



Inspecting policing
in the **public interest**

Protecting the public

Police coordination in the new landscape

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Executive summary

The Government's vision of localism in policing, embodied in the forthcoming election of police and crime commissioners (PCCs), is complemented by the responsibilities and accountabilities for national policing issues set out in the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR). The national landscape, however, is by no means settled, with new institutions under development (such as the ***** S23) and the College of Policing). Against this background, we balance the need for a secure solution in the short term with the opportunity to develop a longer term, more robust and sustainable model for protecting the public as the landscape settles.

Structures will be in place to manage the interface between local and national in respect of serious organised crime and terrorism; but if the police are to play their part in protecting the public and maintaining safety and security, there also must be a fit-for-purpose coordinating mechanism for mobilising police resources so in order to assist a force facing severe challenges, such as a civil emergency or serious public disorder. This mechanism must be real, not virtual. We propose that it should be called the Strategic Police Coordination Centre (SPoCC). Ministers have the ultimate accountability to Parliament for the design and preparation of arrangements for the safety and security of the public. Accountability and responsibility for carrying them into effect rests with chief constables. ACPO has pragmatically undertaken a range of functions in the past as national needs have been identified, but questions have been raised about its operational roles and accountability. We have looked again at the coordinating function currently provided by the Police National Information Coordination Centre (PNICC) and the other ACPO operational functions.

Characteristics of effective national police coordination

A national coordinating function must, first of all, be *necessary* in the sense that its work could not be done at a lower level. It must also have *legitimacy*, through being transparent in its operations and having the buy-in of those involved in police governance; the *authority*, through legislation or formal agreement, to make decisions to draw on and use national capability; and *accountability* for those decisions, including those made under the strategic oversight of the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR). It also needs to have the *capability* to do the job; *resilience* to sustain operations; and *sustainability* in the sense of being a permanent part of the fabric of policing.

Achieving effective operational coordination

The coordinating mechanism currently in place was designed for other circumstances, not the threats set out in the SPR. Our preferred option for the future is based on a somewhat adapted version of the strong mechanisms in place for the Olympic Games; this is what we describe as the Strategic Police Coordination Centre – the ‘SPoCC’. There is a danger of the infrastructure put in place for the Olympics starting to disappear soon after the end of the Games: we recommend that the Home Office should open discussions with the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) now to ensure that this does not happen.

The SPoCC will need to have access to near real-time intelligence and information and to know about the availability of specialist assets in order to prioritise demand and ensure the provision of mutual support. It should also have capacity to plan ahead and to draw out the lessons from experience.

Authority for coordination – ownership and leadership

The SPoCC will need an organisational owner. We have considered a number of possibilities. For pragmatic reasons, we think that the MPS would need to house whichever model is chosen so as to place it close to COBR and to take advantage of the infrastructure put in place for the Olympics. Even if leadership were to rest elsewhere, in this sense, the SPoCC would be ‘in, not of’ the MPS.

Any solution will require credible leadership. The options for the longer term considered in the report raise complex issues, including whether the coordination model should be designed for all eventualities or a lighter touch. We think the former is preferable, and would welcome feedback on this.

It will be important to avoid any unnecessary tensions between local demands and priorities and national need by establishing the most effective, credible arrangements to integrate local and national policing in order to protect the public from harm. Although the decisions made in the face of these tensions may be viewed as *operational* decisions, reductions in the availability of resources for deployment locally will be a matter of legitimate concern for PCCs, and this needs to be acknowledged.

The SPR does provide valuable guidance, so PCCs/forces must have regard to that requirement in their planning processes; but, as a precaution, we have considered the scenario where the coordination of assets made available for national use is not agreed and

therefore direction and control of those available is necessary. These would be exceptional circumstances, but we think it important to consider in advance the effective working of the SPoCC for all eventualities. We recognise that the Home Secretary retains powers of intervention, but such a course is generally considered to be one of last resort. The better course of action in these circumstances, in our view, is to enable effective operational decisions from the outset where clear responsibility and accountability mechanisms are established.

We have taken Counsel's advice on the avenues by which national functions might be given a durable legal basis (available at Appendix I). It appears that in the absence of an alternative legal underpinning, an agreement under s23 of the Police Act 1996 (as amended) is the most likely way of securing a robust legal basis for national functions which retains formal local involvement while recognising the imperative of national coordination. We think that work towards such an agreement should start as soon as possible.

The need for an interim solution

An interim solution is required in the short term. We considered an operational chief constable – be that the Chair of Chief Constables' Council (CCC) or the chief constable of a force area; the ***** S23; and the College of Policing and its CEO. These options were assessed against our tests for legitimacy: legality, accountability, together with independence, expertise and the principal focus of the role.

The *** S23 and the College of Policing are works in progress and it will be many months before they are fully functional. This limit on choice leaves us with two options: to continue the current position with the Chair of CCC leading the work, or to ask the Commissioner of the MPS to undertake the role. Neither of these is without issues, but we do not think realistically that there is another way to proceed in the short term.

Ideally, this decision on leadership should be made with reference to the intended, longer term policing landscape. We also believe that, provided work has started on a permanent solution, the risks of challenge to the interim arrangements are manageable.

Long-term option

In the medium to longer term, the *** S23 and the College of Policing present themselves as stronger candidates but, in their current intended form, both would require significant change in terms of organisational remit:

- the legal status of their leadership (i.e. ability to 'direct and control' police resources, presently requiring a chief constable responsible for territory as described under the Police Act 1996);
- changes to their expertise and principal focus (the new role is not closely allied to their core mission); and
- to differing degrees, changes to their infrastructure (with the associated costs).

Either path should aim to achieve buy-in of both PCCs and chief constables. All in all, they do not appear compelling at this juncture.

These matters are challenging but if changes to the remit of the *** ***,
*****S23, or changes to the College of Policing and the status of its CEO remain possibilities, we could look at these options further in Part Two of this review.

However, our initial conclusion for strong and effective national coordination in the longer term is that, short of significant changes to other bodies, the leadership role is best placed with an operational Chief Constable. We think, in the absence of a change of remit for the other national bodies that this should be the future Chair of CCC with appropriate legislative underpinning put in place, or a territorial Chief Constable – who, in practice we believe, could only be the Commissioner of the MPS.

The arguments for the *Commissioner* as an alternative in terms of stature, operational capability and accountability are strong. There would, however, be a need to secure the agreement of MOPAC, CCC and PCCs and to be assured that provision was made for a dedicated senior focus on national needs, as opposed to the London requirements which are the Commissioner's principal responsibility.

In the case of CCC, the emerging role, particularly in the light of developing proposals for the College of Policing, is to operationalise national effect. Indeed, ACPO's initial estimate is that less than a third of CCC business will be transferring to the new College.

We recognise that CCC's role is still evolving and needs also to take account of changes in responsibility at a local level (e.g. chief constables as employers and corporation soles).

Equally, matters of accountability and governance would need to be addressed: but whilst these issues are real, they are not insurmountable.

The *Chair of CCC* option, properly supported in law and with adequate arrangements for support in relation to territorial responsibilities (i.e. full-time or supported in his/her force so as to be free to focus), has the potential virtue of securing an individual acknowledged by their peers as being an independent, credible operator.

This option would also be more likely to accord with and preserve the devolved character of British policing, than the alternative of a chief constable of a force (who, as we have stated, we believe could only be the Commissioner of the MPS). Additionally, the objectivity and focus that would accompany the role would assist in avoiding any potential conflict of responsibilities for a chief constable or the Commissioner seeking to brief objectively in COBR and make national decisions on priorities, while also being responsible for law and order in their own force area.

Both options are less than perfect given the current law and the need to secure buy-in within a devolved landscape.

Other ACPO operational units

We have reviewed the other existing ACPO operational functions in the light of the developing landscape of policing, looking in particular at proposals for the *****S23**, the College of Policing and the role of the CCC. We have examined each of them against the condition of necessity and the characteristics as set out above. Further work is needed on this. Few, if any, of the units know with certainty what their future is. A table in the main report sets out our initial views on the future requirement for and ownership of these units.

Part Two of this Review

If Ministers agree Part Two of this review should take place, we will take account of any lessons associated with the use of enhanced coordination during the Olympic Games; follow up any outstanding issues from this part; and endeavour to:

- secure consensus on the best way in which the preferred options could work in the new policing landscape;
- describe how the functionality might operate with the devolved administrations; and
- refine the user requirement in relation to the operational functionality of the SPoCC and the supporting logistic IT system.

Introduction

1. The Home Office and ACPO commissioned Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) to undertake this review (commission is at Appendix A). We have carried out in-depth interviews with those currently providing or supporting operational activity across force borders. We have also discussed the current position and future needs with those in senior positions with an interest in this work being done effectively, either as policy makers, funders or customers. The review terms of reference (at Appendix B) exclude consideration of the functions dealing with terrorism which fall within the remit of ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters Business Area (TAM).
2. The Government's vision for the development of policing involves fresh emphasis on the local responsiveness and accountability of the police, coupled with increasing professionalism of police practice and greater efficiency of organisation, procurement and management. Central Government will focus in future on its role of supporting the response to threats with national and international dimensions. We approached this review on the principle of seeking to ensure national support for local policing – not 'national policing'.
3. The desired focus on 'localism' through police and crime commissioners (PCCs) is complemented by Government issuing a Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR). This give PCCs and chief constables notice of the national threats they must prepare for, and the outcomes they must plan to be able to produce to counter those threats.¹ There will inevitably be tensions between local and national policing requirements. The intention is that these will be managed through new or revised structures:
 - National policing responsibilities which currently rest within the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) will move (or have already moved) to either the *** *** ** S23 and thence to the *****S23; to the new arrangements for IT; or to the Home Office. The College of Policing will have a remit to develop professionalism across the Service including standards.

¹ *"But there's a paradox of policing over the last few years. While central government has interfered too much in matters that should be determined locally, it has been weak in areas where a stronger grip was requiredThe time has come to reverse this situation - giving more space for local determination with stronger local accountability, while ensuring real leadership where national organisation is needed."* Nick Herbert 25th January 2011, CityForum.

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, which will coordinate and set the strategy for law enforcement agencies operating at the UK border.
 - Terrorism-related issues will continue to be dealt with at national level under the policy direction of the Home Secretary and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office. However after the Olympic Games, the Government intends to consider how the national counter terrorist (CT) effort should be shaped for the future.
4. Ministers, who will be accountable to Parliament for ensuring that appropriate arrangements are put in place for the protection of the public, are overseeing the creation of these new structures, which are intended to manage the interface between the local and the national levels. The national landscape then is by no means settled and against this background, we balance the need for a secure solution in the short term with the opportunity to develop a longer term, more robust and sustainable model for protecting the public as the landscape settles.
5. Any solution will require credible leadership. The options for the longer term considered in the report raise complex issues, including whether the coordination model should be designed for all eventualities or a lighter touch. We think the former is preferable, and would welcome feedback on this.
6. Additionally, the operational structures for counter terrorism and serious and organised crime both have traceable links through the decision-making structures for national security.² This is not true of arrangements for coordination of the police response to civil emergencies including public disorder. This gap needs to be filled in any short or longer term solution.

² See Appendix C.

The necessity for effective national coordination

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 As discussed above, both of these operational structures have a traceable link through the decision-making structures for national security. The same linkage is not true of arrangements for the coordination of the police response to civil emergencies, including public disorder. However, forces will continue to face such issues that go beyond their borders and their individual capacity, as well as other threats which have a national or international dimension. This gap needs to be filled. Furthermore there are issues which it is more efficient and economical to deal with collectively. A fit-for-purpose coordinating mechanism is not yet in place to mobilise police resources to assist individual forces facing severe challenges, such as a civil emergency or serious public disorder. There is no reason to believe the threats set out in the SPR or the National Risk Register (NRR) will become less pressing in the future.
8. We have commissioned and carried out work to compare the situation in England and Wales with that in other countries. The clearest point arising from this is that in many other countries a wider range of specialist policing functions are carried out at the national level, compared to the quite distinct model of devolved policing in the UK.³ England and Wales police forces are 'all-purpose' forces which provide a very broad spectrum of policing services. This makes it all the more important that forces are able to work together effectively and quickly to meet challenges beyond their individual capacity.
9. The complexity of cooperation between forces the SPR requires is demonstrated by:
 - the range of potential serious threats we face, articulated in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the SPR itself;
 - the volume of CT operations⁴ and civil emergencies,⁵ the increasing use of the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR)⁶ and the number of times Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) resources have been used;⁷

³ See Appendix D

⁴ See Appendix E

⁵ See Appendix F

- the speed with which modern emergencies can develop, as demonstrated by the use of social media during the disturbances in August 2011;
 - the range of specialist but essential national operational or quasi-operational functions that have been delivered by ACPO centrally (or on behalf of all forces by a lead force, e.g. the Police National Information Coordination Centre (PNICC) and NaBIS, the National Ballistic Intelligence Service); and
 - the 54 police services potentially capable of being involved in mutual support, cooperating with 48 fire and rescue authorities, 15 ambulance services and 42 local resilience fora (in England and Wales).
10. Given the effect of austerity measures to reduce the public deficit, police forces may, in general, have fewer specialist resources on which to call. They must, therefore, have access to efficient and prompt arrangements for mutual aid. There are already significant specialist functions that are either centrally delivered in a more cost-effective way than by individual forces, or for which operational advantages are secured by all contributing information to a single system (such as for fingerprints and ballistics, DNA and criminal records).
11. Any models for national coordination in England and Wales need to consider and accommodate Scotland and Northern Ireland. No-one can predict when or where the next major incident or civil emergency may fall. Such a crisis may need a nationwide response. As demonstrated in August 2011, provision already exists for mutual support across national boundaries.⁶
12. Policing is nationally organised for specialist environments such as borders and ports; transport; defence; and civil nuclear sites. The SPR recognises that it is necessary in the public interest to have the capability to mobilise police resources, on a national basis, so as to assist individual forces facing severe challenges in a civil emergency or circumstances of serious public disorder.
13. Given these factors, it is the conclusion of this review that a fit-for-purpose coordinating mechanism, referred to as the 'SPoCC' in this report, is essential to make

⁶ See Appendix G

⁷ See Appendix H

⁸ s98 Police Act 1996 provides that police officers provided under cross-border aid agreements to forces in different jurisdictions, have the powers of constables in that jurisdiction.

more effective and efficient use of the assets (both uniformed and specialist) available nationally.

Characteristics of effective national policing coordination

14. British policing rests on a base of operationally independent, locally accountable police forces. National structures have therefore to be justified on the basis of need. This report proposes a condition of 'necessity' for national coordination, together with a number of key characteristics by which the future management and location of nationally coordinated functions can be assessed.
15. A national policing function must be necessary in the public interest to:
 - help maintain public safety and security in the face of serious national threats (often with international roots) as set out in the SPR and the National Risk Register (NRR); or
 - be a cost effective way of delivering the policing function on behalf of all forces.
16. The characteristics of national coordination proposed are:
 - legitimacy;
 - capability;
 - resilience; and
 - sustainability.

Legitimacy

17. The key components to ensure legitimacy of the function are:
 - adequate operational controls, oversight, and accountability either to Ministers or to an independent statutory body;
 - transparency of operation, in a way which has the regard, respect and confidence ('buy-in') of Ministers (and, as appropriate, Ministers in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly); of PCCs in England and Wales; and, in professional terms, of chief constables through Chief Constables' Council (CCC), in the new policing landscape;
 - the authority, in legislation or through formal agreement, to draw upon the necessary national capability and make decisions (e.g. prioritisation in the use of resources) to deliver the outcomes required.

18. In a major emergency, operational decisions are taken and national policing priorities set under the strategic oversight of COBR for which Ministers are accountable. Ministers will also be accountable to Parliament for the design and preparation of the most appropriate arrangements for protecting the public. If agreement can be reached under s23 of the Police Act 1996 on the leadership role of the Senior Police Officer coordinating the response through the SPoCC, this would have been reached through consultation with PCCs and chief officers, and thus have a measure of democratic legitimacy. If such agreement cannot be reached, there is no alternative mechanism for PCCs, chief constables and the Government to clarify and attribute the required responsibilities and accountabilities. In time, no doubt, a forum for PCCs may emerge.

Capability

19. Any policing function carried out at a national level must be organised so as to be done reliably and effectively. In relation to the SPoCC, it must have as a minimum:
- mechanisms which link effectively to forces, other bluelight services and stakeholders (e.g. Government's crisis management mechanisms and local resilience fora);
 - access to information and intelligence systems (to understand existing and predict emerging threats and demands);
 - visible leadership, trained staff, a fixed location, and IT support;
 - 24/7 availability and timeliness of response with escalation potential; and
 - the capability to cultivate and maintain corporate memory.

Once established, other functions may be added in the interests of securing greater effectiveness and efficiency.

Resilience

20. The function must have the ability to sustain operations over an extended period and have adequate business resilience to continue to provide the function in the face of disruption.

Sustainability

21. The function is at the heart of the owning organisation's mission and is not an optional add-on to main business. It needs to be embedded in the fabric of policing, giving it longevity and sustainability of operation over time. In itself, it can provide value for money for the tax payer because it uses fewer assets to operate than would be

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required if every force undertook this coordination. It should also make more efficient use of assets available nationally and influence the training and planning of specialist responses Service-wide.

Effective operational coordination

Learning the lessons of the failure in coordination in August 2011

22. Experience in August 2011 demonstrates the extent of the potential risk to public safety and security – and to Ministerial and Police Service reputations – from not having adequate coordinating mechanisms in place to meet escalating or multiple demands.
23. PNICC is essentially a ‘peacetime’ organisation geared to deal with demand for coordination in circumstances where there is adequate notice of need (such as industrial disputes).⁹ Feedback from chief officers confirms this. A ‘snapshot in time’ of PNICC activity demonstrates the demands routinely placed on the unit.¹⁰

S31 LAW ENFORCEMENT REDACTION:

24. However, the events of August 2011 underlined that PNICC, as a system, has come to occupy its current role as a result of successive decisions taken in earlier and different circumstances. As a result it has limited scope for mustering resources in emergency situations because it was not designed to do so and its connections to forces are not regularly exercised. It also has a limited capacity itself to scale up to meet large-scale

⁹ For example: serial murder in Suffolk 2006; foot and mouth outbreak Surrey 2007; mutual aid for EDL march in Bedfordshire 2011;

¹⁰ A three-month period in 2011 was chosen to avoid Olympic and public disorder requirements

emergency demands, and inadequate access to the kind of information and intelligence which it would need if it were to make decisions on the allocation of resources. If it were to continue in its pre-Olympic form it would not, for the same reasons, be able in the future to manage the national threats laid out in the SPR.

25. In response to the crisis in August 2011, individual forces sought regional assistance, which is the routine approach used over many years. Many succeeded: but some struggled and public confidence was lost as a result. PNICC was mobilised on day three of the disorder (Monday 8 August). Once fully operational, and in the days that followed, it supplied up to a quarter of the PSUs deployed nationally, which supplemented force PSUs and those raised through local arrangements.¹¹
26. Behind these issues lay a failure of the corporate memory which should have enabled the Police Service to foresee that disorder could arise, grow and be repeated around the country, and triggered contingency planning against such a possibility. We see real advantage for the future in having a properly staffed and equipped centre to meet operational need and ensure contingency plans are in place.
27. By way of contrast to the functionality provided by PNICC, the Fire and Rescue Service provides 24/7 arrangements for coordination, access to logistical information and national situational awareness, thus enabling the management of logistics with clear and identifiable leadership. Similarly, the military has 24/7 capability, readily scaleable staffing, access to logistical information and clarity of command.

The example of the Olympics

28. In recognition of the Home Secretary's guarantee of a safe and secure Olympic Games, all the necessary mechanisms for national police coordination have been put in place – but only for Games Time.¹² A lasting legacy can be obtained to meet the SPR requirements from the significant investment already made as part of the Olympics security programme. Given the limitations of 'business as usual' as

¹¹ 23% of mutual aid requirements were met through PNICC

¹² The Games period runs from the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games on 27th July until the closing ceremony for the Paralympic Games on 9th September 2012, although the National Olympic Coordination Centre has been operational since the Torch Relay began.

experienced in August 2011, special arrangements have been made for police coordination for the Torch Relay and Games Time.

29. These arrangements include:

- a much enhanced PNICC function staffed 24/7, with specially designed web planning software (e.g. Mercury);
- a 24/7 National Olympic Coordination Centre (NOCC) in Scotland Yard under a National Olympic Security Coordinator (NOSC), fully equipped with IT and web-enabled systems which collate information nationally and look ahead to forthcoming Olympics-related events;
- a 24/7 Olympic Intelligence Centre (OIC) informing the NOCC, supported by specialist social media monitoring capability in an All Source Hub (ASH);
- well-rehearsed procedures with COBR to ensure that a fully-informed policing view is provided on the coordination of the overall security situation and response in the event of a major incident; and
- proper infrastructure support in terms of IT and connectivity to the wider Police Service, other bluelight responders, the military and many other Olympic stakeholders.

S31 LAW ENFORCEMENT REDACTION:

30. Mercury provides a planning tool to enable specialist police reinforcements to be sourced and supplied centrally. However, it does not track assets in real time. In parallel, the CT Network has developed a different software tool called Establishment and Skills Availability Tracker (ESAT) which provides information on the resources, skills and availability *****S23. It provides resource information which supports the CT Network tasking and coordination process. *****

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31. The Olympic example illustrates well the type of functionality required to meet the demands for police coordination to cope with the type and level of threats in the SPR. The Torch Relay is an example of better coordination of police resources and command and control across boundaries. This experience should inform future coordination arrangements. If Ministers agree Part Two of this Review should take place, we will look at the reality of coordination during and after the Games and will use this to inform a final report in the autumn.

The functionality of effective national coordination

The aim of an effective national policing coordination function

32. Current ACPO Guidance¹³ reflects the experience that significant disruptive challenges come in two forms:
- ‘sudden impact’ (such as terrorist attacks, flash floods, riots or industrial accidents) where the response has to be very rapid to save life and protect property; and
 - ‘rising tide’ where either warning is available (such as industrial disruption where, by law, notice has to be given) or where the national response can build more gradually (such as coping with foot and mouth outbreaks).
33. The more severe risks (covering both malicious threats and natural hazards) covered in Part 1 of the SPR tend to be of the ‘sudden impact’ variety where little or no advance warning may be available.
34. Past experience and the potential threats the nation faces provide a convincing argument that local police forces will continue to need the support of their peers in a crisis. For this support to be provided in a timely and effective way, a national coordinating function that is fit for purpose will be required.
35. Moreover, effective coordination must:
- be responsive to the new, devolved policing landscape (e.g. PCCs, the SPR, etc);
 - be informed by the Government’s assessment of threats to our national security (i.e. through links with the intelligence and information machinery);
 - have the capability and capacity to predict, and agility to adapt to, the changing landscape of emerging threats and risks; and
 - be able in the future to coordinate a multi-disciplinary response across a wide range of threats

¹³ ACPO Guidance on Emergency Procedures, 2009

36. The overall aim must be to deliver an improved level of response in crisis (whether that is at local, regional or national level) to protect the public and minimise the impact on local policing. In 'business as usual' terms, it could provide the home for some existing ACPO and other policing functions in order to provide cost effective provision of services nationally. The nature of the coordination required needs to be clear, we prefer a model that can deal with all eventualities, i.e. fast as well as slow-time events, and make decisions amongst competing needs. The SPoCC will need to:

- access near real-time information and intelligence about critical events or emergencies;
- provide information on the availability of specialist assets, supported by a networked IT logistics system with capability beyond a simple planning tool and reliable single points of contact in police forces and other agencies;
- broker mutual support, using the logistics system to track real-time availability of individuals and their skills;
- track the implementation of such requests being executed, or that are taking place between neighbouring forces or at a regional level, and thus the ability to maintain situational awareness on behalf of the senior police representative at COBR;
- prioritise requests, authoritatively when necessary, based on having good situational awareness and taking account where necessary of strategic direction from COBR;
- plan ahead with the relevant Gold Commands and other stakeholders (i.e. forces, local resilience fora, etc) based on having access to an all-source intelligence hub which includes the results of social media monitoring. This would be in two parts – both 'peace time' planning and 'in crisis';
- compile debrief reports and draw out lessons learned to inform its future development and support for operations, planning, concepts of operation, doctrine and definitions; and
- manage and deliver those functions that deliver cost-effective cross-cutting services for the Police Service (e.g. UK DVI and the Central Referral Unit).

Possible routes to effective national coordination

37. The pre-Olympics PNICC arrangement has been shown to be insufficient for the times we live in. We have examined three basic models for the SPoCC providing different levels of 'business as usual' readiness. All assume that Mercury (with appropriate enhancements) will remain available as the basic planning tool. The indicative costs of these models, for adapting existing Olympic infrastructure or for bringing in coordination functions currently carried out elsewhere (e.g. UK DVI), are dealt with later in this report.

Option 1: 'New PNICC' model

38. A small organisation based upon the pre-Olympic PNICC model with minimum staff levels for 'business as usual', with 24/7 coverage being met on a call-out basis. It should also have:
- surge capability and capacity provided by trained staff from forces; and
 - improved communication links with forces.

Option 2: 'SPoCC' model

39. A reduced scale Olympics-type coordination centre, reusing the NOCC/Olympics PNICC facilities and IT investment with 24/7 coverage on a call-out basis:
- working to a dedicated chief officer (e.g. an assistant chief constable) to establish the new arrangement and engage forces and Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) at an appropriate level for planning purposes;
 - surge capability provided by trained staff from forces;
 - permanent staff to engage in planning with police forces, other blue light services, the military and CCS; and
 - established links to the ASH to enable early decisions to be made on standing up the full organisation. Ideally the SPoCC and the ASH would be co-located, thus making good use of the existing NOCC accommodation.¹⁴

¹⁴ Strategic public order intelligence and the ASH functionality are fundamental to the effective working of the SPoCC. A decision on the future role of the NDEU and ASH in public order has been deferred until after the Olympics.

Option 3: 'Full Olympics' model

40. As Option 2, with the additional capability currently provided for the Olympics in the NOCC/Olympics PNICC of:
- 24/7 operations and the capability to maintain a common operational picture with on-duty staff;
 - liaison officers from the other bluelight services, *****S23**, etc; and
 - an enhanced planning capability.
41. Under any model, the optimum location for the SPoCC is in central London within easy reach of COBR and the developing ASH. Options 2 and 3 could use the Olympic-funded accommodation provided in New Scotland Yard for the NOCC, preferably co-located with the ASH. London and the MPS already provide the home for the Olympics, so it is existing functionality. In terms of 'ownership', it could either be a part of the MPS or 'in but not of' New Scotland Yard.
42. Applying the characteristics for a capability to make more efficient use of assets available nationally enables these options for the scale of the SPoCC to be assessed. A final assessment of 'Legitimacy' will also be affected by where the SPoCC sits and the 'ownership' of the function (see table on the following page).

Our preferred model

43. Option 2 is the preferred model of this review and, given the Olympic investment already made, we consider that it should be based at New Scotland Yard. This option builds on the experience of the Olympics but with scaled down staffing. However, to make the SPoCC fully capable does require the link to intelligence and progress with the current standardisation initiative (the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme) in order to ensure that police forces are all operating to common operational concepts and doctrine. We consider that this option will fill the key gaps in effective coordination apparent in August 2011.

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	Legitimacy (Depends on ownership, but additional comments are:)	Capability	Resilience	Sustainability
'New PNICC'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> May lack the confidence of Ministers, wider police service and partners due to legacy of August 2011. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lacks the necessary staffing level to take on additional functions (e.g. the existing ACPO national functions) Lacks links to information and intelligence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lacks the necessary staffing level Immediate reliance on surge resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lowest cost option. Questionable whether this would be embedded business
'SPoCC'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dedicated leadership Buy-in from PCCs/chief constables 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sufficient staffing for business as usual and scope to surge Linked to information and intelligence to provide forward look Link to other blue light services, etc 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sufficient staff for initial response Reliance on surge to meet sustained extraordinary demand 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinating function embedded in a dedicated unit. Middle cost option
'Full Olympics'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PCCs and chief constables may see this as excessive national coordination (i.e. lacks 'buy in') 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sufficient staffing for business as usual and scope to surge Linked to information and intelligence Embedded liaison from other blue light services, etc 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fully staffed. Sufficient resilience to deal with the most serious 'sudden impact' crises. Surge capacity only required in extremis. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinating function embedded in a dedicated unit. Highest cost option.

Key	Less fitted to characteristics	Adequate fit with characteristics	Good fit to characteristics
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Authority for effective national coordination

S42 LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE REDACTION:

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45. A function providing effective coordination across national policing in the future (including those units considered in this review) will need ownership within the new landscape. Irrespective of the model adopted, an effective national coordinating function will need to have the support and authority to act on behalf of the Police Service nationally. Any national cooperative function is likely to require PCCs and chief officers to cede some authority to allow local resources to be used in the national good (subject to a legislative framework).
46. In summary, effective national coordination needs an accountable person, in an accountable body, making decisions on the use of publicly funded resources.
47. It is worth highlighting that irrespective of any national agreements, chief constables will always retain accountability for their force areas, although not necessarily for the actions of their officers outside those areas.¹⁵ Furthermore, in a national crisis, the Home Secretary will have power to direct the provision of assistance in the interests of public safety or order where there is disagreement about whether resources should be mobilised, or where there is not time to establish voluntary agreement (s24(2) Police Act 1996).
48. Senior professional police leadership for the SPoCC will be essential to gain the necessary buy-in within the policing sector, especially if an emergency requires judgments to be made about priorities for mutual assistance and professional advice to be presented to COBR.

¹⁵ Where resources from one force are provided to another in mutual aid circumstances or under an express clause in an s23 agreement, the receiving force acquires responsibility for those resources (ss23 and 24 Police Act 1996).

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49. The choice of ownership for the model of coordination chosen (the SPoCC) will be influenced by two considerations: the strength of the legal basis for action and accountability of the 'owner'; and an operationally credible 'owner' organisation.

Ownership and organisation

50. We have considered a number of possible options for providing an 'organisational' owner with a legal foundation for action:
- a legal agreement under s23 Police Act 1996 (possibly supported by a s94 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 agreement to set levels of performance);
 - a voluntary agreement;
 - adaptation of the legal provisions governing the *****S23**; and
 - adaptation of the legal provisions governing the College of Policing.
51. These options need to be considered in respect of their long-term legal responsibility, and the range of potential owners:
- a lead force (including the current arrangements for counter terrorism);
 - the *****S23**;
 - the College of Policing;
 - a host force arrangement; or
 - a Government department i.e. Home Office or Cabinet Office.

a) A statutory agreement on ownership

52. Under s23 of the Police Act 1996, which was originally intended to provide a basis for collaborative arrangements between two or more forces, chief constables with the consent of the police authority (or PCC in the future) can reach a statutory collaborative agreement on the delivery of any police function (in this case national coordination). Those provisions also include a power for the Home Secretary to direct agreement for a specified police function to be exercised in relation to all or some

police areas.¹⁶ Securing statutory agreements will be challenging, not least because of the number of individual forces and PCCs involved.

53. Entering into a legal agreement, properly constructed, could provide:
- legitimacy in law and legal protections;
 - a defined governance, accountability and liability mechanism;
 - clarity and flexibility about what functions will be delivered and funding; and
 - a mechanism to resolve conflict where issues of territory are concerned (e.g. where it is necessary to prioritise one area for mutual aid over another).
54. Any agreement under s23 may be strengthened by a direction under s94 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. This provides that the Secretary of State can agree with a PCC or with MOPAC the levels of performance to be achieved by a police force to deliver national or international functions.
55. This approach could provide the basis for ownership by any of the options. It may however take some time to put into effect given the imminent change to governance arrangements through the introduction of PCCs.

b) A voluntary agreement

56. The present PNICC is overseen by the ACPO Chief of Staff, who is accountable to the ACPO President. This voluntary arrangement sees chief constables (through ACPO) agree how national coordination will operate.
57. Operationally, the new SPoCC capability could be managed by an operational National Coordinator of Chief Officer rank by agreement through CCC. There would be options for where the SPoCC was housed (e.g. in a lead force or in some other body), and the functions undertaken and the governance structure would be part of the agreement. However, such a voluntary agreement could be subject to legal challenge.

¹⁶ *“(the Act) sets out a strong duty for both police and crime commissioners and chief constables to collaborate where it would be in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness... (the proposed new section 23FA will allow the Home Secretary) to specify by order particular policing functions that must be provided collaboratively by all forces, supporting the services’ call for a stronger coordinating drive from the centre on collaboration areas of strategic importance”*. Policing Minister Hansard February 08 2011.

c) Adaptation of the legal provisions governing the *S23**

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d) Adaptation of the legal provisions governing the College of Policing

59. If the College of Policing is created as it is currently planned, it will be non-operational.

Lead force ownership

60. In this option, a lead force is designated to manage the SPoCC on behalf of all forces, either through an s23 or a voluntary agreement (of the type which is already used in the CT Network and for some existing ACPO units). To deliver this:

- the chief constable of a force would oversee and be responsible for the SPoCC's operation, and it would therefore be subsumed in existing force operational arrangements;
- the CC would line manage the ACC Head of SPoCC (if in place), and where necessary represent the Police Service in COBR on the overall police response to the emergency; and
- accountability and independent oversight would rest with the relevant PCC/MOPAC.

61. A lead force would also have operational credibility. However, the agreement would need to provide for objective decision-making around priorities in the use of resources if that force were to be affected by the civil emergency.

62. It would be possible, given the investment necessary and a guarantee of continuing support, to locate the SPoCC in any force with sufficient size to provide the resilience and organisational structures necessary. However, this review considers the SPoCC needs to be located close to the heart of Government and within easy reach of COBR. Hence the only sensible location for the SPoCC would be with the Metropolitan Police at New Scotland Yard. There are two options for leadership: either the MPS would be the lead force and the Commissioner would be responsible for its operation (even

where the crisis did not affect London); or it could be lead by a chief constable of a force from outside London who would be responsible for the SPoCC within New Scotland Yard (i.e. 'in, not of' the MPS).

63. If the Metropolitan Police Service were to be chosen as lead force in terms of ownership, the possibility exists in the future to link the SPoCC with the ACPO CT Coordination Centre (ACTCC). Such a linkage would be strengthened by the units' co-location in New Scotland Yard. The ACTCC coordinates and directs CT resources towards priorities set by the Senior National Coordinator (SNC), an MPS officer. The CT Network is a variant of the lead force model since nationally-funded resources are in regional units which are managed within lead forces, but authority to coordinate and direct them rests with the SNC through the agreement of chief constables.
64. Locating the SPoCC alongside and linked to the ACTCC, under the authority of another National Coordinator, could mirror the existing governance structure, but with a 'firewall' to protect sensitive information in the ACTCC:
- This would create a unit that could deal with a wider spectrum of threats.
 - The Commissioner (through the MPS management structure) would line manage the head of SPoCC and represent the police service in COBR (when necessary) on the overall police response to the emergency.
 - It would build on existing structures and co-location (e.g. it could use the existing NOCC accommodation at New Scotland Yard) which would provide ease of communication and speed of decision making (e.g. securing resources to deal with a multi-sited CT incident).
65. However, coordination of CT resources is driven by national CT priorities. This 'bolt-on' function could represent an unnecessary distraction at the present 'Substantial' level of CT threat. The approach to CT will be subject of a detailed review after the Olympics,
- *** **
- *****S23. It may be premature to build the SPoCC alongside CT at this time.

*****S23 ownership**

66. S23 INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY, OR CONCERNING, CERTAIN SECURITY BODIES

67. S23 INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY, OR CONCERNING, CERTAIN SECURITY BODIES

68. S23 INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY, OR CONCERNING, CERTAIN SECURITY BODIES

69. S23 INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY, OR CONCERNING, CERTAIN SECURITY BODIES

70. S23 INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY, OR CONCERNING, CERTAIN SECURITY BODIES

College of Policing ownership

71. If the concept of the College of Policing were to change, there may be advantage in linking the more 'academic' work of the College of Policing on doctrine and standards with the practical responsibilities for the SPoCC:
- The SPoCC could be a stand-alone business area.
 - Accountability would exist through the relevant Board governance.
 - The Chief Executive Officer would line manage the head of the SPoCC and advise COBR as necessary (but there may be legitimacy/credibility issues if this person is not a chief constable).
72. However, the combination of a policy and accreditation function, allied with an acute operational responsibility, may be challenging to engineer and would be at variance with Ministers' current intention. It remains to be seen whether a College of Policing SPoCC could generate the necessary buy-in for this task from PCCs and chief constables.
73. Aside from the non-operational remit, the College, in its current form, is not intended to provide an embedded operating environment into which a unit like the SPoCC can be seen to flourish.
74. It is important that the SPoCC is not viewed as an annex or only for serious use occasionally. It needs to be close to near real-time intelligence and information, developments in police forces and the preparation for events to ensure that its coordinating activities are relevant. It is not easy to envisage how the SPoCC could be accommodated within the College for these reasons; its development would also entail significant extra costs for infrastructure and re-location from the current NOCC.
75. It is likely that even if leadership by the College were considered, the SPoCC would remain in the MPS. In leadership terms, for this option to remain open and viable the Chief Executive would have to be a senior serving chief constable. There are some complexities around this: for example, it is unlikely that a chief constable could be seconded from a territorial force without raising other issues. However, provision could

be made in law if this were considered the best arrangement in the new policing landscape in the medium term.

Considerations regarding the MPS as host force

76. Under our preferred SPoCC level of capability, the head of the SPoCC would preferably be an officer of assistant chief constable rank, and would:
- oversee the SPoCC, which would (under our preferred option) be located in New Scotland Yard, where the MPS could have responsibility for the IT, communications and support services for the function (and no more) on repayment (i.e. 'in, not of' the MPS); and
 - act and operate with the consent of chief constables, and represent the Police Service in COBR.
77. 'Hosting' by the MPS is our preferred option but may be held, by some, to lack legitimacy in terms of authority as it would not have direct, independent oversight. This could be mitigated by designing a structure that ensures the head of SPoCC is accountable. This would depend on the individual being considered and could be explored in more detail in Part Two of this Review. It would require the agreement of the Commissioner to provide the resilience of a permanent and embedded unit within NSY (i.e. the unit would be 'in, not of' the MPS) for which the MPS did not have operational control.

Cabinet Office/Home Office ownership

78. This option for ownership has been raised with us during this review. The SPoCC capability could be set up within central Government, underpinned either by the Secretary of State's powers to direct collaboration, or by a voluntary agreement. The obvious choices would be the Home Office or the Cabinet Office, within which the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) sits. The Home Office has responsibility in Government for policing matters and the CCS works in partnership with government departments, the devolved administrations and others to enhance the UK's ability to prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies. Even if the SPoCC were owned by a government department reporting to a secretary of state, there would be no need for it to be physically located within the department.
79. If the SPoCC were to be attached to the CCS, the Secretariat would probably need a more operational remit beyond planning, delivery of improved resilience, capability

enhancement, and horizon scanning. In any event, were there to be issues arising from a SPoCC-coordinated incident (for example, around adequacy, deployment or use of equipment, tactics used, or conduct of the police) it would be the Home Secretary who would report on these matters to Parliament.

80. However, locating the SPoCC within a government department would only make sense if it were directly accountable to the relevant secretary of state. While the NCA will be directly accountable to the Home Secretary for all its functions, making the SPoCC (as a national coordinating body for national operational policing functions) accountable to a secretary of state would put that individual close to high-profile operational policing decisions. This needs to be seen within the context of police reform towards greater localism and less Whitehall involvement.

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Making the SPoCC directly accountable to a government department could raise constitutional issues unless carefully framed to preserve the independence of operational decision making and lessen any perception of political control or interference. The option could also make cross-border mutual aid between English and Welsh forces and Scotland problematic, as decisions which are currently taken on operational grounds might take on a political dimension.

81. We believe that the issues set out above militate strongly against the option of locating the SPoCC within a government department.

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	Legitimacy	Capability	Resilience	Sustainability
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lead force Host force 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chief constable or Commissioner Authoritative person (Chair of CCC) may require legal underpinning Assets ceded to the MPS ('in, not of') Potential issue with buy in from PCCs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Established Can be designed into a reliable operation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can be designed in Assumes MPS taking a lead role and providing staff for surge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Essential for police to CCC exists to make public protection operational Dedicated infrastructure (i.e.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> S23 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> S23 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> S23 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> S23 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> S23
College of Policing	<p>not a policing body (As currently configured)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CEO as authoritative person but not legal status of chief constable Will have national governance but not yet in place No buy-in as it is non-operational 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> College of Policing does not exist and plans yet to develop Current plans do not envisage operational role 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not as currently configured Would have to import staff for surge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not have operational coordination at the heart of their mission (bolt on)

Key	Less fitted to characteristics	Adequate fit with characteristics	Good fit to characteristics
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Leadership and supporting legal authority

82. We have given consideration to the requirement for the leader of the SPoCC to have credibility. In addition to legal legitimacy, we think the office holder with ultimate responsibility for the coordinating function must meet three tests:

- Independent – demonstrably so from other influences in making operational decisions.
- Focussed – when the occasion demands, able to make this role their principal focus, without other pressures.
- Expertise – operational credibility in policing.

83. There are a number of possible options:

- a chief constable who is a chief officer of a police force;
- Chair of CCC;
- *** S23
- CEO of the College of Policing.

However, the choice of option is constrained by the question of legal authority.

Leadership tests – independence and credibility

Chief constable

84. All chief constables are ultimately responsible for a specific policing area and so would have operational credibility. They would be expected to behave in a professional way in making decisions about the allocation of resources.

Chair of CCC

85. As a chief constable, elected by their peers in CCC, the Chair would have the same operational credibility and, arguably, greater perceived independence. Additionally, the emerging role of CCC is to operationalise national effect within the new policing landscape. The current Chair of CCC is the President of ACPO, who holds the rank but not the office of chief constable as set out in the Police Act 1996 as amended (i.e. this post is not associated with a geographical area).

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CEO of the College of Policing

87. We are aware that the Home Secretary has announced that the new CEO will be “an experienced senior police officer”,¹⁷ but at the time of reporting the organisation is not intended to have an operational role. Direction and control issues also arise as the CEO will not be a serving chief constable with responsibility for a local area within the meaning of the Police Act 1996, as amended. In addition, the organisation itself is being designed to provide non-operational support to the Police Service. See also paras 71–5 above.

88. These judgments may be represented as follows:

	Independence	Focus	Expertise
Chief constable		???	
Chair of CCC			
*** ** S23			
CEO College of Policing	???	???	???

Key	Less fitted to characteristics	Adequate fit with characteristics	Good fit to characteristics
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¹⁷ Police professional body - written ministerial statement, 16 July 2012

Legal authority to support leadership

89. The policing landscape is in transition and there are a number of different avenues to provide a legal basis for national functions:

- an agreement under s23 Police Act 1996 (possibly supported by a s94 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 agreement to set levels of performance);
- voluntary agreements (e.g. PNICC);
- the hybrid arrangements for counter terrorism;
- *** ** S23; and
- policy proposals for the College of Policing.

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92. A chief constable with territorial responsibility, however, would require significant support within their own force to enable them to focus as far as possible on the common good. Such an arrangement has been found wanting in the past and is unlikely (for a variety of reasons) to be entirely satisfactory in the future.
93. Alternatively, in the long term, the status of the Chair of CCC could be altered by legislation to underpin a full-time national coordination responsibility, unencumbered by territorial accountabilities and concerns. CCC is currently chaired by the ACPO President and has been operating in some form since at least 1948. However, it does not derive its authority from ACPO's status as a company limited by guarantee but from the collective contribution of chief constables who have local accountability. In the case of the Chair of CCC, it is not impossible to conceive a line of accountability to the Protective Services Board – for design and preparation purposes, and to COBR – for the execution of any 'co-ordination' operation.
94. In an emergency, Parliament will expect Ministers to account for action taken to protect the public. If a situation arose in which no agreement could be reached, or if in an emergency there was disagreement about whether or how resources should be provided for mutual aid, the Home Secretary has reserve powers, under ss23 and 24 of the Police Act 1996, to direct agreement or the use of resources to respond. This issue needs to be fully explored and rehearsed by Ministers, officials and police, but we expect that such powers would be used only in the most exceptional circumstances.
95. The current scheme, PNICC, operating under the umbrella of ACPO has some advantages: the system has grown up to deal with specific requirements, and is well known to forces who operationally have 'bought in' to this way of doing business. However, because this arrangement is grounded in an entirely pragmatic approach aimed at responding to the need for national coordination, the accountability and governance arrangements are less clear. When considering how national coordination could be improved, there are clear benefits in retaining something that is already recognisable and, importantly, is likely to achieve the approval of forces.
96. It has been suggested that we look to the role of the National Olympic Security Co-ordinator (NOSC) as a new model for national co-ordination. It has many strengths, not least of which is the fact that the individual is a serving independent chief constable

(assistant commissioner) with responsibility for territory and acknowledged expertise, operating following an agreement reached by chief constables. But it should also be remembered that the NOSC has been 'designated' by the Home Secretary for co-ordination purposes specifically to meet Olympic obligations and supported by forces under a consensus arrangement secured for a once-in-a-lifetime challenge. Additionally, the Olympics is a pre-planned event, which is time limited and not attached to a particular territory; the focus of the Olympic Coordinator is dedicated to the Olympics without other distractions.

97. In contrast, national coordination that is underpinned by a collaboration agreement under s23 (etc) has advantages in the context of clear accountability and transparency. If choices have to be made with limited assets then in order to operate within a statutory framework, a chief individual the direction and control required to make decisions about the disposition of resources across England and Wales. An agreement of this nature adds security to national operations and is less susceptible to local decisions about whether or not to cooperate with demands that may conflict with the priorities of local policing. Accountabilities would then be made clear and, provided the s23 agreement is carefully constructed, would allow sufficient flexibility to cope with changing demands. As the law (the 1996 Act) stands at present, however, that chief constable would have to be in control of a force. Unless legal changes were to be made to underpin the role of Chair of CCC, in effect this restricts the solution to the lead force model.
98. It is under such a model that the ACTCC co-ordinates resources within the CT Network. ACTCC is situated within New Scotland Yard and lead through an MPS line management structure that includes the Senior National Co-ordinator (CT), Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO) and the Commissioner. Independent oversight existed under the Metropolitan Police Authority and this responsibility has now transferred to MOPAC.
99. A lead force model, however, brings challenges. It is likely that, for entirely pragmatic reasons, the MPS would be the only realistic choice as a lead force. (As discussed above, in the past the Chair of CCC, currently the ACPO President, might have taken that responsibility but that post is no longer held by a chief constable in charge of a force area and is therefore outside the definition of chief constable set out in s23 etc.) There is no guarantee that an s23 agreement would be easy to forge quickly. Such an approach is likely to attract debate across the sector or with MOPAC, and there is no guarantee of universal buy-in. Nevertheless, an s23 agreement is worth pursuing in the

longer term if a settled, transparent arrangement for national coordination is to find its feet. Ideally a coherent legal architecture would be created to suit the future requirements of the emerging national landscape.

100. In terms of leadership there may be scope to configure the various options in a way that improves their suitability; but, at this stage, we consider that the option of locating the SPoCC in a Government Department with the Secretary of State accountable for it should not be considered further. Changing the remit of the *****S23** of the *****S23** or CEO of the College of Policing are both possibilities but for the reasons outlined may not be optimal in terms of independence, credibility or their readiness to undertake the role. In our eyes, this leaves the chief constable who is a chief officer of a police force, or the Chair of CCC.

The need for an interim solution

101. In the light of the potential for challenge, there is an imperative to begin a process to secure s23 agreement for national functions or other legal underpinning; but this will take time to achieve. In the short term, an interim solution is required. We think there are two options, (unless the remit of the College of Policing or *****S23** changes) both of which require additional work to provide a durable answer:

- Accept the status quo of the voluntary arrangement, with the Chair of CCC providing the lead for SPoCC, which is situated in the MPS.¹⁸ This option would have the support of current chief constables but does carry a potential risk of legal challenge (because of the way the current Chair's role is defined), accountability issues (which could begin to be addressed), and the need for the SPoCC to be accommodated in the MPS (which the Commissioner has indicated he would support) and to relate successfully to PCCs.
- The Home Secretary to nominate the Commissioner on an interim basis. This would need to be discussed with the MOPAC,¹⁹ chief constables and PCCs. It is more legally secure, within an accountability framework and strong operating environment. Provision would need to be made for this work to

¹⁸ ACPO has indicated an intention to continue to operate at least for another two years; Letter from Sir Hugh Orde to Sir Denis O'Connor, 2nd July 2012.

¹⁹ MOPAC has already indicated to this Review a clear preference that the MPS should not undertake the leadership of the SPoCC.

provide the dedicated, dispassionate senior attention needed to persuade those outside London that it would operate in the common interest.

102. Ideally, the decision on leadership for the short term should be made with reference to the intended, longer term policing landscape. We also believe that, provided work has started on a permanent solution, the risks of challenge to these arrangements are manageable.
103. If the role of CCC and its Chair can be agreed, then given the current alternatives, this represents the best option for a more strongly devolved landscape. If not, the MPS is a strong option.
104. We did consider the possibility of another chief constable leading relevant work (e.g. an existing ACPO Business Area) to undertake this role whilst the unit was housed in the MPS, but this is a less satisfactory than the two options outlined.
105. In summary, national coordination functions sit uneasily within the existing arrangements and neither interim approach is risk free. However, both are capable of being strengthened as indicated.

Long-term option

106. In our view, any solution will require credible leadership and the options for the future considered in the main report all raise complex issues. It will be important to avoid any unnecessary tensions between local demands and priorities and national need by establishing the most effective, credible arrangements to integrate local and national policing to protect the public from harm. Although the decisions made in the face of these tensions may be viewed as *operational* decisions, reductions in the availability of resources for deployment locally will be a matter of legitimate concern for PCCs. This needs to be acknowledged.
107. The SPR does provide valuable guidance so that PCCs/forces must have regard to that requirement in their planning processes, but as a precaution, we have considered the scenario where the coordination of assets made available for national use, is not agreed and direction and control, of those available, is necessary. These would be exceptional circumstances, but we think it important to consider the effective working of the SPoCC for all eventualities, in advance. We recognise that the Home Secretary retains powers of intervention but such a course is generally considered to be one of

last resort. The better course of action in these circumstances, in our view, is to enable effective operational decisions from the outset where clear responsibility and accountability mechanisms are established.

108. In the medium to longer term, the ***S23 and the College of Policing present themselves as stronger candidates but, in their current intended form, both would require significant change in terms of organisational remit (they are not conceived as operational *policing* bodies but as the providers of specialist services); the legal status of their leadership (i.e. ability to 'direct and control' police resources, presently requiring a Chief Constable responsible for territory as described under the Police Act 1996), changes to their expertise and principal focus (the new role is not closely allied to their core mission) and, to differing degrees, changes to their infrastructure with associated costs. Either path should aim to achieve buy-in of both PCCs and Chief Constables. All in all, they do not appear compelling at this juncture.
109. ***S23, or changes to the College of Policing²⁰ and the status of its CEO remain possibilities, then these arguments could change and we could look at these options further in Part Two of this review.
110. However, our initial conclusion for strong and effective national coordination in the longer term is that, short of significant changes to other bodies, the leadership role is best placed with an operational Chief Constable. We think, in the absence of a change of remit for the other national bodies that this should be the future Chair of CCC with appropriate legislative underpinning put in place, or a territorial Chief Constable – who in practice, we believe, could only be the Commissioner of the MPS.
111. The arguments for the *Commissioner* in terms of stature, operational capability and accountability are strong. There would be a need to secure the agreement of MOPAC, CCC and PCCs and to be assured that provision was made for a dedicated senior focus on national requirements (as opposed to the London needs which are the Commissioner's principal responsibility).
112. In the case of CCC, the emerging role (particularly in the light of developing proposals for the College of Policing) appears to be one that will focus primarily on

²⁰ e.g. its functionality was extended to operational support, as is the case at Quantico (FBI)

'operationalising' national effect. Indeed, ACPO's initial estimate is that less than a third of CCC business will be transferring to the new College. CCC's remit may then involve:

- liaising with other bodies (e.g. the College of Policing, *****S23**)
- securing agreement on the workability of new proposals
- providing a response to national consultation exercises
- identifying the best method of tackling issues
- making provision for more effective interoperability
- ensuring the coherent implementation of agreed standards and procedures
- providing a single point of contact for Government with senior Service leaders
- acting as a conduit for all strategic policing issues and fast-time challenges.

113. We recognise that CCC's role is still evolving and needs also to take account of changes in responsibility at a local level (e.g. chief constables as employers and corporation soles). Equally, matters of accountability and governance would need to be addressed, but whilst these issues are real, they are not insurmountable.
114. The *Chair of CCC* option, properly supported in law and with adequate arrangements for support in relation to territorial responsibilities (i.e. full-time or supported in his/her force so as to be free to focus), has the potential virtue of securing an individual acknowledged by his or her peers as being an independent credible operator.
115. This option would also be more likely to accord with and preserve the devolved character of British policing, as opposed to the alternative of a chief constable of a force who, we believe, could only be the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis. Moreover, a chief constable or the Commissioner could be faced with a conflict of responsibilities, seeking to brief objectively in COBR and make national decisions on priorities while also being directly responsible for law and order in their own force area.
116. Both options are less than perfect given the current law and the need to secure buy-in in a devolved landscape.
117. In practical terms, the physical location of the SPoCC should be New Scotland Yard (with ready access to COBR) even if leadership were to rest elsewhere (i.e. it would be 'in, not of' the MPS). Whatever arrangements are made for ownership of the SPoCC we believe the 'hosting' chief officer should be invited to COBR. We do, however, recognise that nationwide sign-up to the statutory framework may take some time, and

we have proposed two options for an interim arrangement to fulfil coordination requirements – but with the proviso that planning for the future begins now.

118. Changing the legal remit of the ***S23 of the ***S23 or CEO of the College of Policing are also possibilities which we have considered. We think both options present bigger challenges and do not appear compelling at this juncture because: they are not conceived as operational *policing* bodies but as the providers of specialist services; the role is not closely allied to their core mission (as presently formulated); they are not lead by a serving Chief Constable; and they are still in the early design stages and can only be expected to be fully functional in the mid to longer term. If their remit were to change – e.g. if the College of Policing functionality were extended to operational support, as is the case at Quantico (FBI) – then these arguments could shift. The changes required to enable these bodies to accommodate this role could be worked up but, realistically, not as short-term solutions.

The other ACPO units

119. Operational coordination will be the main function of the SPoCC to replace the existing PNICC. There is a range of other units and cooperative initiatives which have evolved on an ad hoc basis under the ACPO umbrella, often with funding from several sources to support local policing. These can broadly be categorised under three headings:
- Operational coordination of force assets (e.g. PNICC);
 - Cost-effective delivery of a national policing support service (e.g. National Ballistic Intelligence Service (NaBIS) and the ACPO Criminal Records Office);
 - and
 - Commercial activities (e.g. National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme (NDORS), Secured by Design).
120. We have considered the functions of the other units which currently operate under the auspices of ACPO or fulfil quasi-national functions; their mechanisms of governance and operational accountability; outcomes; and their main funding streams.²¹ Interviews conducted by HMIC for this review demonstrate that the future for all these units has yet to be confirmed. Of the 11 units considered (excluding the existing PNICC), two could provide an indication of what may happen to them in the new policing landscape; four

²¹ See Appendix J

had no plans for change; and the remainder await clarity on their future. It will continue to be effective and economical to do some policing functions nationally rather than in every force.

121. We have been asked to make recommendations as to their future. At the moment, there is a mixed economy of models in terms of governance, operational accountability and funding. In our view, in the new policing landscape, it will be harder to justify local governance to an individual PCC for national operations or products, particularly where these involve sensitive matters for the individual citizen (e.g. national criminal record statements on individual citizens obtained through the ACPO Criminal Records Office). It does not follow, as arrangements for managing local policing are changed, that all the national functions have to be forced into a single new national model, and we have tried to be practical in our consideration of where these should best be located.
122. These units have been assessed in the table below and a judgment made as to whether their current function is necessary in the long term. We have also assessed their current fit to the characteristics and make suggestions as to where they could be located in future. We have considered the SPoCC, the *****S23**, the Home Office and the College of Policing as possible homes for these units, as well as in relevant cases retaining them in a lead force where it is not likely that legitimacy would be an issue. Our suggestions are based upon a principle of 'line of sight' for the functions undertaken; this means operational activity has operational oversight, policy sits with policy makers and so on.
123. Irrespective of future location, clarity will be needed on funding so that the limits of financial liability of the host organisation is known, and the work of a unit is not adversely affected by any change in the willingness of a force to host it. We reiterate our conclusion reached on the SPoCC that where a national policing function is deemed essential in the public interest then the funding to maintain it should not depend on individual force and PCC decisions. Where use of the function is discretionary by forces then it may be possible for the variable costs to be met through a charging regime, provided that the fixed costs are met centrally (to avoid the viability of the function being held hostage to individual larger force decisions).

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	Necessity	Legitimacy	Capability	Resilience	Sustainability	Suggested future location
Operational coordination of force assets						
Disaster Victim identification (DVI)	National coordination is required	Standalone model reporting to ACPO Business Area but HO/FCO Board	Trained staff available on call out National trained cadre	Limited staffing	Not embedded in a sustainable structure, but supported by ACPO lead.	SPoCC
National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU)	Future role and function to be decided (Domestic extremism and public order)	MPS Lead force since January 2012	Resources in place but needs clarity of function	Resources in place, but possible funding issues after the Olympics. Needs clarity of function	Lead force at present (MPS Counter Terrorism Command). Awaits CT review	Lead force at present. Awaits CT review
Cost-effective delivery of a national policing service						
ACPO Criminal Records Office (ACRO)	National coordination is required for VfM	Hybrid governance for unit undertaking a national function but Lead Force arrangement for staff.	Sufficient capability to deliver functions	Of sufficient size to meet administrative functions undertaken	Generates income. Not embedded in force structures	***S23 or lead force (Hampshire)
ACPO Central Referral Unit (CRU)	National coordination is required for VfM	Reporting to ACPO Information Management Business Area	Sufficient capability to deliver functions	Of sufficient size to meet administrative functions undertaken Surge from ACRO if required	Not embedded in force structures but embedded with ACRO	SPoCC

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	Necessity	Legitimacy	Capability	Resilience	Sustainability	Suggested future location
National Ballistic Intelligence Service	National coordination is required for VfM and operational quality of service	Reporting to ACPO Crime Business Area Lead force for staff and facilities	Sufficient capability to deliver functions	Of sufficient size to deliver the functions undertaken No surge capability	Not embedded but lead force has significant interest in gun crime (WMP)	***S23
ACPO Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service	Five business strands. Future under review	Lead force which is due to relinquish. Significant private sector funding	Sufficient capability to deliver functions	Of sufficient size to deliver the functions undertaken No surge capability	Not embedded and no longer supported by lead force	Two forces have offered to provide a short term home for this unit. ²² If decision to continue with functions: NCA
National Wildlife Crime Unit	Questionable whether national coordination is required	Reporting to ACPO Crime Business Area Staff are seconded to ACPO	Sufficient capability to deliver functions	Of sufficient size to deliver the functions undertaken No surge capability	Not embedded	***S23
UK Interoperability (JESIP: Joint Emergency Services Interoperability)	Being established to progress blue light interoperability Function cannot be separated from the SPoCC	Reporting to ACPO Uniformed Operations Business Area	Being established	Being established	Being established	SPoCC

²² Considered at ACPO Cabinet on 18 July 2012

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	Necessity	Legitimacy	Capability	Resilience	Sustainability	Suggested future location
UK National Football Policing Unit	Statutory and operational functions in relation to football violence	Accountable through HO structure to Home Secretary	Delivers statutory functions within existing resources Coordinates available trained police resources for ACPO	Of sufficient size to deliver the functions undertaken	Embedded in HO Public Order Unit; but not a policing body	Split – Policy/strategy to PBB ²³ Coordination to the SPoCC
Commercial Activities						
National Driver Offending Retraining Scheme	Not delivering a function requiring national police coordination					Driving Standards Agency takes the lead; or a commercial contract under Government oversight; or a community interest company
ACPO Crime Prevention Initiative	Not delivering a function requiring national police coordination					Commercial contract under Government oversight or a community interest company
Key	Less fitted to characteristics		Adequate fit with characteristics		Good fit to characteristics	

²³ The UKFPU has statutory functions for football banning orders and as a consequence exchanges football intelligence with other EU member states. These statutory duties will need to be properly considered in the long term e.g. incorporated within the ASH, NDEU or some other intelligence function.

Funding

124. Establishing a coordinating mechanism that can provide a minimum of the SPoCC capability will cost more than the pre-Olympics PNICC (£0.6m). The nature of the model will dictate the scale, but the estimated costs of physical infrastructure and staffing are relatively modest.
125. The indicative costs²⁴ (which could be offset by existing PNICC funding) but only for staffing the three models are:
- 'New PNICC' – £1.2m per annum;
 - 'SPoCC' – £1.7m per annum; and
 - 'Full Olympics' – £2.6m per annum.
126. The set-up costs will be reduced if advantage is taken of the infrastructure developed for the Olympic Games, including the start-up costs to adapt the NOCC accommodation (assuming the SPoCC is located at NSY).
127. Whichever model is chosen, there will need to be investment in IT. This needs to be subject of proper analysis of the operational user requirement, scrutiny and review of potential costs by those charged with building the SPoCC. Provision would also need to be made for ongoing support and maintenance.
128. It is understood that scoping for the development of Mercury has produced indicative costs to provide a post-Olympic benefit. Investment of up to around £0.5m should secure improvements to the mutual aid process for national events only; up to £1.25m should improve operational planning across all forces; and up to £3.5m should provide a networked 'platform for national operational planning and rapid response, with advanced functionality and integrated technology'.
129. The Establishment and Skills Availability Tracker (ESAT) software was developed 'in-house' within the CT Network over a two-month period and costs to date have been restricted to the 'opportunity costs' of the staff involved. Whilst it provides the capability

²⁴ The costings laid out above reflect degrees of enhanced staffing levels (with some associated costs) to secure a range of improvements to coverage, resilience and capability.

to track resources, skills and availability it is inhibited by the lack of a national skills database or a duties management system. This makes it resource intensive as staff at each of the ten CT sites across the country (including Scotland) have to manually update resource information on a weekly basis (i.e. duties undertaken, shift changes, etc). This is manageable for the 5,000 staff across the CT Network for the defined period of the Games; it is questionable whether the whole of the Police Service could be managed in the same way. The costs of developing ESAT into a more sustainable product have not been scoped.

130. Suggestions are made above about the future of the existing ACPO units subject of this review. Some could be subsumed into the SPoCC:

- UK Disaster Victim Identification (two staff) with a budget of c.£0.5m including training and exercising;
- Central Referral Unit (five staff) with a budget of c.£0.3m;
- Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (seven staff) with a budget of £0.8m in 2012/13; and the coordination functions of UK Football Policing Unit (up to ten staff) with a budget of £1.6m.²⁵ This is not police grant but is a Home Office unit housed and funded by the Home Office.

131. If these units are included, there will be an increase in scale but it would be reasonable to assume existing budgets would migrate as well. In the long term, economy of scale may reduce the overall costs. This could be subject of further work, if Ministers agree, in Part Two of this Review.

132. The options for funding the ongoing costs of the SPoCC are

- to fund directly from the Home Office by way of a top-slice from police grant taking account of money saved by not funding PNICC;
- by a voluntary arrangement by which local police areas contribute individually;
- a hybrid mix of funding streams.

133. If it is accepted, as we have argued, that effective coordination as described is essential to public security and safety there should not be a voluntary element to

²⁵ In addition, the Home Office Public Order Unit's Football Disorder Programme has a budget of £2.2m

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funding. It would be more effective for the Home Office to identify a mechanism for the required budget to be found before allocation of the police grant.

Recommendations

134. We recommend that you agree:

- 1) There is a necessity for effective national coordination of policing assets (beyond that which exists for counter terrorism and will be in place for serious and organised crime).
- 2) Effective coordination must be able to cope with all eventualities.
- 3) The characteristics of effective national coordination – legitimacy (whether in law or by convention), capability, resilience and sustainability.
- 4) The formation of the 'SPoCC' with the functionality to provide a mechanism which is real, not virtual.
- 5) The two options for ownership and leadership of the SPoCC – lead force or host force under a chief constable or Chair of CCC – should be further considered, if Ministers agree, in Part Two of this Review.
- 6) The legal basis for effective national coordination is reviewed; and interim arrangements are agreed whilst steps are taken towards a statutory agreement.
- 7) Notwithstanding Recommendations 1–6, the Home Office should now approach the MPS and ACPO to ensure that the capabilities in place for the Olympics (e.g. experienced key staff, existing IT, etc) are not lost at the conclusion of the Games.
- 8) Funding of the work which it is necessary to do at national level should not be left to voluntary arrangements. The Home Office should find a mechanism to fund it before allocation of Police Grant.

Part Two of this Review

135. If Ministers agree Part Two of this Review should take place, we will take account of any lessons associated with the use of enhanced coordination during the Olympic Games; follow up any outstanding issues from Part 1 and endeavour to:

- secure consensus on the best way in which the preferred options could work in the new policing landscape (for example consideration of the need for and nature of, any independent oversight body for the new SPoCC);
- describe how the functionality might operate with the devolved administrations; and
- refine the user requirement in relation to the operational functionality of the SPoCC and the supporting logistic IT system.

Appendix A: Home Office commissioning letter



Stephen Rimmer
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Professor Sir David Omand GCB
Visiting Professor,
Department of War Studies,
King's College, London

Sir Denis O'Connor CBE, QPM
HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary
Globe House, London

31 May 2012

Dear David and Denis

Independent Review of ACPO operational activity

1. This letter formally commissions you to undertake a short, strategic review as agreed with the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice and the President of the Association of Chief Police Officers.
2. This independent review is jointly commissioned by the Home Office and ACPO and will consider the future of ACPO's operational activities (ACPO (TAM) aside) including their location, management and governance. A review of the Police National Information Co-ordination Centre will be a key element and will take full account of the work that Chief Constables Tim Hollis and Phil Gormley have already undertaken.
3. The review will report as soon after the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games as possible, with an interim report on emerging findings provided in mid-July before the Games commence. The terms of reference for the review are attached at Appendix A.

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4. Your individual experience and expertise make you the ideal experts to undertake this review. Thank you very much for agreeing to take it on. I look forward to receiving the interim and final reports.
5. A copy of this letter goes to the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice and to the President of ACPO.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S Rimmer', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Stephen Rimmer

Appendix B: Review terms of reference

The purpose of the review is to identify options and make recommendations on the future of ACPO's operational activity²⁶, including PNICC but excluding ACPO (TAM).

The review should identify and assess ACPO's operational activity and make recommendations on future location, management and governance. It should take into account the potential for synergies with similar activities undertaken by the police and the wider response community.

The review will take account of work already undertaken by ACPO and HMIC, and will involve the police service, the Home Office and other Government Departments, as appropriate. PNICC and ACPO (TAM) aside, the urgent first stage in the review will be to agree the ACPO operational activities in scope.

A key element will be a review of PNICC. In this respect the review will:

- Consider the current effectiveness of PNICC
- Consider the critical elements of a national coordination function for the police service in dealing with a range of significant local, regional or national events, incidents and emergencies, both in planning and in providing a crisis response, including consideration of a possible national mobilisation centre
- Consider the need for an effective coordinated response to international events involving UK residents
- Consider the need to coordinate effectively with existing arrangements to respond to terrorist incidents
- Consider the existing arrangements in place within other emergency services, both as a comparator, and in terms of coordination
- Consider the response needed against national requirements, including those set out in the National Risk Assessment and National Resilience Planning Assumptions
- Consider the effectiveness of this function in supporting the Strategic Policing Requirement in the future for Government, police and crime commissioners and chief constables, including powers of decision
- Consider the need for the coordination function to link effectively with, and support, cross Government and central Government resilience and response arrangements
- Consider the infrastructure and resources needed to deal with different responses, against a range of scenarios, which are affordable within existing police budgets.

²⁶Whilst not constraining the review, examples of relevant operational activity include NaBIS, AVCIS, NWCU, ACRO, UKDVI and NDORS.

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Appendix C: National security structures:

S24 NATIONAL SECURITY REDACTED

Appendix D: Summary of national policing services

Summary of National Policing Services

	Canada	Australia	New Zealand	Japan	Sweden	Norway	Netherlands	France
Specialist Investigations:								
Major Crime								
Economic Crime								
Serious & Organised Crime								
Public Protection								
Witness Protection								
Investigative Support:								
Forensics, including DNA								
High Tech Crime								
Fingerprint Bureau								
Specialist Operations:								
Civil Contingencies (Inc. Public Order)								
Air Support								
Mounted								
Dogs								
Marine/Underwater								
Firearms								
Airports/ports								
Other								
Intelligence:								
Intelligence								
National Security:								
Counter Terrorism								
VIP Protection								
Roads Policing:								
Traffic Wardens & PCSOs								
Roads policing, vehicle recovery								
Support Services:								
IT								
Research								
Learning & Leadership								

Key: Services known to be provided partially or wholly by the main police support body in the country listed

Appendix E: Major CT operations since 9/11²⁷

(Confirmed PNICC activations in red)

30 March 2004:	Seven men arrested with 600 kg of ammonium nitrate fertilizer (Op CREVICE)
03 August 2004:	Plot to attack financial district in USA. Dhiren Barot imprisoned for life - (Op RHYME)
7 July 2005:	London bombings kill 56 people and injure 700 - (Op THESEUS)
21 July 2005:	Failed London bombings - (Op VIVACE)
10 August 2006:	Transatlantic airline plot - (Op OVERT)
01 February 2007:	Plot to behead a British Muslim soldier - (Op GAMBLE)
29 June 2007:	London car bombs and Glasgow Airport attack - (Op SEAGRAM)
07 March 2008:	Mohammed Hamid jailed indefinitely for recruiting terrorists – (Op OVERAMP)
27 December 2010:	Nine charged with Terrorism Offences in 'Christmas bomb plot' – (Op GUAVA)
29 September 2011:	Seven charged in Birmingham for bomb plotting - (Op EXAMINE)
30 April 2012:	Four charged with terrorist training/terrorist preparation offences – (Op ARGONAUT)

²⁷ This list does not include other PNICC activations requiring the deployment of a significant number of officers and large amounts of equipment. The G8 at Gleneagles in Scotland in July 2005 is one such major operation.

Appendix F: Civil emergencies²⁸


(Confirmed PNICC activations in Red)²⁹

2000	Fuel Strikes
2001	Foot and Mouth outbreak
2002	Fire Strike
2003	SARS
2004	Tsunami
2004	Flooding in the South West
2005	Buncefield
2005	Hurricane Katrina
2005	Pakistan Earthquake
2007	Flooding in the South West
2007	Avian Influenza
2007	Foot & Mouth Disease & Bluetongue (BTV) outbreak
2007	Tidal Surge Risk
2008	Avian Influenza
2008	Grangemouth Industrial Action (fuel supply)
2008	Hoyer Tanker Driver Strike (fuel supply)
2009	Swine Flu H1N1
2009	Cumbria Floods recovery
2009	Severe Winter Weather 2009
2010	Volcanic Ash disruption April 2010
2010	Severe Winter Weather 2010
2011	Volcanic ash disruption May 2011
2011	Public Disorder
2011	Public Sector industrial action
2011	Fukushima –Radiation release
2012	Wincanton tanker driver strike (fuel supply)
2012	Potential Industrial action by fuel tanker drivers
2012	Public Sector Industrial Action
2012	Floods

²⁸ Provided to HMIC by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, June 2012

²⁹ This list does not include other PNICC activations requiring the deployment of a significant number of officers and large amounts of equipment. The G8 at Gleneagles in Scotland in July 2005 is one such major operation.

Appendix G: Number of COBR engagements 1974–2011



Appendix H: ACPO Disaster Victim Identification team 'stand by' activations and deployments

Standing by in readiness (casualty bureau or other support)

1 May 2008	Abu Zenima bus crash, Egypt
15 May 2008	Sichuan earthquake, China

Deployments

29 December 2004	South-east Asian Tsunami
07 July 2005	London bombings
31 March 2006	Manama ferry disaster, Bahrain
16 September 2007	Phuket plane crash, Thailand
7 November 2007	Warwickshire warehouse fire
01 June 2009	Air France mid-Atlantic plane crash
17 May 2010	Pamir Air plane crash, Afghanistan
12 May 2010	Air Afriqiya plane crash, Libya
22 February 2011	Christchurch earthquake, New Zealand

Appendix I: Legal advice

S42 LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE: REDACTED

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S42 LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE: REDACTED

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S42 LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE: REDACTED

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Appendix J: Other ACPO units

Unit and Function	Governance (As is)	Fiscal
Operational coordination of force assets		
<p>Police National Information Coordination Centre(PNICC)</p> <p>Prior to the Olympic enhancement, PNICC had three full time seconded posts, providing 24/7 on-call service. Aims:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To ensure that national policing is prepared for events that are beyond the capacity of one force area; 2. To provide forces and external partners with an immediate response to requests for additional resources; 3. To ensure terms and conditions are provided to assisting forces at the earliest opportunity; 4. To communicate information of significance to the forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 	<p>Reports to ACPO Chief of Staff and thence to ACPO President.</p> <p>Oversight through PNICC Board chaired by ACPO Vice President.</p>	<p>Funded through 'top sliced' contributions from forces (c.£0.55m in total including the costs of the ACPO Chief of Staff, other staff costs, IT and office accommodation).</p> <p>In preparation for the London Olympic Games 2012 extra resources have been added ('Enhanced PNICC') which has provided additionality in terms of staff and IT.</p>
<p>UK Disaster Victim Identification (UK DVI)</p> <p>Coordinates and maintains the UK specialist capability (trained and equipped staff) who can deal with mass casualty disasters (e.g. Tsunami body recovery, victim identification through forensics, etc).</p> <p>Two seconded police officers.</p>	<p>Unit reports to the ACPO lead on DVI, who in turn reports the ACPO Uniformed Operations Business Area.</p> <p>There is a Sponsorship Board co-chaired by HO and FCO.</p> <p>There is a Steering Group to oversee the work of the unit with representatives from the ACPO Regions (ACPOS and PSNI invited).</p>	<p>c.£0.5m Funded by Home Office (80%) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (20%)</p> <p>No separate ACPO funding.</p>

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<p>National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU)</p> <p>The function of the NDEU is to collate, assess, develop and disseminate intelligence and intelligence products across all police forces of the UK in order to prevent and detect acts of domestic extremism and protest that cross over the legal threshold.</p>	<p>The NDEU is part of the MPS Counter Terrorism Command. The MPS is therefore the 'lead force'. In governance terms, the head of NDEU currently reports through the Head of CTC to the Chair of ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters Business Area.</p>	<p>Funded by separate Home Office grant and ACPO top slice.</p>
<p>Cost-effective delivery of a national policing service</p>		
<p>ACPO Criminal Records Office (ACRO)</p> <p>Provides criminal records checks for applicants, subject access enquiries and SPOC for EU criminal records exchange.</p> <p>Issues Police Certificates to people who want to emigrate; Updates PNC with international convictions; Provides PNC services to authorised agencies; undertakes Subject Access under DPA for police forces.</p> <p>Also designated UK Central Authority for exchange of criminal convictions with EU states.</p>	<p>Hampshire is the lead force and employs all the staff (c200) except the Head.</p> <p>The Head of ACRO reports to a Governance Board Chaired by the CEO of ACPO.</p> <p>For the UK Central Authority part ACRO reports to a Governing Body that is Chaired by an ACC and has representatives from Government, HO, NIO, etc. It meets quarterly.</p>	<p>Funding from Home Office, top slicing through ACPO for Subject Access from forces and fees for services from public/other organisations.</p> <p>Turnover £8.8m in 2011/12 (generating a surplus of c£1.1m).</p>
<p>ACPO Central Referral Unit (CRU)</p> <p>Acts as a Central Referral Unit and index of FOIA requests made to police forces. Provides advice and supports forces in responding to FOIA requests.</p> <p>Co-located with ACRO but is a separate unit.</p>	<p>Hampshire is the lead force and employs all the staff except the Head who is also Head of ACRO. The Head reports direct to the ACPO Information Management Business Area.</p>	<p>c.£0.3m funded by force contributions, as agreed by ACPO Cabinet and CCC.</p>
<p>National Ballistic Intelligence Service (NaBIS)</p> <p>Uses specialist forensic science services to tackle the supply, use and manufacture of illegal firearms and ammunition by linking bullets, cartridges, firearms, etc used in crime.</p> <p>There are 4 forensic centres in the UK which are 'NaBIS' sites. But only two (in</p>	<p>West Mids Police lead force for NaBIS.</p> <p>There is a Joint Management Group including representatives of the 4 forces, Chaired by an ACC from West Midlands Police.</p>	<p>c.£1.6m top sliced, pro-rata based on the level of gun crime in force area.</p>

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West Midlands and Manchester) are actually managed by NaBIS. The other two are actually a host force facility (MPS and Strathclyde) who do NaBIS work in addition to more day-to-day forensic work.	This group reports to the Criminal Use of Firearms Committee, part of the ACPO Violence and Public Protection Portfolio; thence to the ACPO Crime Business Area (CBA).	
ACPO Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service (AVCIS) AVCIS provides crime intelligence services across five separate domains: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Vehicle Fraud Unit, 2. Op Semita (Tracker), 3. Agriculture and plant theft 4. National Capture Car Programme and 5. Caravan theft. AVCIS provides the SPOC for national reporting of vehicle related fraud, recovery of stolen vehicles fitted with Tracker equipment; specialist advice on theft of agricultural plant; coordinates the use of capture vehicles; and intelligence and vehicle crime prevention expertise.	Lead force is Wiltshire Police (ends November 2012) Currently has 'legal entity status' in Wiltshire Police. Head of unit reports through to the Acquisitive Crime Portfolio and thence to ACPO Crime Business Area. A paper on the future of AVCIS is to be considered at ACPO Cabinet on 19 th July 2012.	Entirely private funding (c.£1.3million per annum) comprising five separate funding streams.
National Wildlife Crime Unit (NWCU) The primary role of NWCU is to assist in the prevention and detection of wildlife crime. It does this by obtaining and disseminating intelligence from a wide range of organisations and by undertaking analysis which highlights local and national threats and by directly assisting law enforcement agencies in wildlife crime investigations.	Through a joint English/Scottish shared arrangement into ACPO Crime Business Area.	Funded by Home Office, DEFRA, ACPO, Scottish Executive, NI Office, and Special Projects Scottish ISO.
UK Interoperability now the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) The aim of the programme is to ensure that the blue light services are trained and exercised to work together as effectively as possible at all levels of command in response to a major incident (including fast-moving terrorist scenarios).	JESIP is being established reporting to Chair of ACPO Uniformed Operations Business Area. This reports to the National Police Protective Services Board (Home Secretary).	c£1.76m Home Office funding over two years agreed for future development of JESIP. Previously, UK Interoperability was funded by forces as agreed by ACPO Cabinet and CCC.

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UK Interoperability evolved from the Stockwell Co-ordination Group which was the ACPO response to HMIC Recommendations into the Stockwell shooting (JC de Menezes) and subsequent Inquest.		
UK Football Policing Unit (UKFPU) UKFPU supports the ACPO lead on football policing in all aspects of policing of football matches in England and Wales, and abroad, including the collation of football related intelligence. It also manages the UK Football Banning Orders Authority (statutory) and houses the UK National Football Information Point (required to be set up under EU law (Council Decision 2002/348/JHA))	UKFPU is part the Home Office Public Order Unit. It is responsible to the Home Secretary through the Head of Unit and the HO Accounting Officer. Strategic direction is overseen by a board.	Budget is £1.6m for 2012/13 paid from Home Office The Football Disorder Programme has a budget of £2.2m.
Commercial Activities		
National Driver Offending Retraining Scheme (NDORS) NDORS originated from a recommendation made by Dr Peter North in his Road and Traffic Law Review of 1988. The aim of NDORS is to divert motorists from the prosecution system where their driving amounts to a lapse of concentration or an error of judgment. The police decide whether or not to divert the offender to undertake a remedial driving course. The offender must pay for the cost of the course.	The NDORS Governance Board meets bi-annually and is chaired by the ACPO Roads Policing lead. Reports to the Uniformed Operations Business Area.	Through ACPO with a private company managing finance. Self funded private registered company, funded entirely through offender payment and covers the costs of administering the scheme, business support using and developing the database and other costs incurred for course development and evaluation.
Crime Prevention Initiative (Secured by Design) Aim is <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. to reduce the burden on the police service by reducing and designing out crime and provide design guides to be used by police forces to work with developers. 2. to encourage product manufacturers to meet secure standards. 	Strategic direction is overseen by a board of directors chaired by ACPO President.	A limited company owned by ACPO. Self-funding project. £1.5-£2m turnover.

Appendix K: Acronyms

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ACPO (TAM)	ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters
ACPO CRU	ACPO Central Referral Unit
ACSO	Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations
ACTCC	ACPO CT Coordination Centre
ASH	All Source Hub
CCC	Chief Constables Council
CCS	Civil Contingencies Secretariat
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
CT	Counter Terrorism
DG	Director General
DVI	Disaster Victim Identification
EGT	Evidence Gathering Team
ESAT	Establishment and Skills Availability Tracker
JESIP	Joint Emergency Services Interoperability
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
NaBIS	National Ballistic Intelligence Service
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NDEU	National Domestic Extremism Unit
NDORS	National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme
NOCC	National Olympic Coordination Centre
NOSC	National Olympic Security Coordinator
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NRR	National Risk Register
NSS	National Security Strategy
OIC	Olympics Intelligence Centre

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OSCT	Office for Security and Counter Terrorism
PCC	Police and Crime Commissioner
PNICC	Police National Information Coordination Centre
PSU	Police Support Unit
SNC	Senior National Coordinator
SOCA	Serious and Organised Crime Agency
SPoCC	Strategic Police Coordination Centre
SPR	Strategic Policing Requirement