



1. Receive Complaint

Case: MERY - FOIA Complaint

Casenumber: 2014020001741

Responsible: Mike Lyng

Status: Finished

General:

Phase: 1. Receive Complaint
Case: 2014020001741 MERY - FOIA Complaint
Phase type: FOIA - Complaint
Description:

Process:

Responsible: Mike Lyng
employee:
Status: Completed

Correspondence
Search

Collected Information
Capture Information

Start the clock
Re-Allocate Case
View Case Activity

Continue
Close Case



Registration

Scan in the complaint.

Is complaint under section ☐ Yes ☐ No
77 (unlawful Disposal) ?

Action log

18/02/2014 17:38:59 -1
2 Compliant has been attached
18/02/2014 17:40:23 -3
4 Complaint has been acknowledged
18/02/2014 17:40:51 -5
6 complaint has been linked to 2014010001589
10/03/2014 10:29:37 -7
8 Further information recieved from applicant which has been attached and forwarded to Brian Wilson
28/03/2014 17:03:27 - Mike Lyng
- email to DMC_Corporate for any MPS press lines.
28/03/2014 17:04:18 - Mike Lyng
- There is an ongoing public blog on this incident
http://gizmonaut.net/blog/uk/2014/03/SLaM_attempted_cover-up_over_massive_police_deployments.html
28/03/2014 18:59:07 - Mike Lyng
- email to9
10 for any records if the incident (both DS/Dc are shown on CAD11 as attended) I have explained this will includes Incident Management Log (which could not be located in an earlier FoIA)
28/03/2014 19:03:07 - Mike Lyng
- previous linked request 2013090002774 and 2013120000057
29/03/2014 18:18:17 - Mike Lyng
- applicant has added:
I'd also like to bring to your attention some further information which was missing from the response that has since come to

light.

In particular
in the letter from AC Mark
Rowley to Baroness Jenny
Jones dated 2014-03-05
it is revealed that TSG officers
entered
the ward and that four of them
drew their Tasers. This
information
is obviously held by the MPS and
should have been communicated
in

your response to my Fol request.
The letter does not state how
many

TSG officers entered the ward
which is likely also information
held.

Furthermore
the recently released 'Police use
of taser statistics
England and Wales
2012 to 2013' suggests that all
Taser incidents
are classified as drawn

aimed
arcing
red dot
drive stun
angled

drive stun
or fired. So the MPS must hold
the information as to
how Tasers were used at this
incident.

Also as MPS officers assisted the
placement of three patients in
supervised confinement (SC) on
other wards

you may also hold
information about the use of
restraints which has not been
communicated in the response.

I look forward to receiving
promptly your internal review into
the

way my request my handled as
well as any information held that
should have been provided.

29/03/2014 18:18:36 - Mike Lyng

- applicant updated with new

deadline of 15th APRIL 2014

02/04/2014 11:53:34 - Mike Lyng

- Press lines from 28 January

2014 attached

03/04/2014 11:21:14 - Mike Lyng

- I have emailed 3 issues

highlighted by this review to

12

1) the location of the incident
management log

2) the 'tremendous amount of
writing' as mentioned on the CAD

3) the taser deployment record -
after confirmation of tsg taser on
the mental health ward by AC
Rowley in response to the
London Assembly

03/04/2014 12:03:24 - Mike Lyng

- earlier response from Insp

13

that he cannot
locate any paperwork - other than
the CADs

03/04/2014 12:18:46 - Mike Lyng
- DMC confirm no original press
lines located attached

03/04/2014 15:05:43 - Mike Lyng
- Duty Officers handover has
been located - this would appear
to be the 'final report' mentioned
in our earlier foia responses. In
addition 14 believes
EAB may have now been
located. i have emailed SC&O19
to ask how would I get copy of
the taser deployment report

04/04/2014 16:11:52 - Mike Lyng
15 confirms:

I can confirm that there was a
Commissioner's Reserve callout
to Bethlem Hospital whereby
officers from the Territorial
Support Group entered the ward
to locate and secure the release
of the staff being held hostage
whereby all the patients were
contained in the lounge area and
the aggressive ringleaders
removed from the group of
patients into a separate secure
location.

During this response

4 Taser Operators deployed
their Taser by drawing it from the
holster. Those officers provided a
separate account/rationale for
use
which was recorded onto
separate Taser Return Forms
(Form 6624).

Due to the content of the
information contained therein
some of which is non disclosable
(i.e identity of officer
location of incident by postcode
etc)

the release of the full content of
the F 6624's would not be
supported our end. In addition we
do not wish to be in a position
where we breach any data
protection legislation.

Access to the relevant Taser use
forms is restricted to the SC019
Firearms Policy Unit
where all submitted Taser Return
Forms (6624's) are stored
electronically.

In addition The Home Office are
sent a copy of this form.

12/04/2014 16:18:54 - Mike Lyng
- draft to PAO smt

14/04/2014 15:27:46 - Mike Lyng
- BOCU approve

14/04/2014 16:07:18 - Mike Lyng
- decision sent to applicant. sets
aside original and engages 12(2)
to locate all the information
(particularly the Incident
management log) this is one of a
series of questions surrounding
the original incident 1.10.2012

Completed - 14/04/2014

16:07:19 - Mike Lyng

Processing

Action log

Completed - 14/04/2014
16:07:22 - Mike Lyng

Head of PAO

Action log

Completed - 14/04/2014
16:07:23 - Mike Lyng

Phase help:

Comments:

Instructions:

From: ¹⁶ [redacted]
Sent: 10 March 2014 10:30
To: Wilson Brian - DoI Information Services
Subject: FW: Internal review of Freedom of Information request - River House 2012-10-01 critical incident

Hi Brian,

Please see email below from Mr Mery for your attention.

Regards

Sheela

-----Original Message-----

From: David Mery [mailto:request-193137-d03fc1a5@whatdotheyknow.com]
Sent: 28 February 2014 12:34
To: ¹⁷ [redacted]
Subject: Internal review of Freedom of Information request - River House 2012-10-01 critical incident

Dear Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),

Can you please ensure that your internal review also checks that searches were made for information held as to the Gold, Silver, Bronze command structure that was put in place for this incident. There must be information describing this structure and at least the rank and the unit for each of these commanders should be released (names of the commanders have been released in several other serious incidents so please consider releasing their names as well).

Yours faithfully,

David Mery

-----Original Message-----

Dear Mr Mery

Freedom of Information Request Reference No: 2014020001741

I write in connection with your request for a review of the original MPS decision relating to 2014010001589 which was received by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 17/02/2014.

Your request for a review will now be considered in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act). You will receive a response to your request for a review of the original MPS case within a timescale of 20 working days. In some circumstances the MPS may be unable to achieve this deadline. If this is likely you will be informed and given a revised time-scale at the earliest opportunity.

COMPLAINT RIGHTS

Your attention is drawn to the attached sheet, which details your right of complaint.

Yours sincerely

S Bhaskaran
Customer Services Administration Team
COMPLAINT RIGHTS

Are you unhappy with how your request has been handled or do you think the decision is incorrect?

You have the right to require the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to review their decision.

Prior to lodging a formal complaint you are welcome to discuss the response with the case officer who dealt with your request.

Complaint

If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of the MPS made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding access to information you can lodge a complaint with the MPS to have the decision reviewed.

Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from the date of the refusal notice, and addressed to:

FOI Complaint
Public Access Office
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
[email address]

In all possible circumstances the MPS will aim to respond to your complaint within 20 working days.
The Information Commissioner

After lodging a complaint with the MPS if you are still dissatisfied with the decision you may make application to the Information Commissioner for a decision on whether the request for information has been dealt with in accordance with the requirements of the Act.

For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner please visit their website at www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk.
Alternatively, phone or write to:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Phone: 01625 545 700

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Please use this email address for all replies to this request:
request-193137-d03fc1a5@whatdotheyknow.com

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<https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/help/officers>

If you find this service useful as an FOI officer, please ask your web manager to link to us from your organisation's FOI page.

From: Lyng mike - Digital Policing
Sent: 28 March 2014 17:03
To: DMC - Corporate Press Office
Subject: Review_2014020001741_MPS Press lines ?

Attachments: Response to FoIA 2014010001589.doc; River House Incident.doc
Dear DMC , I am reviewing the MPS response to a freedom of information request and would appreciate if you could advise me of any MPS Press Lines. The reason for me asking for Press lines is that in the applicants complaint he states '*it was reported at the time*' and suggests the MPS have failed to mention all the information we hold.

The incident took place on the night of 1st October 2012 where a disturbance occurred at the River House facility operated by the South London and Maudsley

NHS Foundation Trust. The MPS has confirmed this incident took place.

http://www.newsshopper.co.uk/news/bromley/9959902.Bethlem_Hospital_secure_unit_incident_attended_by_police_and_firefighters/

There is also an ongoing blog on the issue and this review will generate further

media interest

Regards Mike

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Recipients of this email should be aware that all communications within and to and from the Metropolitan Police Service are subject to consideration for release under the Data Protection Act, Freedom of Information Act and Environmental Information Regulations. The MPS will consider information for release unless there is are valid and proportionate public interest reasons not to, therefore, sensitive information not for public disclosure must be highlighted as such. Further advice can be obtained from the Public Access Office - 783500.

Freedom of Information Request Reference No: 2014010001589

I write in connection with your request for information which was received by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 15/01/2014. I note you seek access to the following information:

On the night of 2012-10-01, a disturbance occurred at the River House facility operated by the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust. The MPS treated this disturbance 'as a critical incident'. From a previous request on this topic I understand that 'there is no information held in regards to the final report. ' Can you please send me information held by the MPS describing this critical incident, whether this is in the form of a (non-final) report and/or 'incident / decision logs' or other form that is retrievable within the acceptable time/cost limit.

EXTENT OF SEARCHES TO LOCATE INFORMATION

To locate the information relevant to your request searches were conducted on MPS systems and with Bromley Borough.

RESULT OF SEARCHES

The searches located records relevant to your request.

The records held include ten CAD reports and one CRIMINT report. The CADs relate to the 999 call and subsequent dispatch of officers, the CRIMINT is an intelligence report.

I have been informed that on Incident Management Log was created however despite searches on borough and with the senior investigating officer I have not been able to locate this document.

Furthermore one document refers to a meeting in which this matter was to be discussed, again no further information could be found in respect of this meeting which may or may not have occurred.

DECISION

Having located and considered the relevant information, I am afraid that I am not required by statute to release the information requested. This letter serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act). Please see the legal annex for sections of the act referred to in this response.

REASONS FOR DECISION

The MPS rarely disclose CAD records other than to the person who made the 999 call. This is because the report is considered the personal data of the caller and the dispatch of officers often reveals our response and this constitutes operational or tactical

information. In this instance the reports also contain health related data which is sensitive personal data as defined by the Data Protection Act, Section 2(e). Similarly CRIMINT reports contain intelligence and will also, in most cases, contain personal data.

Due to the reasons outlined above I have decided to refuse access to the held information. I have applied the exemptions provided under Section 31 and Section 40 of the Act. These refer to Law Enforcement and Personal Data respectively.

http://gizmonaut.net/blog/uk/2014/03/SLaM_attempted_cover-up_over_massive_police_deployment.html

Thu, 20 Mar 2014

NHS Trust attempted cover-up over massive police deployment to mental health ward

Two inter-related incidents involving service users happened on the night of 2012-10-01 at the River House (RH) mental secure unit, part of the Bethlem Royal Hospital run by the South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust. Police were called for both incidents and SLaM has attempted to cover this up. A news story the next day did reveal that Territorial Support Group (TSG) officers were called, but not how many and whether any other specialist units had also been deployed. A few days later a whistle blower and two external third party individuals alerted the Care Quality Commission. When queried about these incidents, SLaM admitted that 'police had been called' without elaborating any further. Data obtained from a campaign of freedom of information (FoI) requests to SLaM, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the Independent Police Complaint Commission (IPCC), the Care Quality Commission (CQC) and Monitor, and an ongoing complaint to the Information Commissioner's Office about the breaches of the Freedom of Information Act in SLaM's responses has revealed the extent of this cover up: 48 police officers were deployed including six officers from armed response units, two from dog units, 21 PC from the TSG and the entire Bromley Borough Night Response team. The TSG, armed and dog units officers are all trained to use Tasers. Further information shows that TSG officers entered the mental health ward and four drew their Tasers. They were called that night to manage a situation involving vulnerable individuals suffering from mental health issues.

SLaM commissioned an independent investigation report. Although dated 2013-05-10, it was eventually published on 2013-08-29 with a large amount of text redacted; simply deleted in non compliance with the Freedom of Information Act ([pdf](#)). The minutes of the board of directors announcing this report had been commissioned disappeared from SLaM's website before eventually being republished after contacting SLaM. The authors of the independent investigation report are not named and not known, SLaM wrote on one occasion that '[t]he investigation panel included a consultant lead investigator with a senior nursing background, a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist and a Forensic Nurse Consultant [... and] that the authors of the investigation report are sufficiently qualified people who are able to conduct such an investigation and were appointed by the Trust Board.' ([pdf](#)) and on another that '[t]he investigation is being undertaken by a retired Director of Nursing, a forensic psychiatrist and a senior nurse with experience of security management.' ([pdf](#))

This incident happened two years after Olaseni Lewis died after being restrained by up to 11 policemen at the Bethlem Royal Hospital and only two months to the day after the Sean Rigg inquest verdict, in which SLaM's failings were criticised to have 'more than minimally contributed to the Sean Rigg's death'. SLaM stated on 2012-11-08 in its first response to my FoI requests that luckily this time 'there were no injuries to patients or staff in this incident'. It reiterated this position to its board of directors: 'there were no reports of any injuries to staff or patients.' However the investigation report states: 'One patient sustained injury to his hand during the second incident. No physical injuries were sustained by staff.' Another discrepancy: at a meeting of Lambeth's Health and Adult Services Scrutiny Sub-Committee, SLaM stated 'The police had been called for support but the incident had been managed well by staff at SLaM and the police did not get involved in the incident', however the investigation report, even though it does not go into details into police involvement, contradicts this statement: 'With the assistance of the Metropolitan Police and the first on-call CAG manager, three of the four patients were, after several hours, placed in supervised confinement (SC) on other wards.'

Following a complaint to the Information Commissioner's Office, on 2014-02-28, SLaM sent in another version of its report with some text previously redacted now included and what remains redacted shown as blacked out text ([pdf](#)). As of this writing this less redacted report has still not replaced the first version on SLaM's [website](#).

The following details the shocking information that we have uncovered.

The incidents

From the investigation report:

This is the report of an Independent investigation commissioned by South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, following two separate but related patient incidents on the night of 1st October 2012, involving Norbury patients on Spring Ward.

[...] The first incident began at approximately 2200, when one patient, as part of his recurrent delusional state, accused the designated ward-based security nurse on the night shift of stealing designer wear and trainers which he believed his mother had brought to RH for him.

Attempts to deescalate this incident were unsuccessful. Although a decision was taken to offer the patient prn medication, a second patient destabilised the intervention and two other patients subsequently became involved. Staff considered the situation to be unsafe and retreated to the nursing station.

Assistance from the Metropolitan Police was first requested at 2244 and the first police officer from Bromley Police Station arrived promptly at 2247.

The police contend that on arrival they were unable to access key information about the patients involved in the first disturbance which frustrated their ability to risk assess the situation.

[...] With the assistance of the Metropolitan Police and the first on-call CAG manager, three of the four patients were, after several hours, placed in supervised confinement (SC) on other wards. The clinical environment was restored at approximately 0230.

In the second incident which occurred at approximately 0250, one patient challenged staff with regard to decisions which had been taken about the management of the four patients involved in the first incident. He accused them of discrimination, believing that there had been a racist motive and that staff had assisted the police to pursue this line of action. He threatened to kill staff and one of the white perpetrators, who he declared had been treated differently to the black perpetrators. This resulted in nursing staff losing control of the ward for a second time when they retreated to the nursing station.

This [second] incident also required intervention from on-call managers and the Metropolitan Police. The clinical environment was finally restored at 0500.

SLaM suggests only local police showed up

The day following the incident, the Bromley News Shopper ran a story, *Bethlem Hospital secure unit incident attended by police and firefighters*:

Officers from Bromley police and the territorial support group dealt with the situation and left the scene at around 2.50am.

And three fire engines were sent to the scene at about 12.30am after receiving reports of a fire alarm going off but there was no fire.

There were no arrests or reports of any injuries to staff or patients.

A whistleblower contacted the Care Quality Commission (CQC) by 2012-10-11 with concerns relating 'to safety of patients and staff and level of incidents.' The next day, the CQC MHA [Mental Health Act] Operations Manager wrote to the CQC Compliance Inspector:

[...] 2. Patients safety incident on Riverside Unit (involving -----)

This is a very serious matter, clearly the ward team lost control of the care of their patients and the situation may well have been much more serious than it has been. I noted the trust have provide a 'fact finding' report and commissioned an independent investigation.

3. Whistle blowing information received

This information appears authoritative and provides background information which would have [sic]

I felt the priorities are as follows:

a) Immediate. From the documentation sent through, unless there is other information I have not seen I am concerned that the provider does not appear to have

demonstrated that they have taken robust action to make the ward environment safer in the light of the incident. This they could do quickly by, for example, increasing staff numbers, decreasing patient numbers, closing to new admissions for a temporary period. Further, issues of staff training, availability and skill mix all seems to be pertinent issues here. These are not ones that should need an independent clinical governance report to help them address. Should they not be able to identify and address issues immediately without recourse to an independent investigation then this further erodes confidence in their management capabilities. [...]

A 'third party individual' was concerned enough to get in touch with Care Quality Commission (CQC) on 2012-10-18. The CQC summarised the received email:

The concerns can be summarised as follows:

- Complainant wished to inform CQC of a violent incident that occurred on the SLAM secure forensic wards on Monday 1 October 2012 and request CQC investigate it
- Overall concerns raised for the safety of detained patients, in particular those from ethnic minorities - especially in light of the Sean Rigg Case in 2010.
- Overuse of restraint and medication
- Culture of intimidation
- Allegations that the trust was covering up details of the incident on 1 Oct, especially in relation to police involvement.
- Over representation of BME people being detained by the Trust

The complainant also made a request for information relating to the incident and its aftermath including:

- Information relating to the police becoming involved, numbers, equipment used, action taken by police against patients
- Numbers of patients involved
- Any injuries sustained by patients
- Details of any restraint or increase in medication of patient following incident
- Timing of incident/resolution
- Reasons for incident

Another concerned third-party individual wrote two letters on 2012-10-22. One addressed to the Care Quality Commission and another to alert the chair of Lambeth's Health and Adult Services Scrutiny Committee, copying the Lambeth Council Cabinet Member for Health and Wellbeing, the Chief Executive of the Care Quality Commission, a Special Correspondent at the BBC and the Director of Black Mental Health UK:

[...] This letter is to request that the CQC conduct an independent investigation into the matter and SLAM's treatment of its patients, particularly those from ethnic minority communities as a matter of urgency.

The recent high profile fatalities of black men in the care of SLAM make this latest incident of particular concern.

The Sean Rigg inquest verdict concluded that SLAM's negligence had more than minimally contributed to his death. Rigg died in 2008 and SLAM made public statements that improvements have been made in the treatment (particularly of black patients detained in their care).

However, in 2010, ----- [the name of Olaseni Lewis is redacted in the copy of this letter disclosed by the CQC] died after he was restrained by 14 police officers for 45 minutes while on a secure ward run by SLAM.

After police release ---- [Lewis] and he was lying in a semi conscious state on the floor of a seclusion room, SLAM staff then injected him with antipsychotic medication. The inquest into the death of ----- [Seni Lewis] will being in March 2013 [this inquest has since been delayed].

I think it is important for the CQC to be aware of the recent history of this trust as it is in light of this that I am writing to you as the health regulator about the riot that occurred on wards run by SLAM on the evening of Monday 1 October 2012.

I have been made aware that the over use of force and high doses of antipsychotics and tranquillisers dominates the way patients are treated in secure wards run by this Trust.

The oppressive culture of this health provider may have been a factor behind the riot at the Bethlam [sic] which is run by SLAM on Monday 1 October.

This letter is also to request that you contact the chief executive of SLAM regarding the issues that have been raised in this letter and also for the CQC to conduct an independent investigation into this incident.

The particular concerns about the incident, which I would like the CQC to investigate include: establishing level of police involvement. It would be helpful to establish how many patients were restrained or subject to force by the police during this incident. I would also like the CQC to find out if Tasers, CS spray, Alsatian attack dogs, batons, hand cuffs or riot gear was used during this incident and also the levels and number of physical injuries sustained by patients.

I look forward to hearing from you as to what action will be taken in response to this complaint; I would like to know how this information will be made available to the general public. [...]

The investigation report was not conducted by the CQC but commissioned by SLAM, and the CQC has no issue with the amount redacted in the heavily redacted version first published: 'The report published by the Trust is intended to demonstrate accountability for issues which arose at the Trust and to show how the Trust intends to prevent similar occurrences in the future. CQC does not consider that the addition of the redacted passages in the Report would further demonstrate accountability, and would instead be more likely to cause significant safety concerns for staff working in River House (and in fact officers from other agencies such as the Police, Ambulance Service and Fire Brigade).'

At the meeting of the Health and Adult Services Scrutiny Sub-Committee, on 2012-10-23, SLaM was asked about this incident, and its response carefully avoids any details even those already known such as the attendance of TSG officers and paints a rosy picture:

In response to queries from Members, representatives from SLaM made the following comments:

[...] A serious incident had occurred the previous week at the Bethlem involving two patients at SLaM taking other patients and staff hostage. The police had been called for support but the incident had been managed well by staff at SLaM and the police did not get involved in the incident. This demonstrated that improvements had already been made to the way in which the Police and SLaM were working together and the team which was called in to deal with such situations were adequately trained.

[...] As follow up actions he proposed that: [...]

- A note of the meeting be sent to Monitor
- That the principles of openness and transparency should be endorsed by health trusts. It is healthy for the health overview and scrutiny committee to be informed of instances such as occurred on 1 October 2012 and all should work towards a protocol on sharing information.

The board of directors of the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust was notified of the incidents at the 2012-11-27 board meeting:

Gus Heafield reported that there was an incident involving patients at River House at Bethlem Royal Hospital on the evening of 1st October 2012. Staff responded promptly and professionally and called the police who attended the scene with fire crews. The incident was contained within the unit and there were no reports of any injuries to staff or patients. An external investigation will be carried out and it was noted that the three members of the independent panel had been appointed and terms of reference for the review had been agreed. The review was due to be completed in January 2013. The Care Quality Commission had been notified of the incident and has been kept informed about the independent review.

Again, the investigation report as it was first published on 2013-05-10 did not mention the presence of Territorial Support Group (TSG) officers that were known to be on the scene from the earlier news story or any more details about the amount of police involvement:

This [first incident] necessitated intervention from the RH Rapid Response team, The Bethlem Royal Hospital (BRH) Emergency Team, various on-call managers from the Behavioural and Developmental Psychiatry (BDP) Clinical Academic Group (CAG), an On-Call Executive Director, the Metropolitan Police, the London Ambulance Service, and the presence of the London Fire Brigade.

Fifteen months later, we learn that 48 police officers were deployed including officers from armed and dog units

In responses to Freedom of Information requests, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) after describing that the 'disturbance at the River House facility, was treated as a critical incident by the MPS and accordingly involved many different police units' eventually gave an account on 2013-12-31, of the scale of its involvement:

The number of officers initially deployed were:

1 Inspector
1 Police Sergeant
10 Police Constables from the response team at Bromley.

The Inspector declared the incident "otherwise so dangerous" and requested Commissioners Reserve.

As a result further officers were deployed which were:

2 Inspectors
3 Sergeants
21 Police Constables from the Territorial Support Group. (TSG)
6 Police Officers in two vehicles from the Armed Response Unit (ARV) - These were stood down upon the arrival of the TSG
2 Police Officers from the Dog Unit (with two dogs) - These were stood down upon the arrival of the TSG
1 Detective Sergeant,
1 Detective Constable from Bromley

In the version of the investigation report SLaM published on 2014-02-28, SLaM unredacted the following:

This necessitated intervention from [...] three divisions of the Metropolitan Police

[...] In the course of approximately three and a half hours, somewhere in the region of forty police officers were on-site,

_____ the Territorial Support Group (TSS) [sic] – Commissioner's reserve, three police dog units and Trojan (specially trained armed officers).

[...] The Lock Down policy stipulates that for a major incident the Bronze, Silver and Gold command structure should be established.

As SLaM didn't follow proper procedures for redacting text, we also found out that SLaM attempted to cover up that the entire Bromley Borough police night response team was deployed to River House and that it failed to put in place a proper command structure:

In the course of approximately three and a half hours, somewhere in the region of forty police officers were on-site, comprising the entire Bromley Borough Night Response team, the Territorial Support Group (TSS) [sic] – Commissioner's reserve, three police dog units and Trojan (specially trained armed officers).

[...] The Lock Down policy stipulates that for a major incident the Bronze, Silver and Gold command structure should be established.

The police adopted this modus operandus, but despite the fact that several managers became involved throughout the night, four of whom came on-site at various times, there is no evidence that the Bronze, Silver or Gold command roles were assigned to Trust staff to work with the police accordingly.

Armed police officers, dog units and riot police officers have no place on a mental health ward. Having a situation deteriorates to the point that SLAM and the MPS decided it needed such a high police response brings serious concerns as to the safety of the vulnerable service users being treated.

Many questions remain unanswered

We know that the Metropolitan Police Service classified these incidents as critical and that they established a Bronze, Silver and Gold command structure. However we do not (yet) know from which units officers forming this command structure came from, and we do not know if any weapon, whether guns, Tasers, batons or CS sprays were drawn and / or used, or whether any dog was released. London Assembly member Baroness Jenny Jones has written to Sir Bernard Hogan Howe, Metropolitan Police Service Commissioner, Sarah Green, ICC Deputy Chair and Norman Lamb, Minister of State for Care Support to raise her concerns and ask for this information.

The only records the police have so far managed to find or 'locate' are exempted from disclosure. It is also likely they are reading the request too literally as they claim not to have any 'final report' for the incident but it is most likely they would have a report of some sort or similar document for a critical incident involving so many officers from several units and a command structure:

To assess who or may have relevant information for this request at least 12 (Twelve) separate CAD messages, the MPS electronic message system, were created and run for the incident mentioned. [Source]

Despite our searches there is no information held in regards to the final report [completed for the incident]. [Source]

The records held include ten CAD reports [Computer-Aided Dispatch] and one CRIMINT report [Criminal Intelligence database]. The CADs relate to the 999 call and subsequent dispatch of officers, the CRIMINT is an intelligence report.

I have been informed that an Incident Management Log was created however despite searches on borough and with the senior investigating officer I have not been able to locate this document.

Furthermore one document refers to a meeting in which this matter was to be discussed, again no further information could be found in respect of this meeting which may or may not have occurred. [Source]

The IPCC does not have any information at all about these incidents:

I am writing to advise you that, following a search of our paper and electronic records, I have established that the information you requested is not held by the IPCC. This is because the IPCC was not involved in this incident.

Section 3 of the investigation report is a list of recommendations, some requiring immediate action and the latest one due by March 2014. Apart from the vague description of some immediate actions taken to make the ward safer listed in an email dated 2012-10-15 between the CQC and SLAM (names are redacted), we do not know whether any of the recommended actions have been implemented; we also do not know whether any restraint were used on patients and the effect this situation had on both patients and staff:

- the patient's [sic] involved in the incident were placed under enhanced levels of care: -- [redacted] transferred to ----- Clinic, -- transferred to HMP -----, -- transferred to HMP -----, -- transferred to ----- ward and -- remains on ---- Ward.
- making the immediate environment safe
- undertaking repair where necessary
- security systems were checked
- the perimeter fence was examined (no breaches had occurred and the fence was undamaged)
- all patients on the ward were subject to updated mental state examinations and risks were reviewed
- debriefing sessions were held with the staff who were also reassured that an independent investigation would be undertaken

Some of the findings of the investigation report show a continuing need to improve safety: '[t]he lack of awareness of the risks outlined above and the ease with which these were quickly identified by the Independent team, suggests a less than optimal grip on environmental security in which safe clinical practice takes place' and '[s]ystems and safety culture are the root cause of the majority of incidents and no less so in relation to what took place on the night in question.'

Between 2012-01-01 and 2012-10-19, 196 violent incidents at River House were reported to the National Patient Safety Agency. Of these 101 were within the Bromley Local Authority and 95 in Lambeth.

Category	Number
Assault by a patient	77
Challenging Behaviour	50
Aggression	42
Inappropriate Behaviour	18

Harassment by a patient	4
Sexual Assault by a patient	2
Sexual Assault by a staff member	1
Assault by a staff member	1
Assault by other (e.g. a visitor)	1
Total	196

It is not known whether the police was called to any of the other violent incidents reported. As safety of patients and staff is paramount, SLAM must become more transparent into the way it operates.

Update 2014-03-21

The day following publication of this article, SLAM has accepted that its use of Freedom of Information exemptions was unwarranted:

As you know, the Trust has previously withheld some aspects of the Report from disclosure by applying the exemptions in sections 38 (health and safety) and 40 (personal data) of the Freedom of Information Act (2000).

Following your complaint, the Information Commissioner's Office has undertaken an independent assessment. The Trust has now resolved to withdraw its use of the exemptions in sections 38 and 40 of the Freedom of Information Act (2000) to the Report and to disclose it in an un-redacted form.

The version of the investigation report just sent in with the blacked out text now visible is available [here \(pdf\)](#). To identify more readily the new information, I had recreated the document highlighting the differences but had not released it until now in case the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) ruled some exemptions were justified; you can check it [here \(pdf\)](#).

There remains one unaddressed issue in my complaint to the ICO, the investigation report mentions, on page 10, 'section 17 of this Independent report' however there are only three sections in the published report. Also mentioned, on page 2, is that the 'report refers to ten patients, whom for the purposes of confidentiality have been anonymised (referred to as patients A to J)', however only patients A to B are referred to. These are either typos or there are further missing sections.

Update 2014-03-24

London Assembly member Baroness Jenny Jones has kindly shared the letter [\(pdf\)](#) she has received last week from Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley. It clarifies that only TSG officers, armed with Tasers, entered the mental health ward (25 TSG officers had been deployed at River House) and that out of those that entered the ward, four drew their Tasers:

[...] The Commissioner's reserve of TSG [Territorial Support Group] was deployed to resolve this incident and when they arrived they effectively took over from the ARV's [Armed Response Vehicle units]. I would stress that they [sic] ARV's never left the rendezvous point. As you may be aware the Commissioners reserve operate as a single unit of 1 Inspector, 3 Sergeants and 21 PCs. This of course would contribute to the seemingly large number of officers on scene at the incident. However, only officers from the TSG entered the ward and although 4 officers had their Taser drawn, through effective use verbal commands they safely resolved the situation without any further use of force. I can also confirm that the Dog support units did not deploy on to the ward.

[...] I am sorry that you have heard that this incident has damaged the confidence of black Londoners in relation to policing and mental health. This scale of incident is quite rare, in fact the MPS has reduced the number of calls that it attends at health based places of safety by 70%, but I remain concerned that police officers are being asked to carry out restraint in mental health facilities. To try to resolve this, protocols between health service managers and police Duty Officers are currently being developed. [...] Unfortunately there is no current time frame for this work to be completed.

This does not state whether TSG officers did restrain any patient that night, and if so how many (the investigation report describes that police assisted in placing three patients in supervised confinement). Also AC Mark Rowley figure of 70% reduction of police calls is meaningless as no period is given, nor a basis or a target for this reduction (and the definition of 'health based places of safety' is open to interpretation).

References

Relevant Freedom of Information (FoI) requests and other sources (note that the date for FoI requests is the date when the request was sent):

- 2012-10-02 – Bethlem Hospital secure unit incident attended by police and firefighters, Bromley News Shopper
- 2012-10-23 – Minutes of meeting of Lambeth's Health and Adult Services Scrutiny Sub-Committee (Item 5)
- 2012-10-30 – FoI request to the SLaM about the RH incidents
- 2012-11-19 – Letter from Lambeth's Health and Adult Services Scrutiny Sub Committee to Monitor about the RH incidents
- 2012-11-27 – Minutes of the meeting of the board of directors of the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust
- 2013-02-21 – FoI request to the SLaM about the RH incidents
- 2013-03-04 – Letter from Monitor to Lambeth's Health and Adult Services Scrutiny Sub Committee about the RH incidents
- 2013-06-11 – FoI request to the SLaM about the RH incidents
- 2013-07-16 – FoI request to the MPS about joint mental health protocols between the MPS and NHS trusts (also available on SLaM's website)
- 2013-07-29 – FoI request to the SLaM about the Mental Health Act s136
- 2013-08-29 – Independent investigation report into the RH incidents on the SLaM website

- 2013-09-28 – FoI request to the MPS about the RH incidents
- 2014-01-20 – FoI request to the IPCC about the RH incidents
- 2014-01-15 – FoI request to the MPS about the RH incidents
- 2014-01-20 – Alarm at armed police being called onto mental health wards, Black Mental Health UK
- 2014-02-07 – FoI request to the CQC about the RH incidents
- 2014-02-08 – Armed Police On Mental Health Wards, FOI Report Reveals, Voice
- 2014-02-13 – Armed Police on Mental Health Wards, MentalHealthCop
- 2014-02-17 – Award winning Mental Health Cop blog shut down, Black Mental Health UK
- 2014-02-24 – Questions raised in parliament over armed police at mental health ward, Black Mental Health UK
- 2014-02-28 – Firearms officers at incident on mental health ward becomes political, Black Mental Health UK
- 2014-03-11 – FoI request to Monitor about the RH incidents
- Undated – CQC's page on the Bethlem Royal Hospital
- Undated – SLaM's Forensic Service booklet

First published on 2014-03-20; last updated on 2014-03-24 (added mention of SLaM unredacting the blacked out text in the investigation report, the letter of AC Mark Rowley to Jenny Jones and minor other corrections).

From: 19
Sent: 03 April 2014 10:13
To: Lyng mike - Digital Policing
Subject: RE: Review_2014020001741_Disturbance River House 1st October 2012
Mike

I was unable to find any paperwork other than the CADs

Kind regards

20

From: Lyng mike - Digital Policing
Sent: 28 March 2014 18:57
To: 21
Cc:
Subject: Review_2014020001741_Disturbance River House 1st October 2012

22 I am reviewing a
freedom of information request and would appreciate your assistance .

To enable me to formulate a response to this latest request (see below) and to ensure the MPS is sufficiently prepared for any appeal to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) I would appreciate if you could confirm what information is held at Bromley in the form of Officers note books, Incident Management Log etc (we already have the CADs and a Crimint)

- In an earlier FoIA request it would appear your BOCU had previously tried to locate the Incident Management Log for this case - **Has this now been located ?**
- In CAD 9657 (page 8) comment by PY1 : *There will be a tremendous - amount of writing for this but no crime report.* - the same CAD mentions that²³ had attended the incident - It is **therefore assumed records were made at the time in the form of Officers Note Books etc - are these archived at Bromley or elsewhere ?**

The Request

On the night of 2012-10-01, a disturbance occurred at the River House facility operated by the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust. The MPS treated this disturbance 'as a critical incident'. From a previous request on this topic I understand that 'there is no information held in regards to the final report. ' Can you please send me information held by the MPS describing this critical incident, whether this is in the form of a (non-final) report and/or 'incident / decision logs' or other form that is retrievable within the acceptable time/cost limit.

The MPS Response

The records held include ten CAD reports and one CRIMINT report. The CADs relate to the 999 call and subsequent dispatch of officers, the CRIMINT is an intelligence report.

I have been informed that an Incident Management Log was created however despite searches on borough and with the senior investigating officer I have not been able to locate this document.

Furthermore one document refers to a meeting in which this matter was to be discussed, again no further information could be found in respect of this meeting which may or may not have occurred.

The Complaint

it would appear that the MPS hold other information about this incident which has neither been released nor exempted.

In particular, the last blog post of Mental Health Cop before his blog and Twitter account were unfortunately suspended includes 'the Metropolitan Police issued a release when contacted with respect to this incident in which it made categorically clear that armed officers were not directly involved in the resolution of it but were in the vicinity of the hospital as a contingency.' Neither this 'release' nor the related information has been provided, and this release does not appear to be public (at least I was not able to find it). I look forward for this internal review to finding information about this incident that is held and has not been exempted.

Regards Mike

24

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From: Lyng mike - Digital Policing
Sent: 03 April 2014 11:16
To: ²⁵ [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Review_2014020001741_Disturbance River House 1st October 2012

²⁶ [redacted] (copy
²⁷ [redacted] I am reviewing the MPS response to a freedom of information request and would appreciate your assistance to locate what information is held by the MPS regarding this incident. This review is in effect a 'last chance' to ensure the MPS is adequately prepared for any appeal to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO). Can you please provide a response to the following 3 issues:

The Incident : *'The Metropolitan Police Service was called to Bethlem Royal Hospital at 22:44 hours on Monday 1st October 2012. The incident was treated as significant as the location is known to officers as housing high-risk mental health patients. There was a serious threat to staff safety, and some patients, whose medical history was not known to officers, were unsupervised and believed armed with furniture and access to a kitchen area containing knives.'*

Issue 1 - Original FoIA response confirmed only CAD/Crimint held :

The records held include ten CAD reports and one CRIMINT report. The CADs relate to the 999 call and subsequent dispatch of officers, the CRIMINT is an intelligence report.

I have been informed that an Incident Management Log was created however despite searches on borough and with the senior investigating officer I have not been able to locate this document. Furthermore one document refers to a meeting in which this matter was to be discussed, again no further information could be found in respect of this meeting which may or may not have occurred.

REVIEW Q1: Despite further searches by ²⁸ [redacted] the Incident Management Log cannot be located - can further search be undertaken to locate this final report , where should it have been filed on Borough ?

Issue 2 - ²⁹ [redacted] and MPS Press line re Duty Officer

MPS Press Line: *'The on call duty Inspector, acting on the information provided by the hospital, developed a tactical response using the widest range of resources available to a highly charged incident by deploying resources appropriate to bring the situation under control while ensuring the safety of staff and patients.'*

Also on (page 8) there is a comment by ³⁰ [redacted]: 'There will be a tremendous amount of writing for this but no crime report.'

REVIEW Q3: Can PY1 (duty officer) please be identified and asked where this 'writing' was filed ?

Issue 3 - AC Rowley has since responded to the London Assembly on the incident of tasers deployed on the mental health ward

'London Assembly member Baroness Jenny Jones has kindly shared the letter (pdf) she has received last week from Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley. It clarifies that only TSG officers, armed with Tasers, entered the mental health ward (25 TSG officers had been deployed at River House) and that out of those that entered the ward, four drew their Tasers:
[...] The Commissioner's reserve of TSG [Territorial Support Group] was deployed to resolve this incident and when they arrived they effectively took over from the ARV's [Armed Response Vehicle units]. I would stress that they [sic] ARV's never left the rendezvous point. As you may be aware the Commissioners reserve operate as a single unit of 1 Inspector, 3 Sergeants and 21 PCs. This of course would contribute to the seemingly large number of officers on scene at the incident. However, only officers from the TSG entered the ward and although 4 officers had their Taser drawn, through effective use verbal commands they safely resolved the situation without any further use of force. I can also confirm that the Dog support units did not deploy on to the ward.
[...] I am sorry that you have heard that this incident has damaged the confidence of black Londoners in relation to policing and mental health. This scale of incident is quite rare, in fact the MPS has reduced the number of calls that it attends at health based places of safety by 70%, but I remain concerned that police officers are being asked to carry out restraint in mental health facilities. To try to resolve this, protocols between health service managers and police Duty Officers are currently being developed. [...] Unfortunately there is no current time frame for this work to be completed.
This does not state whether TSG officers did restrain any patient that night, and if so how many (the investigation report describes that police assisted in placing three patients in supervised confinement). Also AC Mark Rowley figure of 70% reduction of police calls is meaningless as no period is given, nor a basis or a target for this reduction (and the definition of 'health based places of safety' is open to interpretation).'

REVIEW Q2: In line with MPS SOP on taser deployment - should there have been a Taser deployment Notice completed (and if so where would this be held) ?

Regards Mike

31

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From: 32 [redacted]
Sent: 03 April 2014 14:24
To: Lyng mike - Digital Policing
Subject: FW: PY1 Handover ND 01.10.2012

Attachments: PY1 Handover ND 01.10.2012.doc
As discussed

From: 34 [redacted]
Sent: 03 April 2014 14:20
To: 33 [redacted]
Cc:
Subject: PY1 Handover ND 01.10.2012



PY1 Handover ND
01.10.2012.doc...

35 [redacted]

I have found your hand over for the night in question. Did you write any other report than this one?

Thanks

36 [redacted]

MPS FOIA Disclosure

MPS FOIA Disclosure

MPS FOIA Disclosure

MPS FOIA Disclosure

MPS FOIA Disclosure

MPS FOIA Disclosure

From: ⁴³ [redacted] - DMC
Sent: 02 April 2014 15:16
To: Lyng mike - Digital Policing
Cc: ⁴⁴ [redacted]
Subject: RE: Review_2014020001741_MPS Press lines ?

Attachments: P167-12 FOI River House Incident - Met Repsonse (5) (2).pdf
Hi Mike,

This was the FOI I worked against.



And yes checked the press log and ⁴⁵ [redacted] is right there are no press lines logged before mine.

Kind regards,

⁴⁶ [redacted]

Read the latest blog of AC TP

- Not Protectively Marked -

From: ⁴⁷ [redacted]
Sent: 31 March 2014 14:56
To: Lyng mike - Digital Policing; ⁴⁸ [redacted]
Subject: FW: Review_2014020001741_MPS Press lines ?

Mike,
We don't have any press lines until 28 Jan 2014. I have copied them below.
These were prepared by ⁴⁹ [redacted] I don't have any knowledge re the
circumstances and therefore I have copied to ⁵⁰ [redacted] for her to respond to you.

A copy of the FOI has been saved in the PBSharedDox folder, in the Stats and FOI
folder, titled 'P167-12 River House incident'

IF ASKED: Q1. Why were armed officers deployed in this incident?

= The Metropolitan Police Service was called to Bethlem Royal Hospital at 22:44
hours on Monday 1st October 2012. The incident was treated as significant as the
location is known to officers as housing high-risk mental health patients. There was a
serious threat to staff safety, and some patients, whose medical history was not
known to officers, were unsupervised and believed armed with furniture and access to
a kitchen area containing knives.

The on call duty Inspector, acting on the information provided by the hospital,

developed a tactical response using the widest range of resources available to a highly charged incident by deploying resources appropriate to bring the situation under control while ensuring the safety of staff and patients.

The deployment of the two Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs) to the scene was for the ability to provide Taser if required. The ARV officers did not in fact enter the hospital and were released from the scene upon the arrival of the Territorial Support Group, who were themselves equipped with Tasers.

Q2: Does the Met have a policy on the deployment of armed police to incidents that take place in mental health units?

= The MPS does not have a specific policy in relation to the deployment of firearms officers to mental health units.

Firearms officers are deployed to incidents where firearms or weapons are involved. Decisions to deploy firearms officers will include consideration around the type of premises and the persons concerned.

Q3. Do you recognise the concerns from campaigners about the use of armed police in mental health incidents?

= The MPS takes onboard concerns raised around the use of armed officers to mental health incidents and always places the safety of the public paramount.

Met firearms officers attend special training days where they work with mental health workers and patients to assist them in understanding and responding to people who suffer from mental health issues. We have introduced information sharing protocols to obtain fast time intelligence about any person who may be considered EMD (Emotionally or Mentally Distressed) or suffering behavioural disorders. Training around mental health issues is also included as part of officers on going training as well as forming part of the NPFTC (National Police Firearms Training Curriculum) instruction courses for firearms officers.

In September 2012, the Commissioner requested an independent commission to look at the MPS response to mental health. It was also asked to examine the interface between the MPS, mental health services and other partners.

Since the report by Lord Adebawale was published in May 2013, the MPS has fundamentally looked again at how we work as an organisation, and with partner agencies, to improve services, share information and better understand the needs of people with mental ill health with the aim of delivering a service that can be best adapted to fit individual needs.

The 28 Recommendations within the Independent Commission report on Mental Health and Policing (2013) are being progressed and embedded in the direction of travel for policing, both locally and nationally.

We continue to work locally across London and nationally with partners across the health spectrum and we have also contributed to the forthcoming Department of Health Crisis Care Concordat. This is where a number of national organisations have committed to work together to support local systems to achieve systematic and continuous improvements for crisis care for people with Mental Health issues.

The MPS are also in the process of rolling out the Community Risk MARAC group (Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conference) and a pilot is currently underway in all NW London Boroughs. This is a local partnership forum, where high risk and developing cases can be discussed and problem solved.

The MPS are also in the process of training all front line officers in the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF). The VAF is a simple investigative approach to assessing vulnerability, in all interactions the police have with the public.

The MPS is committed to delivering a quality of service and care for all those who come into contact with the MPS - especially those who are at their most vulnerable through mental ill health or crisis.

From: Lyng mike - Digital Policing
Sent: 28 March 2014 17:03
To: DMC - Corporate Press Office
Subject: Review_2014020001741_MPS Press lines ?

Dear DMC , I am reviewing the MPS response to a freedom of information request and would appreciate if you could advise me of any MPS Press Lines. The reason for me asking for Press lines is that in the applicants complaint he states '*it was reported at the time*' and suggests the MPS have failed to mention all the information we hold.

The incident took place on the night of 1st October 2012 where a disturbance occurred at the River House facility operated by the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust. The MPS has confirmed this incident took place. << File: Response to FoIA 2014010001589.doc >>

http://www.newsshopper.co.uk/news/bromley/9959902.Bethlem_Hospital_secure_unit_incident_attended_by_police_and_firefighters/

There is also an ongoing blog on the issue and this review will generate further media interest << File: River House Incident.doc >>

Regards Mike

51

**Protective Marking: Protectively Marked
Not / Suitable for Publication: N**

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From: 52 [redacted]
Sent: 04 April 2014 14:47
To: Lyng mike - Digital Policing
Cc: 53 [redacted]
Subject: RE: Review_2014020001741_Disturbance River House 1st October 2012_Taser deployment report ?

Hi Mike,

In response to the following

In regards to Q3 - how would I locate the taser deployment report (I am assuming one Taser Deployment report for 4 TSG officers) ?

I can confirm that there was a Commissioner's Reserve callout to Bethlem Hospital whereby officers from the Territorial Support Group entered the ward to locate and secure the release of the staff being held hostage, whereby all the patients were contained in the lounge area and the aggressive ringleaders removed from the group of patients into a separate secure location.

During this response, 4 Taser Operators deployed their Taser by drawing it from the holster. Those officers provided a separate account/rationale for use, which was recorded onto separate Taser Return Forms (Form 6624).

Due to the content of the information contained therein, some of which is non disclosable (i.e identity of officer, location of incident by postcode etc), the release of the full content of the F 6624's would not be supported our end. In addition we do not wish to be in a position where we breach any data protection legislation.

Access to the relevant Taser use forms is restricted to the SCO19 Firearms Policy Unit, where all submitted Taser Return Forms (6624's) are stored electronically. In addition The Home Office are sent a copy of this form.

Regards,

54 [redacted]

From: 55 [redacted]
Sent: 03 April 2014 15:27
To: Lyng mike - Digital Policing
Cc: 56 [redacted]
Subject: RE: Review_2014020001741_Disturbance River House 1st October 2012_Taser deployment report ?

Mike,

I am forwarding this to 57 [redacted] who has some knowledge of it and will hopefully be

able to advise you / provide you with the details / report you require.

58

as discussed, can you respond to Mike please,

Regards,

59

From: Lyng mike - Digital Policing
Sent: 03 April 2014 14:50
To: 60
Subject: FW: Review_2014020001741_Disturbance River House 1st October 2012_Taser deployment report ?

61

in regards to my earlier email we have since located local information for Q1 and Q2.

In regards to Q3 - how would I locate the taser deployment report (I am assuming one Taser Deployment report for 4 TSG officers) ?

Regards Mike

62

From: Lyng mike - Digital Policing
Sent: 03 April 2014 11:16
To: 63
Cc:
Subject: Review_2014020001741_Disturbance River House 1st October 2012

64

65 I am reviewing the MPS response to a freedom of information request and would appreciate your assistance to locate what information is held by the MPS regarding this incident. This review is in effect a 'last chance' to ensure the MPS is adequately prepared for any appeal to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO). Can you please provide a response to the following 3 issues:

The Incident : 'The Metropolitan Police Service was called to Bethlem Royal Hospital at 22:44 hours on Monday 1st October 2012. The incident was treated as significant as the location is known to officers as housing high-risk mental health patients. There was a serious threat to staff safety, and some patients, whose medical history was not known to officers, were unsupervised and believed armed with furniture and access to a kitchen area containing knives.'

Issue 1 - Original FoIA response confirmed only CAD/Crimint held :

The records held include ten CAD reports and one CRIMINT report. The CADs relate to the 999 call and subsequent dispatch of officers, the CRIMINT is an intelligence report.

I have been informed that an Incident Management Log was created however despite searches on borough and with the senior investigating officer I have not been able to locate this document. Furthermore one document refers to a meeting in which this matter was to be discussed, again no further information could be found in respect of this meeting which may or may not have occurred.

REVIEW Q1: Despite further searches by Insp. Antoine the Incident Management Log cannot be located - can further search be undertaken to locate this final report , where should it have been filed on Borough ?

Issue 2 - CAD 9657 and MPS Press line re Duty Officer

MPS Press Line: *'The on call duty Inspector, acting on the information provided by the hospital, developed a tactical response using the widest range of resources available to a highly charged incident by deploying resources appropriate to bring the situation under control while ensuring the safety of staff and patients.'*

Also on (page 8) there is a comment by ⁶⁶ : *'There will be a tremendous amount of writing for this but no crime report.'*

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'London Assembly member Baroness Jenny Jones has kindly shared the letter (pdf) she has received last week from Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley. It clarifies that only TSG officers, armed with Tasers, entered the mental health ward (25 TSG officers had been deployed at River House) and that out of those that entered the ward, four drew their Tasers:

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REVIEW Q2: In line with MPS SOP on taser deployment - should there have been a Taser deployment Notice completed (and if so where would this be held) ?

Regards Mike

67

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