



**METROPOLITAN  
POLICE**

**TOTAL POLICING**

**METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE**

DIRECTORATE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS  
ANTI - CORRUPTION COMMAND  
SPECIALIST INVESTIGATIONS

**Operation RIVERWOOD**

**Investigation into the alleged use of  
personal details of "Rod Richardson" by  
MPS / NPOIU**

**T/Detective Superintendent** [REDACTED]

*(Senior Investigating Officer)*

**Detective Sergeant** [REDACTED]

*(Case Officer)*

7th July 2013

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## Operation Riverwood - Freedom Of Information - Heading Table

PROTECTIVE MARKING	<del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>
FOIA EXEMPTION	Yes
SUITABLE FOR PUBLICATION SCHEME	No
TITLE	Operation RIVERWOOD
VERSION	1
PURPOSE	To disseminate Investigation results
RELEVANT TO	Directorate of Professional Standards
DISSEMINATION SUMMARY	Directorate of Professional Standards Investigation into the alleged misuse of personal details of "Rod Richardson" by MPS / NPOIU.
AUTHORISING OFFICER	T/DSU [REDACTED] / DPS
AUTHOR	DS [REDACTED] / DPS SI
CREATING OPERATIONAL COMMAND UNIT/DIRECTORATE	DIRECTORATE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS - OPERATION HERNE
DATE CREATED	07/07/2013
QUALITY ASSURED BY	Detective Superintendent [REDACTED]
DATE	07/07/2013
REVIEW DATE	06/07/2014

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## Operation Riverwood - Interested Parties

SUBJECT	NAME	"ROD RICHARDSON"
	DATE OF BIRTH	05/01/1973
	ADDRESS	Not Applicable.
SIO	NAME	T/DSU [REDACTED]
	CONTACT DETAILS	[REDACTED]
DPS CASE WORKER	NAME	DS [REDACTED]
	CONTACT DETAILS	[REDACTED]
FAMILY LIAISON OFFICER	NAME	NOT APPLICABLE
	CONTACT DETAILS	[REDACTED]

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## **1. Introduction to Operation Herne**

- 1.1 In October 2011, **Operation Herne** [formerly Operation Soisson] was formed by the Metropolitan Police Service [MPS] Directorate of Professionalism in order to review the activities and deployments of the MPS Special Demonstration Squad [SDS] from its origin in 1968 to its closure in 2008.
- 1.2 The purpose of the review was to identify potential vulnerabilities for the MPS arising from the work undertaken by the SDS over four decades, and to offer a historical context to the work undertaken by "field" officers as well as identify any criminality or misconduct offences by those who served on the SDS.
- 1.3 In January 2011, "The Guardian" newspaper published a number of articles focusing on the activities of former SDS officer **Detective Constable James Boyling**, alleging involvement in an intimate relationship with a woman whom he had children with whilst deployed on the SDS. This originated from [REDACTED]
- 1.4 DC Boyling was placed onto restricted duties [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] As a result of these meetings, a criminal investigation was launched into the conduct of DC Boyling. This case was subsequently referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission [IPCC] on 21st October 2011.
- 1.5 In October 2011, *The Guardian Newspaper* printed a further article alleging that a number of former SDS officers had provided evidence in court under their pseudonyms, thus raising the potential for claims of miscarriages of justice as well as perjury. As a result of these further disclosures **Deputy Assistant Commissioner Mark Simmons** made the decision that a full review of the SDS would be undertaken.
- 1.6 The initial terms of reference were to identify potential vulnerabilities for the MPS arising from SDS deployments, identify any criminal or misconduct issues and to disseminate and identify any organisational learning.
- 1.7 Having originally being named **Operation Soisson**, under the direction of **Deputy Assistant Commissioner Patricia Gallan**, it was renamed **Herne** in August 2012, when she assumed oversight.

## **2. The History of the Special Demonstration Squad [SDS]**

Exhibit  
ANS/11  
D134

- 2.1 The Special Operations Squad [SOS] was formed in 1968 by the Metropolitan Police Special Branch [MPSB] in response to mass Anti Vietnam War demonstrations in Grosvenor Square, London. From March to October 1968, a small number of Special Branch officers were deployed to mass public order and political protests. Their role was to assimilate themselves with the protestors and report back on the tactics used by demonstrators, the numbers expected on particular demonstrations and identify core



participants.

- 2.2 These officers were successful in infiltrating the anti-war movement and were able to feedback key intelligence to assist the authorities in the policing of such demonstrations. There was an acknowledgement that Special Branch activity in this area had been invaluable in keeping the **Home Secretary James Callaghan** 'well informed'.
- Exhibit  
ANS/12,  
D135  
588/unre  
g/694 pt  
5
- 2.3 From its origin in 1968, the SOS was directly funded by the Home Office and reviewed firstly on a six monthly basis and subsequently on a yearly basis, until 1989 when oversight was handed to the Metropolitan Police.
- 2.4 The original SOS remit was to gather intelligence on demonstrations by left wing extremists and identify the organisers and participants particularly those promoting disorder or likely to engage in acts of violence. However, world political events dictated that the unit expanded its remit to include groups covering the extreme right wing, [REDACTED] as well as a continued focus towards all public disorder incidents.
- Exhibit  
ANS/11  
D134 -  
History  
of SDS  
JH  
Waddell  
letter
- 2.5 A letter dated the 16th December 1968 from the Home Office to the then Commander of Special Branch, authorised the continual use of Special Branch Officers in an undercover capacity. However, it should be noted that even in 1968 there was a strict requirement for the continual review of the enterprise of infiltration.
- 2.6 **Sir James Waddell - Deputy Under-Secretary of State Home Office** wrote in December 1968 letter to then Commander of Special Branch, **Commander Brodie** :
- "....in an enterprise of this kind there is always some slight danger of innovations like the one we are considering becoming and accepted part of the scene, so that discontinuance might be thought to be a drastic change : hence the suggestion that we ought to look at the matter again mid-summer."*
- 2.7 Sometime between November 1972 and January 1973 the name attributed to the SOS was changed to the **Special Demonstration Squad [SDS]** which remained in place circa 1997. Sometime after 1997, the name was changed again to the **Special Duties Section**.
- 2.8 Between the SDS inception in 1968 and 1989 the Under Secretary of State within the Home Office provided a rolling authority and funding for the deployment of under cover Police Officers.
- 2.9 At this time operational management was provided by a Detective Chief Inspector, who reported to the commander Special Branch. In order to satisfy both the Home Office and Commander Special Branch as to the continued merits of the SDS, an Annual Report was completed by the Detective Chief Inspector who detailed the unit's activities. This was for the benefit of the Commander Special Branch.
- 2.10 In the infancy of the SDS, such reports were often limited in scope. However, the unit developed the Annual Reports began to offer greater detail, including individual

deployment summaries.

- 2.11 The Annual Report was shared with the Assistant Commissioner of the day, who in turn would write to the Home Office seeking authorisation for a further year. Correspondence held by the enquiry team highlights this practice.
- 2.12 This arrangement was revised in 1984. Despite the Home Office retaining primacy for the funding of the SDS, responsibility for the authorisations was passed to the Metropolitan Police Special Branch.
- 2.13 In 1989, responsibility for the SDS along with funding for it was passed in its entirety from the Home Office to the MPSB. The Superintendent of 'S' Squad was appointed lead for the SDS. Strategic direction and authorisation was provided by the Superintendent in consultation with the Commander Special Branch.
- 2.14 In respect of legislation and framework of the SDS, prior to the implementation of *Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act [2000]* [RIPA], there appears to be minimal legislation surrounding the authorisation of undercover policing operations. Home Office Circular 97/1969 'Regarding Agent Provocateur' and Home Office Circular 35/1986 'Consolidated Circular on Crime and Kindred Matters' were two documents of note offering guidance nationally.
- 2.15 A manual used by SDS officers offered guidance. This was called "*Tradecraft*" and was actually entitled "*Metropolitan Police Service Special Branch - Special Duty Section Undercover Operations*." The "*Tradecraft*" manual was an organic document that grew throughout the SDS and offered guidance on building "legends", how to conduct oneself as an undercover officer and was a central guidance for all "field" officers. The substantial contributor to this manual was then **Detective Sergeant Andrew Coles**, warrant number [REDACTED]
- 2.16 DS Coles served as a Detective Constable on the SDS between 1990 to 1995, and was initially deployed into the Animal Rights arena. He later served on the Animal Rights National Index [ARNI]. He is mentioned later in this report as a tutor to the operative concerned.
- 2.17 Day to day management of the SDS fell to a Detective Chief Inspector, Detective Inspector and between two to four Detective Sergeants. There was what was known as the "Back Office", where a Sergeant was responsible of dissemination of intelligence back to key units, and one Sergeant was responsible for administration/expenses.
- 2.18 The amalgamation of SO12 [Special Branch] and SO13 [Anti Terrorist Branch] in 2006 saw the SDS come under the Operational Support strand of the newly formed SO15 [Counter Terrorist Command] [CTC].

### 3. Formation of National Public Order Intelligence Unit

- 3.1 The National Public Order Intelligence Unit [NPOIU] was set up in 1999 in order to track "green" activists and their attendance at public demonstrations. The NPOIU was the





responsibility of **Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO]**.

- 3.2 It incorporated the **Animal Rights National Index** work that had previously been the responsibility of Special Branch.
- 3.3 In January 1995, large numbers of police from London, Kent and Hampshire were drafted to the West Sussex harbour of Shoreham, in protest to the exports of live animal exports to Europe. The Animal Liberation Front [ALF] and another animal extremist group "Justice Department" had a strong base in the community there. Shoreham was one of the few ports that were willing to take on the exports, amid significant community reaction. This led to a number of protests until October 1995, as the focus led to protests in Brightlingsea, Essex resulting in a record number of police being deployed to prevent public disorder. "Ad-hoc" groups emerged and the need for first hand intelligence was evident. This led to operatives being required to infiltrate these animal extremist organisations.
- 3.3 The purpose of the NPOIU was to :
- Provide the Police Services with an ability to develop a national threat assessment and profile for domestic extremism
  - Support services to reduce crime and disorder from domestic extremism
  - Support a proportionate police response to protest activity
  - Help services manage concerns of communities and businesses in order to minimise conflict and disorder.
- 3.4 The definition of the NPOIU from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies [HMIC] is *"...performs an intelligence function in relation to politically motivated disorder [not legitimate protests] on behalf of England, Wales and Scotland by co-ordinating the natural collection, analysis, exploitation and dissemination of intelligence on the extremist threat to public order."*
- 3.5 At its formation, the NPOIU was under the direction of ACPO's National Co-ordinator for Domestic Extremism, **Assistant Chief Constable Anton Setchell**. He was replaced by MPS **Detective Chief Superintendent Adrian Tudway** in 2010. It worked with the National Extremism Tactical Co-Ordination Unit [NETCU] and the National Domestic Extremism Team [NDET].
- 3.6 The NPOIU now exists as part of the National Domestic Extremism Unit [NDEU] under Specialist Operations and is run by **Detective Chief Superintendent Chris Greaney**.
- 3.7 In January 2011, the work of the NPOIU was exposed by former operative Mark Kennedy, who was fundamental in the collapse of the trial involving several activists at Ratcliffe-On-Soar power station.

#### 4. Operation Riverwood



- 4.1 During the week commencing 3rd February 2013, Paul Lewis and Rob Evans, special projects writers for "The Guardian" newspaper published several articles about the Metropolitan Police Services alleged use of deceased children's and young persons identities by undercover operatives on the SDS and the NPOIU.
- The Guardian  
n  
03.02.20  
13.
- 4.2 The article "**Police Spies Stole Identities of Dead Children**" released on 3rd February 2013 in "The Guardian", detailed the practice of undercover operatives used the identities taken from birth certificates and "resurrected" them in order to provide background and history to their character. The article concentrated on the identity allegedly used by former SDS operative, **Detective Constable Peter Francis**, and his cover identity of "**Pete Black**." The article also concentrated on former SDS officer **Detective Sergeant John Dines**, and his use of the cover identity "**John Barker**."
- The Guardian  
n  
04.02.20  
13.
- 4.3 The following day, 4th February 2013 "The Guardian" published the article "**Met Chief summoned to explain why police stole identities of dead children**". The article stated that police had authorised undercover officers to "steal" the identities of around 80 dead children. Comments included those of former **Director of Public Prosecutions [DPP] Ken McDonald** and **Chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee [HASC] Keith Vaz**. Ken McDonald also wrote an additional article that day in the Guardian "**Police Undercover Work has Gone Badly Wrong. We Need a Public Enquiry**."
- 4.4 Coverage of this aspect of police undercover officers utilising the identities of deceased young persons continued in the media amongst Sky News, BBC News amongst others.
- 4.5 On the same day, the Directorate of Professional Standards received correspondence from Tuckers Solicitors, representing a woman named **Barbara Shaw**. The letter was actually dated from their office 31st January 2013 and is given reference [REDACTED]
- 4.6 The letter was addressed to the Metropolitan Police - DPS Customer Support Team and contained the allegation that the Metropolitan Police used the identity of her deceased son, "**Rod Richardson**". The letter forms an official complaint to the Metropolitan Police Service on behalf of Ms Shaw.
- Letter of complaint from Tuckers solicitors dated 31.01.13 from Jules Carey
- 4.7 The letter stated :  
*"Our client believes that her son's identity was "stolen" and used by an undercover police officer calling himself Rod Richardson and claiming that his birthday was 5 January 1973. Our client understands that this police officer was deployed as an undercover officer to infiltrate a number of political groups between 2000-2003.*
- 4.8 "**Rod Richardson**" was born at St Georges Hospital, Tooting on the 5th January 1973. This was the child of Barbara and Brian Richardson. "**Rod Richardson**" tragically died on 7th January 1973 of inhalation pneumonia and respiratory distress syndrome. He was also born prematurely.
- 4.9 At the time of "**Rod Richardson's**" death, Barbara claimed [REDACTED] and the event continued to be traumatic for her. Her





husband Brian Richardson died in 1983

- 4.10 On the 5th February 2013, "The Guardian" published the article **"Second Police Spy unit stole Dead Children's ID"**. "The Guardian" details the alleged use of "Rod Richardson's" details by an officer from the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, posing as an anti-capitalist protestor between 2000 to 2003.
- The Guardian  
n  
06.02.20  
13. 4.11 On Wednesday 6th February 2013, an article appeared in "The Guardian" entitled **"Rod Richardson: the Mystery of the Protestor who was not who he claimed."** This depicted a picture of Ms Shaw holding up her son's death certificate.
- The Guardian  
n  
06.02.20  
13. 4.12 They also published a further article entitled **"Brother of boy whose identity was stolen by police spies demands apology."** The brother of "John Barker" [the cover name for John Dines] wanted a response from the MPS.
- Indymedia UK  
06.02.20  
13 4.13 During the night of the 6th February 2013, a "blog" by a user known as **"potato peeler"** wrote **"Information on "Rod Richardson", suspected undercover cop"** on a site known as "Indymedia UK." Here, the writer suggests that "Rod Richardson" may have been an undercover police officer or 'corporate spy'. Three facial pictures of the subject are published, two of which are obscured.
- 4.14 A review of the risk assessment around "Rod Richardson" was conducted via **Detective Superintendent** [redacted] s office at Covert Policing. [redacted]
- 4.15 The identity of "Rod Richardson" was reported as being unknown by "The Guardian" and Tuckers Solicitors and is to this date.
- 4.16 The lawyer from Tuckers Solicitors representing Ms Shaw is **Jules Carey**, who represents the Tomlinson Family. Jules Carey represents a number of high profile claims against the Metropolitan Police Service.
- 4.17 Jules Carey also represents one of the claimants against the Metropolitan Police Service in respect of former undercover operatives having alleged intimate relationships with their targets. This is in respect of the alleged relationship between former **Detective Inspector Robert Lambert** and a female known as [redacted]. The claim is that Lambert, under his cover identity **"Bob Robinson"** fathered a child whilst deployed on the SDS and in cover. The child concerned is [redacted] who is also represented by Jules Carey.
- 4.18 The complaint was registered to the Customer Support Team under the reference **PC** [redacted]. As the complaint detailed the alleged use of deceased children's identities, the complaint was passed to Operation Herne.
- 4.19 **Detective Superintendent** [redacted] was appointed the Senior Investigative Officer [SIO] and the Investigating Officer [IO] was appointed as **Detective Sergeant** [redacted]
- 4.20 On 28th February 2013, the matter was referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, who directed a supervised investigation under SIO [redacted]. The



current SIO from the IPCC is now [REDACTED] The IPCC was made aware of this complaint at the time as a copy was sent to them by Jules Carey of Tuckers.

## 5. Terms of Reference for Operation Riverwood

D2836  
Holmes  
Operatio  
n Heme

5.1 The Terms of reference for Operation Riverwood were compiled from the existing Terms of Reference for Operation Herne, as the alleged use of deceased person's identities forms a strand of the enquiry.

5.2 The Terms of Reference were agreed by Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary Mick Creedon and Deputy Commissioner Craig Mackay.

## 6. [REDACTED]

6.1 [REDACTED] joined the Metropolitan Police Service in [REDACTED] and is issued with warrant number [REDACTED] He joined the NPOIU when [REDACTED]

6.2 [REDACTED]

## 7. [REDACTED] NPOIU history

7.1 [REDACTED] was part of the NPOIU from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] He was deployed in the "field" between [REDACTED]

7.2 In [REDACTED] entered the field as "Rod Richardson" and infiltrated [REDACTED]

7.3 [REDACTED]

7.4 [REDACTED]

7.5 [REDACTED]



Indymed  
ia UK  
06.02.20  
13

7.7

Indymed  
ia UK  
06.02.20  
13 Blog  
by  
"Potatp  
Peeler"

7.8

## 8. Legality and Framework of Identity Documents Act 2010

- 8.1 In their letter dated 31st January 2010, Tuckers solicitors state: "...it appears that the conduct of the officers concerned constitute an offence under identity Documents Act 2010."
- 8.2 Section 4 of the Identity Documents Act 2012 makes it an offence to possess false identity documents with the intent of using them in specified ways relating to the person in possession of the document.
- 8.3 Section 4 (1) refers to an offence if the person has an "**improper intention**" and if the document is "**improperly obtained**".
- 8.4 Section 7 (1) gives the definition of an identity document and includes specifically driving licence, passport and immigration documents. Section 8 (1) refers to personal information and residential status. Personal information being full name, gender, date of birth, address.
- 8.5 The act itself is not **retrospective** and refers to any other offences committed prior to this date is discussed under the provisions of the Identity Cards Act 2006.

## 9. Investigation

- 9.1 On 5th February 2013, an investigation plan was compiled by Detective Superintendent [REDACTED]. One of the immediate priorities was that the MPS wished to reassure the complainant that her concerns were being investigated. Jules Carey stipulated in his correspondence that all correspondence and contact should go through his office.
- 9.2 On the 4th February 2013, correspondence was sent via e-mail to Jules Carey in order



to facilitate this. No reply was made from his office.

- 9.3 On 22nd February 2013, a reminder was drafted in regards to Jules Carey facilitating contact with the complainant. Jules Carey sent an e-mail to DS [REDACTED] requesting clarification of the appointment of Mr Creedon.

E-Mail  
from  
Jules  
Carey to  
Heme  
dated  
29.05.13

- 9.4 On 27th February 2013, T/DSU [REDACTED] replied to Jules Carey verifying this. On 29th May 2013 another attempt was made via Jules Carey in order to approach Ms Shaw or arrange a meeting with her. Jules Carey replied to this e-mail with another stating that this was "nothing more than a PR exercise."

- 9.5 The enquiry team therefore had no official corroboration or account from the complainant about the accuracy of her claims in "The Guardian" that she was the mother of a deceased child named "Rod Richardson".

Notes of  
meeting  
15.02.20  
13

- 9.6 Arrangements were made to speak to [REDACTED] who met with DS [REDACTED] and **Detective Constable** [REDACTED] on 14th February 2013. Contact was facilitated by [REDACTED]'s contact officer, [REDACTED]

MG11 of  
[REDACTED]  
dated  
10.05.20  
13

- 9.7 The following is taken from [REDACTED] statement :

9.8

MG11 of  
[REDACTED]  
dated  
10.05.20  
13

9.9

9.10

9.11



MG11 of  
[REDACTED]  
10.05.20  
13

9.12

9.13

9.14

Notes of  
interview  
with  
Andy  
Coles  
dated  
22.11.11

9.15

Former DS (retired as Detective Inspector) Andy Coles was spoken to by the enquiry team on 22nd November 2011. DS Coles was placed into the Animal Rights arena in 1990 to 1995, whilst in the field in the SDS. [REDACTED]

9.16

A second trainer within the unit was named by [REDACTED] as **Detective Sergeant** [REDACTED]. DS [REDACTED] was spoken to by the enquiry team and acknowledged that "Rod Richardson" was run by the unit and had obtained his identity by this method. DS [REDACTED] also states that when he arrived in the unit, in 2004, the practice of using deceased person's identities in this fashion was not used. DS [REDACTED] provides a signed evidential account to support the above.

MG11 of  
[REDACTED]  
25.05.20  
13

9.17

The enquiry team also identified from DS [REDACTED]'s account another instructor former **Detective Sergeant** [REDACTED]. He has been contacted by the enquiry team and is willing to provide an account. The enquiry team are also yet to speak to DS [REDACTED] former DCI [REDACTED] and former DSU [REDACTED].

Office  
meeting  
minutes  
dated  
29.05.20  
13.

9.18

On 29th May 2013, it was agreed that this matter would no longer be supervised by the IPCC and would revert to a "local" investigation.



## Operation Riverwood - Conclusions

### 10. Conclusions

- 10.1 From documented evidence provided by [REDACTED] the MPS through the NPOIU used the details of "Rod Richardson, Date of Birth 5th January 1973".
- 10.2 These details were used without consultation or direct permission from the complainant, Barbara Shaw who is the real "Rod Richardson's" mother.
- 10.3 The use of utilising identities in this manner is **not** practiced by police today. In respect of the NPOIU, the practice ceased prior to 2004.
- 10.4 The MPS used these details to allow the practice of "backstopping" a "legend" for covert purposes, in this case use by an undercover officer to infiltrate activist movements [REDACTED]
- 10.5 As it was the training and doctrine passed to the operative, the complaint against police cannot be upheld against the officer as an individual. The complaint cannot be upheld against the Metropolitan Police Service as an organisation as this would serve to "confirm" the use of "Rod Richardson" in this fashion and could serve to compromise the officer's real identity.
- 10.6 In relation to the officer's performance, there are no issues that have been identified that warrant misconduct proceedings at this time. The officer performed his role in accordance to regulations and there is no evidence to suggest unacceptable behaviour.

Name :  
Investigating Officer

Name : DS [REDACTED]  
Case Worker





## Operation Riverwood - Recommendations

### Recommendation 1

- 1.1 MPS – The use of this tactic appears to have desisted post a change in how births, deaths and marriages were recorded in 1994. The introduction of a computerised system increased the risk of compromise to individuals.

The officer took instructions from an officer who had worked on a unit where the practice was used prior to this date. Documentation held by Operation Herne indicates that the change in method was 'suggested' rather than instructed. No direct order to stop the practice has been found.

The MPS no longer use this method.

- 1.2 To uphold the complaint against the MPS would involve the following :

- An admission that the practice was wrong.
- An admission that an individual had been deployed undercover using the details provided, going against the current national stance of 'neither confirm nor deny'.

To do either of the above would, in my opinion be an incorrect course of action. Whilst the practice may be the subject of current public debate the rationale for its use is documented [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The officer concerned has not been identified (real name) and to confirm the use of the identity would put him at greater risk of compromise.

I recommend that the complaint should not be upheld against the service.

### Recommendation 2

- 2.1 Officer – The officer has given a statement in which he admits use of the tactic. Whilst I would expect officers to take personal responsibility for their actions in all situations it is apparent that in this case he was simply carrying out the instructions and directions of those charged with training him prior to deployment. This is not a case where an officer has acted against instructions of supervising officers or created his covert identity without their knowledge. Therefore my recommendation is that the complaint should not be upheld against the officer.

- 2.2 With this in mind, there are no misconduct proceedings that should be instigated against the officer at this time.

.....  
Name  
Investigating Officer

.....  
Name  
Case Worker