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F A CULT Y OF P H IL OSOP HY
U N I V E R S I T Y O F O X F O R D
FHS Philosophy 2017: report of the examiners
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 2
List of examiners and assessors .............................................................................................................. 2
Prizes ....................................................................................................................................................... 2
Take-up and performance statistics ....................................................................................................... 3
Take-up by option, by school .............................................................................................................. 3
Performance by option, by school ...................................................................................................... 4
Individual paper reports ......................................................................................................................... 5
101 Early Modern Philosophy ............................................................................................................. 5
102 Knowledge and Reality ................................................................................................................. 9
103 Ethics .......................................................................................................................................... 11
104 Philosophy of Mind .................................................................................................................... 16
107 Philosophy of Religion ................................................................................................................ 16
108 The Philosophy of Logic and Language ...................................................................................... 20
109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism ................................................................................ 22
110 Medieval Philosophy: Aquinas ................................................................................................... 25
112 The Philosophy of Kant .............................................................................................................. 25
113 Post-Kantian Philosophy ............................................................................................................ 27
114 Theory of Politics ........................................................................................................................ 27
115 / 130 Plato, Republic .................................................................................................................. 29
116 / 131 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics .......................................................................................... 31
118 The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein........................................................................................ 33
120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics ........................................................................................... 35
122 Philosophy of Mathematics ....................................................................................................... 36
124 Philosophy of Science ................................................................................................................ 37
125 Philosophy of Cognitive Science ................................................................................................ 37
127 Philosophical Logic ..................................................................................................................... 38
1
Introduction
This is the subject report for Honour School Philosophy in 2017. The report will be of use to future
candidates, who should when revising read the subject reports on the papers they are offering. The
report will also be inspected by the Philosophy Faculty’s Undergraduate Studies Committee as part
of its review of the year’s examining business.
List of examiners and assessors
The Faculty records its immense gratitude for the efforts of examiners and assessors, who mark
large amounts of work to very demanding deadlines.
The following Faculty members served as
examiners in the Honour Schools in 2017:
As ever, many of the assessors had no obligation to examine, yet volunteered their services: we note
their generosity with gratitude. They played a considerable part in the success of this exam season.
Prizes
The
Henry Wilde Prize for the outstanding performance in Philosophy across all joint schools was
awarded to
The
Elizabeth Anscombe Prize for the best undergraduate Philosophy thesis was won jointly by
.
The
Duns Scotus Prize for best performance on the Medieval Philosophy papers was awarded jointly
2
Take-up and performance statistics
Take-up by option, by school
School
101
102
103
104
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
PPE
43
64
151
6
9
25
9
26
1
4
24
37
39
Lit Hum
6
7
19
3
6
3
12
3
1
1
6
10
PT
20
12
17
1
28
6
2
2
2
1
6
PPL
4
8
4
11
3
2
4
6
1
3
PP
2
11
1
1
2
1
4
MP
1
13
2
5
1
7
1
1
3
1
PML
11
2
1
3
1
7
1
7
2
2
CSP
2
3
3
4
3
1
1
1
2
Grand Total
89
120
194
32
13
64
29
61
7
1
12
37
54
59
School
116
117
118
120
122
124
125
127
130
131
132
133
134
135
Total
PPE
24
3
15
2
5
13
500
Lit Hum
9
1
1
1
2
33
1
6
4
1
3
139
PT
2
3
2
3
107
PPL
1
4
8
3
62
PP
3
13
1
13
2
2
56
MP
3
2
13
2
55
PML
3
1
1
42
CSP
1
1
1
1
1
3
28
Total
38
7
27
13
19
27
13
25
33
1
6
4
1
3
989
Notes: There were also candidates from Classics and English (1
Nic. Eth. in Greek), Mathematics (1 Early Modern Philosophy, 2 Knowledge and Reality, 1 Philosophical Logic. Four candidates
on the Postgraduate Diploma in Theology offered Philosophy of Religion, as did three undergraduates in the school of Theology and Religion.
3
Performance by option, by school
School
101
102
103
104
106
107
108
109
110
112
113
114
Overall
CSP
66.8
Lit Hum
64.7
62.9
64.6
65.5
65.5
64.7
65.9
MP
66.7
60.1
66.3
PML
64.7
67.0
67.7
65.7
PP
64.6
66.3
PPE
65.1
64.7
63.6
65.8
64.3
66.2
66.0
63.4
66.8
64.8
PPL
62.0
63.3
66.7
64.6
PT
63.4
61.3
58.9
65.2
65.0
63.2
Grand Total
64.7
64.2
63.5
65.3
62.3
65.7
62.8
64.9
65.6
68.7
66.6
66.4
65.0
School
115
116
117
118
120
122
124
125
127
130
132
Overall
CSP
66.8
Lit Hum
66.0
66.0
66.8
67.0
65.9
MP
67.8
66.3
PML
65.7
PP
66.4
66.5
66.3
PPE
65.6
65.1
64.3
64.6
64.8
PPL
67.6
64.6
PT
66.7
63.2
Grand Total
65.5
65.4
67.9
66.6
66.4
65.8
67.0
67.8
65.2
66.8
67.0
65.0
Figures are not given for cohorts of 5 or less.
4
Individual paper reports
Reports are not provided where so doing might identify individual candidates.
101 Early Modern Philosophy
The changes to the paper in 2016 again appear to ensure that most candidates were able to answer
questions on topics that they had prepared for examination. However, the standard of individual
answers remained somewhat disappointing. Whilst most candidates display a competent
understanding of textbook versions of the views of the authors they discuss, few seem able to utilize
this knowledge to provide carefully constructed answers that engage directly with the content of the
questions asked.
It is also noteworthy that this tendency was most prominent in answers to the questions that
required discussion of quotations from the primary texts and the comparative questions. With the
former, candidates generally struggled to draw out the details in such a way as to issues in the
passages themselves that were worthy of discussion as opposed to those concerning the general
topic to which the passages were drawing attention. And with the latter (which were attempted by
few candidates) the standard of the answers was generally the lowest.
As always, the majority of answers in section A were focused on Descartes. Given the prevalence of
interest in studying Descartes, it was particularly noteworthy that candidates often appeared to
have little knowledge of material from the lectures that could be brought to bear on the questions
they answered. Indeed, with many of the questions, it seemed that at least some students were
drawing too much on rather outdated and anachronistic accounts of the issues.
The majority of answers clustered around a small number of questions. One result of this is that
there is insufficient data to include generalizable information about performance on 16 of the 36
questions.
SECTION A: DESCARTES, SPINOZA, AND LEIBNIZ
1.
Does it seem plausible to think that the meditator will find herself in the position that
Descartes claims she will by the end of the First Meditation?
Far too few candidates answering this question appeared to be familiar with the ways in which
Descartes characterizes his views with regard to the
First Meditation. Therefore, it was rare to find
answers that focused on the central aim of providing reasons to doubt all
currently held opinions,
and assessments of the success of the meditation were inevitably infected by this.
2.
‘If he were deducing [existence from thought] by means of a syllogism, he would have to
have had previous knowledge of the major premiss “Everything which thinks is, or exists”; yet in fact
he learns it from experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should think without
existing. It is in the nature of our mind to construct general propositions on the basis of our
knowledge of particular ones.’ (DESCARTES, Second Set of Replies
) What does this tell us about ‘the
cogito’?
5
Whilst some candidates were able to use this quote to draw on a wide range of things that Descartes
says which are relevant to the nature of ‘the cogito’, too many appeared to be unfamiliar with the
ideas involved and lapsed into a generic discussion of issues raised in standard secondary accounts.
3.
Is Descartes’ argument for God’s existence in the Third Meditation
at all plausible?
Candidates often displayed a disappointingly sketchy understanding of the details of the
Third
Meditation argument, sometimes to the extent that one would have wondered whether they had
read the primary text. Whilst the best answers provided detailed critical discussion of the
complexities of the argument, many focused on rather anachronistic criticisms of Descartes’ views
on causation and his claims about degrees of reality.
4.
Does Descartes have a conception of freedom of the will that can be applied consistently to
God and
to created thinking substances?
5.
Critically compare and contrast Descartes’ views on innateness with at least one other
author on this paper.
6.
Why does Descartes appeal to the notion of a mind-body union in the correspondence with
Elizabeth of Bohemia? Is it a successful appeal?
Answers to this question were among the poorest. Despite its centrality to all but the most
elementary discussions of Descartes’ views on the mind and body, very few candidates appeared to
understand the notion of the union or the context in which it arose. Indeed, it appeared that most
candidates were using this as a question of last resort and drawing of knowledge that they could
have acquired whilst studying General Philosophy for prelims or mods.
7.
If both are conceptually self-contained, or ‘conceived through itself alone’, what is the
difference
between substance and attributes?
8.
‘[T]he thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance,
which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that.’ (SPINOZA, Ethics
2, scholium to p7)
If the one substance can appear as mental or appear as physical, what is it really?
9.
Is it appropriate to regard Spinoza’s one substance as ‘God’, or is he better understood as an
atheist?
10.
‘The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body.’ (SPINOZA, Ethics
2p13)
Discuss.
11.
Critically compare Spinoza’s account of freedom with that of at least one other author on this
paper.
12.
What for Spinoza is the significance of viewing the world sub specie aeternitas
(under the aspect
of eternity)?
13.
What is a theodicy? Does Leibniz offer us a plausible one?
14.
What is Leibniz’s account of relationship between mind and body and is he successful in
establishing its superiority over the other accounts that he considers?
6
Whilst candidates answering this question generally had an understanding of the notion of pre-
established harmony, none provided any elaboration of the notion of body that Leibniz employs in
order to draw a contrast with other authors. Furthermore, there was surprisingly little attention to
the very specific arguments that Leibniz employs against occasionalism and what he often refers to
as ‘the way of influence’, which comprise the other accounts that he considers.
15.
Critically compare and contrast Leibniz’s views on the nature of body with those of at least
one other author on this paper.
16.
Can Leibniz adequately account for his claim that God freely created the best of all possible
worlds?
Candidates generally had a good understanding of the account of freedom that Leibniz employs
when discussing the freedom of God and creatures. However, in considering the issue of its
adequacy they tended to focus almost exclusively on providing critiques of Leibniz’s account of
contingency, where understanding of the complexity of his views was often weak.
17.
‘It is also necessary that each monad be different from each other. For there are never two
beings in nature that are perfectly alike, two beings in which it is not possible to discover an internal
difference, that is, one founded on an intrinsic denomination.’ (LEIBNIZ: Monadology
, sec. 9) Discuss.
18.
What is Leibniz’s account of the nature of space? Does he have good arguments for his
view?
SECTION B: LOCKE, BERKELEY, AND HUME
19.
Does Locke have the resources to respond adequately to the arguments for existence of
innate principles that he considers?
Along with question 23, this question provided too many apparent examples of the perennial
problem of ‘tutorial essay regurgitation’ as opposed to answering the question asked. Whilst most
answers included some discussion of the pertinent material (i.e., Locke’s response to the arguments
for the position he attacks – i.e., the view that there are innate
principles), few candidates gave it the
detailed attention that it needed, with many including irrelevant discussion of Locke’s arguments
against innatism in general and for his own views.
20.
What role, according to Locke, does abstraction play in the acquisition of our ideas? Is it
adequate to this task?
Whilst a popular, answers to this question were generally quite weak. Often candidates were
completely insensitive to the complexities involved in providing an account of Locke’s views (in
particular, the apparent differences between the treatment in Book 2 of the
Essay and in Book 3),
and proceeded directly to a critical discussion drawing heavily on Berkeley’s attack. Whilst it was
appropriate to bring in Berkeley’s views, the discussion was sometimes too dominant and failed to
engage with Locke in sufficient detail.
21.
Is there anything problematic about the way in which Locke’s account of the perception of
bodies is employed in his case for the distinction between primary and secondary qualities?
22.
How should we understand Locke’s account of the relationship between substance and
essence?
7
Answers to this question were generally good. It was notable that weaker answers failed to display a
good working knowledge of Locke’s views on both substance and essence, with focus tending to be
on the latter.
23.
‘[T]he apostle tells us, that at the great day, when every one shall “receive according to his
doings, the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open”. The sentence shall be justified by the
consciousness all persons shall have, that they themselves, in what bodies soever they appear, or
what substances soever that consciousness adheres to, are the same that committed those actions,
and deserve that punishment for them.’ (LOCKE, ECHU
2.27.26). Discuss.
Along with question 19, this question provided too many apparent examples of the perennial
problem of ‘tutorial essay regurgitation’ as opposed to answering the question asked. As a result,
candidates too often failed to pay much attention to the scriptural dimension of the quotation, and
where they did focus on forensic issues, these tended to be connected with the cases of drunk and
sleep-walking ‘criminals’. It was also notable that many candidates operated with a rather superficial
account of personhood and the diachronic identity of persons (in terms of continuity of
consciousness, or memory), which did not appear to go much beyond that which could have been
acquired whilst studying for prelims or mods.
24.
Critically compare and contrast Locke’s views on knowledge with that of at least one other
author on this paper.
25.
Is Berkeley’s case for immaterialism simply a series of objections to materialism?
Whilst this question was popular, answers were not terribly good, since most candidates failed to
offer criteria by which they were distinguishing objections to materialism from other considerations.
26.
Is Berkeley a phenomenalist?
Again, a popular, but not terribly well answered question. Far too few candidates were able to
provide a clear account of the difference between a phenomenalist and a non-phenomenalist
reading of Berkeley with inevitable knock-on effects.
27.
Does Berkeley’s conception of science make any sense?
28.
Could Berkeley move his own arm, given his own system?
Candidates who attempted this question generally fared well, displaying a good knowledge of
Berkeley’s views and an ability to utilize them to address the puzzle at issue and answer the question
precisely.
29.
Compare Berkeley on the concept of ‘idea’ with at least one other author covered in this
paper.
30.
‘In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained, so long as they excite in us
proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false
soever they may be, if taken in a strict and speculative sense.’ (BERKELEY, Principles
1.52) Explain and
discuss.
31.
What is ‘natural’ in Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature
?
8
32.
Is anything salvageable from Hume’s account of belief?
Whilst a number of candidates attempted to answer this question, it was perhaps the most poorly
answered on the entire paper. Very few candidates approached it with a developed understanding
of the account of belief with which Hume operates and unsurprisingly they were unable to provide
good critical discussion.
33.
Can Hume coherently refer to ‘just and conclusive’ probable inferences?
34.
Why does Hume give two definitions of ‘cause’?
Unsurprisingly, this was one of the most popular questions on the paper given the centrality of the
topic and straightforward nature of the question. However, answers varied greatly from those that
displayed a detailed knowledge of the material, including verbatim quotes of the definitions, and an
excellent grasp of their genesis and significance, to those that were based on only a superficial grasp
of the issues.
35.
Compare Hume’s account of substance with at least one other author covered in this paper.
36.
‘I began this subject with premising, that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses,
and that this wou’d be the conclusion, I shou’d draw from the whole of my reason. But to be
ingenuous, I feel myself at present of a quite contrary sentiment, and am more inclin’d to repose no
faith at all in my senses, or rather imagination, than to place in it such as implicit confidence.’
(HUME, Treatise
1.4.2) Discuss.
Whilst quite popular, this question was not answered well by most candidates. Candidates rarely
seemed to have an understanding of the context from which it was drawn and surprisingly few
discussed the provisional nature of the claims Hume was making or the response he offers.
Furthermore, there was little attention to the relationship between the notions of reason, sense,
imagination and faith. For the most part, answers focused far too much on an elaboration of
skeptical readings of Hume’s arguments concerning sense-based beliefs.
102 Knowledge and Reality
Here are some comments on some of the more popular questions. The number of answers is in
brackets.
2.
[8]
Are there unanalysable factive mental states?
Generally done fairly well. A number of students presented the lecture material in very similar ways,
but the best answers were able to add to this material.
3.
[15]
Does externalism about justification imply that one can have knowledge despite
disregarding available evidence? Mostly good answers. Most students understood this as an allusion to BonJour’s clairvoyant
example. The best answers did more than simply presenting the case as an objection to externalism
and leaving it at that. Considering possible replies on the part of the externalist greatly improved the
answers, even if those replies were ultimately rejected.
9
4.
[6]
Can one acquire a priori
justification by means of testimony?
The answers to this one were quite mixed. Some people saw no connection between this question
and Burge’s idea that testimony, like memory, preserves epistemic status. Some people answered
this question: If
p is knowable a priori, could you know that
p on the basis of testimony (and
therefore empirically)? That was not the question. The best answers saw the connection to Burge
and were able to say something about both sides of that debate.
5.
[6]
Can one provide a foundationalist justification for foundationalism itself?
A difficult question, but generally well done. By and large, people resisted the temptation to weigh
the pros and cons of foundationalism and coherentism while ignoring the complexities of the
question.
7.
[27]
Does the context-sensitivity of the word ‘know’ tell us anything about knowledge
itself?
A very popular question. This question was attempted by a few students who didn’t know what
contextualsim is. A small, but still surprising number of people thought this was about Gettier cases.
If you’re in fake barn country, you don’t know. If you’re in real barn country, you do. But in general,
it was done fairly well. Most students competently explained DeRose-style contextualism and the
standard objections to it, and many were able to add something to the debate.
9(a).
[9]
Can induction inform us about the past?
Many students took this as an opportunity to explain Hume’s problem of induction. One popular
answer to this question was that since induction can’t inform us of anything, it can’t inform us about
the past. Less successful versions of this were simply a restatement of Hume’s argument. More
successful versions considered and objected to attempted solutions to Hume’s problem.
11.
[12]
Is it easier to survive fission than to survive fusion?
The best answers did more than just present a list of theories about personal identity and explain
how each theory would answer the question. But not everyone did more than that.
13.
[13]
If x
prevents y
from preventing c
from causing e
, does this make x
a cause of e
?
Mostly good answers and some very good. There was the usual list of theories about causation and
what each theory would say in answer to the question. But in general, people engaged with the
question itself and used their answer to the question to evaluate the theories.
14.
[26]
Can modality be understood in terms of possible worlds, or does the notion of a
possible world presuppose a prior understanding of modality? Another very popular question. Some very good answers. Many answers had a similar structure.
Here’s a list of views about modality. Most are non-reductive, and the reductive one, usually Lewis’
modal realism, needs to be evaluated for plausibility. In general, people showed a good
understanding of the issues and the views, and they came down on one side or the other in an
answer to the question.
10
19(b).
[7]
Why does time, but not space, seem to pass?
Most people took this as an opportunity to discuss the A-theory and B-theory of time. Not everyone
focused primarily on the apparent difference between space and time, but many people did.
103 Ethics
A wide range of philosophical quality was displayed collectively by the candidates taking this paper.
The best answers displayed deep engagement and appreciation of central problems, arguments, and
positions in moral philosophy, and were written in a clear, succinct, engaging style. The best-
performing candidates show an impressive ability to pack a great deal of substance into a very short
space. Clearly, some candidates are embracing the study of Ethics with enthusiasm and diligence
over the course of their degrees. Many others gain a competent grasp of major debates and are
able to write reasonably engaging essays that make a good case for a clearly stated conclusion.
As ever, too many candidates nevertheless appear to have proceeded by identifying each question’s
topic and then assuming that simply because they had identified the topic of the question, they
knew what sort of discussion was invited. Aiming to test philosophical understanding and analytical
skill, the setters tried to formulate questions so that they did
not invite a survey of standard
arguments for and against some position, but called for candidates to discuss only particular aspects
of arguments or positions, or to think about implications that they might not have considered
before. Thus, for example, Q1 called for candidates to think about hypocrisy in particular and
whether it might be problematic for error theorists; Q5(b) called for candidates to think about the
rationality of willing independently of the success of Kant’s universalisation test; Q9(b) asked
candidates to think about how moral theorists might think about the consequences of actions but
did not ask about consequentialism in particular; and Q15 asked candidates to think about free will
and moral responsibility in the context of the particular suggestion that we can’t help regarding
ourselves as free. The best candidates paid close attention to such details, and brought to bear their
understanding and analytical skill in ways that reflected this; the weaker candidates simply looked
for opportunities to rehearse sequences of dialectic that they had learned, and more or less ignored
the details of the questions.
Many candidates seemed particularly interested in talking about consequentialism (and not only in
response to questions that obviously called for them to do so), possibly drawing on recollection of
first-year work for the Moral Philosophy paper. Detailed, accurate appreciation of other views in
normative ethics, such as contractualism and other forms of non-consequentialism, was not in
general on display in candidates’ answers. Questions inviting discussion of Kant and Aristotle in
other years have typically attracted many answers, but this year knowledge of these philosophers
was not often drawn upon by candidates, even though some questions (especially Q12 and Q15)
were readily interpreted as prompts for exposition and discussion of their work. This was perhaps
because no question quoted either of them or referred to either by name. Candidates taking Ethics
in future should bear in mind that the applicable Examination Regulations state that candidates “will
be given an opportunity to show some first-hand knowledge” of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant (as well
as other principal historical writings on ethics), but do
not state that questions will normally be set
on these authors. Accordingly, even in the absence of questions on these authors, candidates
should be alive to opportunities to employ their knowledge the writings of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant
that are not explicitly flagged as such.
11
Comments on questions
Q1.
Is an error theorist who continues to make moral judgments a hypocrite? Discuss the
metaethical implications of your answer.
This was one of the more popular questions. Candidates showed a solid understanding of error
theory, but some offered no analysis of hypocrisy or said anything about whether and why it would
be a problem if error theorists were hypocrites, appearing to think that the examiners merely
wanted them to offer a general assessment of error theory. The better candidates did offer an
analysis of hypocrisy and what might be problematic about it for error theorists, and discussed the
possibility that fictionalists could rebut the charge of hypocrisy.
Q2.
Supposing that utilitarianism is true, could we find out that utilitarianism is true in the same
kind of way scientists found out that water is H2O?
This was also a fairly popular question, but not that well answered in general. Too many candidates
simply rehearsed standard arguments against metaethical naturalism, such as the Open Question
Argument. The better answers explained how the idea that both “water is H2O” and (e.g.) “utility is
good” are instances of the necessary a posteriori might be used to defend naturalist realism, and
then discussed the Moral Twin Earth problem, though not always with a clear sense of the moral to
be drawn from it. Other good answers discussed what it took for the fact that water is H2O to be a
discovery and then asked whether these conditions could obtain in the case of utilitarianism.
Q3(a). Do non-cognitivists have a problem with negation? If so, can they solve it?
Q3(b). Can I affirm that murder is wrong without also affirming that ‘murder is wrong’ is true?
These questions were not popular, presumably because they called upon candidates to show an
appreciation of some of the more advanced and intricate recent work on non-cognitivism. Q3(a)
was generally attempted only by candidates who had a good familiarity with the Frege-Geach
problem, though candidates’ discussions of the negation problem were often too imprecise. The
best answers to Q3(b) recognised the relevance of appeals to minimalism about truth; others simply
rehearsed arguments for and against non-cognitivism. Surprisingly many candidates took
emotivism, rather than more current expressivist views, to be the central case of non-cognitivism.
Q4.
‘It’s a happy accident that, if I come to believe that some act is wrong, a corresponding desire
not to do that act invariably follows. And most people are like me in this respect.’ Is this an
adequate account of moral motivation?
Many candidates treated this as an invitation to rehearse arguments for and against motivational
externalism. The better answers focused on Smith’s ‘fetishism’ objection and offered convincing
treatments of it. The most insightful candidates saw that the quoted statement articulates a
position distinct from that which is standardly supposed to give rise to the fetishism worry, which
can be offered as a response to that worry.
Q5(a). Can it be rational to want to be unhappy?
This question attracted too few answers to support any general conclusions about it.
12
Q5(b). Are there any states of affairs I cannot rationally will to obtain?
This question was not generally very well answered. Candidates took it to be an invitation to discuss
the success of Kant’s universalisation test of the morality of maxims, and often proceeded to discuss
the Logical Contradiction interpretation, the Teleological Contradiction interpretation, and the
Practical Contradiction in turn, following Korsgaard’s exposition closely and subjecting her discussion
to very little critical scrutiny. Very few candidates discussed what rational and irrational willing
might involve independently of the Kantian test, so there was little discussion of the willing of non-
universalised maxims, for instance.
Q6.
‘If there are normative reasons for action, it must be that people sometimes act for those
reasons, and if they do, the reasons must figure in some correct explanation of their actions.’
Discuss.
This question attracted few answers, and only a minority of those recognised the quoted statement
as an argument for internalism about reasons. Others interpreted the question as inviting discussion
of Harman’s ‘explanatory impotence’ argument against moral realism or of the distinction between
decision-making procedures and moral standards. Though these interpretations were reasonable,
the question was not generally well answered, partly because candidates seemed to have trouble
treating the ‘Discuss’ as a prompt for an argument rather than a survey.
Q7.
‘[B]eing good, or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing
in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute
such reasons.’ (SCANLON) Discuss.
This question attracted very few answers, and even fewer recognised the quoted sentences as a
statement of the buck-passing account of goodness, suggesting that candidates are not very familiar
with buck-passing, despite its prominence in the post-
What We Owe To Each Other literature.
Q8.
If Alex is going to be helped anyway, is it merely selfishness on my part to want that I be the
one who helps?
Some candidates took this question as an invitation to offer a general discussion of selfishness and
egoism. Only a few focused on the peculiarities of wanting to be the one who helps vs. merely
wanting that someone be helped. Better answers distinguished and assessed the selfishness of
various possible motivations for wanting to be the one who helps.
Q9(a). Is satisficing consequentialism an adequate response to the worry that maximising
consequentialism is too demanding?
This was by far the most popular question. Most candidates gave accurate characterisations of
maximising consequentialism and satisficing consequentialism. Accounts of demandingness varied
in accuracy and sophistication. Many candidates took maximising consequentialism’s
demandingness to be primarily epistemic and seemed insensitive to other common understandings
of its demandingness. Although candidates were able to indicate ways in which satisficing
consequentialism appears to address demandingness objections, too many thence proceeded to
assessments of satisficing consequentialism’s adequacy in general (the most popular objection was
that the satisficing threshold must be arbitrary; better answers raised worries that it licenses
gratuitous harms). The best answers distinguished different dimensions of demandingness and
assessed the adequacy of satisficing consequentialism as a response to each.
13
Q9(b). How much of a problem is it that we can’t foresee all the consequences of our actions?
Although this question does not ask about consequentialism in particular, and although there is no
clear reason to think that the unforeseeability of some consequences of our actions is a problem
only for consequentialists, almost every candidate who answered this question discussed only
consequentialism. This was perhaps because candidates assumed that because Q9(a) invited
discussion of consequentialism, Q9(b) must too. In any case, answers were too often fairly
pedestrian rehearsals of arguments for and against act-consequentialism; surprisingly few
candidates seemed familiar with the idea that act-consequentialism could be understood to require
the maximisation of expected value rather than actual value.
Q10.
What is the best argument for contractualism? Does it succeed?
Few candidates answered this question, and that suggests that contractualism in general, and
Scanlon’s contractualism in particular, are not widely included in tutorial teaching for the Ethics
paper. This seems regrettable. Among those candidates who did answer this question, only a few
seemed to have a firm grasp of Scanlon’s view. Some discussed Hobbes and Rawls, but did not in
general offer compelling analyses or arguments.
Q11(a). Can any account of the distinction between justice and beneficence explain why duties of
justice should typically be more stringent, when other things are equal?
Q11(b).‘To have a right is merely for one’s interests to be sufficient to justify holding someone else to
be under a duty.’ Discuss
These questions attracted too few answers to support any general conclusions about them, apart
from perhaps the conclusion that the topic of rights is not widely taught in tutorials for the Ethics
paper, despite its presence on the syllabus.
Q12.
‘[A] virtuous action is what a virtuous person would do…this is not something fixed but will
depend on whether the virtuous person is a learner or more like an expert.’ (ANNAS) Discuss.
This was among the most popular questions. Answers showed that candidates typically have a
reasonable grasp of some key ideas and objections related to virtue ethics (especially the action-
guidingness critique), but many candidates did not engage with the detail of the question
adequately, offering instead general accounts of virtue ethics followed by discussion of standard
objections and replies. The best candidates discussed the ways in which the specification of virtuous
action might depend on the agent’s developmental stage and asked about whether this might
generate problems for the standard of virtuous action proposed at the beginning of the quoted
statement, and showed familiarity with some of the detail of Annas’s view.
Q13.
‘When distributing benefits, we should aim for equality, not to make the outcome better, but
for some other reason.’ Do you agree?
Many candidates demonstrated familiarity with the debates between telic egalitarians and their
opponents, and considered the Levelling Down Objection to the former. But a significant number
were confused about the distinction between two distinctions: the distinction between instrumental
and non-instrumental value and the distinction between telic and non-telic views. So, for example,
they did not appreciate that many prioritarians who aim for equality also aim for it in order to make
the outcome better, and so might disagree with the quoted statement not on the basis of an
14
objection to aiming for equality but on the basis of an objection to the idea that we should aim at
equality for some reason other than to make the outcome better.
Q14.
Which are more problematic: interpersonal comparisons of well-being, or intrapersonal
ones?
This question attracted too few answers to support any general conclusions about it.
Q15.
‘We don’t need to be free; it’s enough that we can’t help regarding ourselves as free.’ Is that
so?
This was among the most popular questions. Weaker answers took the question as an invitation to
rehearse standard debates between incompatibilists and compatibilists, focusing on Frankfurt-style
cases. Better candidates saw the relevance of Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ and focused
on that, although few were able to do much more than give an exposition of the Strawsonian idea.
Only a few candidates recognised the relevance of
Groundwork III, and took the question as a
prompt for discussion Kant’s argument there.
Q16.
Is there a moral duty to do as one’s conscience dictates?
Q17.
Is shame essentially bound up with the internalisation of another’s point of view? If it is, does
that provide a reason to be suspicious of shame?
These questions attracted too few answers to support any general conclusions about them, apart
from the conclusion that the topics of guilt, shame, and conscience are not widely taught for the
Ethics paper.
Q18.
‘It is always permissible to harm non-human animals for the sake of the greater good. But
humans are different.’ Is that so? What could the relevant difference be?
This was among the more popular answers. Candidates showed some familiarity with the views of
Singer and Kagan, and competently wielded over-inclusion and under-inclusion objections to various
accounts of moral status. Most focused on the question about what the relevant difference could be
rather than what the implications would be of non-humans and humans’ respective statuses.
Q19(a). Is it ever permissible to kill an innocent bystander in self-defence?
Q19(b).Is it ever the case that an agent intends a harm if she views that harm as at best a regrettable
necessity? What are the ethical implications of your answer?
These questions did not attract many answers. Some displayed knowledge of relevant discussions of
the Doctrine of Double Effect, but not all of these managed to connect this knowledge to the
specifics of the question at hand—in the case of Q19(a), failing to talk much about self-defensive
killing of innocents in particular, and in the case of Q19(b), failing to make anything of the idea of
viewing a harm as a regrettable necessity. The weakest answers took the questions as an invitation
to offer a shallow discussion of the merits of consequentialism.
15
Q20.
‘Assisted dying is just passive euthanasia by another name. There is no morally significant
distinction between passive euthanasia and active euthanasia, which is impermissible. So
assisted dying is impermissible.’ Is this a good argument?
This question did not attract many answers. Those who did answer seemed surprisingly willing to
accept the equation of assisted dying and passive euthanasia, and more generally did not seem to
have clear understandings of assisted dying or active or passive euthanasia and the distinctions
between them.
Q21.
Since all explanations must stop somewhere, moral theorising is simply a game of taking on
odd commitments to no advantage.’ Is that so?
This question was answered, unwisely, only by candidates who struggled to find any plausible line of
thought suggested in the quote, and who consequently found themselves with little of interest to
discuss.
104 Philosophy of Mind
Owing to an administrative error, there is no report available for this paper. We apologise for the
inconvenience.
107 Philosophy of Religion
71 candidates sat the Philosophy of Religion paper in 2017. This is a compulsory paper for the
Philosophy and Theology degree, and an option in all other Schools. Numbers by degree were as
follows:
Literae Humaniores
6
Philosophy and Modern Languages
1
Philosophy and Theology
27
Theology & Religion
3
Postgraduate Diploma in Theology
4
Philosophy, Politics & Economics
26
Mathematics and Philosophy (B)
1
Physics and Philosophy (C)
1
Psychology, Philosophy & Linguistics
2
Of the two major cohorts above, PPEists appeared more willing to connect their essays to wider
philosophical reflections from other papers studied, with significant benefits in the depth and
interest of their answers. One of the markers for the other major group remarked that ‘Philosophy
and Theology scripts were noteworthy for displaying no independent, original thought. They all took
the safe route.’
16
Candidates spread their answers across the whole paper, with the exception of question 15, but not
terribly evenly; questions 5, 6a and 8 between them produced over half of all answers. This was
probably good for the comparative assessment of scripts, with only the very rarest candidate doing
none of these, though markers found the blessing a mixed one by the time they got to around the
fiftieth answer to 6a. They may perhaps have yearned for just a little more variety.
1a 1b 2 3
4 5
6a 6b 7a 7b 8
9a 9b 10 11a 11b 12 13 14 15
2
6
3 11 3 31 53 4
8
12 27 15 12 5
11
3
1
4
2
0
Comments on individual questions follow; where numbers of responses were small some indicators
are provided of possible lines which might have been followed.
1a. Is there anything wrong with believing in order that one may understand?
Only two answers. Possible questions to address might have included the possibility of voluntary
belief, and the relation of belief to understanding; note that the question is about belief and
understanding, not whether belief may have some other form of benefit. Anselm might thus be a
natural dialogue partner. The question does not mention ‘religion’ directly, though it occurs in a
philosophy of religion paper and might be held to carry some reasonable expectation of focus on
religious understanding, but a discussion of scientific contexts might also be fruitful by analogy or
contrast.
1b. ‘Atheism, like theism, is a belief not fully supported by evidence. So commitment to atheism, like
commitment to theism, requires a leap of faith.’ Discuss.
Six answers. Better ones spent time thinking about the kind of belief that atheism might be; if a kind
of ‘negative belief’, or of ‘non-belief’, is it right to think of there being the kind of symmetry here
which the question perhaps implies? Could context (e.g. a context in which theistic belief is almost
universal) make a difference?
2. ‘God could not be bound by anything external to Himself.’ Could He? If he could, what might bind
him?
Just three answers. Possible avenues for exploration are likely to include moral and logical
restrictions on God (some candidates here and elsewhere had heard that Descartes had something
to say on this, though I do not recall anyone evidencing real engagement with the Mersenne
correspondence; Lit Hum candidates might well have looked at the Euphythro for Mods). Does God
have to create the best?
3. Leaving the problem of foreknowledge and freedom aside, ought we to favour the claim that God
exists in time, or that he exists outside it?
Quite a popular question (11 answers); the best rather impressive, often concentrating on issues
relating to divine action and knowledge, all noting the restriction (‘Leaving aside…’), some being left
with rather thin content because of it, and little capacity to develop what was left.
4. Classical theism holds that God is impassible, i.e. that nothing outside him causes him to be in any
state. If God is impassible, can he know the state of the universe?
Just three answers. The precise definition of ‘impassible’ given here indicates one possible line of
approach, in which ‘the state of the universe’ refers to something caused by God. This thought
might in turn suggest reflections on what it means to talk of God ‘knowing’. A question where
strong conceptual work will be central to a good answer.
17
5. Could anyone be both omnipotent and morally perfect?
One of the ‘big three’ questions, with 31 answers. The best spent time thinking carefully about both
attributes; most were somewhat weaker on moral perfection. (Some had read Geach on
omnipotence, and had a ready line to hand on this, but seemed not to have extended their reading
to his discussion of power and perfection.) A good answer needs to address at some point with as
much clarity and precision as possible why the question is worth asking, that is, what might motivate
one to ask it; a common focus here was the question ‘can God sin?’, though ‘sin’ was often rather
thinly treated.
6a. How may a theist best handle the evidential problem of evil?
Fifty-three answers, and proof again that evil is a significant attraction for undergraduates (at least
in the context of this paper). As one marker put it, ‘Only two of the 50-odd scripts I read nailed the
evidential character of the argument. Most tried to say that what made the argument evidential
was a focus on the large amount of evil in the world. This is just flat wrong: it’s evidential because
it’s a probabilistic sort of argument, and it could be so if there were only one evil in the world.
Students tended to deploy defences as replies. This is just inappropriate to the argument: defences
establish at best a bare possibility, and no particular degree of probability. Pretty clearly, most
students came prepared only to write on the logical argument, and did their best to deploy their
prepared answers even though they were not suitable to the question.’ As well as indicating the
nature of the question, this also suggests that preparation of a topic should not be too restrictive;
and that tying an obviously ill-suited answer to any question is an ill-judged act of desperation. A
direct answer on a question where the candidate does not have prepared material ready to deploy,
but could think ‘live’ in the examination room, would surely be a better idea.
6b. Evaluate the following argument: ‘If there is a problem of evil, the world is not as it ought to be.
But ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. So it is possible for the world to be as it should be. It being beyond human
power to make it be so, there must be a god.’
Four answers. Some saw the Kantian inspiration here; the most common response laid the focus on
the conclusion, none offering any confidence that human power
would in fact bring about a ‘world
as it ought to be’ (presumably candidates pay attention to the news), but pointing out that it
could be so. None really addressed ‘ought implies can’ as fully as they might, nor discussed the first
premise, and whether there is a particular perspective from which the ‘problem of evil’ arises and
which in some sense might be characteristically religious.
7a. Must anything which is a miracle violate a law of nature?
Eight answers. Resolution by definition of ‘miracle’ would obviously lead to a rather thin answer;
given the centrality of the phrase ‘law of nature’ to many definitions of miracle it was disappointing
to see so little depth of reflection on it. Events of very low probability which lie within the normally
understood parameters of the operation of natural laws would have offered a good first move; note
that the question does not involve anyone actually believing or proving that an event is
in fact (say)
caused by the direct action of a deity.
7b. ‘The difference between issues of testimony in the case of a purported miracle are really no
different in kind to any case of testimony, though admittedly they may be different in degree.’
Evaluate the truth of this claim.
Twelve answers, including strong arguments on both sides; some held that the very nature of a
miracle implied ‘difference in kind’, as would any claim of divine intervention, such as answered
prayer; others held there to be no difference of kind, whilst admitting the ‘difference in degree’
claim. Both sorts of answer often claimed Humean inspiration. Which side was argued to be right
seemed to depend on emphasis taken within the definition of miracle adopted.
18
8. If some form of multiverse hypothesis were true, how would it affect the evidence for or against
God’s existence?
Another popular question, with twenty-seven answers. To quote one marker, ‘Only one or two
students really saw the way multiverses affect the probabilities in the argument.’ Some answers
managed considerable scientific detail on multiverse hypotheses, but then turned the essay into a
preface to a discussion of a form of cosmological argument. For this to have worked it would have
been good at least to see the word ‘evidence’ noted – hence the word ‘probabilities’ in the comment
above.
9a. ‘There cannot – logically cannot – be a being whose non-existence is logically impossible. I
conclude then that we must on philosophical grounds repudiate all talk of God as having necessary
being when the necessity in question is construed as logical necessity.’ (HICK) Is this true? What
bearing would its truth have on ontological arguments for God’s existence?
A question which elicited fifteen answers, the majority not really directed to the quoted sentences.
As a colleague put it, this ‘was supposed to be primarily about the claim that God is a necessary
being, but proved to be an occasion to deploy pre-written answers about ontological arguments’.
So, again (see question 6a), candidates should
beware pre-written answers. And, they should
especially beware pre-written answers when they only address the question asked accidentally.
Elaborate effort is put, in revision classes all over the university, into thinking of ever more novel and
striking ways to present the very simple instruction: ‘answer the question’. What is being looked for
here is a capacity for detailed reflection upon an issue which may have been met under a heading
such as ‘nature of God’, ‘divine attributes’ or ‘ontological argument’, with the expectation (which
seems to have been true) that for most candidates it will have been the last of these. There is plenty
in the quotation to discuss without needing to pad out an answer with material which can be given
no credit. A good answer will be likely to turn to the bearing of the discussion on ontological
arguments only once the question of the truth of Hick’s claim has been properly addressed.
9b. Could everything that there is be contingent?
Twelve answers. A common pitfall, which was quite widespread, was to present a prepared essay on
cosmological arguments, which from the outset did not look like, as surely they were not, answers to
the question asked; good answers settled quickly into the terms of the question (‘everything’ as ‘all’
or as ‘each’; the nature of contingency – few did really good work on the nature of ‘thing’) and then
moved on to reflect on fallacies of composition, asking when ‘composition’ is licit and when not.
This groundwork once covered, answers might then indicate prospects for cosmological arguments
at the end.
10. Could God’s existence be too obvious?
Just five answers, though this is a twist on a topic which has generated significant discussion lately
under the label ‘divine hiddenness’. Schellenberg’s books (1993, 2015) would be a way in to the
topic, though more ‘classical’ theological resources might be drawn on as well.
11a. Is there a defensible form of divine command theory?
Eleven answers. Candidates tended to approach divine command theory as concerning the content
of morality, rather than as a meta-ethic. They tended not to see that one could know the right apart
from knowing it to be the content of God's command or will even if in fact, to be right is to be
divinely commanded. This tended to restrict enthusiasm, in some, for more affirmative answers, or
to keep the possibility of an affirmative answer ‘live’ for very long in their essays.
19
11b. Does theism bring any distinctive advantages in meta-ethics? Do these constitute any kind of
argument for its truth?
Just three answers. Best approached by candidates who had also studied the Ethics paper, including
a sufficient coverage of meta-ethics to sense clearly what difficulties might arise to which theism
might offer answers. They could then spend a significant portion of their essay reflecting on these
matters, before addressing the second part of the question. The wording of the second part (‘any
kind of argument’) is quite precise; they may be
some kind of argument for the truth of theism
without it being convincing in the face of counter-arguments.
12. If scientific experiments show a very strong correlation between a person’s particular genetic
endowment and their possession of religious belief, should that fact interest the philosopher of
religion?
Just a single answer. Perhaps sketch a context within which the thought might connect with existing
debates in philosophy of religion; for example, why, if the genetic endowment enables its possessors
to more reliably generate true beliefs, should it not be more widespread? (Would God not want it to
be?) Might there be some evolutionary advantage in possessing this endowment, or not possessing
it? Should we resist arguments which seek to move from correlation to causation here?
13. What, if anything, could religious experience be evidence for?
Four answers, mainly well-versed in standard literature, particularly Swinburne. Much less strong on
the concept of evidence, where Achinstein’s ‘Oxford Readings in Philosophy’ collection might be
useful.
14. Is monotheism more philosophically defensible than polytheism?
Just two answers. Worth reflecting on what ‘philosophical defensibility’ amounts to; what role does
consistency play, for example, and what grounds could make one more plausible than the other?
(The presence of both good and evil might be explained by a conflict of twin deities, to give one
example.)
15. ‘Any plausible account of the logic of identity-statements renders the doctrine of the Trinity
incoherent.’ Does it?
No answers. This was felt to be a question which theologically-interested candidates might well
have developed views on; those looking for inspiration as to what might be done could look at David
Brown’s
The Divine Trinity, Chapter 7.
108 The Philosophy of Logic and Language
Twenty-nine candidates took the paper. Performance was quite good overall, with six candidates
(approximately 20%) achieving first-class marks.
It was notable that candidates were often tripped up by the more technical aspects of the theories
under consideration. Examples will be given below.
Not all questions were answered and many questions were only answered by small numbers of
candidates. There follow some comments on the more popular questions.
1. (a) Do Tarski's truth definitions provide the basis of a definition of the concept of truth? If not,
what do they achieve?
20
Answers to this question were not particularly impressive. Some candidates were let down through
an inadequate grasp of technical details. Few if any students, for example, seemed to be aware of
the difference between Convention T and the T-schema. And there was little if any attempt to show
what Tarski's definitions might achieve if they do not provide a definition of truth.
2. 'The only solutions to the Liar Paradox that do not lead to further paradox are ad hoc and artificial.
We must therefore learn to live with paradox.' Discuss.
There were some excellent answers to this question, but the paradox was not always carefully set
out.
8. Does Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction show that definite descriptions are ambiguous?
This was a very popular question and attracted some excellent answers. The best answers went
beyond a mere recapitulation of standard points (the theories of Russell, Strawson, Donnellan, and
Kripke) and questioned the effectiveness of Kripke's reply to Donnellan. Some candidates also
brought in more recent literature (Neale on Gödelian completions, Elbourne on Fregean
approaches), which was very nice to see; but they did not always get the details of that literature
correct. Less successful answers spent too long setting out the basics of the theories of Russell and
Strawson; they read to a certain extent like tutorial-style surveys not very well adapted to the
question at hand. Some candidates also made questionable assertions about the basic theories: to
mention a few of them, it is not obvious that Strawson can deal straightforwardly with Donnellan's
referential cases, as the examples involving misdescription arguably show; Donnellan does not
predict that definite descriptions are ambiguous between two different syntactic categories; and it is
not exactly right to say that according to Kripke's theory speakers intend to refer to Jones with
`Smith's murderer', since Kripke has definite descriptions be Russellian and hence non-referential.
9. Could all the Gricean maxims be reduced to the Maxim of Relation?
There were some good answers to this question, although some candidates did not set out the
maxims with sufficient care (especially, for some reason, the Maxim of Manner). Candidates did not
show any awareness of alternatives to Grice's theory, such as Relevance Theory.
10. 'People who say that meanings just ain't in the head have to admit that we have some kind of
mental representation of meanings, in order to explain our psychological competence with language.
So postulating external meanings too is just multiplying entities beyond necessity.' Discuss.
The answers here were very much a mixed bag. Some were excellent; but it was essential to discuss
at least some of the leading externalist theorists (certainly Putnam and preferably Burge) and not
everyone did. One or two candidates made some use of the psychological literature, which was
pleasing to see; but this was not always done successfully. (In particular, typicality effects are not a
good illustration of linguistic competence; they are appealed to by some theorists in order to argue
that word meanings are concepts in the psychologist's sense.)
11. Can any theories of meaning other than truth-conditional ones provide a basis for explaining
compositionality?
The answers to this question were disappointing. Candidates did not always explain successfully
what compositionality is. Some candidates did not talk very much about non-truth-conditional
theories of meaning but concentrated on truth-conditional ones. It should be noted, contrary to
what some candidates said, that Davidson's theory can arguably deal with compositionality pretty
well.
21
13. 'The name "Santa Claus" refers to Santa Claus; but Santa Claus is an abstract object.' Is this a
good way for a Millian to deal with the problem of apparently non-referring names?
This was a popular question and produced many excellent answers which displayed a good
awareness of the options open to the Millian. Some candidates were let down by not discussing
important aspects of the question, such as negative existentials (`Santa Claus does not exist') and the
arguments of people like Salmon who support this position. Not everyone displayed a good
knowledge of what abstract objects are reckoned to be by the relevant theorists, with some
candidates taking slightly out-dated Meinongian positions.
18. 'Dissatisfied with all attempts to say what is wrong with sorites arguments, one may be tempted
by the simple thought that nothing is wrong with them: a typical sorites argument is sound, its
conclusion strange but true.' (WILLIAMSON) Is this a viable strategy?
This was a very popular question and attracted some excellent answers. The more successful
answers answered the question directly and clearly. Less successful answers typically just gave a
survey of options available to solve the sorites problem and did not relate this very directly to the
question at hand. A few candidates assumed that Williamson endorsed the position outlined in the
question, which he most emphatically did not.
109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism
General observations:
Good answers showed evidence of having read more than the bare minimum normally
assigned in tutorials. This is not to say that they necessarily mentioned many readings.
Rather, they showed a deeper appreciation of the problem, which clearly had come from
reading more.
Good answers made intelligent use of real examples of artworks to support their
conclusions.
There was a reluctance to go outside a narrow range of topics. About 75% of answers were
on questions 1–3 and 6–8. No one answered questions 13–16.
Few answered on Kant. This is understandable, given how difficult Kant is. But it is
unfortunate, given how important he is. Kant’s ethics is difficult too, and yet this problem
does not seem to arise on the Ethics exam.
There was a tendency to read philosophers uncharitably. Several candidates only discussed
one weak version or interpretation of a theory, when there was an obviously better version
available.
Several answers made no attempt to consider why someone might hold the view that was
being asked about. This was especially noticeable on questions 1, 3, and 7.
Not enough candidates memorized what needed to be memorized. For instance, many were
vague about what exactly the definitions of art they discussed say. An hour spent
memorizing four or five definitions of art would have tangibly improved many answers.
It is also clear that many candidates did not read last year’s report on this exam. Several problems
that arose this year were identifed in that report. These could have been easily avoided if candidates
had revised with this advice in mind: for example, the points about reading more widely, and about
memorization, were mentioned last year.
22
The most popular questions were the following:
•
‘Plato is right that we do not learn from poetry. But he is wrong that poets lack knowledge of
their subjects.’ Assess these claims.
There was a tendency to read this question as referring to a contrast between Plato’s moral
and epistemological criticisms. The case for reading it this way was not usually convincing. It
seemed to reflect a desire to give a prepared answer that employed this contrast.
Good answers showed a solid understanding of several of Plato’s arguments for these
conclusions, rather than just one or two.
Good answers showed awareness of the different possible readings of the word ‘learn’.
There is a reading of ‘learn’ on which you can only learn truths and things you don’t already
know (so, e.g., you cannot learn that 2 + 2 = 5). Some answers simply dismissed the first half
of the quoted view on the grounds that Plato thinks we learn falsehoods from poetry. This
was rather uncharitable.
Good answers were sensitive to subtleties such as the distinction between knowledge of
their subject and knowledge of other things (e.g., how to write poetry or how to manipulate
people), and the possibility that poets simply manifest or express knowledge that both we
and they already have (and so we do not learn).
•
Does Aristotle identify any important reasons why tragedy matters?
The stronger answers made a serious effort to think about what would count as a reason
why tragedy matters, and also what would count as an important reason why it matters.
Weaker answers made no effort to argue that the reasons why
Aristotle might have thought
tragedy matters really
are reasons why tragedy matters. Similarly, some did not argue that
the reasons that were
important to Aristotle really were important reasons why tragedy
matters.
Several answers made a good distinction between the reasons why tragedy matters that are
also reasons why other forms of poetry matter, and reasons that are distinctive of tragedy.
Some good answers made intelligent reference to other views on tragedy, e.g., Nietzsche’s.
•
‘You can dislike art you judge to be beautiful. You can like art you judge not to be beautiful. This
is so even if you are a true critic. So Hume’s aesthetic theory fails.’ Evaluate this objection.
The stronger answers tended to give examples to explain why a person might think you can
feel this way about works you judge to be beautiful or not beautiful. Weaker answers
tended not to consider why someone would hold the view expressed in the quotation.
Many candidates argued well that you can like some things about a work, and
simultaneously dislike other things about it.
Stronger answers often proceeded to consider the possibility that a true critic might not like
anything about a work they judge to be beautiful. Weaker answers tended not to consider
this possibility.
Weaker answers sometimes ignored the claim, made in the third quoted sentence, that even
a true critic can feel this way about such works.
Good answers showed serious thought about the distinction between liking and judging, and
how these might be related. A few managed to relate this distinction to the ‘sources of
variation’ (age, temperament, culture, etc.) discussed toward the end of Hume’s essay.
23
6. (b)
‘Each new theory of art is an attempt to make sense of new developments in taste. These
developments will never cease. So every theory of art is doomed to obsolescence.’ Discuss.
A surprising number of candidates simply did not know the specifics of the definitions of art
they were discussing. They could have done better if they had memorized them.
There were several good arguments against the idea that each new theory of art is
interested in making sense of developments in taste (e.g., Beardsley’s lack of interest in
accommodating Duchamp).
Several did not adequately understand what an open concept is, or the notion of a family
resemblance concept and how it relates to open concepts, and some arguments against
views grounded in these concepts were consequently rather weak.
7.
‘Some ethical defects are aesthetic defects. But no ethical merits are aesthetic merits.’ Discuss.
There was too little effort to think about why someone might endorse the quoted view. The
stronger answers came up with interesting arguments for this view.
Several were too quick to move from the premise that we need to use our moral
understanding to understand and appreciate art to the conclusion that moral defects are
aesthetic defects.
Here too, it was surprising how vague candidates were about what exactly the theories say.
This was also a problem last year.
o Many candidates did not know the difference between Carroll’s moderate moralism
and Gaut’s ethicism.
o In many answers, it was wrongly said that Eaton thinks no ethical defects are
aesthetic defects. This is mistaken. She says some ethical defects are aesthetic
merits. This does not mean no ethical defects are aesthetic defects.
o Several answers wrongly claimed that the quoted view expresses Carroll’s moderate
moralism. The view is moderate, but it is not Carroll’s.
8.
‘Multiple interpretations of a literary work are legitimate. Anti-intentionalism can account for this
better than intentionalism can. So we should be anti-intentionalists.’ Evaluate this argument.
Intentionalism and anti-intentionalism were often not defined.
Again, several candidates were vague about what the theories say.
It was often asserted without argument that intentionalism cannot allow for multiple
interpretations. There was a similar problem with answers last year. Stronger answers
considered the possibility that an author might intend to be read in more than one way.
There were some very interesting answers that discussed actual interpretations offered by
critics, which went beyond standard examples like psychoanalytic readings of
Hamlet.
There were some good discussions of what it might mean for an interpretation to be
legitimate.
10.
‘The arousal theory is the correct theory of some cases of musical expressiveness. The
resemblance theory is the correct theory of some others. No single factor will explain all cases of
musical expressiveness.’ Is this true?
Some answers uncharitably considered only the weakest, simplest versions of the arousal
theory.
There were some good attempts to distinguish different questions one might have about
expressiveness, e.g., what makes music expressive and why we perceive music as expressive.
These distinctions were employed more skilfully in some cases than in others (e.g.,
24
candidates did not always recognise that an arousal theory and a resemblance theory might
be presented as answers to different questions).
Again candidates were vague about what the theories they discussed say.
110 Medieval Philosophy: Aquinas
Seven candidates sat this paper (3 LHU, 1PPE, 2PTH, 1 MPC). Four candidates answered questions
from both parts of set-texts, i.e., (1) ST Ia, qq. 2-11, 75-89 (God, Metaphysics, and Mind) and (2) ST
Ia IIae, qq. 1-10, 90-97 (Action and Will; Natural Law), two candidates answered questions only from
part (2) and one only from part (1). The performance was overall rather strong.
Most popular questions were Q. 6 (Human soul) and Q. 10 (Happiness), with three answers each.
The remaining questions received one or two answers, with the exceptions of Qq. 5, 8, 9, 14, which
were not attempted. One candidate answered the gobbet question this year. The best candidates
showed a deep engagement with the primary texts. All candidates should be encouraged, however,
to read and take into account wider portions of the set texts.
Some comments on the two most popular questions:
Q. 6
How defensible is Aquinas’ view that the human soul is a subsisting form but not a separate
substance? There were a variety of issues that the candidates focused on in dealing with this question, some of
them leading to very original and insightful discussions (for example, about the individuation of the
human soul). It is regrettable, however, that no candidates engaged with Aquinas’ critique of
Averroes’s view about the separation of the intellect (ST I, q. 76, a. 1).
Q. 10
Is Aquinas’ account of the happiness available in this life more convincing than Aristotle’s? While all candidates had a good grasp on the differences between Aquinas’ and Aristotle’s accounts,
not all of them displayed the first-hand knowledge of Aristotle’s view required for a very good
answer to this kind of question.
112 The Philosophy of Kant
Twelve candidates sat this paper. The overall standard was extremely high; all but one of the
candidates achieved a mark of 67 or above; and five of those candidates achieved first-class marks.
The most popular question by far was question 2, with eleven answers. (‘‘The metaphysical and
transcendental expositions tell us something about our representation of space and time. They tell
us nothing about
space and
time themselves.’ Discuss.) The second most popular question was 11b,
with six answers. (Can we know anything about things in themselves? Why does Kant think there are
such things?). These were followed by question 6, with four answers (‘Some series of perceptual
events are reversible. Some are not.’ Does this claim play any role in establishing that every event
has a cause?); question 4, with three answers (‘Thus we ourselves bring into the appearances that
order and regularity in them that we call
nature’ (A125). Does this claim help establish the objective
validity of the categories? If so, how? If not, why not?); question 7, with three answers (Does Kant
refute scepticism?); and question 8, with two answers (In what sense, if any, would Kant accept the
inference
cogito ergo sum?). All other questions received one answer, with the exception of
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question 9b which was the only question not attempted (Explain and assess Kant’s account of
transcendental illusion with reference to either rational psychology, rational cosmology, or rational
theology.)
Some specific comments on the most popular questions:
2. ‘The metaphysical and transcendental expositions tell us something about our representation of
space and time. They tell us nothing about space and time themselves.’ Discuss.
The best answers were able to provide detailed explanations of the metaphysical and transcendental
expositions. Some candidates understood the arguments of the expositions only in very general
terms; the better candidates had a detailed grasp on the arguments and were able to reflect on the
differences between the metaphysical and transcendental expositions. Many candidates used the
essay as an opportunity to discuss the ‘neglected alternative’. The very best of these were sensitive
to the distinction between claims about the representation of space and time and claims about
space and time themselves.
11b. Can we know anything about things in themselves? Why does Kant think there are such things?
There were a number of different ways in which candidates answered this question, many of which
were very good. (This is a useful reminder for candidates that there is often more than one way of
writing a good answer to a question.) Some issues which came up in the best answers: how should
we formulate the claim of Kantian humility? Are there different types of knowledge which need to
be distinguished when thinking about things in themselves? Is there a tension or contradiction
between the claim that there are things in themselves and that we do not know anything about
them? What are the individuation conditions for things in themselves, and how does that relate to
the nature of transcendental idealism? The best answers clearly set out the doctrine of humility, the
reasons for endorsing it, and its connection with transcendental idealism.
6. ‘Some series of perceptual events are reversible. Some are not.’ Does this claim play any role in
establishing that every event has a cause?
Many candidates had a good grasp on the structure of the Second Analogy, and used this to good
effect in answering the question. A number of candidates discussed Strawson’s objection that Kant’s
argument involves a non-sequitur. Some candidates structured their essay by presenting the
argument of the Second Analogy, and then determining what role, if any, the quoted claim played in
that argument. This was usually an effective way of presenting the material. The best answers
showed a detailed knowledge of the structure of the argument in the text.
4. ‘Thus we ourselves bring into the appearances that order and regularity in them that we call
nature’ (A125). Does this claim help establish the objective validity of the categories? If so, how? If
not, why not?
Good answers to this question explained what was meant by the objective validity of the categories,
and gave an account of how Kant aimed to establish the objective validity of the categories in the
first
Critique, with focus on the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Some answers focused
on very general issues to do with the Copernican revolution; this was usually less effective than
those answer which had a good grasp on the detail and structure of the Transcendental Deduction.
Some commented on the relation between the A and B editions of the Deduction; this was a helpful
point to bring in.
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7. Does Kant refute scepticism?
The best candidates were able to distinguish different forms of scepticism – for example, Cartesian
scepticism vs. Humean scepticism – and were attentive to the different places where each form of
scepticism is addressed. Many candidates focused on the arguments against Cartesian scepticism in
the Refutation of Idealism; the best of these set out the argument clearly, and raised various
objections. Some answers weren’t clear about the target of the Refutation, nor about the
differences between the target of the Refutation and the target of the Deduction; this led to unclear
essays.
113 Post-Kantian Philosophy
We regret to say that the assessors for this paper have been unable to provide a report.
114 Theory of Politics
Overall candidates showed a good knowledge and understanding of political concepts. Answers
were highly concentrated on particular questions, however, with some important topics receiving
little or no attention. Also, a theme merging from the comments on specific questions below is that
candidates were sometimes too narrow in their approaches to certain concepts or arguments.
1. If the state did not exist, would we have a moral obligation to invent it?
This was quite a popular question. Better answers were able to relate ideas and arguments from the
literature on political obligation in a focused way to the specific question.
2. Can there be liberty outside the rule of law?
This question was less popular than questions on liberty have tended to be in recent years.
This is somewhat surprising since the relationship of law to liberty connects with some
central debates such as the debate between proponents of negative and positive liberty and,
in particular, between liberty as ‘non-interference’ and liberty as ‘non-domination’. Those
who answered the question made the connections but that relatively few attempted it
suggests that many candidates may not have seen them.
3. Do representative legislatures express or compromise the ideal of democracy?
This was a popular question which was generally well answered. Some of the better answers
noted that ‘representation’ can take the form of representation by lot (sortition) not only
representation by election.
4. ‘The equality that matters fundamentally is our equality as citizens.’ Discuss.
This was a popular question. Better answers were able to draw on the literature on
relational (and luck) egalitarianism in a selective way, answering the question while avoiding
an unfocused literature review. Some answers also considered whether the category of
‘citizen’ might itself be criticisable on relational egalitarian grounds.
27
5. Do we have persuasive reasons to regard the distribution of income and wealth produced by market
forces as just?
This was a popular question. Many answers focused on Nozick’s entitlement theory and the
quality of these answers depended on the depth of understanding of this theory. However,
many answers did not consider other putative justifications for market-based distribution
such as provided by desert theory or arguments from the incentive effects of allowing
inequality in market-derived incomes.
6. What distinguishes a ‘right’ from some other value or claim that is important but not a ‘right’?
There were too few answers to comment on.
7. Has the term ‘liberalism’ become too elastic to tell us very much about someone’s political beliefs?
There were not many answers to this question. Answers showed reasonable knowledge and
understanding of liberalism but sometimes presented somewhat narrow constructions of
liberalism, e.g., focusing only on Rawlsian/post-Rawlsian formulations.
8. How, if at all, does feminism affect our understanding of what politics is?
This was a popular question. Answers tended to show good or very good knowledge and
understanding of how feminist thought reconceives the site of politics. Perhaps answers
could have given more attention to whether/how feminist thought might also have
implications for the doing of politics.
9. Is socialism’s major flaw that it puts too much faith in our capacity to plan the good society?
There were too few answers to comment on.
10. EITHER: Must conservatives be nationalists?
There were some thoughtful answers, but answers tended to rely too much on accounts of
conservatism in the secondary literature and did not show enough direct knowledge of
primary texts. More knowledge and understanding of primary texts may have enabled
candidates to direct their answers more confidently to the idea of ‘nationalists’.
10. OR: Should we be ‘citizens of the world’?
This was a popular question. Most answers connected the question to the literatures on
global justice and/or global democracy and showed a good or very good knowledge and
understanding of this literature in ways that addressed the question. Answers sometimes
also included thoughtful reflection on the notion of the ‘citizen’.
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11. ‘Power is at its most effective when it is hardest to observe.’ Discuss.
There were not many answers but these tended to be well-informed and focused on the
specific question.
12. Is utopianism necessarily undesirable in a political theory?
Although not a popular question there were some original and outstanding answers.
Department of Politics and International Relations
115 / 130 Plato, Republic
On the whole, the standard of the scripts was good, and in some cases extremely high, both from
the point of view of the knowledge of the text and the central arguments of the
Republic and in
terms of the quality of philosophical engagement with Plato’s ideas.
As usual, some of the best scripts also showcased the candidate’s capacity for writing well-
structured answers which were at the same time appropriately focused upon, and relevant to, the
specific essay question (or passage for commentary), while drawing pertinent and insightful
connections with other parts/themes of the
Republic (and, at times, of the Platonic corpus more
widely). One of the examiners especially commended the quality of a number of answers to the
essays on knowledge and true belief (question 5) and on women rulers (question 4).
The best scripts were also clearly informed by the debates in the scholarly literature, and engaged
independently with some of their key arguments and assumptions, while avoiding the temptation of
merely summarising the standard moves in the scholarly debate and ‘naming names’ (X said that
p; Y
replied that
q; another view is Z’s…).
There were quite a few cases in which candidates failed to focus on the precise issue raised,
although they did show some sound general knowledge of the topic in question (cf. especially
questions 1, 2, 9, and 11). As always, the examiners emphasised how crucial it is to make one’s
answers closely relevant to the question actually asked.
As usual, the majority of candidates seemed more confident with questions which could be
answered (at least apparently) by focusing uniquely on a well-defined section or argument of the
Republic; those (fewer) candidates who engaged with wider-ranging questions, like questions 6 and
8, typically showed a commendable capacity for thinking imaginatively on their feet. In general,
candidates should not shy away from such questions, and should be encouraged to engage with this
kind of questions in tutorials and revision sessions.
Some comments on specific questions
1. Many candidates displayed good knowledge of book I, but not all of them engaged precisely with
the question, and some ended up offering competent, but not fully relevant, summaries of the main
arguments, especially the exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus. Some of the better
answers explained
Socrates’ own misgivings at the end of book I, and what they might tell us about
the underlying reasons for the difference in method between book I and the following books.
29
2. Several candidates focused on the issue of whether Plato’s Kallipolis is a totalitarian state, without
explaining clearly how this relates with the question asked. Some focused too narrowly on the
happiness of the philosopher rulers as individuals, and the problems surrounding their return to the
cave.
3. The better answers explained in detail
why one might think that the state-soul analogy commits
Socrates to treating the parts of the soul as being like persons, and analysed (and in some cases
challenged) these reasons. Weaker answers just consisted of a general exposition of the state-soul
analogy, or a general discussion of whether in fact Socrates treats the parts of the soul as being like
persons, without examining the underlying philosophical reasons.
4. Several thought-provoking answers. The weaker ones worked with a crude (or completely
unspecified) concept of ‘feminism’.
5. The less successful essays provided competent accounts of the ‘Two World Theory’ (and possible
alternative interpretations), but failed to identify why one might think that the theory would
undermine Socrates’ proposal that philosophers would be the best rulers.
7. Only the best candidates tackled both aspects of the question, and therefore managed to clarify
the reasons why it is difficult to map the cave onto the line, engaged with the difficulty, and
explained why this engagement is philosophically rewarding. Most candidates focused on the
problematic relationship between
eikasia and
pistis, but failed to problematize the role of
dianoia (and its objects) in relation to
noesis. Some candidates were not sufficiently precise, both
conceptually and terminologically, in their account of the distinction of the four cognitive stages.
9. Some candidates did not show enough appreciation of why it might be philosophically
problematic to say that the producers in the ideal state,
as individuals, are appetitive and the
auxiliaries,
as individuals, spirited.
10. In a number of cases the question was not answered satisfactorily, and the scripts showed an
important gap in the knowledge of book IX. In particular, a number of candidates did not realise, or
failed to clarify, that there are two arguments at the end of book IX explicitly about justice and
pleasure. Instead they talked about the defence of justice as psychic health conducted at the end of
book IV.
11. Some candidates did not focus enough on the way in which imitative poetry is compared to
optical illusions, and why (and what is surprising or thought-provoking in Socrates’ comparison), but
instead gave a general evaluation of Plato’s arguments on imitative poetry, or talked about the
comparison between painting in general and poetry.
12a. The passage generally prompted good commentaries, carefully reconstructing the logic of the
argument in its context, but a number of candidates misidentified the context of the argument as
part of the refutation of
Thrasymachus.
12b. Very few candidates commented on the theme of persuasion, and how the rulers could ever be
persuaded by their ‘noble lie’. Several candidates connected the passage with Plato’s criticism of
imitative poetry in the
Republic, but failed to explain where the connection was supposed to lie
exactly. Some references to other passages in which the theme of lying, and its possible utility, are
problematised in the
Republic would have been welcome.
12c. The best answers examined important details in the passage, including in what sense the
spirited part is a natural helper of reason, in spite of being distinct from reason. Less successful
30
answers just discussed the parts of the soul, or more specifically spirit, without engaging with the
details of this passage, and in particular without explaining what Socrates’ arguments for
distinguishing the spirited part from
both reason and appetite are (only very few candidates were
both exhaustive and precise in their description of these arguments).
12d. Weaker answers commented upon the passage as a general remark about education, without
recognising its essential context (the cave). The best answers managed to explain what Socrates
might mean by ‘turning the whole body’, ‘the brightest thing’, and what the significance is of the
claim that the power to learn is in everyone’s soul, with reference to the theory of recollection in
other Platonic dialogues. Some also raised the question how the passage can be reconciled with the
division of human beings in ‘natural classes’ earlier in the
Republic.
12e. The best answers managed to explain exactly what distinction between kinds of desires is
introduced here, and why (in order to characterise the tyrannical man). However, the majority of
candidates who attempted the commentary of the passage taken from the beginning of book IX
failed to specify the context adequately. They talked about the decline of the soul in very general
terms, but failed to mention the category of lawless desire, to which the passage is an introduction.
12f. Most candidates were able to give a general account of the myth of Er, but only the best
answers commented on the important features of this passage in particular, for example, on the fact
that the soul that picks the tyrannical life is a soul whose previous life was a life of virtue without
philosophy, and on what this tells us about the value of philosophy, and about the function of the
myth of Er at the end of the dialogue.
116 / 131 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
The examiners suggest a change to 116. The proposal is that candidates be asked to write 2 essays
(rather than the current 3) and comment on 4 passages (rather than the current 3). This would have
two advantages. By giving candidates a bit longer to write their essays, it would allow them to write
deeper and more adventurous answers to the essay questions. By adding another passage for
comment, it would encourage candidates to focus more carefully on reading the text.
(Some comments on the more popular questions are provided below. The numerals refer to the
question number in 116, with the 132 number in brackets.)
1 (2) If I have a choice between a life of study and a life of political virtue, would Aristotle advise me
to go for the former? Is his position based on plausible arguments? Many candidates discussed whether Aristotle’s remarks about the value of contemplation in book X
undermines his focus on the ethical virtues in the rest of the Nicomachean Ethics. Some of the better
answers focussed in particular on the relative values of the
political and contemplative life, and
considered whether there were any circumstances in which Aristotle might recommend someone to
pursue the former over the latter. A few of the more sophisticated answers also discussed what
exactly is meant by ‘a life of X’, e.g. what is the role of study/politics in a life of study/politics?
3 (4) How can virtue be in a mean, if as far as the best and the good are concerned it is in an
extremity? Many candidates were able to produce reasonable discussions of Aristotle’s account of the mean.
For instance, many candidates were able to explain that being in a mean doesn’t imply always
choosing the option that is mid-way between two extremes. Disappointingly few candidates really
focussed on the question asked, which was about how these remarks about virtue’s being in a mean
31
can be compatible with the sense in which virtue is an extremity. Some of the better candidates
connected the idea of virtue’s being in an extremity with the difficulty of being virtuous, and hence
with the idea that being virtuous is a great achievement.
5 (6) How can I be ‘in some way’ responsible for my character? Either I’m responsible for it, or I’m
not.’ Discuss whether this is a good objection to Aristotle. This question was generally well answered. Candidates showed good knowledge of the relevant
arguments in III.5. To achieve really high marks, candidates also needed to evaluate the plausibility
of the idea that I can be ‘in some way’ responsible for my character, rather than simply describing
Aristotle’s view.
7.(8) How philosophically useful is Aristotle’s distinction between natural and legal justice?
Those who answered this question had a good knowledge of Aristotle’s remarks about justice, but
several candidates mistook the distinction between natural and legal justice for the distinction
between special and general justice. Also, the question calls for some evaluation of the usefulness of
Aristotle’s distinction. Most candidates tended to focus much more on describing Aristotle’s views
than on evaluating them.
8 (9) If I have been habituated into possessing all the virtues of character, why do I need prudence?
This was a popular question. Many candidates explained that Aristotle thinks one needs prudence in
order to have the virtues of character. Several candidates explained that prudence enables one to
identify the virtuous action to do in a particular situation. Better candidates also noted that one only
acts virtuously if one decides on the action and acts from knowledge, so that one needs to make the
decision to act for oneself (rather than simply being guided by another) in order to count as acting
virtuously. Some answers were marred by a rather crude understanding of habituation. For instance,
several candidates simply assumed without argument that habituation cannot itself be a reason-
involving process.
9 (10) Evaluate the extent to which Aristotle’s idea that we can speak of knowledge in different
senses helps in explaining incontinence.
This was another popular question. Most candidates knew the distinction between having and using
knowledge. Many candidates also explained the relevance of the distinction between the particular
and the universal premise. The best answers showed some awareness of alternative possible
interpretations, and took care to evaluate the use Aristotle makes of this distinction between
different kinds of knowledge, rather than simply describe it. It was disappointing that very few
candidates queried whether distinguishing between having and using knowledge (or between
knowing a universal and knowing a particular) amounts to ‘speaking of knowledge in different
senses’.
10 (11) How would Aristotle persuade someone contentedly living alone that they should try to make
some friends? Discuss whether his arguments would be plausible?
Many candidates pointed out that Aristotle regards friends as an external good. The best candidates
knew (and were able to evaluate) the detailed arguments in NE IX about the importance of friends
for happiness.
11 (12) Explain what exactly is wrong with hedonism, according to Aristotle, and evaluate his view. While there were some good answers to this question, some candidates didn’t show any knowledge
of Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure in books VII and X, and hence took the question to be simply
about why Aristotle thinks we shouldn’t lead a life of bodily pleasure.
32
Commentaries
13a (1) (Passage from I.2) Many candidates suggested there is a tension between Aristotle’s
advocacy of the life of contemplation and his remarks here about the value of promoting the good of
the city. Several good answers also discussed the relevance of this passage for questions about
whether Aristotle is advocating a kind of egoism.
13b (1) (Passage from III.2) The best candidates were able to explain the connection of decision with
deliberation. Some good answers also raised questions about how actions done on the spur of the
moment can still be virtuous if they are not decided upon. Several candidates discussed the role of
decision in responsibility.
13c (1) (Passage from IV.9). Candidates made some good remarks about shame, but several of the
weaker candidates did not say enough to explain the central point that shame is a feeling but a
virtue is a state not a feeling.
13d (1) (Passage from VII.12) The better candidates recognised that this is a response to Plato, and
also commented on the possible tension between this account and that given in book X. Many
candidates were able to explain the idea that pleasure is not a becoming. A really good answer
should not just explain this but also spell out why establishing this is important for Aristotle.
13f (1) (Passage from X.9) Good answers discussed whether this is compatible with Aristotle’s
remark that young people should not do philosophy. Many candidates commented on the fact that
we need to be habituated in the right way if we are to be persuaded by arguments encouraging us to
be fine. Some candidates were held back by not being aware of the context of this passage (in a
discussion of the role of law).
118 The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein
28 candidates sat the later Philosophy of Wittgenstein paper in 2017. Numbers by degree were as
follows:
Literae Humaniores
1
Philosophy and Modern Languages
1
Philosophy and Theology
3
Philosophy, Politics & Economics
16
Computer Sciences and Philosophy (B)
1
Mathematics and Philosophy (B)
1
Mathematics and Philosophy (C)
1
Physics and Philosophy (C)
3
Psychology, Philosophy & Linguistics
1
Those taking Part C of Mathematics & Philosophy and Physics & Philosophy also submitted an
extended essay as an element of their assessment.
33
Numbers of answers by question were as follows:
Question
1
2
3
4a
4b
5a
5b
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Answers
12 2
2
8
12
10
7
2
1
6
5
5
2
7
1
2
On the whole the paper was well done, with 5 candidates earning an overall mark of 70 or above
and only one below 60.
The most popular questions were question 1, which attracted 12 answers (‘Does Wittgenstein’s
critique of Augustine’s conception of language give us any reason to reject the view that the
meaning of a sentence is a function of the meanings of its parts?’), question 4b, which also attracted
12 answers (‘What is the relation between using the ‘+’ sign to mean
addition and being disposed to
give the answer ‘1002’ in response to the question, ‘What is 1000 + 2?’), and question 5a, which
attracted 10 answers (‘“Far from advocating a semantic or epistemological theory that provides the
basis for a proof that a private language is impossible, [Wittgenstein] aims to get us to see that we
cannot find words that will do justice to the idea; that it falls apart on closer examination.” (STERN)
Should one agree with this assessment of the private language sections of
Philosophical
Investigations?’).
Every question received at least one answer, although 2 received only one answer (question 7: ‘“In
the use of words one might distinguish “surface grammar” from “depth grammar”.”
(WITTGENSTEIN) What distinction is he making, and what is the point of making it?’, and question
13: ‘Explain and assess Wittgenstein’s view of the connection between the concepts of seeing an
aspect and of experiencing the meaning of a word’), and 5 only two (question 2: ‘“Whether and how
a proposition can be verified is only a special form of the question “How do you mean?””
(WITTGENSTEIN) Why does Wittgenstein say this? Is he right?’; question 3: ‘“The agreement, the
harmony, between thought and reality consists in this: that if I say falsely that something is
red, then
all the same, it is
red that it isn’t. And in this: that if I want to explain the word “red” to someone, in
the sentence “That is not red”, I should do so by pointing to something that
is red.” (WITTGENSTEIN)
Discuss.’; question 6: ‘“The point of the analogy which Wittgenstein draws between games and
families is made far better by the analogy he draws between games and ropes.” Discuss.’; question
11: ‘“Pity, one may say, is one form of being convinced that someone else is in pain.”
(WITTGENSTEIN) How, if at all, does this observation contribute to resolving philosophical problems
about other minds?’; and question 14: ‘“If e.g. someone says “I don’t know if there’s a hand here” he
might be told “Look closer.” – This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game.”
(WITTGENSTEIN) Discuss.’). The paucity of answers to questions on aspect-seeing, family
resemblance, and ‘the problem of other minds’ was something of a surprise.
The best scripts (this should hardly need saying) showed a combination of thorough acquaintance
with the primary texts, analytic skills, and active engagement with the issues; good answers
sometimes challenged Wittgenstein and the very best responded to such challenges on
Wittgenstein’s behalf. Even so, very few noted (much less drew consequences from) the fact that
Wittgenstein precedes his suggestion that ‘words are connected with the primitive, the natural,
expressions of the sensation’ with ‘Here is one possibility’, of direct relevance to question 5b (‘What
answer does Wittgenstein suggest to the question “How do words
refer to sensations?”? Is it a good
answer?’, which received 7 answers); one would like also to have seen more sensitivity to
Wittgenstein’s use of quotation-marks, e.g. in question 7 and in question 10 (‘“‘Inner processes’
stand in need of outward criteria.” (WITTGENSTEIN) Discuss.’, which attracted 5 answers). There was
a reasonable range of secondary material drawn upon, although many seemed to be drawing on
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much the same range of material, e.g., only one student mentioned Travis (in their response to
question 1) and many answers to question 12 (‘“For [Wittgenstein] the logical necessity of any
statement is always the
direct expression of a linguistic convention. That a given statement is
necessary consists always in our having expressly decided to treat that very statement as
unassailable.” (DUMMETT) Discuss.’, which attracted 7 answers) slightly formulaically churned
through Stroud and Canfield.
120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics
Q1.
Are Newton's first two laws jointly just a definition of force?
3 answers, all competent. Candidates took this question in different ways. An excellent answer
might discuss the role of the third law in identifying inertial frames (no candidate did this); in general
candidates tended to take for granted the spacetime structure required to make sense of
accelerations.
Q2(a).
In relation to the insights of ether theorists like Lorentz and Poincaré, what was new in
Einstein's treatment of length contraction and time dilation?
No answers.
Q2(b).
Is there a length contraction analogue of the twins paradox?
1 answer.
Q3.
Offer a derivation of the Lorentz transformations showing the precise role of the relativity
principle and Einstein's light postulate. 7 answers. This was the most popular answer, and was handled well — in a few instances
excellently so. An excellent answer to this question might consider the Ignatowski transformations,
which clarifies the role of the RP (plus reciprocity and isotropy) without the LP; and also the problem
of establishing a synchrony convention for distant clocks. Some candidates seemed to confuse
Einstein’s light postulate in 1905, which constrains the one-way speed of light (and so assumes a
synchrony convention) to be
c in all frames, with a weaker version, which concerns only the two-way
speed and requires only that it be independent of the speed of the source.
Q4.
Einstein’s understanding of the possibility of the relativity of simultaneity was based on his
conviction that, relative to a single inertial frame, simultaneity is conventional. Was he right? 4 answers, generally well done. Candidates tended to answer a slightly more standard question on
the conventionality of simultaneity, not much addressing the specifics of the question. An excellent
answer might be expected to consider Malament’s account in particular, according to whom epsilon
= 1/2 is
not merely a convenient convention, but rather the uniquely correct synchrony.
Q5.
Do rods and clocks contract and dilate, respectively, because spacetime is Minkowskian, or is the
geometry of spacetime what it is because of such relativistic kinematics? No answers.
Part B
Q6.
State the conditions that a stochastic hidden variable theory has to satisfy to entail a Bell
inequality and comment on their connection with the locality principle.
6 answers, generally handled quite well. One might expect an excellent answer to distinguish
between outcome and parameter (aka act-outcome) independence, use them to derive
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factorisability, and to discuss whether their respective failures pose an equal threat to locality.
Candidates tended to do some but not all of these. One would also expect a mention of the “no
conspiracy” assumption.
Q7(a).
Does the de Broglie-Bohm theory solve the measurement problem? 6 answers, with some spread in quality. Some candidates did not answer the specific question, so
much as offer a standard essay on de Broglie-Bohm’s strengths and weaknesses; one might hope
some discussion of what the measurement problem is and what would count as a satisfactory
solution to it. Some impressive answers considered the role of decoherence in “effective collapse”.
Often candidates neglected to offer possible replies to objections levelled against de Broglie-Bohm.
Q7(b).
How does the de Broglie-Bohm theory escape the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph no-go result?
No answers. It is worth noting that this topic may be too recent and advanced to expect all
candidates to have been taught this topic in tutorials.
Q8.
Carefully state the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument. Should it (i) depend on the collapse of the
wavefunction in measurements, and (ii) appeal to incompatible observables associated with each of
the entangled systems? 5 answers, with a large spread in quality. (i) invites candidates to consider EPR scenarios in no-
collapse theories (such as Everett or de Broglie-Bohm); some candidates did this, with varying
degrees of depth. Also, more impressive responses took (ii) as an invitation to distinguish between
the actual EPR argument and a shorter, “single-basis” version, which (for example) observes that for
the EPR-B spin singlet, locality and completeness would seem jointly to demand that p(2down | 1up)
= p(2down), whereas QM predicts that p(2down) = 1/2 and p(2down | 1up) = 1. Some answers
contained spurious formalism and muddle-headedness.
Q9.
Why is appeal to decoherence important in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics?
6 answers, all at least competent. Surprisingly, some candidates did not offer a discussion of the
“probability problems” facing Everett (some did not even mention probability), tending to focus on
the preferred basis problem. More impressive answers considered probability, and even made use
of density operators to illustrate decoherence. Weaker answers offered only a superficial discussion
of the preferred basis problem — one might hope, for example, for some discussion of the fact that
decoherence offers only an approximate diagonalisation of reduced states.
Q10.
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the GRW model of dynamical collapse of the
wavefunction? 1 answer.
122 Philosophy of Mathematics
We regret to say that the assessors for this paper have been unable to provide a report.
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124 Philosophy of Science
All save Qu.3b and Qu.15 found at least one taker, but three were very popular, each with answers
from half or more of the cohort: Qu.7, 10, and 13, on historicism (normative vs descriptive),
constructive empiricism, and structuralism respectively. Qu.2 and Qu.6 both six takers; of these Qu.2
was poorly answered, with a highest mark of 64, but Qu.6 found three strong first-class marks.
Qu.3a, Qu.5 and Qu.12 each had three takers. Answers were mixed; disappointingly, given the
connections with philosophy of physics, Qu.5, “ Can objective probabilities be identified with relative
frequencies? If not, what are they?”, found only one 1st class answer.
Qu.7, “ Is Kuhn’s account of science purely descriptive, or does it have a normative dimension?”
invited comment on Kuhn’s words on the topic in the ‘Postscipt’ to the Structure), but alas was not
much in evidence, with only one of twelve answers addressing what Kuhn actually said; but several
took the opportunity to explore wider aspects to the question: there were six 1st-class marks, three
of them strong.
Qu.10 found fifteen takers`. It read: “’Even in endorsing a simple perceptual judgement, and
certainly in accepting any theory is empirically adequate, I am sticking my neck out. There is no
argument there for belief in the truth of the accepted theories, since it is not epistemological
principle that one might as well hang for a sheep is for a lamb)’ (Van Fraassen) Discuss.” Of these
four were firsts, one of them exceptional; the rest were mostly in the middle ‘60s with no 2(2)s.
Qu.13, “‘The move from scientific realism to structural realism is just an ad hoc way of dealing with
the history of past failures.’ Discuss” likewise found fifteen takers, six 1st-class, four of them strong.
The rest, with one exception, were strong 2(1)s.
Unusually, the most popular questions were the best done; exempting 6, 7, 10 and 13, only Qu.1a,
Qu.5 and Qu.12 found first-class answers, just one of each.
Only two out of twenty-six candidates obtained a strong 1st-class overall (in PPL and classics)
Another seven were in the range 70-72 (4 in PP); there were two lower-seconds (in PT and PP); the
remainder were evenly distributed in the 60s.
125 Philosophy of Cognitive Science
The finalists who attempted this paper generally did well or very well. Overall results suggest that a
background in psychology is in no way necessary to do well in this paper. The majority of responses
came from the following questions:
(1a) How do Marr’s levels relate to each other ?
10 responses, roughly 68 average.
Weaker responses did not properly define explain and illustrate Marr’s levels, marring the discussion
of how levels relate.
37
(4) How strong is the case for a multi-factor account of Capgras delusion?
10 responses, roughly 67 average.
Weaker responses, as in previous years, didn’t consider more than one reason why single-factor
models are problematic and did not offer any attempt at presenting single-factor models as anything
but a straw-man.
(2) What is the language of thought hypothesis and does it entail that thought has all the
properties of a language like English?
7 responses, roughly 68 average.
Good responses clearly explained notions of structured representations and compositional
assignment of content.
(5a) ‘In making sense of other minds, simulation theory and theory theory really come to the
same thing.’
7 responses, roughly 67 average.
(7) How good is the case for innate aspects of cognition?
7 responses, roughly 67 average.
(3a) What advantages, if any, do symbolic accounts of mental representation have in
explaining
productivity and systematicity?
As in previous years, weak responses failed to notice that productivity cannot be involved in an
empirical claim in quite the same way as systematicity. Moreover, there was a challenge to describe
those phenomena in ways that do not presuppose a particular account of cognitive architecture (it is
possible). Finally, the difference between exhibiting and explaining a phenomenon presented a
challenge.
Other questions drew less than five responses each, with 1b, 9, 11b-13, 14b-16 drawing no
responses.
127 Philosophical Logic
Twenty six candidates sat the paper this year, compared with thirty last year. The distribution of
candidates across the Final Honour Schools was as follows:
Literae Humaniores
2 students
Philosophy, Politics and Economics
13 students
Philosophy, Psychology, and Linguistics
3 students
Computer Science and Philosophy*
3 students
Physics and Philosophy*
2 students
Mathematics and Philosophy*
2 students
Mathematics
1 student
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The students in the schools marked with asterisks take a more advanced logic paper at Prelims level
(Elements of Deductive Logic). For purposes of comparison, these students, together with the
Mathematics student, are labelled “EDL students”, while the others are labelled “non-EDL students”.
Out of the twenty six scripts, marks were distributed across the two groups as follows:
EDL students
Non-EDL
All students
Class I
2
4
6
II.1
4
11
15
II.2
2
3
5
The examination paper had six questions. Question 6 was an essay question. The others mixed logic
exercises with philosophical assessment, with 30-40% of the marks awarded for the latter. As in
previous years, all students were able to set out informal mathematical proofs, and essay
components were generally less well done than logic components. All students attempted three
questions, though there were indications that a small number of students found themselves running
out of time.
Comments on individual questions Question 1 (many-valued logic). This was the most popular question, attracting 21 answers. The
attempts at parts (a) and (b) were on the whole better than the attempts at part (c). Less successful
attempts at part (c) did little more than review the results of parts (a), and some of the more
successful attempts discussed supervaluationism.
Question 2 (second-order predicate logic). This question attracted only 1, excellent answer.
Question 3 (two-dimensional modal logic). This question attracted 10, generally good answers.
Attempts at parts (a) and (b) were generally good, though some students failed to state the
definitions in part (a) correctly, and though all at least attempted the inductive proof required in
part (b), some failed to cover all the necessary cases. Part (c) was less well done, on the whole, most
students resting content with setting out the logic; better attempts discussed Evans’s
deep/superficial necessity distinction.
Question 4 (counterfactuals). This was another popular question, attracting 20 answers. While most
attempts were to a reasonable standard, few were first class. The argument that students were
asked to formalise in part (b) contained a premise with a disjunctive antecdent. Only a very small
number of students spotted the significance of this in formalising the argument, and only one
discussed the significance of this in assessing the merits of a strict conditionals approach in part (c).
Question 5 (modal propositional logic). There were 16 attempts at this question, most to a good
standard. Some students struggled to complete later parts of part (b), and not every student was
sensitive to the complications in the inductive proof of part (b.ii). Attempts at part (c) were less
successful, on the whole, than attempts at parts (a) and (b), with only a few students drawing any
connection to the results just established.
Question 6 (quantified modal logic). There were 10 attempts at this essay question, generally of a
high II.1 standard. The best of these offered a sophisticated and detailed discussion of the debate
between Williamson and Hayaki, discussing, among other things, Kit Fine’s distinction between
essential and necessary properties.
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