Your request has now been considered under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) and we provide our response to your request below.

You asked;

(1) Can you please tell me for the year 2011, how many RIPA applications were made by members of your Force in relation to Police Officers' use of Social Media or e-mail?

(2) Can you please tell me for the year 2011 what were the relevant offences or Discipline Regulations for these applications?

(3) For the year 2011 what was the result of these applications? How many officers were either prosecuted or disciplined?

(4) For the year 2011, how many such applications (as above) were refused and on what grounds?

Section 17 of the Act provides that:

A public authority which, in relation to any request for information, is to any extent relying on a claim that any provision in part II relating to the duty to confirm or deny is relevant to the request or on a claim that information is exempt information must, within the time for complying with section 1(1), give the applicant a notice which – (a) states that fact, (b) specifies the exemption in question, and (c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.

I can neither confirm nor deny that Dorset Police holds information relevant to this request as the duty in s1(1)(a) of the Act does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions;

Section 44(2) Prohibitions on Disclosure
Section 23(5) Information relating to the Security bodies
Section 30(3) Investigations
Section 31(3) Law enforcement
Section 40(5) Personal information

This should not be taken as conclusive evidence that any information that would meet your request exists or does not exist.

Section 30 is a qualified class-based exemption and there is a requirement to conduct a public interest test.

Section 31(3) is a prejudice based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in confirming or not that the information is held as well as carrying out a public interest test.

Sections 44, 23 and 40 are absolute exemptions which means that the legislators have identified that harm would be caused by release and there is no requirement to consider the public interest test, (except for Section 40(5))

Overall harm for Neither Confirm Nor Deny response
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) is often a complex piece of legislation to interpret. The RIPA Act is a regulatory framework around a range of investigatory powers to ensure the powers are used lawfully and in a way that is compatible with the European Conviction on Human rights. It also requires, in particular, those authorising the use of covert techniques to give proper consideration to whether their use is necessary and proportionate. A legislative scrutiny framework already exists for RIPA activity: Police surveillance activity is subject to annual inspection by the Interception of Communications Commissioners Office (IOCCO) and Office of Surveillance Commissioners (OSC). These inspections assess each constabulary’s compliance with the legislation and a full report is submitted to the Prime Minister containing statistical information.

In order to counter criminal activity it is vital that the police and other agencies have the ability to work together, where necessary covertly, in order to obtain intelligence within current legislative frameworks to ensure the successful arrest and prosecution of those who commit criminal acts. In order to achieve this goal, it is vitally important that information sharing takes place with other forces and security bodies within the UK and Internationally in order to support counter-terrorism measures in the fight to deprive criminal and terrorist networks of their ability to commit crime.

The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which policing is built and the police have a clear responsibility to prevent crime and arrest those responsible for committing crime. To do this the police require evidence and that evidence can come from a number of sources, some of which is obtained through covert means. If the Police Service were to either confirm or deny any of the police actions around RIPA this would undermine ongoing investigations, reveal policing techniques, risk the identification of individuals and the possibility of revealing involvement of any exempt bodies.

Revealing information that specific tactics are used in certain circumstances would help subjects avoid detection, and inhibit the prevention and detection of crime. This could either lead to the identification of specific cases or in providing this level of information at force level is likely to result in significantly small authorisation numbers being published and presents a real risk of identifying the resources available to individual departments to covertly monitor individuals likely to be committing offences under their remit. Disclosure would undermine the partnership approach to law enforcement but also, due to the legal constraints under Chapter 1 of part 1 of the RIPA legislation, it may actually be a criminal offence to do so (Section 19).

To confirm or deny how many RIPA applications have been made relating to police officer’s use of social media or email would compromise ongoing investigations or identify individuals. If a force applied an exemption to the information this would reveal that these policing techniques and investigative activity had taken place. Conversely, by stating ‘no information held’ would highlight to an officer that his conduct is not being investigated and that he is free to continue.

It is important the Police Service discloses information regarding surveillance activity under RIPA where it is appropriate to do so but an officer’s conduct may be investigated covertly by the force PSD (Professional Standards Department) without the member of staff knowing of its existence. By confirming or denying that RIPA applications have been made would alert an officer that may or may not be involved in the misuse of social media or email, not only that PSD have the ability to ask for RIPA applications in these circumstances, but that they are aware of his misconduct. The officer would then cease his activity and perhaps make attempts to hide or delete the evidence.

Information compiled for the purposes of an investigation, be it a criminal investigation or internal misconduct hearing, may contain information obtained from individuals to assist with
an investigation, which would be in confidence. To disclose investigative information could
dissuade people from providing information to the police in future. The public, be they general
members of the public or internal police officers or staff, must have confidence that their
information is treated sensitively and appropriately. Confirming or denying the information is
held could lead to ‘trial by media’ as it is likely to identify any officers that may or may not be
involved.

**Factors favouring confirmation or denial for S30** - By confirming or denying that any
information relevant to the request exists would enable the public to obtain satisfaction that all
investigations are conducted appropriately and that their public money is well spent.
Confirming or denying that RIPA is applied to police that misuse social media would increase
public scrutiny of police actions and in turn hold the police service to account.

**Factors against confirmation or denial for S30** - By confirming or denying that RIPA
applications have been made in instances of police use of social media or email would hinder
the prevention or detection of crime and undermine the partnership approach to law
enforcement.

**Factors favouring confirmation or denial for S31** - By confirming or denying that RIPA
applications have been made in respect of police officers use of social media would enable the
public to see where public funds are being spent. Better public awareness may reduce crime
or lead to more information from the public.

**Factors against confirmation or denial for S31** - By confirming or denying that any information
relevant to the request exists, law enforcement tactics could be compromised which could
hinder the prevention and detection of crime and lead to more crime being committed.

**Section 40(5) – Personal Information**

The duty to neither confirm nor deny under this section of the Act arises where the disclosure
of the information into the public domain would contravene any of the data protection
principles or Section 10 of the Data Protection Act 1998 or would do so if the exemptions in
Section 33(1) of that Act were disregarded.

Irrespective of what information Dorset Police may or may not hold, any request which has
potential to identify a third party by citing an exemption, would attract a neither confirm nor
deny response that information is held by virtue of Section 40(5) as it constitutes personal data
of an individual other than the applicant and disclosure would contravene the first data
protection principle which states in part that personal data shall be processed fairly and
lawfully.

**Balance test** - The Police service will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do
so would undermine ongoing investigations or compromise law enforcement. Whilst there is a
public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance
that the police service is appropriately and effectively managing the conduct of police officers,
there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and
operations.

There is also no requirement to satisfy any public concern over the legality of police operations
and the tactics we may or may not use. The force is already held to account by independent
bodies such as The Office of the Surveillance Commissioner and The Interception of
Communications Commissioners Office. These inspections assess each constabulary’s
compliance with the legislation and a full report is submitted to the Prime Minister containing
statistical information. Our accountability is therefore not enhanced by confirming or denying
that any other information is held.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of police officer conduct, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The points above highlight the merits of neither confirming or denying the requested data exists. It is appreciated that members of the public will naturally be interested in techniques employed for surveillance. Likewise, we also understand some people believe surveillance (in any form) is used too widely, and therefore an unnecessary intrusion into their privacy.

However, taking into account the fact that the Police Service are already scrutinised as detailed above and effective operational law enforcement would be compromised by any disclosure, it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test for confirmation or denial is not made out.

As previously mentioned, none of the above can be viewed as an inference that any information does or does not exist.