Consumer complaints handling and ADR
CAA policy statement and notice of approval
criteria for applicant ADR bodies
CAP 1286
Published by the Civil Aviation Authority, 2015
Civil Aviation Authority, CAA House, 45-59 Kingsway, London WC2B 6TE
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CAP 1286
Contents
Contents
Contents
3
Foreword
4
Introduction
6
What is this document?
6
Who is this document for?
7
Scope of our policy
8
Which consumer complaints are covered by our policy?
8
Which businesses are covered by our policy?
9
Which businesses are the focus of our policy?
10
What is the geographical scope of our policy?
10
Part one – Our approach
12
Our objectives
12
The need for change
13
The problem with current arrangements
13
Could PACT be turned into an approved ADR entity?
13
Could PACT continue its service without being an approved ADR entity?
14
The type of ADR we want to see
15
A high level of consumer protection
15
Minimum requirements under the ADR Directive
15
Additional CAA requirements for approval
16
How the CAA will enable change
20
Ending the PACT service
20
Maximising participation in ADR
23
A simple ADR landscape
26
Part two – Approval criteria for applicant ADR entities
28
Core requirements
28
Additional requirements
28
Supplying information
29
April 2015
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CAP 1286
Foreword
Foreword
We are today announcing the CAA’s final policy on consumer complaints handling and
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). This follows extensive consultation with our
stakeholders and our recent designation as the competent authority for ADR entities in our
sector.
The approach we consulted on at the beginning of the year still largely stands. We believe
that the future of consumer complaints handling in aviation lies not in the CAA handling
individuals’ complaints, but in ADR schemes, such as consumer ombudsmen. These
bodies are directly funded by the businesses that use them, but have clear and
independent governance, with oversight provided by the relevant regulator. This has been
the norm for many years in major consumer service sectors, such as financial services,
telecoms and energy. It is now time for aviation consumers to benefit from the simple, swift
and effective approach to dispute resolution that ADR brings.
There is one key difference between our sector and the aforementioned markets: ADR will
not be mandatory in aviation and the CAA has no powers to require airlines – the focus of
our policy – to join an ADR scheme. Our policy is therefore focused on creating the
conditions within which voluntary ADR can develop and thrive. As a competent authority
for ADR we can set the rules of the schemes in our sector, and deliver better redress
outcomes for consumers than we can in our present voluntary role as a complaint handler,
but we cannot force airlines to participate.
This means that in developing our policy we have had to make some compromises
between what consumers and their representatives want and what the airline industry is
prepared to support. Our strong preference is for ADR to be free at the point of use, as it is
in other sectors. Nonetheless, we have decided to allow ADR entities to charge a nominal
fee to consumers using their services, as permitted under the European Directive on ADR.
Our approach on fees responds to industry concerns that if ADR is free then it will attract
spurious and/or poorly prepared complaints, which are costly to administer. This is seen as
a particular risk in aviation, because the vast majority of disputes relate to claims for lump
sum compensation under the sector’s consumer protection rules. However, we have
balanced this concession to the industry with a requirement that if a complaint is upheld in
any way, the consumer’s fee will be refunded. Assuming that complaint outcomes from
ADR schemes in aviation will be similar to those in other sectors, this means that the vast
majority of consumers will not pay to use ADR.
Airlines have also made it clear to us that they are not prepared to support the costs of
both private ADR and the CAA’s current complaint handling service. As such, we have
decided to make withdrawal of our service conditional on airlines carrying at least 50% of
passengers in and out of the UK demonstrating firm commitment to ADR by September
April 2015
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CAP 1286
Foreword
2015 – a realistic target given the characteristics of the airline industry. However, this
means that there could be a period when the only option for some consumers seeking
redress is the courts. This is not desirable, so we have set out a number of measures to
mitigate this risk:
1. The CAA will rigorously enforce the ADR Directive’s information requirements, which
oblige businesses to tell consumers if they are not prepared to use ADR;
2. We will provide additional information to the market under our consumer information
powers, if we feel this will sharpen incentives for industry to participate in ADR;
3. We will, for the foreseeable future, provide a backstop complaints handling service for
disability access issues, reflecting the particularly high risk of detriment to this group of
consumers; and
4. Finally, if, having been given the chance, voluntary ADR does not develop as we
envisage, we will actively seek legislative opportunities to make participation by
industry compulsory.
Our overriding objective is for all consumers flying in and out of the UK to have access to
high quality ADR. We have been encouraged by the constructive and proactive way that
the airline industry has engaged with this issue so far. Now that the CAA has made its
position clear, we hope to see real progress towards that goal before the end of this year.
Andrew Haines
Chief Executive of the Civil Aviation Authority
April 2015
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CAP 1286
Introduction
Introduction
What is this document?
1.
This document is the Civil Aviation Authority’s (CAA) policy on consumer
complaints handling and alternative dispute resolution (ADR). We define ADR as
a complaints handling process that:
Provides an out-of-court solution for disputes between consumers and traders,
as specified in the European Directive on consumer ADR
1 (the ADR Directive);
Is provided by an ADR entity, which has been approved by an independent
competent authority on grounds of independence (from consumers, traders
and anyone else that might have an interest in the ADR outcome), and which
offers impartial, transparent, effective, fast and fair alternative dispute
resolution procedures – again, following the ADR Directive;
Is privately, rather than publicly, funded, e.g. through businesses paying
membership fees, levies or case fees to the ADR entity – this is common
practice in existing UK ADR arrangements
2.
In this document we explain the approach we intend to take to ensure that
consumers booking flights serving UK airports have access to high quality
complaints handling arrangements. Our policy encompasses both how we will
carry out our new role as the competent authority for ADR entities in the UK
aviation sector, as well as what we will do to encourage as many airlines as
possible to make high quality ADR arrangements available to their passengers.
3.
We consulted on our draft policy in early 2015
2, following the conclusion of the
Government’s own consultation on implementing the ADR Directive, and the
publication of the Government Response in November 2014
3. Alongside our
consultation we published the findings of independent consumer research on
ADR.
4.
We received 15 responses to our consultation, mainly from airlines and their
trade associations and consumer bodies. We have also received ongoing input
on this issue from the CAA Consumer Panel, which is independent from the
CAA. We have published a separate document
(CAP1285) detailing the
1
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1417446013180&uri=CELEX:32013L0011
2
CAP 1257
3
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/377522/bis-14-1122-
alternative-dispute-resolution-for-consumers.pdf
April 2015
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CAP 1286
Introduction
responses we received and the changes we have made to ensure that the issues
and concerns raised by stakeholders are addressed in this document.
5.
In this document, we provide clarity on two issues:
Part 1 explains the CAA’s vision for complaints handling in the UK aviation
sector. This includes the type of ADR we want to see develop if we are to end
our longstanding, direct involvement in complaints handling, as well as the
steps we will take to encourage as many airlines as possible to participate in
ADR.
Part 2 sets out the criteria we will use in our role as a competent authority for
the approval of ADR entities in our sector. These will consist of the minimum
criteria prescribed by the ADR Directive and a number of additional criteria
which we believe are necessary to ensure a higher level of consumer
protection principally that ADR entities that we approve must impose binding
decisions on businesses if a resolution cannot be agreed between the two
parties.
Who is this document for?
6.
This document is aimed at informing all stakeholders with an interest in aviation
consumer complaints handling, or consumer complaints handling in general,
especially:
Airlines operating in the UK market, who receive consumer complaints (some
20,000 of which are passed to the CAA each year because they have not
been resolved to the consumer’s satisfaction);
UK airports, who also receive complaints from consumers (some of which are
referred to the CAA), although not usually in the volumes experienced by
airlines;
Trade bodies, particularly given the important role trade bodies have played in
other sectors in setting up complaints handling schemes;
Providers of ADR services, such as ombudsman schemes, who may be good
candidates to deliver an aviation complaints handling scheme;
Consumer bodies, due both to their broad interest in improving outcomes for
consumers through efficient and effective complaints handling, and their own
roles in dealing with enquiries and complaints from individual consumers;
April 2015
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CAP 1286
Introduction
Legal professionals and claims management companies (CMCs), who are
playing an increasingly prominent role in aviation complaints by helping
consumers take court action;
4
The media, who play an important role in helping consumers understand their
rights and the redress available to them; and
Regulators and other authorities in the UK and Europe, who can assist us with
broader perspectives on good practice, and on how the complaint handling
landscape is evolving at both the national and cross-border level.
Scope of our policy
Which consumer complaints are covered by our policy?
7.
The ADR Directive applies to “disputes between consumers and businesses
concerning contractual obligations in sales or services contracts, both online and
offline”. The terms and conditions of a service contract between an airline and its
passengers are set out in the airline’s conditions of carriage. Certain statutory
rights flow from these contracts.
5 The issues that dominate complaints currently
handled by the CAA are all covered by airlines’ conditions of carriage. These
include: delayed and cancelled flights; denied boarding; lost or damaged
baggage; and disability access.
6 We expect ADR entities to deal with all of these
types of complaints.
8.
Indeed, one of the core requirements of the ADR Directive is that approved ADR
entities must have a general understanding of law to understand the legal
implications of the disputes they deal with. Clearly, in the aviation context this
must be the relevant law for resolving passenger disputes. To support this, the
Directive also places an obligation on consumer protection authorities, such as
the CAA, to cooperate closely with ADR entities. This cooperation includes the
provision of information and guidance necessary for the handling of consumer
disputes.
7 This will help ensure that ADR entities are equipped to deal with the
main issues that give rise to air passenger complaints. However, we will also
expect ADR entities that we approve to build on their own knowledge and
expertise.
4 Particularly claims against airlines for fixed sum compensation under Regulation (EC) 261/2004 (covering
passenger rights in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights – se
e http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32004R0261)
5 For example, compensation for denied boarding under Regulation (EC) 261/2004.
6 Based on data collected by the CAA’s Passenger Advice and Complaints Team (PACT), the main drivers of
consumer complaints are: denied boarding, cancelled or delayed flights (these alone account for over 90%
of PACT complaints); delayed, damaged and lost baggage; and assistance for passengers with a disability
or reduced mobility.
7 See Article 17 of the ADR Directive.
April 2015
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CAP 1286
Introduction
9.
Moreover, the ADR Directive does not prevent approved ADR entities from
dealing with non-contractual complaints. In practice, we would expect any
approved aviation ADR entity to be able to deal with the main issues faced by
passengers, whether or not statutory protections apply. In the event of ADR
becoming compulsory in aviation in the future, we would expect that it would
cover disputes over contractual and statutory obligations.
Which businesses are covered by our policy?
10.
Under The Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes (Competent
Authorities and Information) Regulations 2015 the CAA has been designated as
the competent authority for ADR entities offering ADR services in:
Areas for which the CAA has regulatory responsibility; and/or
Any other areas for which the CAA has oversight under any enactment.
11.
The CAA is therefore the competent authority for ADR entities covering disputes
concerning contractual obligations arising from consumer contracts for air
transport services provided to or from a UK civil airport. In practice, this means
complaints about airlines, whether or not they are based in the UK. Any ADR
entity established in the UK and seeking approval from a competent authority to
provide ADR services in this area would have to apply to the CAA.
12.
For clarity, although we have regulatory responsibility under certain pieces of
consumer protection legislation for the sale of flights to UK consumers by travel
agents, we do not intend to be the competent authority for ADR entities handling
complaints about travel agents. This is because the vast majority of complaints
about travel agents are not about activities or issues that we regulate.
8 Our view
is that the competent authority for ADR schemes covering travel agents should
be the Trading Standards Institute, which will act as a ‘generic’ competent
authority for sectors that do not have a designated competent authority.
9
13.
The provisions of the ADR Directive do not apply to airports, as airports have no
contract with the consumer. However, we see no reason why UK airports could
not use an approved ADR entity to handle the type of complaints they receive.
We would therefore encourage the voluntary use of ADR by airports, and would
ensure that we make our competent authority function available for the approval
of such scheme. In the event of ADR being made compulsory in aviation at some
point in the future, we would make a strong case for the inclusion of airports in
8 In respect of travel agents, the CAA primarily considers enforcement action regarding price transparency
and unfair contract terms.
9 The Trading Standards institute will perform this role on behalf of the Secretary of State for Business,
Innovation and Skills.
April 2015
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Introduction
such arrangements, given the statutory obligations they have towards disabled
passengers and passengers with reduced mobility.
Which businesses are the focus of our policy?
14.
Our policy is primarily concerned with how complaints against commercial
airlines are handled, particularly whether airlines voluntarily use ADR entities.
This is because the ADR Directive is about disputes arising from consumer
contracts, and it is airlines that passengers contract with. Furthermore, the vast
majority of complaints currently received by the CAA are about airlines.
15.
However, there is no reason why other aviation businesses could not join an
ADR entity overseen by the CAA as a competent authority. For example, as
noted above, ADR could be used to resolve complaints about assistance that the
law requires is provided to consumers with a disability or reduced mobility at
airports.
What is the geographical scope of our policy?
16.
We want to see ADR arrangements that meet the criteria set out in this policy
statement in place for complaints from consumers of any nationality about flights
operated by any airline departing from or arriving at UK airports.
17.
This goes beyond our duties under Regulation (EC) 261/2004 (covering the
rights of passengers in the event of flight disruption) and Regulation (EC)
1107/2006 (covering the rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced
mobility when travelling by air) to provide facilities for consumers to complain
about infringements of their rights:
Under Regulation (EC) 261/2004, the CAA only accepts complaints about
disrupted flights from UK airports (or disrupted flights from a non-EU airport to
a UK airport).
Under Regulation (EC) 1107/2006, the CAA only accepts complaints about the
provision of assistance at UK airports and on flights from UK airports.
For all other journeys where there is an alleged infringement of rights (i.e. from
another EU Member State to the UK), passengers must complain to a
designated body in that country.
18.
These arrangements – which apply to the vast majority of complaints seen by the
CAA – do not serve consumers or airlines well. For example, UK consumers can
be faced with the difficulty of trying to make their case with an organisation
based in a different country and with the possibility of language barriers.
19.
We know that some airlines would prefer a pan-European system for ADR as it
would mean having to deal with fewer organisations when resolving consumer
complaints, but we see no evidence of such a system developing in the short- to
April 2015
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CAP 1286
Introduction
medium-term. However, by putting all flights in and out of the UK within the
scope of our policy, our intention is that more consistent and coherent complaint
handling arrangements will at least develop for the UK aviation sector in the
coming years.
20.
In practice, the above means that consumers flying to or from UK airports with an
airline that is signed up to ADR should be able to use the same approved
scheme to deal with a complaint regardless of where their flight departed from.
Airlines, on the other hand, would only have to deal with a single ADR entity in
order to resolve the complaint. For airlines that do not use ADR, we will ensure
that our duties under Regulation (EC) 261/2004 and Regulation (EC) 1107/2006
will continue to be met (see paragraph 58).
21.
The CAA will ensure that any ADR entity approved by us as a competent
authority meets the requirements set out in this policy statement. Where an
airline joins an ADR entity approved by a competent authority in another Member
State and uses that ADR entity to handle complaints about flights in and out of
the UK, we will look at the type of ADR provided by that ADR entity and consider
whether it satisfies our policy. Ultimately, the type of ADR that airlines choose to
sign up to will determine:
Whether the CAA withdraws its own complaint handling service – we will not
do this unless at least half of the market is covered by ADR arrangements that
meet the criteria in this policy statement (see paragraph 57); and
Whether there is a need to press the UK Government for national legislation
mandating participation in ADR if airlines are resistant to voluntarily signing up
to ADR that meets our requirements.
April 2015
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CAP 1286
Part one – Our Approach
Part one – Our approach
Our objectives
22.
Effective and efficient complaint handling is a cornerstone of any industry that
delivers choice, value and fair treatment for its consumers. If consumers know
that, in the event of anything going wrong with their purchase, their complaints
will be resolved quickly, fairly, professionally and transparently, they will be more
confident as a result. Confident consumers are more likely to shop around,
driving effective competition and economic growth. They are also more likely to
hold businesses that don’t meet their expectations to account, resulting in higher
standards.
23.
The CAA has no specific statutory duties relating to consumer complaints
handling.
10 However, the strong relationship between effective complaints
handling and well functioning markets gives us a legitimate interest in this area.
The better that markets function, the less need there should be for regulatory
intervention, supporting Better Regulation and deregulation agendas.
24.
Our objective is to ensure that all consumers flying in and out of the UK have
access to high quality ADR mechanisms if they cannot resolve their complaint
with an airline. In line with the ADR Directive, ADR must be independent,
impartial, and a quicker, cheaper and more attractive option than court action. It
must also be able to provide the consumer with a final decision on their
complaint, avoiding the need for consumers to have to go to court. ADR
mechanisms should also:
1. Ensure that airlines face strong incentives to resolve complaints relating to
flights to or from UK civil airports efficiently, effectively and fairly ‘in-house’.
(We want other service providers to face these incentives too, but we focus
on airlines for the reasons set out in paragraph 14); and
2. Not adversely affect the CAA’s enforcement role, which relates to the
collective interests of consumers and depends on, among other things,
access to timely and accurate data about consumer complaints. Equally, the
CAA’s enforcement role will not in any way adversely affect the operation of
complaints handling arrangements.
10 The CAA has duties under Regulations (EC) No 261/2004 and (EC) No 1107/2206 to receive complaints
relating to, respectively, denied boarding and delayed and cancelled flights, and provision of assistance for
disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility. However, these do not extend to handling complaints
(i.e. considering representations of both sides and proposing a resolution).
April 2015
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Part one – Our Approach
The need for change
The problem with current arrangements
25.
The above objective will not be achieved if the CAA continues to handle
consumer complaints itself, through its Passenger Advice and Complaints Team
(PACT). Instead, we want complaints that cannot be resolved through airlines’ in-
house processes to be referred to private ADR entities funded directly by the
businesses that use them and with independent regulatory oversight by the CAA.
26.
In our view, the two main benefits of private ADR over current arrangements are:
Greater flexibility to design funding arrangements that set correct
incentives. At present, UK airlines fund most of PACT costs (currently around
£1.3m per year), through direct and indirect CAA charges. UK airlines, as a
whole, are responsible for approximately three quarters of PACT complaints.
However, there are significant differences in the average cost-per-complaint
paid by airlines in this group, which ranges from £10 to over £150. This is
because our charges to airlines are based on passenger and cargo volumes,
so are not directly related to how many PACT complaints or enquiries that
airline generates. By contrast, ADR presents the opportunity to eliminate ‘free
riding’, enforce ‘polluter pays’ for poor in-house complaints handling, and
establish that individual airlines (both UK and foreign) pay a proportionate and
fair contribution towards the handling of complaints from dissatisfied
consumers.
Contractual arrangements that can bind airlines to implement rulings.
This is essential in a sector with strong and often contested consumer
protection provisions. The CAA has no such powers to require airlines to
adhere to decisions made by PACT (or even require airlines to provide
information to inform our decisions), and this significantly undermines
consumer confidence.
Could PACT be turned into an approved ADR entity?
27.
If the CAA had not become a competent authority, the ADR Directive would not
have prevented us from developing PACT into an approved ADR entity that
could contract privately with airlines. However, there was no compelling reason
to do this, given that complaint handling is not an activity that we are required to
carry out, and that specialist consumer ADR entities already exist (and have
expressed an interest in the aviation sector).
28.
Furthermore, the ADR Directive does not compel airlines to use ADR, so we
would have been in no better a position than specialist ADR entities in terms of
our ability to introduce incentive funding and binding decisions, which we see as
key to delivering the outcomes set out above.
April 2015
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Part one – Our Approach
29.
Moreover, the CAA being a public enforcement body raises a number of other
challenges that would not apply to commercial ADR entities. These include:
susceptibility of ADR decisions to judicial review; the need for information
barriers between ADR and enforcement functions; and perceptions of
independence, e.g. if the CAA was taking enforcement action against a particular
airline that was also involved in an ADR case at the same time.
30.
The CAA accepted the Government’s invitation to be designated as a competent
authority because the role is much better suited to our core skills and expertise
as a regulator. As a competent authority, the CAA will ensure that ADR operates
in the general consumer interest by ensuring that the criteria to qualify as an
ADR entity in the ADR Directive (and any additional criteria we believe should be
applied in the consumer interest) are adhered to. At the same time, we will not
be encumbered by negotiations or disputes with individual airlines over ADR
funding, service quality or decisions, and with no conflict arising with our primary
role as an enforcement body.
Could PACT continue its service without being an approved ADR
entity?
31.
We explain above why it is not appropriate for the CAA to act as both a
competent authority and an approved ADR entity. However, it would be possible
to continue to run PACT on an unapproved basis. This is because the ADR
Directive does not prohibit unapproved consumer complaints handling services
from operating. However, we believe that there are good reasons for not
continuing the PACT service once ADR is established in the aviation sector:
The information obligations in the ADR Directive discourage the promotion of
unapproved complaint handling schemes. As explained below, in the event of
an unresolved dispute, airlines must provide information about an approved
ADR entity or entities, regardless of whether or not the business is willing to
use ADR. We believe it would be confusing for consumers if an unapproved
ADR entity was signposted at the same time.
More fundamentally, the CAA continuing to provide a complaints handling
service is likely to discourage the industry from establishing its own ADR
arrangements. UK-based airlines, who largely fund PACT, have told us they
are unwilling to support the costs of both PACT and private ADR. Non-UK
airlines may see little reason to change their approach if they continue to
receive the benefits of PACT (including the ‘buffer’ it appears to provide
between consumers and the courts) in return for their current minimal financial
contribution.
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Part one – Our Approach
The type of ADR we want to see
32.
Because ADR will be voluntary in aviation, there is a need for us to balance the
needs of consumers against what industry is prepared to offer, in order to
maximise the chances of industry-led ADR being established at all. The
responses to our consultation have indicated some differences between
consumer and airline views. These centre largely on charging consumers to use
ADR and the proportion of the market that needs to be signed up to private ADR
before we start to withdraw our own complaints handling service.
33.
In this section we explain the type of ADR we want to see develop in the UK
aviation sector. In the following section we set out how we will ensure that all
consumers flying in and out of the UK have access to this type of ADR.
A high level of consumer protection
34.
As the competent authority for the aviation sector, the CAA will be required to
ensure that the ADR entities that it assesses meet the minimum requirements
set out in the ADR Directive (see below). However, the CAA may also apply
more stringent approval criteria for the purpose of ensuring a higher level of
consumer protection.
35.
Part two of this document sets out the criteria the CAA will use to assess ADR
entities who apply to us for approval. In the remainder of this section we explain
our rationale for selecting these criteria.
Minimum requirements under the ADR Directive
36.
The main operational rules that have to be followed by all ADR entities in all
sectors are summarised below. As the ADR Directive is a minimum
harmonisation directive, the CAA must adopt the following criteria as a
competent authority:
The individuals in charge of the ADR process must have a general
understanding of the law, possess the necessary knowledge and skills in
dispute resolution, and be independent and impartial.
The ADR procedure must be free of charge or available at a nominal fee to
consumers.
ADR entities have three weeks from receiving a complaint file in which to
inform the parties concerned if the ADR entity is refusing to deal with a case.
Dispute resolution must be concluded within 90 days of receiving the complete
complaint file. This timeframe can be extended in the case of highly complex
disputes.
ADR entities must make available specific information about their organisation,
methods and cases they deal with, and provide annual activity reports.
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Part one – Our Approach
Consumers must have the option to submit a complaint (and supporting
documentation) and to exchange information with the airline through the ADR
entity either online or offline.
Additional CAA requirements for approval
37.
Following consultation, the CAA has chosen to apply the following additional
criteria for ADR entities who apply to us for approval:
ADR must be available for the most common types of disputes between
passengers and airlines (see paragraph 38 below);
If ADR entities are unable to reach a mutually acceptable settlement, they
must make a decision that is binding on the airline (if the consumer agrees
with the decision);
Fees for consumers must be kept to a minimum;
Fees for consumers must be refunded by the ADR entity if the complaint is
upheld by the ADR entity in any way;
Fees must not be charged to consumers whose complaint relates to access or
equality issues.
ADR must be available for the most common types of disputes between passengers
and airlines
38.
We would expect any approved ADR entity to be able to deal with all of the most
common causes of complaints currently handled by the CAA. At a minimum,
consumers must be able to use ADR to resolve disputes relating to a flight to or
from the UK in the following areas:
Denied boarding, delay, or cancellation;
Destruction, damage, loss, or delayed transportation of baggage;
Destruction, damage, or loss of items worn or carried by the passenger;
Problems faced by disabled passengers or passengers with reduced mobility
when using air transport services; and
Any more general disputes arising where the consumer alleges that the
business is not trading fairly.
ADR decisions must be binding on businesses
39.
Aviation consumers have robust rights. These rights, and particularly the
availability of substantial compensation for certain infringements, means the
possibility of litigation is perhaps greater in aviation than some other consumer
markets. Civil court action provides a route to a binding outcome and therefore
ADR needs to offer an attractive alternative. This should not prevent an ADR
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Part one – Our Approach
process from also being able to negotiate mutually acceptable settlements
between parties – many ADR complaints are resolved this way, see paragraph
47).
40.
As such, we see it as essential that, if a mutually acceptable settlement cannot
be found, any ADR entity we approve should make a decision that is legally
binding on the airline, if the consumer agrees with the decision. This is common
practice in other UK ADR schemes. We set out below why we will not approve
ADR entities that propose to resolve disputes by also imposing a decision on the
consumer.
41.
Our consumer research on ADR
11 found strong support for the proposition that if
the consumer accepts an ADR entity’s decision it should be binding on both
parties, but if the consumer rejects the decision there should be the right to have
recourse to court. This arrangement is standard practice in most UK ADR
schemes.
42.
Airlines generally support such ‘one way’ binding decisions, although some have
claimed that these arrangements would be unfair to airlines. We do not agree
with this minority view for the following reasons:
Consumer confidence in industry-funded ADR arrangements (and consumers’
willingness to use ADR as an alternative to the courts) will be enhanced if
consumers have a fallback option.
12 This should be seen as a way of building
trust in new arrangements, rather than giving consumers any real advantage
over businesses. This is because feedback from established ADR entities
strongly suggests that consumers very rarely do take court action, even if an
ADR decision is not in their favour. This appears to be because, through use
of the scheme, consumers come to view the ADR scheme as independent and
impartial.
There is the potential for consumer confidence in ADR provision in general to
be undermined if consumers can incur time and effort in pursuing a dispute
through ADR only for the business not to comply with the ADR entity’s
decision. If cases such as this receive public attention, the result could be
many consumers deciding to go direct to court.
11 We published this research in our consultation document
(CAP 1257). 12 Research has found a clear link between ADR schemes in which businesses are bound to accept the
decision and the level of consumer trust in the scheme, as reflected in the level of complaints directed to the
scheme. See: Hodges, C., Benöhr, I. and Creutzfeldt-Banda, N. Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart Publishing,
2012).
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There is also the potential for consumers to be misled into making purchases
from businesses which refer to ADR membership as a benefit of buying from
them, but who do not comply with ADR decisions arising from those
purchases.
43.
It should also not be the case that an ADR decision is completely immune from
challenge and we would encourage ADR entities and participants to explore
ways for legal issues that emerge from ADR cases to be referred to the courts
for a ruling to provide legal certainty. For example, the UK Pensions
Ombudsman is able to refer any question of law to the high court for
determination.
13 However, this should be on the basis that the parties agree that
the court’s ruling would not affect the outcome of the specific ADR case in hand
but would provide certainty for future cases.
Fees must be kept to a minimum
44.
As set out above, airlines believe that charging consumers to use ADR will
discourage spurious and poorly prepared claims and limit the involvement of
CMCs, since a fee would have to be paid for each individual claim.
45.
Our strong preference is that ADR is free at the point of use. Nonetheless, the
ADR Directive does permit a ‘nominal fee’ to be charged to consumers and we
have decided to allow this for ADR entities that we approve in order to maximise
the chances of voluntary ADR developing. However, we recognise consumer
groups’ strong opposition to ‘charging consumers to complain’, and would
emphasise that any reputational benefits to businesses from voluntarily joining
ADR are likely to be diminished if the scheme they join charges consumers a
fee.
46.
Neither the European Commission, nor the UK Government, has defined what
‘nominal’ means in the context of consumer fees for using ADR. In practical
terms, our view is that a nominal fee should be much lower than the fee charged
to the business for using the ADR process and its sole purpose should be to help
deter consumers or their representatives from submitting frivolous complaints.
47.
As ADR in the UK is typically free at the point of use, there are no direct
comparators from other sectors, against which an ADR fee for aviation
complaints could be benchmarked. However, we consider that the lowest fee for
starting a claim in the civil court provides a relevant yardstick in the sense that it
represents an existing direct cost to the consumer to access a dispute resolution
process. This fee is currently £25
14 and we would be very unlikely to approve an
ADR entity proposing a higher fee.
15 Additionally, if an identical complaint has
13 Pension Schemes Act 1993, s 150(7)
14
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/fees
15 We would only consider revising this position if we were presented with sound evidence that a fee of this
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been submitted by multiple passengers on the same booking (as is frequently
the case with complaints related to EC 261/2004), the fee should only be
charged once.
16
48.
Some stakeholders have argued that this approach ignores the fact that civil
court claims attract additional fees if the case proceeds to a hearing. However,
we do not accept this argument, because ADR is not bound by the rules of civil
procedure, which increase the handling time and cost of cases in court. These
include an ordered sequence of investigation and presentation of evidence and
arguments, and a hearing with a judge in the presence of all parties.
17 (In fact,
according to the most recent figures from Ombudsman Services, over half of the
complaints investigated by its energy and telecoms ADR schemes are resolved
without the need for any kind of formal determination.
18 For the Financial
Ombudsman Service, the proportion is even lower: the latest figures show that
just 6% of cases required an ombudsman to make a final decision.
19)
Fees must be refunded if any award is made to the consumer
49.
There is a risk that allowing consumers to be charged to use ADR may deter
consumers with genuine grievances from seeking redress. In order to ensure
that only consumers whose complaints are entirely without merit have to pay a
fee we will require that:
Any fee charged to the consumer is refunded if their complaint is upheld in any
way by the ADR entity; and
This refund arrangement is made clear to consumers by the ADR provider
before they agree to enter into the ADR process.
50.
We also encourage ADR entities to explore whether pre-authorisation of debit
and credit cards could be used so that the consumer is not out of pocket until
their complaint has been resolved.
level was failing to prevent spurious or vexatious complaints.
16 For the avoidance of doubt, this would mean a family of four travelling on the same booking would pay £25
to submit four compensation claims, not £100.
17 Hodges, C., Benöhr, I. and Creutzfeldt-Banda, N. Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2012)
18 For energy the proportion of complaints requiring a binding ‘Ombudsman Services decision’ in 2013-14 was
44%
(http://www.ombudsman-services.org/downloads/OS_annualreport_energy_2013-14.pdf). For
telecoms the equivalent figure was 48%
(http://www.ombudsman-
services.org/downloads/OS_annualreport_communications_2013-14.pdf).
19
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar14/index.html
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Fees must not be charged to consumers complaining about access or equality
issues
51.
Under Regulation (EC) 1107/2006, airlines and airports are required to provide
assistance to consumers with a disability or reduced mobility to enable them to
participate in the market on the same basis as other consumers. The Equality
Act 2010 also provides individuals with protected characteristics with protection
from unfair treatment by businesses.
52.
We do not believe consumers should be charged to make a complaint about
their fundamental right to access air travel services. As such, a consumer fee
should not be charged in these types of cases.
How the CAA will enable change
53.
We have set out above the type of ADR that we wish to see develop in the UK
aviation section. Because the CAA has no power to mandate industry
participation in ADR, we will need to implement strong incentives for industry to
voluntarily join an ADR entity that meets our requirements. This is a key
difference between aviation and other major consumer service sectors in the UK,
such as financial services, legal services, energy and telecoms, where ADR is
mandatory. We set out these incentivising measures in this section.
54.
Our policy is designed to allow for the possibility that airlines may choose to join
an ADR entity overseen by a competent authority in another Member State to
resolve complaints about flights to or from the UK. Indeed, it is likely to be
impractical and uneconomic for airlines to join an ADR scheme in every Member
State that they operate in.
55.
The CAA will ensure that any ADR entity approved by us as a competent
authority meets the requirements set out in this policy statement. Where an
airline uses an ADR entity approved by a competent authority in another Member
State to handle complaints about flights in and out of the UK, we will look at the
type of ADR provided by that ADR entity and consider whether it satisfies our
policy. Ultimately, the type of ADR that airlines sign up to will determine:
Whether the CAA withdraws its own complaint handling service – we will not
do this unless at least half of the market is covered by ADR arrangements that
meet the criteria in this policy statement (see paragraph 57); and
Whether there is a need to press the UK Government for national legislation
mandating participation in ADR if airlines are resistant to voluntarily signing up
to ADR that meets our requirements.
Ending the PACT service
56.
As stated above, we see ending the PACT service as a necessary measure to
enable the development of private ADR. However, we are committed to
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continuing to provide the PACT service until at least half of all passengers
departing from or arriving at UK airports are served by airlines who are
committed to a form of ADR that meets our requirements. It does not matter if the
relevant ADR entity is approved by us as a competent authority. We explain why
we have chosen this threshold below.
57.
Table 1 (below) sets out an indicative timetable for the closure of the PACT
service. It assumes that we see contractual commitment on our deadline of 1
September 2015.
Table 1: Indicative timetable for closure of PACT service
Date(s)
Milestone
CAA response
1 September
Contractual commitment to ADR
Begin preparations to wind-down the
2015
by airlines who collectively carry
PACT service in time for the potential ADR
at least half of all passengers to or ‘go live’ date of March 2016 (see below).
from UK airports.
September
Period between contractual
Continue to accept complaints into PACT
2015 – March
commitment and the ADR ‘go live’ and handle them in line with prevailing
2016
20
date.
procedures.
March 2016
ADR covering half of passengers
PACT switches to approach set out in
onwards
ready to accept complaints from
Table 2 and will only handle complaints
consumers.
about access issues; any existing ‘open’
complaints retained and handled in line
with prevailing procedures (unless airlines
wish for them to be passed to ADR).
Our legal obligations to receive complaints
58.
Unless every airline serving the UK joins ADR at the same time, ending PACT’s
service would not mean an end to our direct involvement in consumer
complaints. This is because we have statutory duties to receive complaints in
accordance with Regulation (EC) 261/2004 and Regulation (EC) 1007/2006
21,
whichever ADR arrangements emerge as a result of our policy. We set out in
Table 2 (below) how we are likely to respond to the situations that we think will
emerge, depending on circumstances that exist at the time.
20 We understand that it takes around six months from an ADR provider being awarded a contract to it being
ready to accept complaints from consumers.
21 Under Article 16 of Regulation (EC) 261/2004 and Article 15 of Regulation (EC) 1107/2006, Member States
must designate a body to whom consumers can complain regarding infringements of the Regulations.
The CAA is designated as the body to receive such complaints in the UK and must forward complaints to
designated authorities in other Member States as appropriate.
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Table 2: How the CAA will meet its legal obligations to receive complaints
Situation
CAA response
For airlines and
We would expect complaints from consumers that would have previously
airports that have been received by the CAA to go to ADR instead. We would continue to
joined ADR
receive intelligence about these complaints in order to ensure that we are
still able to carry out our role as the UK enforcement body for the
Regulations (as provided for under Article 17 of the ADR Directive). We do
not think a system where consumers are expected to recount their
complaint to both the CAA and ADR would be in consumers' interests.
For airlines and
The CAA still needs to provide a service to receive complaints from
airports that have consumers about an infringement of their rights under Regulation (EC)
not joined ADR
261/2004 and Regulation (EC) 1107/2006. Our approach to the two
Regulations will be different:
For Regulation EC 261/2004 complaints, which represent around
80% of current PACT complaints, the CAA providing any kind of
complaint handling service is likely to be a disincentive to airlines using
a private ADR entity. Therefore, we will only do the minimum required
in terms of handling complaints under the Regulation. This is likely to
mean us treating the complaint as intelligence to support our
enforcement work (mirroring the approach we would take for airlines
that do join ADR, see above). We would not seek to investigate and
mediate individual complaints as PACT does at present. Instead, we
would encourage consumers to report the apparent infringement to us,
and provide information on our website explaining the law and how
consumers can seek a remedy through the courts.
For Regulation EC 1107/2004 complaints, which are relatively few in
number and can involve significant detriment to consumers in
vulnerable situations, we will continue to take responsibility for
investigating and mediating complaints. Additionally, these complaints
may be made against airports as well as airlines, and airports, which
have no contract with consumers, are not within the scope of the ADR
Directive.
The 50% milestone
59.
The UK airline sector is characterised by a large number of operators of varying
sizes. While this is good for competition, it also presents significant challenges to
collaborative initiatives, such as the establishment of voluntary ADR. For
example, only four airlines have a market share of more than 5% (in terms of
passengers carried), and over 150 airlines account for about half of the market.
We therefore believe that 50% is a realistic target for a critical mass of
participation that will then encourage the rest of the market to follow.
60.
However, we want to be absolutely clear that we see 50% as a milestone, rather
than the end point for the CAA’s interest in complaints handling. We recognise
the risk that PACT’s service may end without every airline serving the UK
committed to private ADR. For passengers of those airlines who have a
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complaint that they have not been able to resolve directly with the business,
court action will be their only option.
61.
One of our mitigations is that participation in ADR is likely to be attractive to
airlines. At present virtually all passenger airlines serving the UK cooperate to
some extent with the PACT service – which has some similarities to ADR – even
though they do not have to. Compared to PACT, ADR is likely to provide better
information to airlines about customer problems. It also offers the opportunity to
rebuild and improve relationships with customers, which may be damaged
irreparably if a regulator has to get involved. Other key benefits include
enhanced corporate reputation and access to a more cost effective and
consistent alternative to litigation. Evidence suggests support for ADR among
businesses that have used it.
22
62.
There are also a range of measures that we can use to encourage participation
among more reluctant airlines, as described in the next section. These range
from informational interventions to seeking legislation to mandate participation in
ADR once voluntary approaches have been exhausted.
63.
We believe that ADR offers significant benefits to consumers compared to
current complaint handling arrangements. We also believe there are good
reasons that airlines will want to switch voluntarily to ADR, although the CAA
needs to make its position on PACT clear first. However, we want to be clear that
we can only accept a situation where the PACT service has been withdrawn and
some passengers have no access to ADR on the basis that this situation is
temporary.
Maximising participation in ADR
64.
This section explains the measures we may take to encourage airlines to
participate in ADR. In line with our usual approach, our preference is to use the
provision of information to consumers to maximise incentives for airlines.
65.
However, it is necessary to have fallback options if, for whatever reason, private
arrangements do not materialise, fail after having been established, or if
widespread adoption of ADR does not happen once the initial threshold is met.
66.
We have deliberately not devoted significant resources at this stage to exploring
options beyond the provision of information to consumers, as our strong
preference is for industry to lead on the provision of ADR. The time we allow for
industry to come to its own arrangements will also allow us time to give further
consideration to our contingency plans. Therefore, at this stage it is only
22 E.g.
a survey of 335 businesses by the European Commission’s Business Test Panel found that 73% of
businesses were satisfied with their experience of using ADR, that 82% said they would use ADR again in
the future, and that 70% preferred ADR to the courts to settle disputes.
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necessary to provide a brief overview of the options we are considering beyond
the provision of information.
Information obligations under the ADR Directive
67.
The ADR Directive introduces a range of information obligations on businesses
that are intended to encourage voluntary participation in ADR, principally by
raising consumer awareness of ADR and requiring businesses to disclose
whether they are willing to use it. Businesses should be aware of the following
requirements:
1. From July 2015, any business that is obliged or has voluntarily committed to
using an approved ADR entity to resolve disputes, must provide information
about that ADR entity on their website and, if applicable, in the terms and
conditions of sales or service contracts.
2. From July 2015, in the event of an unresolved dispute, all businesses must
provide information about an ADR entity that would be competent to deal with
the complaint, and advise whether or not the business will use ADR in an
attempt to settle the dispute in question. This means that businesses
operating in sectors where the use of ADR is voluntary will have to advise
their customers whether or not they are willing to refer the complaint to an
appropriate ADR entity.
23
3. From January 2016, all businesses who sell their goods or services online
(e.g. airlines) must provide a link to the Online Dispute Resolution (ODR)
platform on their website, whether or not the business has voluntarily
committed to using ADR.
24 All websites which act as a platform for businesses
to sell their goods and/or services (e.g. online travel agents; price comparison
websites) must also provide a link to the ODR platform.
Information obligations under the Civil Aviation Act 2012
68.
We will give serious consideration to whether there is a need for disclosure of
information regarding ADR provision beyond the requirements of the ADR
Directive, particularly if those requirements do not appear to be having the
desired effect in terms of airlines joining ADR.
23 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/377522/bis-14-1122-
alternative-dispute-resolution-for-consumers.pdf
24
Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 obliges the Commission to establish an online platform (the ODR platform) to
facilitate communication between the parties and an approved ADR entity, in the event of a contractual
dispute arising from an online transaction. A translation service will be available on the platform to assist
with disputes involving parties based in different EU member states. The ODR platform will not seek to
resolve the dispute itself; rather it will (if both parties agree) channel such disputes to a relevant ADR
scheme.
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69.
The CAA has a duty under the Civil Aviation Act 2012 to make information
available to help consumers compare the offers available to them in the market;
this may include whether a business is committed to using ADR to resolve any
disputes. Our information duties policy statement
(CAP 1143) explains our duties
and the powers that underpin them in more detail.
70.
It is not possible to say what the appropriate intervention would be at this stage
(or indeed whether we would need to intervene at all), but the options available
to us include:
Simply providing information to the market (including other providers of
consumer information) about which airlines are committed to using ADR;
‘Naming and shaming’ airlines that do not participate in ADR (an approach that
may be more appropriate where airlines also have a poor record of
compliance with consumer protection legislation);
Requiring airlines to actively disclose in an appropriate place on their
website
25 whether or not they are a member of an approved ADR scheme
(rather than only in response to an unresolved complaint, as required by the
ADR Directive).
Other consumer information
71.
Our dialogue with airlines found that ADR was seen by airlines as an effective
way to respond to an increasingly high profile claims management industry in the
aviation sector. Airlines told us they are particularly concerned about the cost of
investigating spurious or poorly prepared claims for financial compensation.
Some airlines see these risks as greater when claims management companies
(CMCs) are involved.
72.
We do believe, however, that CMCs will remain a viable option for some
customers of airlines that have not joined an ADR scheme. We will provide clear
information on our website (and encourage other consumer information providers
to do the same) about the option of enforcing a claim against an airline through
the courts to encourage consumers to take action themselves. This may include
providing information about CMCs, including the advantages and disadvantages
of using them.
Exploring legislative options
73.
We believe that consideration should be given to making the use of ADR in the
aviation sector mandatory if the approach set out in this policy statement fails to
deliver our vision. We note that legislation was required to deliver aviation ADR
in Germany when voluntary approaches failed. We note that the Government
25 E.g. ‘Customer services’, ‘complaints’, ‘feedback’ areas.
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intends to continue to consult with stakeholders and to carry out further work to
assess the costs, benefits and impacts of any future simplification of ADR
provision in the UK, including making ADR compulsory for all sectors of the
economy.
26 We will therefore remain in close contact with the Government on
this issue.
A CAA-procured ADR scheme
74.
Another option to encourage industry participation in ADR would involve the CAA
procuring an ADR scheme from an approved ADR entity. We could either do this
unilaterally or in partnership with airlines which support ADR but which are
unable to meet our 50% market share threshold.
75.
The model that seems most viable would be to fund the essential overheads of
the scheme (i.e. to make it available for use) through regulatory charges, with the
handling of complaints accepted by the scheme funded through case fees paid
directly by businesses. This approach has already been used in the UK: it was
used by the self-regulatory body the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
(RICS) to deliver an ADR scheme for the industry it oversees. The information
obligations in the ADR Directive would also apply, and the additional measures
described above would be available to us to encourage participation. We would
ensure that any funding from our charges is recovered in the most equitable way
possible, i.e. an ADR scheme that we procure would not be funded in the same
way as PACT.
76.
We do not see that this would be a conflict of interest as the CAA would not run
the scheme, but would procure it from an independent ADR entity which would
need to be approved and overseen according to the same criteria as any other
ADR entity. If we withdrew our approval from that ADR entity for failing to meet
the relevant criteria, we would simply seek to replace it with a different ADR
entity. Moreover, the objective would be to eliminate the CAA’s involvement in
time, by handing over the full financing of the scheme to the industry, once
enough airlines were committed to it.
A simple ADR landscape
77.
Regardless of the sector in which a dispute arises, there should be a consistent
way for consumers to understand the responsibilities of businesses and their
rights to redress, and to obtain assistance in accessing ADR and contacting a
relevant ADR entity. This will help ensure that ADR can deliver the widest
possible benefits to consumers and the economy.
26
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/377522/bis-14-1122-
alternative-dispute-resolution-for-consumers.pdf
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78.
The Government sees a single point of contact as key to making the ADR
landscape easier for consumers to navigate. The Government has announced
that it will be providing additional funding to the Citizens Advice telephone and
online consumer advice service
27 so that it can provide specific advice and
assistance to consumers attempting to resolve a disputes, including referring
them directly to ADR entities where appropriate.
79.
The CAA supports the Government’s objective to make the ADR landscape
easier for consumers to navigate. Although we will continue to provide consumer
information on the CAA website, we do not see that providing a separate
frontline advice and guidance service for aviation consumers is conducive to this
aim, particularly when we no longer have a complaints handling role. We have
therefore begun to explore how this advice function could be provided in future
by Citizens Advice.
27 The Citizens Advice consumer advice service replaced the OFT’s Consumer Direct service in 2012.
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Part two – Approval criteria for applicant ADR entities
Part two – Approval criteria for applicant ADR entities
Core requirements
80.
As the competent authority in relation to ADR services in the areas for which the
CAA has regulatory responsibility, the CAA must be satisfied that ADR
applicants seeking to provide ADR services in these areas either meet, or would
be able to meet within a reasonable period of time, the requirements set out in
Schedule 3
28 of The Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes
(Competent Authorities and Information) Regulations 2015
29.
Additional requirements
81.
Pursuant to regulation 9(5) of The Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer
Disputes (Competent Authorities and Information) Regulations 2015, the CAA is
using its existing power under section 20 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 to impose
additional requirements on ADR applicants for the purpose of ensuring a higher
level of consumer protection.
82.
These additional requirements are deemed to be included in Schedule 3,
regulations 12 and 13(1) and (2) and paragraph (i) of Schedule 2 of the
Regulations.
83.
The CAA’s additional requirements are that ADR applicants must satisfy the CAA
that they meet, or will meet within a period of time that the CAA considers
reasonable, the following requirements:
1. As a minimum, the ADR process is available for consumer disputes relating
to flights to or from UK civil airports in regards to the following issues:
a) Denied boarding, delay, or cancellation of flights;
b) Destruction, damage, loss, or delayed transportation of baggage;
c) Destruction, damage, or loss of items worn or carried by the passenger;
and
28
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/542/schedule/3/made
29
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/542/pdfs/uksi_20150542_en.pdf
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d) Problems faced by disabled passengers or passengers with reduced
mobility when using air transport services
30; and
e) Any more general disputes arising where the consumer alleges that the
business is not trading fairly.
2. In the event of being unable to reach a mutually acceptable settlement, the
ADR entity will make a decision which, if the consumer agrees with the
decision, becomes legally binding on the trader.
3. Any fee charged to the consumer by the ADR entity to use ADR procedures
is:
a) Kept to a minimum, its sole purpose being to deter consumers or their
representatives from submitting frivolous complaints;
b) Charged only once if an identical complaint is submitted by multiple
passengers on the same booking;
c) Refunded to the consumer if the complaint is upheld by the ADR entity
in any way, with this arrangement being made clear to the consumer
before they agree to use the ADR process;
d) Not charged to consumers whose complaint relates to access or equality
issues.
Supplying information
84.
ADR entities seeking approval from the CAA must provide with their application:
1. The information required under Schedule 2 of The Alternative Dispute
Resolution for Consumer Disputes (Competent Authorities and Information)
Regulations 2015. This includes a reasoned statement which sets out how
the applicant complies, or proposes to comply, with the requirements set out
in Schedule 3, and our additional requirements as set out above;
2. Information to satisfy the CAA that the ADR applicant is established in the UK
for the purposes of regulation 9(4)(a) of the Regulations; and
3. Such other information as the CAA may require in order to assess whether
the ADR applicant meets the requirements in Schedule 3.
30 As defined in section 83(7) of the Civil Aviation Act 2012 as “a service for the carriage by air of passengers
or cargo to or from an airport in the United Kingdom”.
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Document Outline