations of factions, local populations and others are
managed, or met, by those executing the mandate.
8-21. Land forces’ contributions to stability should be both legal and purposeful. They should also
be, and be perceived to be, legitimate, acceptable and appropriate in a broader sense. Campaign
authority derives from confidence that the appropriate and legitimate measures are employed by
land forces. This helps to maintain support from those that shape opinion, share power and grant
. Legitimacy encompasses the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and ethical
propriety of the conduct of military forces. As the justification for using force, and the way it is
applied, legitimacy has both collective and individual aspects, both of which directly affect the utility
of force. Legitimacy is based upon both subjective considerations, such as the values, beliefs and
opinions of a variety of audiences (at home and overseas), and demonstrable, objective legality.
8-23. Law and the Use of Force
. Law governs the use of force in several different ways; it
regulates when States can resort to using force, for example by sending their troops onto the
sovereign territory of another State. It also establishes how force can be lawfully used once those
troops have been deployed, whether in an armed conflict, or on a peacekeeping mission or other
operation. It is important to distinguish between laws that regulate how a State may act, and those
that govern the conduct of the individual/unit. These distinctions must be made in order that rules
of engagement (ROE) can be viewed in a proper context.
8-24. While it is the responsibility of those who authorise ROE to ensure that the permissions
contained in them are lawful, commanders at all levels remain responsible for ensuring that forces
under their command operate within the law. Furthermore, everyone remains ultimately responsible
in law for his/her actions. Typically, the amplification to the Political Policy Indicator within the ROE
profile wil explain the legal basis for action.89 Nevertheless, both this amplification and the ROE
profile exist only to give guidance; they cannot by themselves guarantee the lawfulness of any
action. An appreciation of the relevant legal principles is essential.
8-25. A complex mixture of international and domestic (national) laws regulate when and how force
may be used. The principal sources of these laws include:
The UN Charter.
The Hague Regulations, the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols; Customary
International Human Rights Law including, in some circumstances, the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The Criminal Law Act 1967 and section 76 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
and the common law defence of self-defence.
8-26. The specific circumstances of each operation, including the location of the actions
undertaken, and the nature of any conflict wil influence which of these laws wil apply. Most
stability operations wil spring from a UN resolution, an invitation from the partner nation, or some
kind of international agreement like a treaty. That authority determines all freedoms and
89 This gives overall direction to commanders for how the ROE are to be applied, including if new circumstances evolve
and swift direction from higher authorities is unavailable. In addition, it provides an indicator to commanders of those
ROE changes that are likely to be acceptable.
constraints: control of and/or responsibility for territory and people, lethal effects, the ability to
capture and detain, intelligence collection and interaction with civil defence institutions.
Mandates, Rules of Engagement and Use of Force
Mandates can be seen either as ceilings or floors [constraints or freedoms]. Conservative,
risk-averse UN officials or commanders constrained by their home governments will interpret
the mandate as a ceiling. By contrast, creative and decisive commanders will take a
leadership role by interpreting the mandate as a floor, defining it operationally and using all
their capabilities to implement the spirit, not just the word, of the mandate.
Major General (Retd) Patrick Cammaert UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations
8-27. Ethics and Morality
. Ethical and moral considerations underpin the law and the
administration of justice, and are also reflected in operational decision-making and military
conduct. Commanders are accountable for their actions and the actions of those under their
command. Commanders are duty-bound to ensure that the highest moral and ethical standards are
maintained by their subordinates and can achieve this through a robust ethos, personal example,
training and education.
8-28. Land forces wil be exposed to chal enge and complexity during stability operations. They wil
face opponents and partners with different moral, ethical and legal boundaries and perspectives,
while themselves operating under intense scrutiny. The trend towards transparency and greater
regulation of Defence activities reflects the expectations of the society we serve and whose values
we reflect. If we are to maintain campaign authority, then we must respect the morals and ethics of
our own culture. Moreover, while never compromising our own moral standards, we must respect
local traditions, customs and practices and pay appropriate attention to the needs of minority or
otherwise vulnerable groups, such as women, children and ethnic minorities.
Our chal enge is to
ensure that society’s expectations of greater legal and ethical regulation are balanced against the
imperatives of operational effectiveness.
8-29. General Conduct
. Land forces can threaten stability and campaign authority through
inappropriate conduct, on and off duty, including when their spending power attracts criminal or
unethical activity. By, for example, using sex workers, or exchanging favours for sex, soldiers and
foreign aid workers support the sex trade and undermine local values. Foreigners may also distort
the local economy and undermine justice and other local values by paying bribes or over-paying for
contracts. Commanders, their staff and all personnel must be clear about the importance of
exemplary behaviour on and off duty, and must state explicitly what is and is not acceptable.90 Audiences, Actors, Adversaries and Enemies (A3E)
. Integrated Action requires us to gain a sophisticated understanding of the
operating environment and situation. We need to defeat or neutralise those who oppose us while
winning over and possibly empowering those who are neutral and friendly. To do this we must
identify audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies.91
90 MATT 6, including the Army Standards, is a useful reference.
91 See ADP Land Operations 2017
, Chapter 4.
Audiences, Actors, Adversaries and Enemies
8-31. The population may be divided by ethnic, religious or political affinities or origins. These are
often deeply rooted in history and may be the very origin of the conflict. These complex divisions
may cause problems during stabilisation and reconstruction operations. This subject is covered in
more detail in Part 4 to this AFM. Frequently, military intervention is required because a decaying
local state apparatus is unable to rule and provide reasonable public services to the population.
Accordingly, the population becomes the centre of gravity for both the alliance and the insurgents.
8-32. A population may be rich in history, traditions and culture which must be understood by land
forces. Local society is often structured in traditional communities and organised in solidarity
(tribal) networks. Leaders of traditional, cultural or religious organisations are key interlocutors and
must be considered as part of the KLE programme.
. Social groups are generally based on nationality; family, clan and tribe; with
language, religion, culture, ethnicity, beliefs and values held in common. Different groupings wil
hold different views on such fundamental issues as birth, life and death, honour and dishonour and
the role and position of men, women and children in society. Care must be exercised when
interpreting the behaviour of a group against our own values and standards. Strict observance of a
religious dogma or set of beliefs or significant hatred of a group may provide an insurgent with an
unshakable wil to die for their cause. Non-combatants may be hostile, ambivalent, tolerant or
friendly in nature and may change their attitude because of actions by any actor. Their consent
could be given freely or may be conditional, but cannot be assumed.
8-34. Leadership and Authority
. The leading personalities within the human environment wil
differ from state to state or region to region depending on the culture, education, religion and
political beliefs. This results in a complex linkage by which authority and power may be exercised.
This is of relevance, as the allegiance of a group may not be to a Head of State but to someone
else inside or outside the state borders. Respect for chiefs or an elder is traditionally maintained in
many societies. These key leaders may have been influenced or marginalised by other actors such
as insurgents, warlords or criminals. Nevertheless, linked to the stability operations principle of
understanding the context, a commander should endeavour to discover who the social leaders are
as they are likely to have knowledge of and exert influence in the community.
8-35. It should be noted that in many societies women are excluded from formal leadership
positions, but nonetheless are likely to play an important role in influencing societal attitudes and
perspectives. The informal nature of these leadership and influencing roles, combined with the
potential difficulty of accessing women in conservative societies, can make it easy to overlook
women in outreach or engagement programmes. This needs to be guarded against, and creative
ways found to achieve this engagement.
Local, Regional and National Authorities
8-36. When intervening in a crisis overseas, land forces must recognise that as well as being part
of a UK Ful Spectrum Approach they wil also have to work closely with local, regional and national
authorities. These actors may well have the capacity to take some if not ful responsibility for the
planning and execution of the crisis response. A military force simply acts as an instrument of
power employed by a government. Land forces must be aware that their supporting role is only
temporary and that the aim is to return to a situation in which their contribution is no longer
8-37. Good cooperation with partner nation representatives is essential from the outset.
Consultation and joint planning must start at an early stage. The use of Liaison Officers (LOs) is
important. Fol owing the partner nation’s plan where possible, land forces can then promote
stability through tactical activities.
8-38. When deployed overseas, in some cases, land forces have been inclined to help local
societies by introducing their own forms of administration and their own norms. Often, this ignores
how societies have evolved in their own context. Although these initiatives are well meant, this
approach is not always successful. For example, agricultural societies have a different level of
organisation from industrialised societies. Military Forces
. The range of military actors in an area of operations can be almost as diverse as
the number of civilian actors. Not all military actors, or perceived military actors, conduct
themselves with the appropriate level of professionalism. Nor do they always act in accordance
with international law and the Geneva Conventions. The prior actions of armed, uniformed
elements may make initial engagement with the local community quite difficult. For many civilians,
it is virtual y impossible to distinguish between one camouflage uniform and another. Considerable
time and patience may be required for UK land forces to build a workable rapport with the local
8-40. Foreign Military Forces
. Foreign military forces are military elements – friendly or
adversarial – from other nations influencing or operating within the borders of the partner nation.
These forces may be present due to a request for intervention or assistance, or by aggressive
military action. Investment in understanding the motives of these foreign forces wil allow land
forces to select the necessary actions to be taken to influence them.
8-41. Coalition Forces
. Operations conducted as part of a coalition wil be subject to additional
frictions. Each contributing nation is likely to have strategic objectives that are not necessarily
aligned with the UK’s, and their forces may be under different remits. ROE and chains of command
may be complex. National agendas and their implications for the employment of their troops must
be understood and considered when planning. Decision making is likely to be slower, more
complicated and perhaps more frustrating than when a single nation is involved. This wil in part be
due to the problems with language and not having a common understanding of terminology.
National reporting chains should not be allowed to side-line the coalition chain of command. The
coalition view of events should always be considered.
8-42. Partner Nation Forces
. Partner nation military forces are those forces raised, trained and
sustained by the partner nation as part of the national defence. These forces may include the
military services such as; army, navy, marines and air force. Some nations may also have
paramilitary forces that are not part of the defence force. These paramilitary forces typically have
responsibility for internal security and might include police or specialist security forces.
8-43. Former Partner Nation Military Forces and Non-State Security Forces
. In a post-conflict
or fragile state situation, a partner nation may have forces that are not under its control. Former
military forces that are in the process of demobilising may have retained their uniforms and
weapons. Non-state security forces may have been raised for special or particular interests. Both
may have significant grievances with the partner nation government and chal enge its authority.
8-44. Local Contractors
. Local companies or local civilian workers may be offered contracts by
land forces for construction and logistical work. Part 1 to this AFM provides guidance on how to
avoid distorting the local economy and reduce the risk of corruption through conflict sensitivity.
8-45. Commercial Organisations
. Multinational corporations are often engaged in reconstruction,
security, economic development and governance activities under contract from supporting
governments. These companies are, or could become, part of the redevelopment of the state and
should be part of the partner nation’s overall plan for development. As a minimum, military
commanders should know which companies are present in their area of operations and where
those companies are conducting business.
8-46. Private Security Services/Companies
. See Chapter 9, para 9-34. The Media
8-47. National and international media are routinely interested in stability operations. Due to rapid
information transfer, images and articles in the national or regional media may influence the
opinion of the population and politicians, including military departments. In addition, the media may
exert direct and indirect influence on the operational planning process and C2, therefore potential
media effects should be considered.
Social Media and the Arab Spring
As a result of the many technological advancements and innovations that have
revolutionized how individuals communicate, an abundance of information has become
available to everyone. Depending on where the information is found, however, it’s reliability
can be questioned. With the growing number of international, self-described (both non-for-
profit and for-profit) organizations such as Facebook, Wikipedia, Wikileaks and more, much
of the information provided is now often opinionated and biased, nonetheless, truthful.
Ultimately, public information supplied by social networking websites has played an
important role during modern-day activism, specifically as it pertains to the Arab Spring. In
Arab countries, many activists who played crucial roles in the Arab Spring used social
networking as a key tool in expressing their thoughts concerning unjust acts committed by
Being capable of sharing an immense amount of uncensored and accurate information
throughout social networking sites has contributed to the cause of many Arab Spring
activists. Through social networking sites, Arab Spring activists have not only gained the
power to overthrow powerful dictatorship, but also helped Arab civilians become aware of the
underground communities that exist and are made up of their brothers, and others willing to
listen to their stories.
In countries like Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, rising action plans such as protests made up of
thousands, have been organized through social media such Facebook and Twitter. “We use
Facebook to schedule the protests” an Arab Spring activist from Egypt announced “and [we
use] Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world.” The role that technology has taken
in allowing the distribution of public information such as the kinds stated by the
aforementioned activist, had been essential in establishing the democratic movement that
has helped guide abused civilians to overthrow their oppressor.
Kassim, S. (2012). Twitter Revolution: How the Arab Spring Was Helped By Social Media.
Mic.Com. Accessed 30 Jan 17. Available at https://mic.com/articles/10642/twitter-revolution-
International Organisations (IOs), NGOs and Human Security
8-48. Role of Land Forces
. Given the population-centric nature of stability operations, land forces
must understand the threats to human security within their area of operations. The threat to human
security as a direct or indirect consequence of conflict is not a new phenomenon; the issue is as
old as warfare itself. Within the context of Integrated Action, guided by the Conflict Sensitive
approach, the promotion of human security may bring considerable benefits in positively shaping
8-49. In most operations, the military is likely to play a role in helping address elements of the
human security needs of the population. Responsibilities may include protecting the population
from adversaries and fulfil ing human rights obligations. In most circumstances, the military wil
almost certainly be in a supporting, rather than leading, role, working with other agencies as part of
a Full Spectrum Approach. There are many aspects of human security that armed forces do not
always have the capabilities to address. For example, land forces wil rarely be able to provide
long-term humanitarian assistance, unlike dedicated civilian agencies. Details on the execution of
tasks supporting human security can be found in the annexes to Chapter 10. Other CJIIM actors
involved in the provision of human security likely to be encountered on operations are:
Other Government Department (OGDs)
. These are departments of state with specific
remits and are sometime known as ‘Partners Across Government’ (PAG). They include:
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
The FCO safeguards the UK’s
national security by working to reduce conflict and builds our prosperity by promoting
sustainable global growth. In human security, the FCO is engaged in such areas as
human rights protection, preventing sexual violence, and the protection of child
(2) The Department for International Development (DFID)
DFID’s goal is to
promote sustainable development and to eliminate global poverty. Within this mandate
DFID supports al dimensions of human security.92
International Organisations (IO)
. These are organisations supported by states from
within the international community which attempt to set the agenda on development issues.
Examples of UN affiliated IOs can be found in Figure 8.1 below. These organisations are
covered in more detail in Parts 2 and 3 to this AFM.
UN organisations likely to be encountered on stability operations
International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs)
. These include
international non-profit organisations and worldwide companies, for example, Save the
Children and Médecins Sans Frontières.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
. The ICRC is a humanitarian
institution which does not fall neatly into the categories above.93 Signatories to the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols have given the ICRC a
mandate to protect victims of international and internal armed conflicts. Such victims include
war wounded, prisoners, refugees, civilians, and other non-combatants. ICRC is the only
institution explicitly named under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as a controlling
92 See Chapter 2 for further detail on FCO/DFID roles.
93 See https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5w9fjy.htm.
94 The terms ‘law of armed conflict’ and ‘international humanitarian law’ are terms of art and mean the same thing as both
are concerned with the way armed force is used in conflict. See para 1.2 to JSP 383: Manual of the Law of Armed
. INGOs, NGOs and the ICRC often prefer to operate alone and without
direct military support to maintain impartiality. Humanitarian organisations use their
impartiality to gain access to all those in need, which often incudes dialogue with all parties,
Chapter 9: Stability Activities
. Part B provided an overview of the link
between operations themes, types of operation and
tactical activities (Figure 3-1). This chapter describes in
• Security and Control
detail the category of tactical activities known as stability
• Support to SSR
activities. While stability activities are central to stability
o Support to DDR
operations, other tactical activities may need to be
• Support to Initial Restoration of
executed within the same area of operations. In
operational design and tactics, the groups of tactical
• Support to Interim Governance
activities are closely related.
9-01. Within all types of operation, land forces conduct
all or some of a range of tactical activities
, often concurrently. The balance between the
different activities varies from one operation to another over time, as il ustrated in Figure 9-1
below. Tactical activities are either offensive, defensive, stability or enabling
. In the mosaic of
conflict a force may be required to conduct all activities simultaneously. Also, these activities
are not mutually exclusive. A single force element may link them by a simple transition from one
activity to another without breaking contact with an enemy; for instance from a defensive activity
to an offensive one. Enabling activities are never conducted for their own sake; their purpose is
to enable or link other activities.
Within the mosaic of conflict, the balance of tactical activities vary over time and between
9-02. Stability Activities
. Stability activities are bespoke tactical methods used for delivering the
stabilising aspect of any land operation. They require the application of the Ful Spectrum
Approach in cooperation with partner nations and allied agencies. This collaboration requires
individuals with the right skil s and personalities.95 There are four types of stability activities:
Security and Control.
Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR).
Support to Initial Restoration of Essential Services.
Support to Interim Governance Tasks.
9-03. Note that this chapter explains the characteristics of the stability activities only. Chapter 10
provides guidance on how they might be executed at the Divisional, Brigade and Battlegroup levels
95 These are broadly the same as the five aspects of human interoperability (language, rapport, respect, knowledge and
9-04. Tactical Functions
. The tactical functions represent the full breadth of a land force’s
activities when conducting operations. They are a device that helps to organise activities into
intelligible groups; they have no effects, whereas the activities do. Few, if any, stand alone. Al
activity needs to be commanded and sustained for example. The bigger and more combined arms
the force is, the more likely it is to have the ability for significant activity under every heading.
9-05. As a rule of thumb, corps and divisions are designed to conduct all the tactical functions
simultaneously. Subordinate force elements may be able to apply all the functions to lesser
degrees or specific ones to great effect. For example, an engineer unit has less access to fires
than a combined arms battlegroup, which in turn may have fewer opportunities for capacity building
than one scaled for security force assistance tasks. The tactical functions also provide a useful
checklist for commanders when assessing a plan, and a common vocabulary for describing a
force’s overall capabilities. See Chapter 8, ADP Land Operations
for further detail. Security and Control
. Security and control is likely to be the activity which requires most military
effort. Security is a fundamental human need and motivates and regulates behaviour. Security
(human, personal, regional, national and physical) creates the conditions in which other activity
crucial to well-being can take place. People wil generally give their loyalty to the group that best
meets this need. Winning the contest for security is therefore essential to establishing the security
of a state. The early establishment of a secure environment and a degree of law and order,
following military intervention helps to:
Provide a permissive environment for external, civil actors to operate.
Promote campaign authority.
Provide the opportunity for the development or resumption of normal security, social,
political and economic activity.
Provide the opportunity for dialogue between opposing factions leading to political
9-07. Security and control activities are intended to avoid actions by adversaries and reduce civil
disorder and violence from uncontrolled groups; other goals are to enforce ceasefires, and forge
peace agreements to ensure long-term security. A secure situation is required prior to starting the
reconstruction of a country or region after a crisis (conflict or natural disaster). Independent of the
origin of the crisis, should the local security forces be unable to act, land forces should gain control
of the situation at the earliest opportunity possible.
9-08. Achieving Security
. Security is achieved and maintained through:
. Through deterrence, land forces can discourage the adversary from acting
against the interests of the partner nation government and its military forces. This is done by
showing them that the cost of their action wil be higher than the potential benefit.
. Through control, land forces can gain awareness of the situation and
anticipate the evolution of events, so they can plan an action or a reaction to what might be a
threat to security. Control involves securing borders, lines of communication, key points,
population and towns, as well as occupying key areas and facilities. It requires dynamic
planning and implementation; passivity must be avoided. In addition, control wil be more
efficient if deterrence and an appropriate response capability are combined.
. If deterrence is ineffective and control does not prevent or counter hostile
aggression, land forces, along with the partner nation’s security forces, can provide an
effective response to restore the conditions to its former state. The response should consist
of a rapid and balanced reaction to the aggression which wil counter, neutralise or destroy
the adversary, if needed. Similarly, the response should include the capacity for monitoring
and crowd control activities.
9-09. Planning considerations
. Success in establishing a secure environment depends upon
many variables, some of which are outside the control of an external military force. Al these factors
should have been considered by the strategic comprehensive estimate and are linked to the
principles of stability operations. 96 Variables to consider when planning are:
Social, Ethnic and Political Factors
. The social and ethnic mix of a society and its
propensity to violence because of its history, political divisions or criminality wil impact on the
The Nature of the Political Settlement
. A comprehensive peace settlement reduces
the scope for further violence.
The Nature and Extent of the Demobilisation of Combatants
. Failure to conduct a
comprehensive and timely demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programme
can perpetuate violence and lawlessness. Equally, an overly ambitious programme can also
lead to a security vacuum that can be exploited by protagonists.
. The influence of neighbouring states can exacerbate or improve a
The Size, Posture, Command and Skills of the Military Force
. The military force
providing security and control must be configured, trained and resourced to conduct the
mission. For example, large numbers of combat-ready soldiers who remain in barracks wil
be of little use in promoting stability. A continuous presence on the ground can have a
The Extent of Organised Crime
. In a transitional phase, organised crime can emerge
as an ally of spoilers and rejectionists. Criminals wil benefit from a lack of law and order and
wil exploit any security vacuum. It is therefore essential that credible and impartial criminal
justice systems and the civil police service are developed early. Part 1 to this AFM provides
further details on counter-criminality.
The Allies and the Mafia: Sicily, Second World War
“The Al ied occupation undeniably gave new oxygen to the mafia. Anxious to exclude both
Communists and Fascists from power, the occupying Anglo-American Army – whether
knowingly or unknowingly – installed several prominent mafiosi
as mayors of their towns. (An
Vito Genovese, managed to
become interpreter for the American
governor of Sicily, Colonel Charles Poletti, during the six months of military occupation.)
Criminal elements succeeded in infiltrating the Al ied administration, often with the help of
Italian-American soldiers. They managed to smuggle supplies from military warehouses and
ran a flourishing black market in such scarce commodities as food, tobacco, shoes and
clothi ng…the aftermath of World War II was a time of chaotic freedom and economic
ansion which the mafia exploited ably.”
Stil e, Alexander. (2011). Excellent Cadavers: The Mafia and the Death of the First Italian
Random House, New York City, pp 17-18.
96 For example, through Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure (PMESI) and Area, Structures, Capabilities,
Organisations, People and Events (ASCOPE) analyses.
Condition of Security Sector
. The capacity and capability of the partner nation’s
security sector wil influence the security situation.
. Analysis of the history of conflict (including key events such as uprisings,
assassinations and peace agreements) and associated changes in governance, security and
socio-economic development wil provide an insight into local attitudes towards violence and
Intelligence will prove essential in the conduct of security and control tasks to
permit both the precise targeting of individuals and organisations and informing wider situational
awareness. Integral assets (Field human intelligence (HUMINT) Teams, signals intelligence
(SIGINT) teams etc.) may be augmented by partner nation assets, where appropriate, and other
international intelligence organisations (e.g. INTERPOL).97 The sharing of intelligence will help to
develop a climate of cooperation between land forces, partner nation forces and other
organisations. Commanders will require guidance from PJHQ as to what can be shared and this
guidance should be kept under review. Equally, advice from LEGADs on intelligence and
information gathering is essential given the considerable array of legal frameworks that may be
constraining the intervention.
9-11. Establishing the Rule of Law
. Successful implementation of the rule of law requires an
effective criminal justice system consisting of police, judiciary and penal elements. Early
establishment of rule of law wil increase the chances of mission success. Delivering personal
security (part of human security) for the population should be a high priority and wil set the
conditions for the resumption of normal economic and social activity. See para 1-11 and note that
Part 1 to this AFM covers detention operations.
9-12. Stability Policing
. Experience has shown that it can take a considerable amount of time to
build and deploy a civilian police force. During the initial stages of a conflict, military forces may be
required to maintain internal security and fil the security vacuum in the absence of a viable
indigenous or international police force. Where this is necessary, combat force elements should be
complemented by military and civil law enforcement capabilities, such as the Military Police, and
replaced entirely by an appropriate civilian organisation as soon as practicable. Stability Policing
needs to be linked to judicial and penal processes and wil set the foundations for wider SSR as
the operation progresses. Specialist pre-deployment training may be required for force elements
due to the complex legal issues surrounding Stability Policing. Legal guidance and clarification
must be sought concerning powers of stop, search, arrest and detention.
9-13. Military Police
. Military Police (MP) are a significant force multiplier during Stability Policing
operations due to their specialist knowledge of police-specific considerations and operating within
a non-permissive environment. Their employment as part of the Stability Policing force is essential
to safeguard the reputation of land forces when operating under the complex legal conditions that
accompany this type of activity. Due to MP being a finite and limited resource, the scale and remit
of their employment wil be determined by the Force Provost Marshal (FPM). AJP-3.22 Al ied Joint
Doctrine on Stability Policing
provides detailed guidance on the employment of MP during stability
9-14. Civilian Police
. Typically, following Stability Policing activity or where the security situation
permits, UK land forces may deploy civilian police. These personnel are likely to be deployable
experts working for the Stabilisation Unit. They are particularly useful in the training and mentoring
of partner nation police forces and may reduce the requirement for Military Police support in that
9-15. Information Activities
. Information activities are actions designed to affect information or
information systems. They can be performed by any actor and include protection measures.
97 AFM Vol 1 Part 3A ISTAR
and Doctrine Note 16-06 ISR
contain more detail on intelligence activities.
Activities include: psychological operations (PSYOPS); engagement; operations security (OPSEC);
deception; electronic warfare (EW); cyber; presence, posture, profile (PPP); special capabilities
(SPECAP); and physical destruction.98 More detail is in Doctrine Note 17/05: Information Activities
Support to Security Sector Reform
. SSR is a comprehensive set of programmes and activities undertaken to
improve the way a partner nation provides safety, security and justice. SSR is a long-term effort
conducted by the partner nation’s government requiring extensive resources and participation of
many security sector actors. Land forces’ principal contribution to a partner nation’s SSR is through
capacity building. This subject is covered in more detail in Part 5 to this AFM and AJP 3.4.5 Stabilization and Reconstruction
9-17. The Security Sector
. The composition of the security sector differs from country to country
so there is no universally applicable definition of it. There are four generally accepted categories
comprising the security sector:
. Armed forces; police and gendarmeries; paramilitary forces;
presidential guards; intelligence and security services (military and civilian); coast guards;
border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces,
national guards, government backed militias) and veterans’ groups.
Security Management Oversight Bodies
. The executive; national security advisory
bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs,
foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance
ministries, budget offices, financial planning and audit units); civil society organisations
(civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).
Justice and Law Enforcement Institutions
. Judiciary; justice ministries; correctional
facilities; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and
ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.99
Non-Statutory Security Forces
. Liberation armies, private security companies (PSC),
guerril a armies, private bodyguard units and political party militias.
. There are four primary objectives when conducting SSR:
Increase the capacity for effective governance, oversight, and accountability in the
Improve delivery of security and justice.
Assist local leadership to develop an ownership of the reform process.
Support the development of sustainable security and justice delivery.
9-19. The Full Spectrum Approach
. To be successful, SSR requires all elements of national
power to be applied in a coherent fashion and in coordination with other donors and the recipient or
partner nation. See Part A.
9-20. Security concepts
. International consensus supports the idea that the foundation of state
security action should be the protection of the people. This idea is based on two principles:
98 NATO includes civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) as an information activity whilst the UK views it as an element of
capacity building. More detail on CIMIC is in Part 5 to this AFM.
99 Guidance on the reform of these sub elements of the security sector can be found in ATP-188.8.131.52, page 2-12.
The security interests of the state should not conflict with the security interests of its
The state is ultimately responsible for providing the security conditions for the wellbeing
of its population.
9-21. In developing countries that security is not provided exclusively by western-style statutory
bodies but also comes from traditional and non-statutory systems. The conditions are not limited to
law and order issues but include all political, economic and social issues that ensure life is as free
from risk as possible. Ideally the security sector wil be controlled and guided by a national security
strategy. If one does not exist its development could be an early element of the SSR programme.
9-22. Supporting the Development of a Partner Strategic Plan for SSR
. The military
contribution to a SSR programme should be incorporated within an overall partner nation strategic
reform plan, developed by the partner nation with support from all the stakeholders, including the
intervention force where applicable, IOs, and NGOs.
9-23. Security is the essential element to effective rule of law, political participation, legitimate
governance and ultimately state sovereignty. For states that are fragile due to armed conflict,
natural disaster, or other events that threaten the national government, an effective security sector
builds legitimacy, secures the people from harm, fosters economic and social development, and
encourages foreign investment.
9-24. Partner Nation Defence
. Military forces are developed primarily to counter external threats.
The design of these forces develops from the analysis of those threats and the specific capabilities
required to counter them. Providing humanitarian assistance and countering certain types of
internal military threats can also be a necessary capability. Defence reform should be structured by
the constraints of relevant partner nation executive and legislative branch directives, legislation and
policy documents. Partner nation national security strategies, policies, acts and budgets are
examples of documents which should inform the design and implementation of defence reform and
SSR programmes. Assisting the partner nation to craft them if they are absent or out-dated
becomes an essential feature of the reform process.
9-25. The activities of land forces are generally focused on reforming the partner nation’s military
forces, but those actions are only part of a broader, comprehensive effort to reform the entire
security sector, which is composed of individuals and institutions that provide safety, security and
justice for the people of a state.
9-26. Execution of comprehensive SSR unites all elements of the security sector through the Ful
Spectrum Approach. See Figure 9-1 below for other elements within the security sector and their
Elements of SSR (from ATP-184.108.40.206)
9-27. Leadership Capacity Building
Chal enges associated with developing legitimate, and
accountable security forces require capable leadership in the partner nation security sector at all
levels. To establish the conditions for long-term success, SSR may help the partner nation identify
and begin training and advising security force leaders as early as possible. Such efforts must avoid
undermining partner nation legitimacy while recognising that assistance, advice, and education
may be needed. Programmes focused on developing senior leaders may prove helpful.
9-28. Advisor, trainers, mentors, monitoring and liaison staff should be carefully selected to deal
with the frustration of working with developing security forces. Advisors’ tour lengths should be long
enough for relationships to be forged and for a deep understanding of how best to develop the
indigenous force to emerge. See Part 5 to this AFM for further details on this subject.
9-29. Public Trust and Confidence
. In rebuilding the institutions of a fragile state, commanders
must engender trust and confidence between the local population and the security forces. As SSR
proceeds, these security forces carry a progressively greater burden in ensuring public safety.
Frequently, they do so in an environment characterised by crime and violence. This proves true in
areas recovering from violent, predatory forces. Recovery requires a community-based response
that uses the unique capabilities of the security forces and police. Operating in accordance with the
laws of the partner nation, the success of these forces wil help to gain the trust and confidence of
the local population. Furthermore, increased public confidence engenders greater desire among
the people to support the efforts of the security forces. Note, though, gaining trust can be a huge
chal enge, especially where the security forces themselves have historically been viewed by the
public as corrupt and predatory.
9-30. Partner Nation Dependency
. During reform, the risk of building a culture of dependency is
mitigated by adopting a training process. This process sequentially provides training and
equipment to security forces, a dedicated advising capability, and an advisory presence. After initial
training efforts, this reform helps partner nation security forces progress toward the transition of
security responsibility. A robust transition plan supports the gradual and coherent easing of partner
nation dependency, typically in the form of increased responsibility and accountability.
9-31. Depending on the security environment, external actors in SSR may need to protect new
partner nation security forces from many direct and immediate threats during their development.
While this requirement usual y applies only during initial training, security forces remain at risk
throughout their development during SSR; these threats may contribute to problems with discipline,
dependability, and desertion. In extreme circumstances, protecting partner nation security forces
may necessitate training outside the physical boundaries of the state. Prior to this, detailed
analysis must be conducted of cultural and security implications.
9-32. Non-State Security Forces
. Local militias, neighbourhood watches, and tribal forces are a
frequent response when the state is unable to provide effective security to local communities and
may be significant employers within local communities. SSR programmes must acknowledge the
presence of these non-state actors and determine how best to deal with them. Indeed, intervening
forces may quickly achieve a measure of local legitimacy by partnering with local non-state security
actors in such situations.
9-33. Local militias and other non-state security forces are less legitimate and functional at the
district and provincial levels, though their activities may undermine state authority at those levels
due to the disconnects between local actors and the district and provincial government bodies that
are charged with formal responsibility for public safety. Given many non-state security actors tend
to lack inclusive and formal accountability and oversight mechanisms, over time they tend to
become major abusers of human rights and predators in their own and other communities.
9-34. Uncontrolled violence, once accepted by state authorities or intervening forces, is very
difficult to restrain. The DDR of non-state security forces is essential to reforming a partner nation’s
security sector. Where bearing weapons is a socially accepted feature of adulthood, disarmament
wil be problematic at best. Disarmament processes may require a nuanced approach that
differentiates between personal weapons and heavy or crew-served weapons. The perception that
former combatants are receiving benefits that are not broadly available to civilians may generate
resentment, if not open hostility. To add to the complexity, combatants may be adamant they have
earned such benefits. Without adequate economic opportunities for reintegration, disarmament and
demobilisation activities alone wil gain little traction. A summary of DDR can be found at Annex A.
9-35. Private Security Companies and Security Forces
. The private security industry comprises
those individuals and institutions that provide security for people and property under contract and
for profit. The activities of an uncontrolled or poorly regulated private security industry can present
unique governance problems and act as an obstacle to SSR programmes directed at both military
and law enforcement forces. Increased security provision by non-state actors is prevalent in all
regions of the world. SSR planners therefore must consider the potentially serious implications of
the private security industry in the partner nation, as wel as the effects of limited regulation and
accountability of a market, which continues to grow in both size and importance.
9-36. Intelligence and security service reform
is a key element of SSR that is often overlooked.
Intelligence and security services are normally located within central government, typically
reporting directly to senior decision makers. They should provide warnings and insights about
threats and trends which impact on the security and economic well-being of a state and allow
decision makers to shape policy. Intelligence services can make a significant contribution to the
process of building a nationally-owned and led vision of security through the provision of tactical or
strategic intelligence assessments on the range of threats faced by the state.
9-37. In addition to assisting the overall SSR process, intelligence services themselves frequently
require reform. Intelligence services of the state may have been involved in human rights abuses
or colluded in the rule of a corrupt or tyrannical regime. Thus, there may be a requirement to
reform the intelligence services and structures of a state as a part of the comprehensive SSR
programme. This is not a specifically military problem, but given our potential reliance on local
intelligence agencies to develop our own understanding reform is very often in land forces’ interest.
9-38. Border forces
. The control of border areas by state-sanctioned border forces wil be
necessary to prevent any movement of hostile actors into a fragile state. This helps to restore the
idea that the state is sovereign. Border forces are often involved in detecting and preventing crime
in border areas, including illegal trafficking and entry. These forces can include border guards,
coast guard, and immigration and customs personnel. In many states, ineffective border
management systems frustrate efforts to detect and prevent organised crime and other irregular
activity. Border forces can also be associated with corruption, which reduces state revenues,
erodes confidence and discourages trade and economic activity. Issues to be considered in the
initial development of a border control force are:
Facilitating the efficient and regulated movement of people and goods, thereby
achieving an appropriate balance between security, commerce, and social normalisation.
Building capacity to detect and combat il icit trafficking, organised crime, terrorism and
other factors leading to insecurity in border areas.
Strengthening revenue-generating capacity, promoting integrity and tackling corruption.
Establishing a border guard under central government control.
Harmonising border control and customs regulations regionally and enhancing cross-
Establishing cross-border protocols with adjoining states.
. SSR is a complex activity, and participants must demonstrate persistence
and resilience in managing the dynamic interactions among the various factors affecting the reform
programme. Within the SSR processes, some failures are likely. Early identification of potential
points of failure allows for mitigating action.
Support to Initial Restoration of Essential Services
. Sustainable human security depends on providing essential services, for
example medical services, electricity, water, sewerage and food. The more demanding the physical
environment and the more destructive the preceding fighting, the greater the lack of services wil
be felt. Most of the solutions are in the hands of the civilian components supporting the Ful
Spectrum Approach and the main military contribution should be the provision of sufficient area
based security to enable this. If the security situation is not permissive to civilian specialists,
military forces may need to directly support local authorities (state or non-state) to deliver these
services, or, in extremis, directly deliver themselves.
9-41. Definition and scope
. Restoration of services comprises life-saving activities and essential
services for a limited period. Life-saving activities are those actions that, within a short time span,
remedy, mitigate or avert direct loss of life, physical harm or threats to a population or major part
thereof. Essential services are those that satisfy basic human needs and provide the necessary
infrastructure for economic recovery as efficiently as possible. They cover Sewage, Water,
Electricity, Academics (i.e. education), Rubbish, Medical and Security (SWEAR-MS).100 Land
forces may have to intervene to support the initial restoration of essential services for the following
Civil agencies are incapable of delivering the required effect due to the security
situation. Note that military restoration must complement longer-term partner nation
development plans and avoid creating dependence on military support.
To improve security:
100 Adapted from ATP-220.127.116.11. The NATO version uses ‘trash’ rather than rubbish.
(1) Directly, by fixing populations (for example, by the provision of clean water in a
given area), improving routes (permitting, armoured vehicles/ quick reaction force
access), improving street lighting etc.
(2) Indirectly, by removing cause for discontent amongst the civil population and
denying a shadow government and/or adversaries the opportunity to occupy a vacuum.
To promote campaign authority.
To support the logistic and infrastructure requirements of a military force.
To act as a catalyst for governance, economic and social activity (for example by
repairing strategic infrastructure and improving transport links).
Legal obligations placed upon occupying powers by international law to provide and
care for civilian populations.
9-42. The restoration of essential services for a civilian population, linked to information activities
and other lines of operations, is an early measure that can be taken to increase the chances of
mission success. Restoration work must be linked to information activities to capitalise on the good
wil from the local population and deny criminal groupings from taking unwarranted credit.
Restoration activity is likely to be conducted primarily by military engineers or contractors with
STABADs playing a coordinating role. The military medical services may also be involved where
there is a requirement to restore medical facilities for the civilian population and to provide advice
on environmental health issues.
9-43. The nature and size of the military contribution wil vary. In some circumstances, it may be
appropriate to focus military engineer effort on the restoration of services for the population at the
expense of the provision of facilities to the force.
9-44. Restoration Planning
. Restoration planning should be undertaken early, as part of the
integrated planning process in the absence of appropriate civilian agencies. An overall assessment
of the partner nation’s infrastructure should be made and used to focus military and civilian
resources to best effect in support of the campaign plan. Short-term, quick-win solutions should be
aligned with long-term objectives and resources identified and allocated to conduct both. Provision
should also be made for the military to hand over responsibility for restoration tasks to appropriate
civil actors or partner nation institutions as soon as is practicable while having contingency plans to
retake the lead in periods or in areas where the security situation deteriorates and prevents other
actors from carrying out their role. The partner nation should be involved as early as possible in the
planning of work and the allocation of priorities with partner nation personnel employed wherever
. Military forces wil often face a dilemma. In the short term there wil likely be pressure
for immediate results to be shown in the re-establishment of essential services, and short-term
stability may partly depend on this. In the absence of civilian agencies, under pressure from local
populations and authorities to assist, and with military capabilities available, it may be that in some
circumstances providing this direct support wil be necessary. Military commanders must not forget
that their greatest contribution wil always be the provision of sufficient security to allow partner
nation authorities and supporting civilian agencies to conduct this service provision.
9-46. Military delivery is unlikely to be sustainable and solutions provided may detract from the
local development of more permanent solutions. They may also indirectly undermine the legitimacy
of local authorities, underlying their inability to provide basic services to the population. They also
run a very real risk of exacerbating conflict dynamics if they inadvertently favour different groups
over others. Where UK civilian departments and the military agree that direct military involvement
is appropriate, these risks can be minimised by, for example, ensuring military restoration planning
is conducted in cooperation with local communities and authorities
. Wherever possible, plans
should be made to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of interventions and their impact on
overall conflict dynamics. As a minimum, the conflict-sensitive approach should be applied.
9-47. Military support within Integrated Action
. The restoration of essential services can
contribute directly to improvements in the security situation. Restoration actions, most likely in the
form of information activity and capacity building should aim to deliver non-lethal effect within a
broader Integrated Action sequence. Within both combat and stability operations, expert advice
from military engineers and cultural property protection specialists should be used to:
Avoid, where possible, damaging or destroying infrastructure that wil be required to
achieve long-term stability.
Minimise the long-term damage to any infrastructure that must be targeted to achieve a
required effect during combat operations.
Protect infrastructure crucial to stability that might be vulnerable to other threats during
Identify infrastructure whose protection or repair wil positively affect actor behaviour.
9-48. Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE)
. Basic services and infrastructure
should be examined as part of the IPE process during all phases of a campaign. Correctly focused
restoration effort can achieve significant results.
9-49. Short-term gains wil need to be balanced against long-term objectives and the impact on
perceptions of local populations should be considered. Restoration activity should be conducted in
support of and exploited by information activities (failure to do so may leave a vacuum that is
exploited by opposition groups). Information activities may also be required to produce a remedial
effect where critical infrastructure has been damaged because of military action or to manage
expectations when quick repairs are not achievable.
9-50. Coordination of Activity
. Military restoration activity must be coordinated with the efforts of
civil actors and in line with long-term strategic objectives. The process of integrated planning and
coordination should continue at the operational and tactical level. Stabilisation Advisors and CIMIC
staff wil play a role in this process, conducting liaison with civil actors and, where the situation
permits, establishing a Civil Military Operations Centre (CMOC) as a mechanism for
. Ideally, funds for restoration activity should be made available from a single source
at the national level and channelled to partner nation institutions as they develop their capability
and capacity. Restoration activity must be adequately resourced with funds being made available
at the tactical level to deliver targeted effect. The mechanism for obtaining funds for restoration
activity is theatre specific and must be understood. Financial authority must be delegated to the
appropriate level102 to ensure that sufficient funds can be used in a timely manner to achieve
desired effects. Restoration work with a direct impact on the military mission, such as repair of
street lighting in an urban area to reduce the requirement for patrolling, should be funded through
9-52. Military units
. Military units with specific capabilities may be directed to support the initial
restoration of essential services, particularly:
Military engineering resources will be limited, reinforcing the need for
the appropriate targeting of assets and effective liaison and coordination of effort with other
actors, including contractors.
101 See AJP 3.4.9: CIMIC
for more detail.
102 Some funding could be made available to ground holding unit commanders, but funded projects must contribute to the
overall effect that is trying to be achieved.
. Varied support tasks can be developed by these units: provisional
water/fuel supply, humanitarian relief tasks; airport/port management support, etc. Logistic
units need to be flexible in their delivery of CSS to OGDs and NGOs and must be able to
support the rebalancing of land forces during the transition to stability operations.
. They may, in extremis, provide limited medical support until the local
medical facilities are rehabilitated. Medical support may range from local medical care to
health inspection through prevention campaigns (vaccination). Veterinary services may also
. Working with STABADs, they wil enable cooperation between the military
forces and civil actors in support of the mission.
9-53. In some circumstances, it may be necessary to surge additional engineer resources to a
theatre to cope with the infrastructure demands of the civilian population and the military
9-54. Non-local civil organisations
. A few IOs and NGOs may start their activities within the area
of operations from the very beginning of the conflict. They wil play an increasingly important role to
support the restoration of basic services, when security conditions are appropriate. Under such
conditions, specialised civil agencies or corporations (contractors) – either local or foreign – may
effectively participate in restoration activities, complementing land forces’ efforts or replacing them
for the performance of this type of task.
9-55. Use of Local Expertise and Labour
A chal enging but essential task is to make the best
use of available local expertise as soon as possible.103 To set the conditions for long-term success
and the eventual transfer of responsibility to the partner nation’s institutions, indigenous personnel
should be involved in problem solving and decision making from the outset. Institutional capacity
should be developed alongside technical ability and planning processes (prioritisation of tasks,
securing of funds etc.) linked to governance activities.
9-56. Wherever possible, local labour should be used on reconstruction projects to boost local
economies and provide legitimate means of income to the local population. DDR programmes may
be linked to reconstruction projects to provide employment opportunities for ex-combatants.
9-57. Quick impact projects
. Ultimately, support to restoration of services wil contribute to the
longer-term campaign objectives of allowing the nation to recover and become self-sustaining in
terms of stability. In the short term, the development of quick impact projects is very useful to
demonstrate that things are evolving in the area for the benefit of the population. These quick
solutions should be aligned with the long-term objectives and resources, and they should
contribute to increasing partner nation ownership. They should only be started if there is a certainty
that they can be finished and must be conducted with conflict sensitivity in mind.
9-58. Quick impact projects should provide the community with an immediate benefit, which should
win the good wil of the community. This wil set the conditions for the local community and the
alliance to cooperatively identify, plan and implement longer term projects. Highly visible
improvements for the population are a decisive starting point on the way to success.
9-59. Transition Management
. Where the military has been obliged to undertake activity normally
carried out by civil actors there will be a requirement to hand over responsibility, either by province
or nationwide, to partner nation institutions or other appropriate civil actors. Depending upon the
situation (capability and capacity of partner nation institutions, security etc.) the time required for
the transition process wil vary. It should be a conditions-based activity and decisions to conduct a
103 A risk is that intervention alters the dynamics of the local economy potentially creating dependency cultures and
fostering corruption. This subject is covered in Part 1 of this AFM, Counter-Irregular Activity
transfer of responsibility should be linked to other relevant lines of operation (for example
Governance). Information activities should exploit opportunities to highlight progress and the
effectiveness of legitimate partner nation institutions.
Support to Interim Governance Tasks
. It is accepted that the provision of governance is not generally a military
responsibility and if land forces do get involved it is most likely to be in a supporting role. In some
circumstances, however, the military may be the only organisation able to take responsibility for
governing an area.
9-61. Land forces may be required to undertake a range of civil administration tasks in support of a
weak partner nation government or in the absence of a working indigenous or international
administration. Such tasks may range from CIMIC liaison to the establishment of an interim military
government and are likely to include some degree of responsibility for the provision of essential
services. The military should seek to hand responsibility for governance tasks to an appropriate
indigenous or international civil organisation at the earliest appropriate opportunity. Its primary role
wil be in establishing the environment in which civil actors can operate.
9-62. Planning considerations
Comprehensive and detailed planning wil be required with input
(and ideal y the lead) from OGDs, the partner nation government and other IOs and NGOs as
appropriate. Considerations include:
The mandate under which the force is operating will articulate responsibilities
and structures for government.
Existing structures and legislation need to be clearly understood and
their existence and ability to function effectively assessed. The subtleties of the local
environment should be understood. To understand fully the local situation, an analysis of
existing power bases and the interrelationships between them should be conducted.
9-63. A Possible Approach
. Although there is no template for best practice in governance, the
following functions are likely to be required:
Rule of Law
. Some form of rule of law should be established. Land forces may be
required to perform the role of a police force through Stability Policing, or assist local police;
protect and assist existing, or establish, some form of judiciary; and support or establish
some form of penal system. This wil usually involve working with both formal (state) and
informal (customary or community-led) security, justice and conflict resolution providers.
. A mechanism for meeting the immediate needs of the civil population
(shelter, food, water, medical provision, sanitation, fuel, power etc.) must be established.
Committees comprising prominent local citizens may provide a suitable means for
determining needs and establishing priorities. How these members are selected so that they
are seen to broadly represent the local population (including women) can be crucial to their
legitimacy and stabilising influence. An understanding of the local politics wil be essential in
negotiation and communications in general.
. Communication is critical to the establishment of civil authority and
the rule of law. Information activities wil be required to support governance activity, and
information collection to provide data on the civil authority being established, the role of the
military etc. An information vacuum risks exploitation by elements hostile to the military force
or the supported civil authority.
9-64. In all cases, best use should be made of local expertise, structures and capabilities.
Adequate resources should, ideally, be provided to allow local officials to resolve their own issues.
Strict standards of accountability should be enforced to lessen the effects of corruption.
9-65. Protection of Existing Facilities
. Early effort must be made to protect existing government
infrastructure. Failure to do so is likely to increase the amount of resources and time required to
establish even basic partner nation governance facilities and capability/capacity.
9-66. Use of Existing Institutions
Experience has shown that using existing government
institutions produces quicker results than building new ones from scratch. The prominence
afforded to non-state institutions also requires careful consideration. Frequently these wil continue
to operate in the absence of state institutions. Even when state institutions are available, non-state
institutions are often the preferred service provider for most of the population (for example,
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms as opposed to the formal court system). To provide an
initial degree of governance there may be a requirement to permit former, undesirable regime
elements to remain in post (under close supervision) until they can be replaced by a suitable
. The military may also support an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in
organising elections. The temptation to hold early elections to meet deadlines and exit strategies
should be avoided to prevent the legitimisation of spoilers and disruption of the long-term
democratic process. Studies suggest that it is desirable to hold local elections in the first instance
to provide the opportunity for local leaders to emerge and gain experience and for political parties
to build a support base. Extended preparation periods also facilitate the establishment of other
aspects of civil society, such as a free press.
9-68. Coordination and Consistency
The activities of all agencies involved in the provision and
development of governance and capacity must be coordinated. A consistent approach should,
ideally, be adopted by all actors.
9-69. Control of Partner Nation Security Forces
. SSR activity must include the development of
how partner nation Security Forces are controlled by a legitimate government. Attempts should be
made to include this principle from the outset of any governance activity.
Annex A to Chapter 9: Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration
. A further intervention role for land forces is in the DDR of armed
elements of a conflict. DDR usually forms part of a peace agreement and is conducted within the
wider post-conflict recovery process.
Purpose of DDR
. DDR seeks to increase the stability of the post-conflict security
environment by ensuring that combatants, and their weapons, are taken out of the conflict and
provided with at least a minimal transition package so that they can return to their civilian life and
forego returning to arms again. The complex DDR process has dimensions that include culture,
politics, security, humanity, and socio-economics. In a UN context, the ‘UN Integrated DDR
Standards’ wil apply.
Ex-combatants in Society
. While the process is focused on the ex-combatants, the
wider community wil also feel the benefits of a successful DDR programme that enhances security
and is a clear sign of progress to peace. Communities wil require assistance to successfully
absorb such ex-combatants. If combatants are disarmed too quickly then this may create a security
vacuum, if they are detained for too long in encampments this may create unrest. Without a fully
funded reintegration programme, militia leaders may simply re-form their groups for criminal
purposes, creating a new security problem.
Gender, ethnic and minority issues must also be considered in the design of DDR
programmes. For example, while women are sometimes used as armed combatants, frequently
their role in armed groups may be as cooks, spies or porters, or as sexual y enslaved 'wives' of
male combatants. As such, the criteria for entry into DDR schemes needs to look beyond simple
ownership of weapons, and special arrangements made in relation to subsequent demobilisation
and reintegration support provided to groups such as women and children.
Effective DDR planning relies on analysis of possible beneficiaries, power dynamics,
and local society as wel as the nature of the conflict and on-going peace processes. External and
partner nation military forces and police working together in a peace support role may facilitate the
process. Former combatants must develop confidence in DDR and the organisations charged with
implementing it. To build this confidence, the programme must be focused on promoting a stable
society, government, and economy at all levels. This leads to the partner nation taking
responsibility for DDR processes. Some former combatants wil be incorporated into the armed
forces, while others may not.
Role of Land Forces
. Generally, UK land forces do not lead the planning and
execution of DDR programmes. When involved, land forces should be integrated in the planning
from its inception and may assist more directly in the disarmament and demobilisation stages.
Military forces and police, whether from external sources or the partner nation, are fundamental to
the broad success of the programme, providing security for DDR processes. Successful
programmes use many approaches designed for specific security environments.
Each programme reflects the unique aspects of the situation, culture, and character of
the state. International DDR approaches must comply with “The Principles and Guidelines on
Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups”, also known as The Paris Principles.104
The legal advisor is responsible for providing command guidance on any situations pertaining to
child combatants. See Annex B to Chapter 10.
is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms,
ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former combatants, bel igerents, and the
local population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management
programmes. Ideally, disarmament is a voluntary process carried out as part of a broader peace
104 The Paris Principles (2007) are designed to guide interventions to prevent unlawful recruitment of children, to facilitate
the release and reintegration of children associated with armed forces or armed groups, and to ensure the most
process. Disarmament functions best with high levels of trust between those being disarmed and
the forces overseeing disarmament. Some groups may hesitate to offer trust and cooperation or
even refuse to participate in disarmament efforts. In these circumstances, disarmament may occur
in two stages: a voluntary disarmament process followed by more coercive measures. The latter
wil address individuals or small groups refusing to participate voluntarily. In this second stage,
disarmament of combatant factions can become a contentious and potentially very destabilising
step of DDR. Military forces should manage disarmament carefully to avoid renewed violence.
is the process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military
establishment and defence-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining
national security and economic vitality. Within the context of DDR, demobilisation involves the
formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups.
Demobilisation includes identifying and gathering former combatants for processing and discharge
orientation. This extends from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the
massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments,
assembly areas, or barracks). In many societies, women and children are active participants in
violent conflict. During demobilisation, separate facilities are necessary for adults and children.
Additionally, child soldiers require specific services including health, education, food, assistance
with livelihood development, and reintegration into communities. This subject is covered in more
detail in Chapter 10. SSR programmes must adequately address demobilisation to avoid renewed
violence from combatant groups or organised criminals.
Reinsertion is also part of the demobilisation phase. It is the immediate assistance
(usually cash) provided to demobilised combatants to allow them to return home and support
themselves and any dependents until such time as their reintegration programmes commence.
is the process through which demobilised combatants receive amnesty,
re-enter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local
population. It usually teaches marketable skills to participants and provides them with psycho-
social support. To minimise tensions with host communities, ideally ex-combatant reintegration
should be complemented with parallel community-based programmes that provide economic and
livelihood support to the wider population.
Chapter 10: Orchestrating and Executing Stability Operations
. Land forces have four inherent
Orchestrating and Executing
attributes: people, presence, persistence and versatility. The
which alters these properties so they are relevant in
new and changing situations is adaptability.105 Stability
operations routinely present new and changing situations
• The Division
requiring adaptability, not least in how the force is organised.
• The Brigade
• The Battlegroup
. Parts 1-5 to this AFM concern the
• Annexes: Human Security Themes
discrete types of stability operations. The emphasis in this
o Women, peace and
chapter is on the execution of stability activities in the context of
o Children and armed
transition from major combat operations.
o Human trafficking
In stability operations, at the operational or higher
o Cultural property protection
tactical level, corps and divisions orchestrate Integrated Action
and align their activity with joint, inter-agency and multinational
operations. The orchestration of operations concerns the direction and arrangement of actions,
sequential y and simultaneously, to create desired effects. Brigades, units and other force
elements, operating at the tactical level, plan and execute their contributions to the divisional
operation. Throughout, formations and units will apply the Operations Process as described in
Chapter 4 to AFM Command
. The likely weight of effort against the stability activities can be seen
in Figure 10-1 below.
Likely weight of effort in stability operations by formation. Lighter areas indicate more limited
involvement. A Corps responsibility would be similar to the Division/2* node.
This chapter provides guidance on how stability activities might be executed at the
corps, divisional, brigade and battlegroup levels of command. The annexes to this chapter provide
guidance on the land contribution to human security by theme, linking to the population-centric
nature of stability operations.
105 ADP Land Operations 2017
, Chapter 1.
The Corps and the Division
. The role of the corps, 2* node or divisional HQ in stability operations is to
coordinate, synchronise, prioritise and resource the activities of force elements under command.106
It must engage with the partner nation to understand its vision and how existing institutions work. It
wil also need to understand the divide between its tasks and those of subordinate formations. The
corps or division can also support civilian-led elements of the campaign plan through active
participation in the Full Spectrum Approach. Generic tasks are:
Planning, resourcing and coordinating the restructuring of partner nation’s security
forces. This includes assessment of Security Sector Reform (SSR) activity.
ISTAR and targeting.
Joint and combined operations, lethal or non-lethal.
Coordinating and resourcing divisional/brigade actions with capabilities retained at the
divisional level, such as command support, aviation, artil ery, ISTAR and sustainment assets,
including the identification and committal of reserves.
Coordination with higher political and military authorities.
Future and contingency plans.
Information activities, including the provision of metrics and the resources to monitor
and analyse influence outcomes.
Focus for media operations.
Synchronisation of military operations and information with the development of
essential services and the economy.
. The requirement to conduct stability operations concurrently with
warfighting wil see corps and divisional HQs relying on subject matter experts such as those listed
Information activities and capacity building specialists.
Legal Advisor(s) (LEGAD).
Policy Advisor(s) (POLAD).
Operational Analyst(s) (OA).
Stabilisation Advisor(s) (STABAD).
Gender Advisor(s) (GENAD). See Annex A to Chapter 10.
Cultural Advisor(s) (CULAD).
Religious Advisor(s) (RELAD).
Environmental Protection Advisor(s).
OGD liaison officers.
106 In a NATO coalition context, refer to AJP-3.4(A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.
Staff may need to take on additional roles to enable the HQ to plan and execute certain
tactical activities. In particular, support to SSR, interim governance tasks and the restoration of
essential services. Pre-deployment preparation should include role-specific individual training for
staff and HQ collective training should include attached civilian and multinational staff. Limited
resources mean commanders and staff must understand that a balance needs to be struck
between force elements conducting security tasks and those conducting civil-military cooperation
(CIMIC). The point where the balance lies wil depend on the security situation and the level of
effort required to conduct the core military tasks. As the security situation improves over time, or
when partner nation security forces become more capable as part of SSR, more divisional force
elements can be flexed to support civil effects or to meet changing requirements. In most
circumstances the headquarters is likely to be augmented by specialist personnel from Force
Troops Command, in particular 77 Brigade.
Executing the Stability Activities
Security and Control
. Establishing and maintaining the rule of law is essential,
particularly in transition, where partner nation law and order institutions may not be
functioning effectively and where international police may not immediately be available.
Initial responsibility for enforcing law and order wil likely fall to the military through the
conduct of Stability Policing. The HQ wil therefore be required to plan and resource
accordingly. Consideration should be given to rerol ing troops that are no longer
employed in major combat. See the brigade and battlegroup sections below for a
description of the tasks associated with security and control. Corps/divisional level
considerations are captured in the Table 10-1 below.
1. Understand legal
• Understand the means
• Legal Advisor.
available to the military to
• Stabilisation Advisor and other HQ
enforce the rule of law. This
based civilian advisors.
includes the use of force,
• DFID in-country advisor.
powers to stop, search, detain
• FCO Security and Justice Advisor.
and intern civilians.
• Ensure that actions taken to
establish the rule of law are
• Understand partner nation
criminal laws and powers.
• Engage prominent local figures • Tac Psyops Teams.
within the civil community.
• Legal Advisor.
• Use local media.
consequences must be
• Use information activities to
• Military personnel
clearly articulated to the
inform and influence behaviour.
• Civpol advisors.
• Information activities & media.
3. Stability Policing and
• Consider use of curfews.
support to Rule of Law
• Conduct patrolling activity (if
• Civpol advisors.
possible with local police service
• Legal Advisor/Army Legal Service.
and or indigenous armed
• Royal Military Police.
• Stop/search/detain persons as
• Royal Engineers.
• Military Provost Staff.
• Establish and run temporary
• Prison Service advisors.
• Log & Med sp.
- Include inspections by IOs and
• Clerical support.
• Information activities.
- Provide opportunity for
• Stabilisation Advisor and other HQ
enquiries & visits by family
based civilian advisors.
members (through International
• DFID in-country advisor.
Committee of the Red Cross).
- Publish lists of detainees and
• Establish interim assessment
system to determine the need
- A panel of military and
prominent civilian figures may
provide an appropriate means of
- Efforts should be made to
reduce numbers held in
detention facilities for minor
- An independent oversight
mechanism should be
established (e.g. a committee of
prominent local figures,
- Processes and findings should
Imposition of martial law?
4. Transfer responsibility
• Agree conditions for transfer of • Stabilisation Advisor and other HQ
authority early. Note that this
based civilian advisors.
. These could
must be to a legitimate,
• DFID in-country advisor.
accountable entity in order that
partner nation Police and
campaign authority is
• Civpol advisors.
Prison Services and
• Legal Advisor/ Army Legal Service.
• Assist with the development of
• Royal Military Police.
police, judicial and penal
• Royal Engineers.
• Address as part of broader
• Military Provost Staff.
SSR (see Chapter 9).
• Prison Service advisors.
• Log & Med sp.
• Clerical support.
• Information activities.
• Army Legal Service.
• Clerical support.
Establishing temporary rule of law
Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)
. The scope of corps/divisional support to
SSR wil vary according to the level of reform required and the security environment. In an
unstable environment, it is likely that the military wil be required to initiate capacity building,
which wil be conducted in line with reform criteria developed during the SSR pre-
assessment. The priority wil be to ultimately establish a secure environment, preferably
using indigenous forces. Planning by the HQ should address the need for support to SSR.
This wil include an assessment of the threat to security, existing security sector capabilities,
likely responsibilities and tasks of the security sector and an articulation of the characteristics
of the reformed security sector (role, function, primacy, size, structure, gender distribution,
equipment). It needs to be recognised that a meaningful reform plan wil not be possible
without partner nation leadership and ownership. Nonetheless, initial planning, with as much
partner nation participation as is practicable, wil at least start to identify the broader
parameters of the Security Sector chal enge, and put initial military tasks into a broader
context. See Part 5 to this AFM for detail on the execution of SSR.
Support to Initial Restoration of Essential Services
. The HQ may be required to
assist in the restoration of essential services during transition. Planning should be conducted
early as part of the comprehensive planning process, including an assessment of partner
nation infrastructure. Functional and integrating cel s should assess how their approach to
targeting must change as the emphasis shifts from an enemy to population-centric approach
in transition. Quick-win solutions must be aligned with long-term objectives, with resources
identified and allocated to conduct both. Responsibility for restoration tasks should be
handed over to appropriate civil agencies or partner nation institutions as soon as is
practicable, while having contingency plans to retake the lead in periods, or in areas where
the security situation deteriorates. Empowered partner nation personnel should be involved
in prioritisation and planning, and best use made of the HQ's STABAD. It may be necessary
to surge additional resources to a theatre to cope with the concurrent infrastructure demands
of the civilian population and the military. Tasks potentially requiring land forces’ support
Conducting existing infrastructure technical assessments.
Preparation of an emergency infrastructure plan.
Advising on targeting and effects.
Securing key infrastructure assets.
Managing contracts processes.
Programme and project management.
Repair, maintenance and operation of infrastructure.
Re-establishment, training and mentoring partner nation service institutions.
Support to Interim Governance
. The military wil likely be in a supporting role, given
that its primary role wil be security related. An HQ may be the only organisation able to take
responsibility for governing an area. AJP-3.4.1. Peace Support Operations
identifies that the
military may be required to undertake civil administration tasks in support of a weak partner
nation government, or in the absence of other administrative structures. The HQ should seek
to hand responsibility for governance tasks to an appropriate civil indigenous, or International
Organisation at the earliest opportunity. Guidance on the division’s contribution to
governance can be found in Table 10-2 below. A preceding step to all this activity is to
conduct a conflict sensitivity assessment to ensure all activity wil at a minimum not
exacerbate existing conflict dynamics and at best contribute positively to reducing
• Hold meetings with civil
• Safe, neutral venue for
dialogue with key community
society representatives (use
figures (including women) to
J2 assessments etc. to
increase awareness and
• CIMIC staff.
manage local expectation.
personalities are involved).
• Tac Psyops teams.
• Use media/information
• Media teams.
activities to inform local
• Clerical support to record
opinions, perceptions and
• STABAD and other HQ
• Publicise activities.
based civilian advisor.
• Protect civil representatives
• DFID in-country advisor.
• FCO representatives.
2. Identify and prioritise local
• Consult widely on what
• Safe, neutral venue for
selection criteria should be
to ensure broad community
• CIMIC staff.
107 See Conflict Sensitivity - Tools and Guidance
, Stabilisation Unit, 2015).
the needs of the civil
legitimacy of all committees.
• Clerical support to record
• Hold regular meetings to
establish priorities and
• STABAD and other HQ
update on progress.
based civilian advisors.
• Identify and include local
• DFID in-country advisor.
expertise (e.g. facilities
• Encourage local ownership
3. Provide administration and
• Establish sector working
• Meeting venues.
groups (e.g. water, power,
needs of the
law and order) comprising
• Subject matter experts (e.g.
local and military experts.
Army Legal Service, Royal
• Develop working group
Engineers, Army Medical
capability with military elms
Services) and technical
increasingly performing a
• Clerical support.
• Establish a mechanism to
• Source(s) of funding.
• Financial support.
and monitor effectiveness
• Information activities.
• CIMIC staff.
established in step 2 may
form the basis of this).
• Publicise activities and
responsibilities to enhance
legitimacy of organisations.
• Manage expectations.
• Audit accounts and
• Link to national structures
as soon as practicable.
4. Set conditions for and
• Identify and agree
• CIMIC staff.
handover of responsibility
conditions to be met for
• Information activities.
Responsibility for governance
transfer to occur early.
should be handed over to the
• Identify suitable
• STABAD and other HQ
partner nation authorities or an
organisations to accept
based civilian advisors.
appropriate international civil
responsibility (partner nation • DFID in-country advisor.
organisation at the earliest
institutions, IOs, NGOs,
• Develop capacity of local
• Publicise achievements.
• Manage expectations (local
administrators, NGOs, own
Establishing civil authority
. Brigade stabilising actions wil usually be conducted within a divisional
framework. The 2* HQ wil provide the command experience and staff capacity to deal with the
significant complexity and inter-agency nature of stabilising actions, allowing the brigade to
concentrate on tactical delivery. The challenges of stabilisation may see additional functionality
devolved to the brigade; influence, civil effect, additional intelligence, stabilisation and cultural
advisors may all be task organised. The brigade HQ wil need to reconfigure to integrate and
optimise these assets. The sub-division of function and task between brigade and division wil vary
depending on context. Generic brigade HQ on stability operations tasks are:
Intelligence gathering and identifying sources of instability.
The over watch, training, supervision and mentoring of partner nation security forces.
Surge operations as required to restore law and order.
Coordination with NGOs, civil ministries, donors, reconstruction agencies and
Border security (where appropriate until relieved by partner nation security forces).
Infrastructure security until relieved by partner nation security forces.
Supporting information activities.
. Once the brigade has achieved an acceptable level of security and public
order, the commander should consider moving to a partner nation security lead. This wil be a
political as wel as security judgement. There are at least two options: transition from the brigade to
an indigenous military security lead; or transition direct to a civil (police) lead, i.e. police primacy.
Police primacy should be the goal as it can bolster the perception of progress and reinforce the
impression of hostile groups as criminals rather than freedom fighters. It demonstrates the partner
nation’s commitment to governing through the rule of law. Police primacy wil often be
unachievable until relatively late in the campaign and may even be an alien concept in some
societies. Security transitions are often periods of high risk and uncertainty for the brigade, which if
enacted prematurely can be counter-productive.
. To carry out stability activities, the brigade may need to adapt individual
and unit roles, composition, equipment, operating procedures and training. If the initial deployment
of the force is based on a contingent intervention operation which then transitions to a stability
operation (e.g. Iraq 2003 – 2004), then the force may have to adapt in contact. Commonality of CIS
and a shared information environment must be sought despite chal enges such as security
clearances. As the operational context evolves, the force must remain responsive to the ever-
changing demands of the operating environment.
The initial composition of the brigade and its options for adaptation should be one of
the major tasks to fall out of the commander’s analysis. A typical brigade composition to conduct
stabilising actions is likely to contain the following generic elements:
Integrated Headquarters (HQ)
. The brigade HQ structure is likely to require
adjustment and, as a minimum, wil need to integrate liaison officers, multi-agency partners
and staff such as stabilisation, policy or cultural advisors. There is likely to be an increased
emphasis on future plans/operations. In areas of limited permissiveness, the brigade HQ
may need to host OGDs and agencies. The aim must be to promote coherence across civil
and military activity. Ful integration may only be necessary in the most complex of tasks and
even then, may be difficult to achieve. Exchanging empowered planning staff or simply
collocating HQ are viable alternatives in less demanding scenarios.
. Framework forces enable and conduct the bulk of the routine
security operations. They wil largely be focused on securing key installations, locations and
. Strike forces are used to disrupt and defeat the insurgent, often in
depth. These forces can take both lethal and non-lethal actions to achieve these effects.
. Surge forces are deployed to reinforce framework forces to achieve
specific effects, for example the provision of security and control during elections. They can
be based over the horizon or in-country.
Capacity Building Forces
. Capacity building forces are made up of brigade
specialists who should have a deep cultural understanding of the local population and wil
need to build robust working relationships with them. They may also deliver combat enabling
capabilities, such as air and medical support that indigenous security forces lack.108
Joint/Multi National Enablers
. Joint enablers are those elements that move, sustain,
maintain and support the brigade. These often prove to be a very large proportion of a
stabilisation force and the requirement for joint enablers should not be underestimated.
. During transition, the brigade may be augmented with additional
personnel (including liaison officers) and capabilities. Examples are as follows:
. POLADs are responsible for advising on aspects of UK defence policy and
practice that affect decision making.
. LEGADs are usual y military lawyers, held at brigade or divisional level but
may be task organised with a battlegroup for specific missions or activities. They are
responsible for offering legal advice to the deployed force. They have a wide range of duties,
covered in detail in JDP 3-46.
. STABADs are deployed civilian experts from the Stabilisation Unit. They
work with the brigade commander, integrating cross government stabilisation strategies and
programmes into brigade planning.
. OAs can provide a range of specialist analytical and
assessment products and advice to support land forces’ mission planning and execution,
such as assessment of local variation from standard planning data or in support of Course of
Action (COA) evaluation. OAs wil also be able to advise on setting, collecting, and analysing
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) in support of the Effects Matrix or Campaign Plan.109
Executing the Stability Activities
Security and Control
. Success in achieving security is a precursor to enabling all the
other lines of operation to flourish. The early establishment of a secure environment and a
degree of law and order following military intervention provides a permissive environment for
external and civil actors to operate. The brigade wil contribute to the provision of security
usually on behalf of the partner nation government. This may range from advice, military
assistance, offensive actions to contain or deter, or a full-scale intervention to combat a
108 Note that the Specialized Infantry Battalion concept is under development.
109 OAs were employed at the brigade level on Operation HERRICK but are generally a divisional level asset.
violent insurgency. In the latter case, the brigade wil need to engage in offensive actions to
suppress the insurgent, to wrest the initiative from him to dictate terms, and to demonstrate
the partner nation government’s authority. Offensive action carries the risk of military and
civilian casualties and the insurgent may deliberately target the population and through
violence and intimidation try to dissuade the population and international community from
supporting the government’s efforts. The following tasks may be executed as part of security
Establishment of Tactical Bases
. Static, tactical bases are used to support a
continuous and effective security presence. Tactical bases wil be established when the
command decision is made that they offer sufficient tactical advantage over relying
solely on vehicle and dismounted operations. They are the hubs around which forward
operations are conducted on an enduring operation. Main bases are sited for strategic
purposes such as theatre entry, whereas the locations of tactical bases are determined
primarily by tactical considerations. Some bases are established to provide indirect
support to operations such as communications nodes or to control border-crossing
points. Others are required to establish the essential framework for security operations.
In counter-insurgency and stability operations, this latter category is used to secure the
population, establish a stabilising presence and create local influence.
Protection of political processes
. The central chal enge of stabilisation is to
bring about some form of political settlement in a pressured and violent context, and
supporting the evolution of political processes is key to this. Brigade level contributions
to this chal enge include:
Provision of a secure environment for negotiations
, including protecting
key sites where political processes take place.
Ensuring freedom of movement and protection of those engaging in
Monitoring of ceasefires
Promotion of Human Security
. Winning the contest for human security is
fundamental to the development of partner nation government authority and, ultimately
security of the state. 110 The commander can employ a range of techniques including:
Protecting the Population and Key Assets
. Winning the contest for
human security is fundamental to the development of partner nation government
authority and, ultimately security of the state.
Establishing Secured Areas
. By providing secured areas the brigade wil
isolate the adversary from the population. Securing key areas helps to support
economic activity, enables major infrastructure projects and encourages effective
governance and the rule of law. Once the situation allows, such areas should be
consolidated and expanded. Support to local governance and development,
together with initiatives that generate local employment and economic growth, wil
be critical to maintaining security and stability.
. Effective border control is essential to combat regional
criminality and the movement of foreign fighters, weapons and supplies. The
brigade may be tasked to patrol borders and mentor customs, immigration and
border control agencies.
110 This subject is covered in detail in the annexes to this chapter.
Provide Humanitarian Assistance
. The greatest contribution to the
delivery of humanitarian assistance that the brigade can generally make is to
ensure area security and freedom of movement and access for civilian agencies
delivering that humanitarian assistance. In extremis, the brigade may be asked to
facilitate this provision more directly by providing direct convoy protection, or
even to deliver it directly themselves. The brigade should only engage in these
more direct forms of support after close consultation with DFID or other IOs
leading aid distribution, such as the UN. This subject is covered in detail in Part 3
to this AFM.
. Direct military action against adversaries is likely to be
a central component of the brigade contribution to the wider campaign to build stability.
In this case, setting the conditions for a negotiated political settlement may entail
breaking the ideological, financial or intimidation links within and between different
adversarial and bel igerent groups, as well as between them and the local population.
‘In wars among the people, if you are using a lot of firepower, you are almost certainly losing.’
General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff (2010-2013)
Key Leader Engagement (KLE)
. KLE is recognised as an important element of
the influence process and needs to be synchronised at brigade level with fires,
manoeuvre and other information activities to achieve the required effects (Integrated
Action). Engagement is predominantly conducted to gain information or influence
behaviour and is a key enabler of human terrain analysis. The Commander wil usually
engage directly with the perceived key leader of the intended target audience. At
brigade level, KLE mission analysis and planning should be conducted by the
information activities staff or a designated engagement staff officer. While frequently
excluded from holding formal positions of leadership, women generally play an
important role in influencing societal attitudes and perspectives. The informal nature of
these leadership and influencing roles, combined with the potential difficulty of
accessing women in conservative societies, can make it easy to overlook women in
KLE programmes. This needs to be guarded against, and creative ways found to
achieve this engagement.
KLE must be focused. Al engagement should take place under a single
competent authority – which then determines the effects required and the means best
suited to delivering those effects. KLE must not be passed to a separate part of the
HQ. The conduct of KLE might be planned by information activities staff – the execution
of KLE must be more coherent and part of a whole HQ.
Support to SSR
. The precise scope and nature of military support provided by the
brigade wil vary per the level of reform required and the security environment. The brigade
wil require a SSR cell to carry out the level of planning and liaison required with the partner
nation and OGDs. The brigade contribution to SSR is likely to focus on capacity building,
covered in Part 5 to this AFM. Other tasks may include:
Support to DDR
. Further details can be found in Chapter 9.
Initial Generation and Management of Indigenous Forces
. The condition and
suitability of existing indigenous security forces should be assessed before a decision
is made to generate new forces. The commander should ensure training teams
establish basic support structures parallel to operational training, as the operational
capability of local forces is likely to reflect the quality of basic administration: pay,
feeding and equipment husbandry.
Support to the Judicial Sector
. During the initial stages of a campaign, the
brigade may be required to identify and provide protection to any functioning judicial
mechanisms, both formal (state) and informal (customary, community-led), to ensure
ongoing citizen access to justice and dispute resolution. Identification of what systems
are functional wil also provide important information to reform planning processes,
once these commence. The brigade may also be required to begin the refurbishment or
reconstruction of facilities, possibly including court houses and correctional facilities, or
at least to provide security.
Developing Indigenous Police Services
. The brigade may need to lead on
basic police training. The responsibility for on-going internal security should ideally be
provided by a demilitarised police force with a mandate for law enforcement and strong
links to the judiciary. Ideal y, this sees the creation of a community-based police service
in the brigade area of operations, with a clear separation between the roles of the
partner nation’s police and the military. Police primacy for internal security should
remain an aspiration, however, community policing models assume consent which is
unlikely to be achievable during violent conflict. Therefore, the policing model must be
Support to Initial Restoration of Essential Services
. The brigade may be required to
contribute in the early stages of an operation, or subsequent periods where the security
situation deteriorates and civil agencies are unable to deliver. The nature and size of the
military contribution wil vary; in some circumstances, it may be appropriate to focus brigade
engineer effort on restoration of services for the population at the expense of provision of
facilities for brigade personnel. The ability to provide essential services demonstrates visible
signs of progress and effective local governance and the two should be linked where
The brigade contribution may be optimised in supporting local and international
humanitarian and development organisations to expand their access to the population.
Where these agencies cannot operate, the brigade may be asked to provide direct
assistance. In deciding whether and how to respond, the risks of exacerbating conflict
dynamics must be considered, and a conflict-sensitive approach adopted. In extremis,
support to the restoration of services may provide land forces with leverage over certain
Support to Interim Governance Tasks
. Where possible, governance activities should
be implemented by civilian actors and enabled, only where necessary, by the brigade. The
military contribution to governance wil depend on the level of security and in non-permissive
environments where civilian access is limited the brigade may be drawn into those areas of
governance essential for early progress. Civilian expertise must be integrated into planning
through reach back/outreach or by in-theatre governance advisors and responsibility handed
over as soon as practicable. Governance tasks should seek to build on the foundations of
existing capacity, however informal or unsubstantial. By building on existing structure the
expansion of governance is more likely to succeed than a system imposed by outsiders. This
may mean the brigade carrying out much of the planning and delivery while ultimate
responsibility lies with the local authorities. There may be a requirement for the commander
to focus heavily on supporting key governing actors and this may take up a large proportion
of his time. Al brigade activities must strengthen the partner nation government and reinforce
its legitimacy with the people. Typical tasks may include:
Support Development of Local Governance
. It should be recognised that local
governance is usually an intricate, highly politicised space, and direct military
involvement should be a last resort. Even where civilian agencies are not present for
security reasons, consultation with DFID and involvement of the Stabilisation Advisor
should be sought. They wil also help local people devise local solutions to problems
and help the population and community leaders to build skills in community decision
making. In best-case scenarios, this can provide greater transparency in resource
allocation and other decision making processes. At the local level, support should be
provided for the organs of the state (such as the Police) to help them build consent with
the local population. Effective cooperation between state and non-state systems should
Dispute and Conflict Resolution
. The brigade may be involved in supporting
mechanisms that facilitate non-violent political contestation and the peaceful resolution
of disputes and conflicts, and that assist communities to connect with local authorities.
These may include:
Providing a secure environment for negotiations and dispute resolution
Direct and regular engagement with key elites and government authorities.
In extremis, settling disputes, for example over land or property seizure.
Public outreach and information programmes.
Enforcing ceasefires and support to transitional justice arrangements.
. The ability of the partner nation government to run fair
and secure elections is an important indicator of stability and should be implemented
by the partner nation government where possible. The brigade may be required to
provide security for the civilian agencies that administer the election process and the
wider community to enable maximum participation. Where possible security for
elections should be provided by partner nation security forces, preferably police,
supported and reinforced where necessary by the brigade. If elections are held too
early they may provoke an increase in violence. The commander should assess their
likely impact on security and advise the partner nation government and international
. Corruption undermines confidence in the state,
impedes the flow of aid, concentrates wealth in the hands of a minority and can be
used by elites to protect their positions and interests. See Part 1 to this AFM for more
. During transition the battlegroup is unlikely to be optimally task organised
or equipped to execute al the stability activities required to fulfil medium and long-term stability
objectives. The focus should thus be directed at setting the conditions and enabling stability
activities to begin, mostly through the provision of security and control.
. During transition, information activities wil refocus to place
more emphasis on engaging with local nationals and both international and UK audiences. Local
national consent and support is likely to be fragile and may benefit from early interaction. Detailed
guidance can be found in DN 17/05: Information Activities
. Battlegroups may need to re-task sub-units out of their primary role to
generate additional mass and reinforce some specialist capabilities. Re-rolling non-infantry sub-
units to conduct a ground-holding infantry role may be required to achieve sufficient presence
across a battlegroup area of operations. Drivers, medics, combat engineers, logisticians and
intelligence analysts may need to be centralised. A1 Echelon is likely to be a supported, rather than
supporting element and may be regularly employed on the battlegroup main effort.
. During transition, the battlegroup may be augmented with additional
personnel (including liaison officers) and capabilities. Examples are as follows:
. CULADs advise the battlegroup commander and his staff on cultural norms
and practices of the partner nation to further KLE activities and assist the battlegroup in
understanding the environment in which they are operating. They are key members of the
battlegroup planning team and can be used as a Red Team player offering contrary views
from the partner nation aspect.
. STABADs are deployed civilian experts from the Stabilisation Unit. They
work with the battlegroup commander, integrating cross government stabilisation strategies
and programmes into battlegroup planning.
Defence Advanced Search Advisor (DASA)
. DASAs advise battlegroup commanders
on the employment of specialist search capabilities, such as the Defence Advanced Search
Team (DAST) or the Al Arms Search Teams and are part of the Battlegroup Engineer party.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operator
. Operators advise battlegroup
commanders on the destruction or exploitation of explosive ordnance and Improvised
Explosive Devices. They deploy with a team and equipment to conduct explosive ordnance
disposal operations within battlegroup areas of operation.
Combat Camera Team (CCT)
. Army CCTs are deployed by PJHQ. They deploy with
battlegroups to record video and voice data in support of media operations. They are often
tasked by media staff within either the brigade or division.
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)
. Experts from 77 Brigade wil normally deploy
to conduct discrete PSYOPS within the battlegroup area of operations. This may include
messaging, information campaigns and target audience analysis. These elements wil
normally be tasked by brigade or divisional staff.
Military Working Dogs (MWDs)
. MWD teams can reinforce the search capability of
the force. During stability operations, units are also likely to be based in static locations
creating a greater guarding responsibility. MWDs can become a significant force multiplier
both as a sensor but also by deterring intruders.
The battlegroup HQ could also expect to receive an increase in CIS capability with
which to manage stability operations. They are also likely to find themselves in static
locations operating from buildings of opportunity where available, until more permanent
accommodation is provided.
Executing the Stability Activities
Security and Control
. The military tasks associated with security and control at the
battlegroup level are described in detail in the Handbook to this AFM. These tasks are:
. Patrolling is conducted to dominate ground, gather information,
protect key infrastructure, reassure and gain the trust of the population, and support
other operations or deployed troops.
. The purpose of strike operations should be to provide greater
overall security for the population by removing undesirable elements from it. This can
be: to search a building or site to remove il egal weapons, sensitive material or
munitions; to search a building to gain evidence with which to enable an internment or
successful prosecution through the appropriate justice system; to detain an individual
for subsequent questioning, internment and prosecution; the exploitation of action
taken or information gained for information activities purposes.
. Convoys either manoeuvre employing organic recce
elements and can control organic and joint fires, or they conduct moves controlled and
co-ordinated by the in place force or battlespace owner. Convoys consist of five
elements: Command, Vanguard, Close Protection Group, Logistic Elements and the In
Public Order Operations
. The battlegroup may need to conduct public order
operations to maintain law and order where the civilian police are unable to deal with
Cordon and Search
. Cordon operations are usual y mounted to obtain evidence
or deny weapons and equipment to an enemy. They can be deliberate or hasty
operations in response to an enemy attack, where preservation of the scene and
control of the incident is required.
. The protection of routes may be required as an own-force
protection measure, to enable local populations to go about their business or to deny
freedom of movement to an enemy. Route protection operations include vehicle check
points and route checks.
Separation of Hostile Forces
. Interposition or the separation of hostile forces
may be required. Detail on interposition tactics, negotiation and mediation, delineation
procedures and observation and monitoring is given in AJP-3.4.1. Peace Support
Enforcement of Out of Bounds Areas
. Key infrastructure, vulnerable
communities, food storage depots, weapons cantonments etc. may need to be kept out
of bounds or protected. The intelligence preparation of the environment should
highlight such areas.
Curfews provide a means by which the movement of personnel can be
controlled during specific periods of time.
(10) Prisoner and Detainee Handling
. The mandate under which the force is
operating wil articulate the specific powers of arrest and detention available to
members of the force. JDP 1-10 Captured Persons
must be followed throughout in
conjunction with theatre-specific Standard Operating Instructions. In general, the
procedures adopted should ensure that human rights are not infringed and that any
evidence relevant to a potential prosecution is gathered, preserved and recorded
(11) Management of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)
effort should be made to prevent the local population becoming displaced through
measures such as ensuring their security and provision of essential services. Support
to IDPs and refugees is usually conducted by specialist agencies such as IOs and
NGOs. Depending on the scale and location of the problem land forces may be
required to help with the movement and management of IDPs and refugees.
(12) Stability Policing
Elements of the Battlegroup may need to conduct Stability
Policing activity in order to maintain initial law and order in the absence of a viable
indigenous police force.
Support to SSR
. The battlegroup contribution is described under capacity building
within Part 5 to this AFM. Note that support to SSR includes the provision of short-term
training teams within Army International Activity, part of the UK’s DE plan.
Support to Initial Restoration of Essential Services
. The battlegroup contribution to
the initial restoration of essential services should address immediate requirements where
local or international civilian agencies are unable to do so. Such activities should be handed
to a civilian agency lead as soon they can take over. The repair of complex infrastructure will
be the remit of specialists, and beyond the scope of battlegroup engineers. This may wel be
identified by the battlegroup, but work wil probably be tasked and controlled centrally by the
division as troops able to carry out work wil be limited in number. Possible tasks include:
Clearing Debris and Improving Key Routes
. Battlegroups may need to employ
engineer plant, EOD and search teams to clear and repair arterial routes and
infrastructure damaged by our own or enemy force activity.
Fixing Power Supplies
. Maintaining a supply of power to local populations wil
assist in maintaining local consent. The repair of electricity sub stations, power cables
or enabling the delivery of fuel are examples of activities to consider.
Supplying Clean Water
. The provision of emergency supplies of potable water
to the local population may be necessary where supplies have been damaged or
contaminated by combat operations. Quick impact projects to establish a sustainable
supply by, for example, digging bore holes should also be considered.
Erecting Temporary Shelters
. Depending on the severity of major combat
operations or crisis, many displaced persons may be expected to reside within the
battlegroup area of operations, or to gravitate towards battlegroup locations. Although
the battlegroup must avoid becoming fixed by the presence of displaced persons, due
consideration should be given to the provision of suitable shelter. Where possible, local
buildings should be used rather than committing limited battlegroup resources.
Delivering Humanitarian Aid
. Land forces should consider all requests to
support the delivery of humanitarian aid where required. Consideration should be given
to whether military vehicles and manpower deliver the aid or if they act in support of the
international or NGOs providing the aid. Advice should be sought through the policy
advisor before agreeing requests from outside the military chain of command.
Support to Interim Governance Tasks
. While a major part of stability operations,
Support to Interim Governance is likely to be a relatively minor battlegroup activity within
transition. Plans for elections, the reconstitution of a judicial system and the long-term
economic development and reconstruction plan are unlikely to have been formulated or
enacted at this stage of the campaign. The battlegroup should be prepared to assist where
directed by its chain of command.
Women Peace and Security and Gender Mainstreaming.
Children and Armed Conflict.
Cultural Property Protection.
Annex A to Chapter 10: Women, Peace and Security and Gender Mainstreaming
This annex deals with three related issues:
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) and responses to it.
Promoting a gender perspective to improve operational effectiveness.
The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) on operations in general and
UN missions in particular.
…Sexual violence was our big weapon…we did it as a way of provoking the Congolese
overnment. Sexual violence has led to the Government wanting to negotiate with us.”
ommander Taylor, National Congress for the Defence of the People, in 2009 documentary
eapon of War: Confessions of Rape in Congo’.
aylor was subsequently prosecuted and convicted for his involvement in these crimes.
The UK, NATO, and the UN recognise the different vulnerabilities to conflict
experienced by men, women, boys and girls. This includes the impact on a society's prospects for
post-conflict recovery and long-term stability caused by all forms of sexual and gender based
violence, and the positive role women can play in building sustainable peace. This was articulated
in 2000 through the UN's Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security, and
has subsequently been strengthened through many additional resolutions. The UK's National
for implementing our commitments related to this agenda includes many commitments
specific to the military. But in addition, there is a growing recognition across NATO, the UN, and the
British military that mainstreaming gender across all aspects of how we conduct stability operations
can directly improve our operational effectiveness. It can improve our understanding of the context,
our intelligence and our force protection, and impacts directly on how we interpret our mandate and
translate this into action at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
Definitions and Descriptions
The following definitions apply to the role of gender in conflict and the development of a
Gender and Sex
. Sex refers to biological and physiological characteristics. Gender
refers to learned behaviours, roles, expectations, and activities in society. These societal
norms can vary from society to society and can change in the lifetime of a mission. Sex
refers to male or female, while gender refers to masculine or feminine. The differences in the
sexes do not vary throughout the world, but differences in gender do.
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
. The term “gender-based violence” refers to
violence that targets individuals or groups based on their gender. Sexual violence includes
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. It refers to any act, attempt, or threat of a sexual
nature that result, or is likely to result in, physical, psychological and emotional harm.
. Any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability,
differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting
monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another (UN).
. A method used to understand the relationships between men and
women in the context of a society.111
Gender Advisor (GENAD)
. A dedicated gender expert who operates at strategic and
operational levels providing internal advice and subject matter expertise. Gender advisors
are needed to ensure that gender is an integrated part of planning operations (derived from NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1).
Gender Focal Point (GFP)
. The Gender Focal Point can be an officer or senior non-
commissioned officer who supports the commander in ensuring a gender perspective. The
Gender Focal Point remains within the chain of command and ensures that a gender
perspective is fully integrated into the daily tasks of the operation. He/she is likely to hold the
GFP role as a secondary responsibility (derived from NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive
. Gender perspective considers the impact of gender on people's
opportunities, social roles and interactions (Doctrine Note 16/02: Human Security – The
. The systematic implementation of a gender perspective
within an organisation or unit (derived from NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)
Impact on Society
. Sexual violence is prevalent in conflict and may be used as a
method of warfare to humiliate enemies and undermine their morale, terrorise and control civilians,
force communities out of their homes and affect ethnic balance. The longer-term impact of
widespread CRSV on societies is also increasingly understood; it perpetuates grievances and
drives further conflict; undermines the transition to peace and stabilisation, increases hostility to the
state (which is seen as unable to protect its citizens or provide justice), and has long-term
economic and development consequences. Practices of CRSV are forbidden under the Law of
Armed Conflict and the national criminal law of the UK as wel as most other nations.
Sexual violence affects men, women, boys and girls differently. Women and girls are at
particular risk of violence in conflict, whether in the home, during flight or in camps to which they
have fled for safety. Children affected by sexual violence also include those who have witnessed
the rape of a family member, male and female, and those who are ostracised because of an
assault on their mother. Nonetheless, it is not always the case that women are the victims and men
the perpetrators. Both men and women can be victims and perpetrators of violence, and
combatants and agents of peace.
Systematic rape is often practised with the intent of ethnic cleansing through deliberate
impregnation. This was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Rwanda and Democratic
Republic of Congo. Wartime rape often has a tragic ripple effect that extends far beyond the pain
and degradation of the rape itself. Rape victims who become pregnant are often ostracised by their
families and communities and abandon their babies. The text box above illustrates that men and
boys can also become victims. The International Response
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and Other Relevant Resolutions
. In 2000,
the UN Security Council recognised the unique and disproportionate threats to women in conflict
and the positive role women can play in building peace through Resolution 1325. The resolution,
111 Derived from NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1
under the banner of Women, Peace and Security (WPS), also set out a blueprint for understanding
and tackling gender-specific issues. Subsequent resolutions (see Table 10A-1) follow similar
themes and reflect the impact of conflict on men, women, boys and girls.
Focuses on the protection of women, girls, men and boys from sexual and gender-
based violence in armed conflict. Links sexual violence as a tactic of war with women,
peace and security issues. Demands parties to armed conflict to take appropriate
measures to protect civilians from sexual violence, including training troops and
Mandates peacekeeping missions to protect women and children from sexual violence
during armed conflict, and requests that the Secretary-General establish the Office of
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict.
Calls for further strengthening of women’s participation in peace processes and the
development of indicators to measure progress on Resolution 1325. National Action
Plans (NAPs) introduced as a tool to demonstrate how member nations were
implementing Resolution 1325.
Focuses on the mechanisms to monitor the enforcement of protection from sexual and
gender-based violence in armed conflict. Introduced a “name and shame” policy within
the Security Council.
Promotes participation of local women in post-conflict negotiation.
Strengthens broader Women, Peace and Security agenda on participation (leadership)
and gender mainstreaming at the highest-levels.
Commits member states to integrate gender analysis into the understanding of drivers
of conflict. Promotes increased consultation with women’s groups. Set new targets for
participation of women in peacekeeping operations.
Recommends specific measures to address allegations of Sexual Exploitation and
Abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers, including robust pre-deployment training for police
and troop contributing nations and quick, thorough investigations of allegations and
prosecution of offenders.
UN Security Council Resolutions relating to gender and sexual and gender-based violence
. The UN’s plan to tackle sexual and gender-based violence and
to promote awareness of the role of gender in conflict is set out in a four-pil ar approach under
. The participation and inclusion of women (including servicewomen and
civil society actors) in decision-making related to peacemaking, post-conflict reconstruction
and the prevention of conflict.
. The protection of women and girls in armed conflict.
. Prevention of conflict-related sexual violence, and effective reporting and
protection of victims.
. The systematic implementation of a gender perspective in
peacekeeping and peace building, as per Resolution 1325, by all member states, especially
in the context of peace missions led by the UN.112
UN Action against CRSV (UN Action)
. UN Action unites the work of 13 UN entities
with the goal of ending sexual violence in conflict. It is a concerted effort by the UN system to
improve coordination and accountability, amplify programming and advocacy, and support national
efforts to prevent sexual violence and respond effectively to the needs of survivors. UK
commanders serving with or alongside the UN should identify local representatives of the scheme
to establish actions on and reporting requirements relating to sexual and gender-based violence.
112 Note that subsequent resolutions emphasise the impact of conflict on men and boys more than Resolution 1325.
UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2014-2017
. The UK
National Action Plan (NAP), established in 2006, emphasises that women’s participation is needed
to make and build peace and prevent conflict breaking out. The NAP is jointly owned by the MOD,
DFID and the FCO and follows the framework of Resolution 1325. The UK therefore recognises
that sometimes women and girls suffer specific forms of violence in conflict which need to be
addressed as part of any stabilisation effort, not just Peace Support. Building on the NAP, the UK
agreed to review the doctrine and training provided to military personnel on Women, Peace and
Security and sexual and gender-based violence at the 2013 G8 Summit. This includes training
provided by the UK to other nations through capacity building.
The UK’s National Action Plan for Women Peace and Security.
Linked to the above, HMG has placed emphasis on its Preventing Sexual Violence
Initiative (PSVI) which seeks to eradicate sexual and gender-based violence within conflicts. The
aim of the PSVI is the eradication of rape as a weapon of war, through a global campaign to end
impunity for perpetrators, to deter and prevent sexual violence, to support and recognise survivors,
and to change global attitudes that fuel these crimes. Further to the NAP, the UK (and the MOD
specifically) also made commitments on Women, Peace and Security at the High Level Review of
UNSCR 1325 and at the 2016 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial.
Improving Operational Effectiveness by Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective
Gender perspective is a tool used to better understand societies. Adopting a gender
perspective and mainstreaming it into all dimensions of our operations can have a positive impact
on our operational effectiveness. It can improve our understanding of the operating context, our
intelligence and force protection, our influence amongst the host population and over our
adversaries, our choices of what tactical actions we undertake and how we undertake them. To
achieve mission success, land forces must fully understand the operating environment. Without a
gender perspective, 50 per cent of the population might be missing from the estimate/analysis
process. This is of particular importance in relation to establishing stability and security. The MOD’s
intention is to deliver this capability through a cadre of land gender advisors using the NATO model
as a guide.
The MOD’s intention is to deliver this capability through a cadre of land gender
advisors using the NATO model as a guide. The Field Army’s Training Needs Analysis, presented
in August 2016, includes recommendations for the training of 50 Gender Advisors, who wil sit at
command level within the tri-Services, and Gender Focal Points, who wil sit within each unit and
advise on incorporating gender into the unit’s ordinary task. These recommendations wil be
implemented during 2017.
Interacting and communicating with women and girls results in improvements to our
understanding of the local society, improved situational awareness, additional intelligence and
increased mission influence. But in many of the societies we operate in, accessing women and
girls through our KLE programmes and daily force interaction can be chal enging. Women are
frequently excluded from formal positions of leadership, and conservative social norms can make it
culturally unacceptable for our predominantly male land forces to interact directly with women and
girls. Extra effort and creative approaches therefore need to be found to overcome these
chal enges and maximise the benefits of these gender perspectives into our planning and
Gender Balance on Operations
The experiences and skil s of both
men and women are essential to the success of
land operations. Specifically, a gender-mixed force aids communication with a broad cross-section
of society within the operating environment. Notably, Integrated Action requires the identification
and understanding of the key actors, male and female, in a conflict situation prior to designing
operations to change or maintain actors’ behaviour as required. Appropriately trained and
experienced female soldiers are essential for engagement with women and children. This should
not be a narrow specialist activity; gender engagement activities include, but are not limited to:
CIMIC, HUMINT, Information Activities, investigations, medical services, public affairs and support
NATO Approach: Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1
. In Aug 2012, NATO
members, including the UK, subscribed to a command directive integrating Resolution 1325 and its
strands into the NATO command structure and operational practices.113 This focuses on enhancing
operational performance by adopting gender mainstreaming across all functions. It also
emphasises the effect servicewomen can have through their ability to engage with both women
and men in conservative societies.
The NATO’s direction to its members:
Incorporate Resolutions relating to gender into military planning and the conduct of
Establish Gender Advisors into military HQ to provide specific advice and operational
support on gender dimensions to the Commander and NATO personnel.114
Educate and train soldiers on gender mainstreaming and the theory of Resolution 1325
and Women, Peace and Security.
Operational Planning and Preparation
Thorough planning and preparation are crucial to the success of the mission.
Integrating a gender perspective at all levels of planning is imperative when developing strategies
to address the full spectrum of crisis management scenarios in which land forces are involved.
Gender analysis is not a standalone function but must be integrated into every line of
113 See NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1
dated 8 Aug 2012.
114 See Annex A and definitions section.
operation/staff function to contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the whole operating
Gender perspective should be considered while conducting the intelligence preparation
of the environment (IPE), for example during PMESI, ASCOPE and stakeholder analysis. Appendix
2 provides a list of gender-specific considerations for inclusion within the intelligence preparation of
the environment. Their significance wil vary per the mission although all wil support a better
understanding of the operating environment. The nature of the information requirements wil also
vary between formation and unit levels. Where the protection of civilians forms a central element
within the mission, Neutral/ Environmental Information Requirements may replace enemy-focused
Priority Intelligence Requirements.
The Full Spectrum Approach must be applied to ensure that expertise is fully exploited.
Commanders must also understand, via the G2 Branch and cultural advisor, the cultural context
within which they are operating and not simply apply their own norms, law and behaviour. The
distinction between international and local law, human rights and culture must be analysed and
addressed. Note that, wherever possible, cultural expertise should also be made available to junior
commanders to support tactical level cultural understanding.
Measures to Achieve or Enhance a Gender Perspective
Specify the requirement for gender advisors during the force generation processes.
Consider the participation of women in the force to engage with the entire population at all
Seek early advice from the cadre of gender advisors throughout the planning process
to ensure the full integration of gender perspective. Their knowledge should be based on a
gender analysis specific to areas of operation, integrated with broader intel igence
preparation of the environment.
Gender advisors should provide subject matter expertise on procedures to protect
civilians, with specific consideration given to men, women, girls and boys, from violence,
rape and other forms of sexual abuse, including human trafficking. This fol ows Resolutions
1325, 1820 and related resolutions. If the gender advisor does not hold expertise on sexual
and gender-based violence an appropriate representative within the CJIIM environment
should be consulted. Note that it is preferable for a gender advisor to hold these skil s.
Deployable Stabilisation Unit experts can also provide guidance.
Ensure a gender perspective in all capacity building efforts supporting, training and
mentoring local security forces.
Consider how a gender perspective can be integrated into operational staff work. Note
that NATO has directed that its operational plans must contain an annex on gender.
More detail on Tactical and Operational measures that can be taken to incorporate gender
perspectives into operations is provided in 'How can gender make a difference to security in
operations - Indicators
', NATO, 2011, p37-38. Disrupting and Reporting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
. Strong and effective monitoring and reporting mechanisms should always
be in place, making sure that criminal acts including human rights violations, sexual and gender-
based violence and indications of domestic or international trafficking of human beings are
reported, addressed and correctly processed. This includes the requirement to understand who the
interlocutors are within police forces, OGDs, NGOs and IOs. This wil vary from theatre to theatre
and wil be briefed within Mission Specific Training. Taking early advice from the legal advisor or
the military police is essential.
. In many societies, women and girls often bear responsibility
for collecting water, purchasing food and firewood. In conflict areas, these gendered activities may
expose them to significant security risks, such as rape, assault, and kidnapping. Therefore,
consultation with women and women's organisations is essential in the planning of patrol routes
and schedules when trying to improve security. Such consultation is crucial, as measures taken to
protect women and girls without consultation often result in ineffective or counterproductive
Protecting and engaging with women and girls can also have significant security and
intelligence benefits for the force. While they conduct their outdoor activities, women and girls may
be the first to observe actions that might affect the security environment. Their perspectives can
enhance the mission's understanding of the security environment daily. They may be aware of the
activity of male fighters from or around their household, black market economic activity, and
informal power structures that are having a destabilising effect at the local level. Specific
consideration should be paid to protecting female sources and their households from identification.
Handling of Female Captured Persons (CPERS)
. The captivity of female captured
persons may be very culturally sensitive and personnel should follow the guidance in JDP 1-10 Captured Persons
throughout. Due regard must be given to females’ physical strength, the need to
protect them against rape, forced prostitution and other forms of sexual violence or abuse, and the
special demands of biological factors such as menstruation, pregnancy and childbirth as well as
meeting culturally specific requirements. Pregnant women and mothers of dependants must have
their cases considered with the utmost priority. Female captured persons shal in all cases benefit
from treatment as favourable as that granted to male captured persons. Advice and guidance on
the handling of female detainees should always be sought from attached Military Police assets.
Female captured persons must be kept in separate accommodation from male
captured persons. Female captured persons should be under the immediate supervision of female
Service personnel where possible. In cases where families are detained or interned, if possible,
and unless there is an urgent operational requirement to segregate specific family members, they
should be kept together as family groups and away from other captured persons.
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
. Some members of the force may be tempted to engage in sexual
exploitation and abuse. This includes using prostitutes and trading assistance for sex. Sexual
exploitation and abuse is forbidden on all multinational operations on the basis that it undermines
campaign authority and is most likely il egal. The additional risk that sexual exploitation links
military personnel to human trafficking is explored in Annex C.
. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cases of
alleged abuse by peacekeepers within communities they were responsible for protecting. This has
led to considerable reputational damage to the UN and the troop-contributing nations.
Consequently, the UN has adopted a zero tolerance approach to sexual exploitation, expressed in
its Sexual Exploitation and Abuse policy.116 The policy forbids all UN personnel from engaging
in sexual relations with sex workers and with any persons under 18, and strongly
discourages relations with beneficiaries of assistance (those that are receiving assistance
115 UN Women’s Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
(2010) provides examples of successful tactics,
techniques and procedures implemented within UN peacekeeping missions. These will be subsumed into the Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures handbook accompanying this publication.
116 UNSCR 2272, passed in Mar 16, provides further direction on standards expected of peacekeepers and allows the
Secretary General to repatriate units involved in Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.
food, housing, aid, etc... as a result of a conflict, natural disaster or other humanitarian
crisis, or in a development setting).
Note that efforts to prevent the perpetration of sexual exploitation and abuse by our
own troops wil differ from those targeting sexual violence amongst the population of the partner
nation, not least because the jurisdictions wil differ. In the context of sexual exploitation and abuse,
commanders must seek legal advice early so as not to contaminate evidence which may endanger
. UK personnel should be aware of the following procedures for reporting
sexual exploitation and abuse when serving within a UN mission:
In the first instance, report to the chain of command. Alternatively, reports can be made
to the mission Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT).
All complaints and information on misconduct (for all categories of personnel) are to be
channelled to the CDT. The Team reviews and assesses information to determine if
allegations of misconduct are credible. The Team then recommends notification and
investigation in accordance with applicable procedures.
In some cases, it may be necessary to report directly to the Office of Internal Oversight.
Most missions have a structure with sexual exploitation and abuse focal points. Reports are
confidential and personnel are protected from retaliation.
The CDT informs the Head of Mission through Chief of Staff (heads of component
informed as appropriate).
The CDT is responsible for tracking and follow up of allegations.
Standards of Partner Nations’ Armed Forces
. Where UK forces are deployed
alongside other troop-contributing nations suspected of abuse in a UN context, commanders
should follow the guidance above. When operating outside of the UN but in a multinational context,
UK personnel identifying sexual exploitation and abuse should inform their own chain of command
so that appropriate national representatives can be notified. Concerns regarding conduct may not
be limited to sexual exploitation and abuse. Partner nations may not be as capable or as
disciplined as UK forces in other areas, such as in the provision security and control. While land
forces cannot cover the failings of others throughout a mission, UK standards must not drop to
those they must work with, even if this creates reputational issues for other contingents.
Reporting with a gender perspective.
Appendix 1 to Annex A to Chapter 10
Reporting with a Gender Perspective
10A1-01. The following is a list (not exhaustive) of questions that should be considered when
reporting or contributing to Intelligence Preparation of the Environment:
How does the security situation affect women, men, girls and boys?
What risks, similar and/or different do men, women, girls and boys face?
What are the differences in vulnerabilities between these groups (women, men, girls
Are women's and men's security issues known, and are their concerns being met?
What role do women play in the military, armed groups, police or any other security
institutions such as intelligence services, border, customs, immigration, or other law
enforcement services (per cent of forces/groups, by grade and category)?
What role do women play in the different parts of and social groups in the society?
Does the selection and interaction between local power holders and the operation
affect women's ability to participate in society - such as legal, political or economic spheres?
Gender disaggregated data on for example: political participation, education, refugees,
prisoners, health-related issues, refugees, sexual and gender-based violence etc.
Assessment of the current situation and planned actions.
Report on who in the operational theatre is responsible for gender issues/WPS and UN
Security Council 1325 agendas. Who are the UN Humanitarian officers and Women’s
Protection Advisors (WPAs)?
Annex B to Chapter 10: Children and Armed Conflict
Conflict has a disproportionate effect on children and land forces can play an important
role in safeguarding them from violence and exploitation during operations. The nature of that role
is dependent on the mission and whether humanitarian and law enforcement agencies are present
within the area of operations.
The Law of Armed Conflict and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) provide
overarching direction on the protection of children from unnecessary suffering and the
safeguarding of their fundamental human rights in conflict. Other laws may apply too, such as
local, military or UK law.
The UN identifies six grave violations of children’s rights:
Kil ing or maiming.
Recruitment or use as soldiers.
Attacks against schools or hospitals.
Denial of humanitarian access.
Abduction of children.
This annex focuses on child soldiers and attacks against schools.
. A person below the age of 18, unless the laws of a particular country set the
legal age for adulthood younger (UN Convention on the Rights of a Child). Note that UK doctrine
(JDP 1-10, Edition 3), in a CPERS context, classes people aged 15,16 or 17 as juveniles. This
distinction is explained in detail in paragraphs 10B-22 to 10B-23.
. Children who have been conscripted or enlisted into armed forces or
groups or who have been used to participate actively in hostilities (Law of Armed Conflict).
Note that the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) applies a broader interpretation:
“…a child associated with an armed force or armed group refers to any person below 18
years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force in any capacity,
including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters,
messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking part
or has taken a direct part in hostilities
Recruitment and Vulnerabilities
. There are many complex factors (push and pull)
which result in a child’s vulnerability to being recruited or used by armed groups. Possible factors
Potential for income, food, or security through service with armed groups or through the
“spoils of war”.
Ideology of the child or their family as a motivation for fighting.
Being offered by their community in exchange for staying safe from attack.
Being offered by their family due to extreme poverty and hunger.
Emotional and physical immaturity.
The UK is a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which
defines a child as "every human being below the age of 18 years unless under the law applicable
to the child, majority is attained earlier”. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict - to which the UK is a party - requires States Parties to
"take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained
the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities".
. Children employed or used by armed groups wil have an array of experiences.
Some become desensitised to violence – often at a very formative time in their development which
can psychologically damage them for life. This experience may make them more likely to commit
violent acts themselves and can contribute to their break with society. The association of children
with armed forces and groups can lead to:
Deterioration in their physical and mental health.
Reduced opportunities for education and social development.
Poor relationships with families and communities.
A reduction in their physical safety and the risk of reprisals and re-recruitment.
Even when child soldiers are set free or escape, many cannot go back home to their
families and communities because they have been ostracised by them. They may have been
forced to kil a family member or neighbour to prevent them from returning to their homes. Many
girls have babies from their time spent with non-state armed groups and their communities do not
accept them home. Most have missed out on school – sometimes for many years. Without an
education, they have few prospects and sometimes return to their armed groups as they have
simply no other way of feeding themselves. The chal enge for civil society is to channel the energy,
ideas and experience of demobilised child soldiers into contributing in positive ways to the creation
of their new, post-conflict society. This task is nothing new with the Second World War providing
many examples of the use of child soldiers.
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
. Effective child-sensitive and
specific DDR is vital to long-term stability and is usual y part of a national programme that is led by
the host government, with support from international donors, the UN and NGOs. UNICEF and the
relevant host nation ministry usually takes charge of the aspect of DDR programmes that relates to
child combatants, with support from child protection NGOs such as Save the Children and the
International Rescue Committee. Land forces may be directed to assist in the disarmament and
demobilisation stages of the programme.
UN Security Council Resolutions
. There have been 10 resolutions relating to
children and armed conflict:
Condemned the targeting of children in armed conflict and the recruitment of child
soldiers in violation of international law. This included the “Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention” and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which prohibits
forced conscription of children under the age of fifteen in armed forces or the
participation in war crimes.
Expressed concern at the impact of conflict upon children and the use of child soldiers.
Expressed willingness to consider more targeted measures to protect children during
and after conflict. Called for provisions to protect children including during the
demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration of child soldiers and inclusion of child
protection advisors in operations.
Declared schools and hospitals off limits for both armed groups and military activities.
Considered provisions to protect children during peacekeeping operations and
requested the Secretary General to identify parties to conflict that used or recruited
Called for the immediate end to the use of child soldiers and endorsed an “era of
application” of international norms and standards for the protection of war-affected
Condemned the use and recruitment of child soldiers, the killing and maiming of
children, rape, sexual violence, abduction, forced displacement, denial of humanitarian
access, attacks against schools and hospitals, child trafficking, forced labour and
slavery. Implemented monitoring schemes.
Established a mechanism to monitor and report on the most serious violations that are
committed against children in conflict. This mechanism, referred to as the 1612
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism, reports on six grave violations which ultimately
can result in sanctions.
Directed that parties to armed conflict engaging in patterns of killing and maiming of
children and/or rape and other sexual violence against children should be ‘named and
Declared the readiness of the UN to impose sanctions on armed groups persistently
violating the human rights of children.
Called for children’s continued access to health care, condemns attacks on health
facilities and health workers and affirms children’s right to access services.
Called for increased monitoring of the abduction of children in conflict.
Resolution on youth, peace and security recognising the contribution of youth in the
prevention and resolution of conflicts. Warned against the rise of radicalisation to
violence and violent extremism amongst youth.
Resolutions relating to children in conflict
Schools in Conflict
. Schools and other educational establishments must be permitted to continue
their ordinary activities. Any occupying power must, with the cooperation of the national and local
education authorities, facilitate the proper working of schools and other institutions devoted to the
care and education of children. In certain circumstances an occupying power may be within its
rights in temporarily closing educational institutions, but only when there are very strong reasons
for doing so, these reasons are made public, and there is a serious prospect that the closure wil
achieve important and worthwhile results.
. There is no definition of civilian objects within the Law of Armed Conflict nor
is the term used in the treaties dealing with internal armed conflicts, but the principles of military
necessity and humanity require attacks to be limited to military objectives. Thus, attacks on schools
are prohibited unless they are being used by the enemy for military purposes. If an attack is
deemed necessary, all feasible means must be taken to minimise injury to civilians and damage of
The role of land forces in safeguarding children wil be dependent on the nature of the
mission and the type of operation being conducted. Beyond the demands of the Law of Armed
Conflict, commanders may be required to support the work of child protection agents operating
within their area of operations by means of the stability activities.
UN Country Task Force (CTF)
. Where the UN is present, mechanisms to monitor and
report on grave violations wil be established via the CTF on Monitoring and Reporting. This body
is generally co-chaired by UNICEF and the senior UN representative in-country but wil receive
input from others including IOs and NGOs. The CTF also has established protocols for verification
of information, ensuring confidentiality and security of victims/witnesses and information.
. UN monitoring and reporting mechanism for child protection (UN Child Protection
Child Protection Advisors (CPAs)
. Child Protection Advisors are specialist staff sent
to UN missions to help fulfil the child protection mandate. Their work includes:
Ensuring that child protection is integrated into the mission.
Training newly-deployed peacekeepers on child protection.
Monitoring and reporting the most serious violations against children to UN HQ.
Land forces can be crucial in identifying grave violations against children to child
protection staff, helping to identify and release children from armed groups. For land forces to
respond correctly, education and training must include:
Briefing on the details of child protection actors within the mission.
Briefing on SOPs for monitoring and reporting of grave violations against children.117
How to identify vulnerable children and gather information on the recruitment of child
soldiers and abuse of children.
How to report sightings of child soldiers.
117 Note that UNICEF has created templates for this based on the direction given in UN Security Council Resolution
How to treat detained child soldiers (see JDP 1-10 Captured Persons
ROE relating to child soldiers.
Occasionally, child protection advisors will be told that partner nation military units are
holding child soldiers from rival factions. Land forces may be asked to work with them to secure the
freedom of these children from the partner nation who may be using the children as servants or
worse. Using the Force Commander to speak with a partner nation military commander sends a
strong message to that military and may deter them from holding children in future.
Responding to Child Soldiers
. The use of child soldiers puts professional forces at a
disadvantage. Not only is it demoralising to fight and kill children, the shock of having to do so can
increase reaction times. Commanders should consider the following when issuing direction to their
The killing and wounding of child soldiers is likely to be
perceived differently to the killing and wounding of adults and could be used in propaganda
against land forces. This is a key consideration for commanders at all levels. Actions could
be perceived as excessive, and could bring into question consent from home, irrespective of
the freedoms to tackle threats as expressed within the Law of Armed Conflict. There could
also be scrutiny by government, parliament and the media after the event. The possibility of
combat with child soldiers must be anticipated and guidance given to the force.
. The immaturity of child soldiers may result in a reduced
understanding of the consequences of their actions. Human Rights Watch, an NGO,
identifies the following characteristics of child soldiers which may make them behave
differently to adult soldiers:
“Because children are often physically vulnerable, easily intimidated, and susceptible to
psychological manipulation, they typically make obedient soldiers. As part of their training for
violence, child recruits are often subject to gruelling physical tasks as well as ideological
indoctrination. Children accused of the slightest infractions may be subject to extreme
physical punishments including beating, whipping, caning, and being chained or tied up with
rope for days at a time. In some conflicts, commanders supply child soldiers with marijuana
and opiates to make them "brave" and lessen their fear of combat. Furthermore,
commanders may initiate child recruits by forcing them to witness or commit abuses and
killings in order to desensitize them to violence.”118
Reaction to Child Soldiers
. The following actions should be considered where child
soldiers are encountered:
Response to Threat
. Commanders should ensure that theatre-specific ROE are
understood by their subordinates allowing rapid and decisive action to be taken.
Post Incident Report
. The killing or wounding of child soldiers is likely to draw the
attention of many audiences, including the media. All personnel involved in incidents must
record the details of the incident at the earliest opportunity using the Post Incident Report
Regardless of the legality of the act, the killing of child soldiers can be used to
undermine campaign authority. Personnel involved in incidents must report them quickly so
that land forces can be “first with the accurate facts and message”. This wil avoid the local
population being subject to misleading propaganda by armed groups operating in the area.
118 See https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/16/coercion-and-intimidation-child-soldiers-participate-violence.
Trauma Risk Management (TRIM)
. Commanders should ensure that all personnel
involved in incidents concerning child soldiers receive adequate support through TRIM.119
. For each operation, the MOD will establish a policy for handling
juveniles, which will conform with human rights law and the humanitarian principles of the Geneva
Conventions. In the first instance, commanders should seek advice from the Force Provost
Marshal and force legal advisors on managing juveniles and children and should refer to JDP 1-10: Captured Persons
. The Force Provost Marshal should seek assistance from and engage with the
International Committee of the Red Cross. Medical staff, padres and potentially some appropriate
NGOs could also provide advice and assistance if appropriate in the circumstances. Medical
support can be especially helpful in efforts to ascertain the age of captured persons.
. For this publication, captured juveniles are defined as captured
persons aged 15, 16 or 17. The following guidance reflects the basic legal position regarding the
treatment of juveniles:
Captured persons who are, or are judged to be, juveniles shall be processed through
the same administrative and induction arrangements as adult captured persons. Where
possible, juveniles will be separated from other captured persons during these processes.
Juveniles should be accommodated separately from all adult and child captured
persons except where they are part of a family group. Male and female juveniles shall be
accommodated separately. Juveniles could suffer from isolation and therefore careful
consideration should be given for them to associate with adult captured persons at certain
times, for example, communal prayer time, exercise and feeding. Such association must
always be planned and supervised closely.
The International Committee of the Red Cross will assist with repatriating juvenile
prisoners of war and early liaison is essential. All other juvenile captured persons can be held
by land forces. They can also be transferred to the partner nation authorities or to another
nation’s authorities, but such transfers wil be governed by MOD policy and human rights
Initial questioning of juveniles can be carried out to establish the identity and age of the
individual. Subsequent tactical questioning and interrogation of juveniles is not prohibited in
law; however, MOD will issue operation-specific guidance on whether this is permitted as a
matter of policy. Such policy wil have due regard to the juvenile’s age, any special condition
and vulnerability, as well as the military benefit to be derived.
. For this publication, captured children are defined as all captured
persons under the age of 15. The following guidance reflects the legal position for the treatment of
Children should not be held in captivity unless captured to prevent imminent danger to
our Armed Forces. If they are detained, this should be for the shortest possible period.
Children must be housed in separate quarters from adults and juveniles, unless they are part
of a family group. In certain circumstances those under the age of 15 may be removed from
a location to be protected from danger.
Children must be guarded by a minimum of two UK personnel specially selected for
this task. One of them (at least), where possible, should be of the same sex as the captured
119 For further guidance see Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative (2014), Child Soldiers: A Handbook for Security Sector
Actors. Halifax, Canada: Dalhousie University.
Children are not to be tactically questioned or interrogated. The International
Committee of the Red Cross can assist in gaining neutral information.
For each operation, the MOD will issue specific guidance regarding transferring or
releasing children who have been captured.
There may be instances where captured persons do not know, are unwilling to reveal,
or mislead land forces about their date of birth to avoid tactical questioning or interrogation. It may
be extremely difficult to ascertain the age of young captured persons. Such a captured person will
be considered to be a child until more detailed checks can be made. Assessment of age will be
made by, or on behalf of, the detention authority, considering all relevant evidence, particularly
medical and dental officers’ assessments. If an individual reasonably claims or is assessed to be
less than 15 years of age, they should be treated as a child.
All officers responsible for captured persons facilities must pay particular care and
attention when holding juveniles, children or vulnerable people. They have an obligation to care for
them in a manner that takes account of their age and particular needs. Juveniles and children are
more vulnerable than adults and need to be protected from violence or abuse, including to, and
amongst, themselves. They are to be treated with special respect and shall be protected from any
form of assault. In addition, they will be provided with the care and assistance they need whether
due to their age or for any other reason.
In many countries, a significant proportion of juveniles may have lost contact with their
families before, or because of, their period in captivity. Commandants at captured persons holding
facilities will need to give attention to identifying those young people who may want and need
additional support in re-establishing links with their families or for whom family links have
irrevocably broken down. Land forces may request assistance from the International Committee of
the Red Cross in establishing family links. In addition, where operational circumstances allow,
depending on the nature of the operation and the duration of the period in captivity, the
commandant should consider some sort of purposeful activity or training for juveniles. The main
purpose should be to avoid returning the young persons to the social circumstances that
contributed to their original capture. It will be important to enlist the help of the relevant government
and non-government agencies, including those of the partner nation, in designing and delivering
appropriate resettlement programmes.
Annex C to Chapter 10: Human Trafficking
. Human trafficking occurs within and between countries. Trafficking may
take place for a range of exploitative purposes and victimises women, men, boys and girls. While
land forces are unlikely to lead in disrupting trafficking networks and supporting victims, they may
be required to support other agencies facing such tasks within their area of operations.
Elements of Human Trafficking
. Figure 10-C-1 below il ustrates the elements
involved in human trafficking. The purpose of trafficking can be varied including prostitution, slavery
and organ removal. Trafficking can occur through a variety of means ranging from deception to
coercion and is enabled by recruiters, drivers and agents who harbour people.
Elements in human trafficking
UN Response to Human Trafficking
The adoption in 2000 by the UN General
Assembly of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children
marked a milestone in international efforts to stop the trade in people. As the
guardian of the Protocol, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) addresses human trafficking
issues through its Global Programme against Trafficking in Persons. Most states have ratified the
Protocol but translating it into reality remains problematic. Few criminals are convicted and most
victims are probably never identified or assisted.
UN Departments Seeking to Prevent and Combat Trafficking
. UNODC has issued
various strategies to address trafficking including the Thematic Programme Against Transnational
Organized Crime and Il icit Trafficking (2011-2013).
Interagency-Coordination Group Against
Trafficking, aims to improve coordination and cooperation between UN agencies and other IOs to
facilitate a holistic approach to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, including protection of
and support for victims of trafficking. The International Organization for Migration, an
intergovernmental organisation, is also a major contributor to international efforts to reduce human
Trafficking in Persons
. UNODC defines Trafficking in Persons as “…recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”
. There is no universally agreed definition regarding the exploitation of
people. UNODC considers exploitation in the context of the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices like slavery, servitude or the
removal of organs.
. The role of land forces in disrupting trafficking networks and
supporting victims wil vary per the mission and military activity. In most cases, land forces wil
serve in a supporting role, enabling police primacy, assisting IOs and NGOs by means of the
stabilising actions. For example, when providing security and control, land forces wil gain an
understanding of the movement of people throughout the area of operations. At the same time,
when engaging in SSR and capacity building it may be possible to provide training to partner
nation forces on the impact of trafficking and exploitation.
In this context, commanders should
ensure that effective liaison and reporting networks are established with partner nation law
enforcement agencies as well as NGOs and IOs.
. As stated in Chapter 8, commanders must ensure that they, and their
soldiers, are beyond reproach in their personal conduct to maintain mission legitimacy. This means
considering out of bounds areas and the level of personal relationships permitted within the area of
operations. For example, strip clubs are out of bounds to all British personnel serving with the UN
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Part of the aim of these measures is to reduce the
likelihood that British troops directly or indirectly support or sustain trafficking and sexual
exploitation and abuse.
Annex D to Chapter 10: Cultural Property Protection
. Cultural property is defined in Article 27 of the 1907 Hague Regulations as
including buildings dedicated to religion, art, science or charitable purposes and historic
Sites of cultural and historic importance are areas where inappropriate
behaviour by land forces can undermine campaign legitimacy and wider influence efforts. Enemy
forces may use such sites as firing points, bases or depots in the belief that they will not be
targeted. They may also use them to prompt inappropriate action by land forces to provide
opportunities for their own information activities. The dilemma posed in such circumstances is the
need to avoid alienation of the population, and any perceived desecration of these sites, while
confronting the enemy.
Damage to cultural property may be detrimental to the cultural heritage of a nation or
even mankind and is often irreversible. Harm to cultural property will most likely attract negative
publicity to the operation, and may therefore give rise to tactical problems or even result in conflict
escalation. Damage to cultural property can thus complicate the attainment of the ends of stability
and thereby undermine mission success. Conversely, if land forces demonstrate care for cultural
property, they have the potential to gain and maintain popular support. See Figure 10D-1 below.
Cultural property in conflict in legal and emotional contexts (NATO).
At the time of writing the UK is on the verge of signing up to the 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. While provision
has been made for cultural property protection through The Law of Armed Conflict historically,
ratification will make commanders liable under law. Land forces are also supported by a
designated unit of cultural property protection experts.
For the purpose of CPP, HQs at all levels should develop:
Measures for identifying and protecting cultural property in the Operations Process
from its early planning stage and throughout the operation.
Systems for identifying and protecting cultural property throughout operations.
Procedures for mitigating the risks and consequences of damage to cultural property
caused by accidents or lawful collateral damage, through public diplomacy and information
Contingency plans for urgent restitution if necessary.
As part of pre-deployment training land forces should receive appropriate training,
education and instructions to fulfil their CPP responsibilities under international law.
In support of the commander, and in coordination with CIMIC staff and LEGADs, the
CPP officer should:
Provide or seek advice on CPP, including the applicability of and responsibility under
the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols (upon ratification of the convention in
ensure that CPP aspects are considered during the completion of the environmental
baseline study (EBS).
obtain lists of cultural sites and repositories to be used in locating of camps,
installations, infrastructure, and preparation of areas for on-the-ground military activity; post
off-limit areas; avoid/minimise damage due to mission requirements.
account for the mission capability to address local concerns about cultural property and
the impact the construction of bases and other installations and infrastructure will have on
It is essential that the location and reasons for significance of cultural
sites within an area of operations are understood. Sacred sites should be routinely considered in
the intelligence preparation of the environment process. As a guideline, the following should be
In addition to the location of the site the importance of the area as a whole
should be understood.
Reason for Significance
There is a need to understand the unique aspects of sites.
For example, whether a site is significant at a local, national, or global level.
Rules and practices regulating entry and behaviour (for example carrying
weapons, using force and shedding blood are strictly prohibited within a mosque).
The impact of desecration
Acts of desecration may be seen as a violation of the
sanctity of a site. This may prompt the use of force to defend it or to avenge the desecration.
There may be religious festivals, times of the month etc, which would impact
on military activity near the site (e.g. large numbers of pilgrims present or auspicious dates).
Consultation with Custodians of Cultural Property and Religious Leaders
Custodians and religious leaders may not be willing collaborators with security forces but they are
likely to help with providing information that will avoid damage to sacred sites. They should be
consulted to gain a detailed understanding of the significance of property and the implications of
military operations in or around it. They will understand rules of behaviour and may be able to
determine acceptable compromises. They will have an influence on public opinion and, if not
consulted or involved, may hamper the efforts of military forces.
Conduct of Operations
The following guidelines may assist with planning and
conducting operations in and around cultural and historic sites:
Where possible, avoid significant religious festivals and time operations to avoid
unnecessary offence to religious sensitivities (prayer times, holy periods etc.).
Balance the anticipated gains of lethal operations against the wider effect on public
Consider the use of partner nation security forces to enter sacred sites with foreign
troops providing external security.
Involve cultural custodians and local religious leaders as far as practicable. This should
include the application of the gender perspective to achieve a broad understanding of cultural
Consider cordon operations and negotiation to facilitate a peaceful solution when the
enemy is known to be in a culturally significant site.
Support all activity concerning cultural sites with a campaign to shape perceptions prior
to, during and after operations.
Conduct remedial action post-operation. Restoration work or some means of
compensation for damage may be required. In extremis, repair may become a military
responsibility. Information activities may also be required.
Military Infrastructure and Cultural Property120
Military activities including the construction and management of military camps and
installations and other infrastructure have a propensity for damaging cultural and historic resources
in a number of ways, including:
Damage resulting from acts of hostility or use for military purposes, including combat
related collateral damage.
Damage caused by camp construction, expansion, and other construction activities,
including roads and infrastructure improvement.
Deliberate destruction, plundering and looting by civilians and combatants of sacred
structures, museums, archaeological sites, and other forms of cultural property.
Inadvertent damage resulting from military-supported projects like engagement
exercises, training activities, and/or CIMIC sponsored construction or infrastructure
Paying attention to and, when necessary, protecting cultural property provides an
opportunity for land forces to demonstrate respect for local customs and traditions.
120 Adapted from NATO doctrine: Allied Joint Environmental Protection Publication - 2 (AJEPP-2).
In sum, cultural property protection (CPP) is a mission requirement and involves
strategic to tactical level considerations.
CPP is a cross-cutting activity during stability operations, involving functions with
expertise in environmental protection (EP), intelligence gathering and analysis, CIMIC, Geospatial
Imaging, LEGAD, combat support (targeting and fire support, engineers) and combat service
support. Best Practice
Environmental Baseline Study (EBS)
. For the purpose of identifying cultural property
during operations, the definition of cultural property in the 1954 Hague Convention is applicable. As
part of the operational planning, the best possible geo-spatial data information should be sought
regarding the presence of cultural property within the proposed operational area.
Specialist support is required for detailed baseline characterisation of cultural property.
To ensure best practice, including compliance with international law, EP officers are to coordinate
on CPP-related activities with J9 CIMIC staff for verification and reporting. To the greatest extent
possible, information about cultural property should be collected from partner nation experts and/or
The baseline characterisation of cultural property should include, but not necessarily be
limited to, the following considerations:
Is the camp/installation/infrastructure located in an area which is known for cultural
property? Do operational maps identify cultural property in the designated area?
In addition to clearly visible cultural property – included but not limited to places of
worship, like churches, mosques, cemeteries, and burial grounds; collections of cultural
property, such as museums; ancient buildings and structures; memorials and sites of trauma
– the baseline characterisation needs to consider also indications of less visible cultural
property, such as archaeological sites, ancient infrastructure, and underground features.