Vote Leave Investigation

The request was partially successful.

Dear Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),

My query relates to the investigation into criminal behaviour from Vote Leave and other pro-Brexit groups, as referred to the Metropolitan Police from the Electoral Commission, which has been stalled due to "political sensitivities."

Please release:
1) All documents, letters, communications and minutes of any meeting where this investigation was discussed between the MPS, Electoral Commission and the Government
2) The name of the senior individuals who decreed that criminal behaviour should not be investigated and the reasons recorded (with evidence) for this decision

Yours faithfully,

John Harding

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Dear Mr Harding

Freedom of Information Request Reference No: 2018100000882

I write in connection with your request for information which was received
by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 13/10/2018.  I note you seek
access to the following information:

"My query relates to the investigation into criminal behaviour from Vote
Leave and other pro-Brexit groups, as referred to the Metropolitan Police
from the Electoral Commission,  which has been stalled due to "political
sensitivities."

Please release:
1) All documents, letters, communications and minutes of any meeting where
this investigation was discussed between the MPS, Electoral Commission and
the Government
2) The name of the senior individuals who decreed that criminal behaviour
should not be investigated and the reasons recorded (with evidence) for
this decision "

Your request will now be considered in accordance with the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 (the Act).  You will receive a response within the
statutory timescale of 20 working days as defined by the Act.  

If you have any further enquiries concerning this matter, please contact
us at [email address] quoting the reference number above. Should your
enquiry relate to the logging or allocations process we will be able to
assist you directly and where your enquiry relates to other matters (such
as the status of the request) we will be able to pass on a message and/or
advise you of the relevant contact details.

Yours sincerely

R. Loizou
Support Officer - Freedom of Information Triage Team
 
COMPLAINT RIGHTS

Are you unhappy with how your request has been handled or do you think the
decision is incorrect?

You have the right to require the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to
review their decision.

Prior to lodging a formal complaint you are welcome to discuss the
response with the case officer who dealt with your request.  

Complaint

If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of
the MPS made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding
access to information you can lodge a complaint with the MPS to have the
decision reviewed.

Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from
the date of the refusal notice, and addressed to:

FOI Complaint
Information Rights Unit
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
[email address]

In all possible circumstances the MPS will aim to respond to your
complaint within 20 working days.

The Information Commissioner

After lodging a complaint with the MPS if you are still dissatisfied with
the decision you may make application to the Information Commissioner for
a decision on whether the request for information has been dealt with in
accordance with the requirements of the Act.

For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner
please visit their website at www.ico.org.uk.  Alternatively, write to or
phone:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Phone: 0303 123 1113

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NOTICE - This email and any attachments may be confidential, subject to
copyright and/or legal privilege and are intended solely for the use of
the intended recipient. If you have received this email in error, please
notify the sender and delete it from your system.  To avoid incurring
legal liabilities, you must not distribute or copy the information in this
email without the permission of the sender. MPS communication systems are
monitored to the extent permitted by law.  Consequently, any email and/or
attachments may be read by monitoring staff. Only specified personnel are
authorised to conclude any binding agreement on behalf of the MPS by
email. The MPS accepts no responsibility for unauthorised agreements
reached with other employees or agents.  The security of this email and
any attachments cannot be guaranteed. Email messages are routinely scanned
but malicious software infection and corruption of content can still occur
during transmission over the Internet. Any views or opinions expressed in
this communication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).

 

Find us at:

Facebook: [1]https://m.facebook.com/metpoliceuk 

Twitter: @metpoliceuk

Dear Mr Harding

Freedom of Information Request Reference No: 2018100000882

I write in connection with your request for information which was received
by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).  I note you seek access to the
following information:

My query relates to the investigation into criminal behaviour from Vote
Leave and other pro-Brexit groups, as referred to the Metropolitan Police
from the Electoral Commission, which has been stalled due to "political
sensitivities."

Please release:
1) All documents, letters, communications and minutes of any meeting where
this investigation was discussed between the MPS, Electoral Commission and
the Government
2) The name of the senior individuals who decreed that criminal behaviour
should not be investigated and the reasons recorded (with evidence) for
this decision

SEARCHES TO LOCATE INFORMATION

To locate the information relevant to your request searches were conducted
within the MPS. The searches located information relevant to your request.

DECISION

·        I am able to confirm that the below items of correspondence are
held by the MPS and are attached to this decision. I can advise that some
information has been redacted by virtue of the Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law
Enforcement and Section 40(2) - Personal Information, Freedom of
Information Act 2000 (the Act).

1. A letter that the Member of Parliament Ben Bradshaw wrote to the
Commissioner.
2. An email chain of correspondence between the Directorate of Media and
Communications (DMC) and a journalist.
3. Official statements made by the MPS in relation to the referrals
received from the Electoral Commission.

·        The Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm nor deny
whether it holds any other information, as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of
the Act does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions - reasons
for which can be found at Annex A below.

Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security
bodies.
Section 24(2) - National Security.
Section 30(3) - Investigations and Proceedings conducted by the public
authority.
Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement.
Section 40(5) - Personal Information

This response therefore serves as a Partial Refusal Notice under Section
17 of the Act. Please refer to Annex A below and the legal annex for the
relevant sections of the Act that have been applied.

DISCLOSURE

1. Please find attached a copy of a letter that the Labour MP Ben Bradshaw
wrote to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service highlighting
the importance of an investigation into the alleged electoral crimes
committed by pro-Brexit campaigners. Protective markings which are not
relevant to the request have been redacted.

2.  Please find attached a redacted email chain of correspondence between
the Directorate of Media and Communications and a journalist regarding the
investigation of the alleged electoral crimes. Please note that the
statements made by the DMC Officer within this correspondence were given
without consultation with the MPS Special Enquiry Team (SET), and they do
not represent the views of the MPS. Some names, personal email addresses
and internal mailbox addresses have been redacted in accordance with
Section 40(2) Personal Information and Section 31(1)(a)(b) Law
Enforcement.

Section 40(2)(3) & (4) - Personal Information

Please note that some names and personal email addresses of third parties
and staff members have been redacted from the above correspondence by
virtue of Section 40(2) of the Act. The reason for this is because this
data is considered to be Personal Data. In this case, the expectation of
the individuals who are identified within the information is that their
information will not be disseminated into the public domain. Their
expectation would be that their personal information will be treated
confidentially and not disclosed to the public. Therefore, to release the
personal data of third party individuals, who are identified within the
information you have requested, would be an unfair disclosure, and would
breach the data protection principles.

Section 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018 confirms that information which
relates to an identified or identifiable living individual is Personal
Data. In order to apply the Section 40(2) exemption the disclosure of the
requested information must satisfy either the first, second or third
conditions as defined by subsections 3A, 3B and 4A of the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 (as amended by Section 58 of the Data Protection Act
2018). The first condition ensures that the exemption would apply in
circumstances where the disclosure of the information would breach any of
the Data Protection Act 2018 principles.

There are six Data Protection principles set out in the 2018 Act and these
can be found at Section 34. In this instance I have decided that the
disclosure of the Personal Data would be incompatible with the first Data
Protection principle which states that the processing (in this case the
disclosure) of the data must be both lawful and fair.

The basis for determining whether such a disclosure would be lawful and
fair is outlined under Section 35 of the 2018 Act which states that the
subject of the data must have given his/her consent for disclosure, or the
processing must be necessary for the performance of a task carried out by
a competent authority. As we do not have consent for the disclosure of
personal data and the disclosure is not necessary for any law enforcement
purposes it would not be considered lawful processing. Such a disclosure
would therefore contravene the first data protection principle.

I have applied the exemption provided under Section 40(2) of the Freedom
of Information Act to this information as the first condition, defined in
subsection 3(A)(a) of Section 40 has been satisfied.  

As Section 40 is a class based absolute exemption there is no requirement
to evidence harm or consider the public interest.

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement

Under Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act, public authorities are able to
withhold information if its disclosure would, or would be likely to,
prejudice the prevention or detection of crime or the apprehension or
prosecution of offenders. Section 31 is a prejudice or harm-based
qualified exemption, which means that there is a requirement to consider
the harm and the public interest.

Evidence of Harm

Internal mailbox addresses are contained within the correspondence that is
being disclosed. The disclosure of this information would result in
internal mailbox addresses, which are specifically in place and designated
for internal policing purposes only, being used by the public. This would
enable an individual, intent on committing an offence, to make contact
with the department, pose as a police officer or member of police staff,
and try and glean information that would assist in their offending
behaviour. Disclosure is also likely to interfere with individuals being
able to carry out their specified function.

Public Interest Considerations

Considerations favouring disclosure

If internal mailbox addresses were disclosed, members of the public would
be able to contact individuals directly. It is important for members of
the public to have reliable contact information for the Metropolitan
Police Service should they require assistance in an emergency.

Considerations against disclosure

The disclosure of internal mailbox addresses could be exploited by any
person who may wish to cause disruption to the day-to-day running of the
Metropolitan Police. This would waste staff time and resources, diverting
them away from core policing. This would have a negative impact on the
effectiveness of investigations and compromise law enforcement. In turn,
this would hamper the prevention and detection of crime and expose
individuals to a higher risk of crime. The law enforcement capabilities of
the Force would be compromised which would enable the criminal fraternity
to take advantage of this. Disclosing information that is likely to place
the public at risk, or make it easier for crime to be committed, cannot be
in the public interest.

Balancing Test

The core policing purpose includes the prevention and detection of crime,
and the apprehension of offenders. The MPS's ability to carry out these
functions, in particular protection of the public, would be undermined by
the disclosure of the withheld information. Whilst there is no doubt a
public interest in members of the public being able to contact the police
in an emergency, this obligation is fulfilled through the designation of a
universal emergency contact number, therefore in this instance the reasons
against disclosure outweigh the reasons for disclosure.

3. The MPS has released the below statements in relation to the Electoral
Commission's referrals of alleged electoral crimes to the MPS.

Commander Stuart Cundy's statement (released on 12th October 2018 and
updated on 18th October 2018):

"The Electoral Commission has made two referrals to the MPS in relation to
the EU Referendum regarding potential criminal offences under section
123(4) Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. The first
referral was received on 11 May 2018 and concerns Leave.EU, the second
referral was received on 17 July 2018 and concerns Vote Leave and BeLeave.
In relation to both referrals, the relevant documentary evidence from the
Electoral Commission was only received on 7 September 2018, when the MPS
was provided with over 2000 documents. These documents are being assessed
by specialist investigators, supported with advice from the Crown
Prosecution Service, in order to make an informed decision as to whether a
criminal investigation is required. For clarity, the status of our
enquiries is not due to "political sensitivities", but the evidential
material that is required to be considered. As with previous referrals
from the Electoral Commission, the MPS will make public the outcome of our
assessment."

MPS Press Lines (issued to national media news desks on 11th October
2018):

"The Electoral Commission has made two referrals to the MPS regarding
potential criminal offences under section 123(4) PPERA in relation to the
responsible person. The first referral was received on 11 May 2018 and
concerns Leave.EU, the second referral was received on 17 July 2018 and
concerns Vote Leave and BeLeave. In relation to both referrals,
subsequently on 7 September 2018 the MPS received over 900 documents from
the Electoral Commission, which are being assessed by the MPS in order to
make an informed decision as to whether a criminal investigation is
required."

Should you have any further enquiries concerning this matter, please email
[email address], quoting the reference number above.

Thank you for your interest in the MPS.

Yours sincerely

Mr Lyng
Information Manager

ANNEX A

Reasons in respect of neither confirming nor denying the existence of any
additional information relevant to your request

Partial Neither Confirm Nor Deny - Section 23(5) Information supplied by,
or concerning, certain security bodies

Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act places two
duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at
Section 1(1)(a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in
a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1)(b) is to disclose
information that has been confirmed as being held. Where exemptions are
relied upon Section 17 of the Act requires that we provide the applicant
with a notice which: a) states that fact b) specifies the exemption(s) in
question and c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the
exemption applies.

Confirming or denying the existence of any additional information relevant
to your request would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section
23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 which stipulates a generic bar
of the disclosure of any information supplied by, or concerning, certain
security bodies.

Partial Neither Confirm Nor Deny - Section 40(5A) Personal Information

With regard to Section 40(5A), confirming or denying whether additional
information is or is not held would breach the First Principle of the Data
Protection Act 2018 in as much as personal information must be processed
lawfully and fairly. To confirm or deny whether personal information
exists in response to your request could publicly reveal information about
an individual or individuals, thereby breaching the right to privacy
afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act.

The basis of the decision to neither confirm nor deny has been taken
separately from the decision not to disclose information. It has been
taken entirely on its own merits, regardless of establishing whether the
information is held. It is a theoretical test/consideration on the
consequences of confirming whether information is held. As a consequence
of which, it is the view of the MPS that to confirm or deny the existence
of such information would constitute a breach of the Data Protection Act
in that it constitutes third party personal data. Under the first data
protection principle, processing of personal data must be lawful and fair
and shall not be processed unless one of the conditions set out in
Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (the 'Schedule 2 Conditions')
is satisfied. As a result the MPS is satisfied that, in the circumstances
of this request, none of the Schedule 2 Conditions would be satisfied by
confirming or denying the existence of the information requested. In
particular such confirmation would be unwarranted as it would prejudice
the rights and freedoms of third parties. Such confirmation would also be
unfair as third parties have an expectation that such information would
not be made public. We have considered the public interest in disclosing
whether we hold the information and conclude that there does not appear to
be any overriding argument in favour of confirming whether additional
information is held that might render such disclosure lawful or fair.

Sections 23 and 40 are class-based absolute exemptions which means that
the legislators have identified that harm would be caused by release and
there is also no requirement to consider the public interest.

Partial Neither Confirm Nor Deny - Section 24(2) National Security and
Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

Sections 24 and 31 are prejudice or harm-based qualified exemptions, and
as such there is a requirement to evidence the harm in confirming or
denying whether information is held as well as consider the public
interest.

Evidence of Harm

There may be occasions when complying with the duty to confirm or deny
whether information is held in accordance with Section 1(1)(a) would in
itself disclose sensitive or potentially damaging information that falls
under an exemption. In these circumstances, the Act allows a public
authority to respond by refusing to confirm or deny whether it holds the
requested information. The decision to issue a neither confirm nor deny
response is not affected by whether we do or do not hold the information,
but relates to the consequences of confirming or denying whether the
information is held.

With the United Kingdom set to leave the European Union in March 2019,
there is undoubtedly a period of uncertainly with unknown consequences for
the entire country and the public at large.    

There is a lot of information published on the Gov.UK website to keep the
general public up to speed on the ongoing negotiations for Brexit. Some of
the publications include information about the Article 50 process; the
policy paper on The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the
European Union, to name but a few, see the below link:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publicatio...

There is also a vast amount of media speculation and rumour surrounding
potential fall-out should there be a no-deal Brexit. Examples can be found
at the below links:

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/po...

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-4...

Although there is some information within the public domain about Brexit
generally, any release under the Act is a disclosure to the world, not
just to the individual making the request.

Every effort should be made to release information under Freedom of
Information. However, to confirm or deny whether additional information is
held other than what has already been disclosed, would undermine ongoing
investigations, reveal policing techniques, contravene legislation, risk
the identification of individuals, possibly reveal involvement of any
exempt bodies and would risk national security.  

Police forces work in conjunction with other agencies and information is
freely shared in line with information sharing protocols. Modern day
policing is intelligence-led and this is particularly pertinent with
regard to both law enforcement and national security. The public expect
police forces to use all powers and tactics available to them to prevent
and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety.

The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which
policing is built and the threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is
generally recognised that the international security landscape is
increasingly complex and unpredictable. The current UK threat level from
international terrorism, based on intelligence, is assessed as 'Severe'
which means that a terrorist attack is highly likely, see the below link:

https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels
 
In order to counter criminal and terrorist behaviour, it is vital that the
police have the ability to work together, where necessary covertly, to
obtain intelligence within current legislative frameworks to assist in the
investigative process to ensure the successful arrest and prosecution of
offenders who commit or plan to commit acts of terrorism.  

To achieve this goal, it is vitally important that information sharing
takes place between police officers, members of the public, police forces
as well as other security law enforcement bodies within the United
Kingdom. Such an action would support counter-terrorism measures in the
fight to deprive terrorist networks of their ability to commit crime.

ICO guidance stipulates that the more specific a request for information
is, the more likely it will be that the public authority will need to
neither confirm nor deny whether the information is held. Confirming or
denying whether additional information exists, which in itself reveals
information, particularly in consideration of the fact that specific
organisations are named in this request, would harm the close relationship
that exists within such organisations, where trust and confidence in this
specific area has been built up.

To confirm or deny whether the MPS hold any other information would allow
inferences to be made about the nature and extent of national security
related activities which may or may not take place in a given area. This
could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection and as
such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to national security.

Furthermore, those intent on causing crime, disruption and terror would
have the ability to gather small pieces of information in order to build a
more complete picture and it is the cumulative effect of information
disclosures that the Police Service feel will lead to this prejudice being
realised.

Public Interest Considerations

Considerations favouring confirming or denying whether further information
is held

Confirming or denying whether any other information exists would lead to a
better informed public and the public are entitled to know how public
funds are being spent and how resources are distributed within an area of
policing. In this case, confirming or denying whether additional
information exists would directly highlight the use of public funds and
the efficiency of the force.

Considerations against confirming or denying whether further information
is held

Irrespective of whether any additional information relating to this
request is or isn't held, confirmation or denial of this is likely to
reduce the flow of information to the Police Service and intelligence
agencies and would have a substantial prejudicial impact on the ability of
such authorities to collect reliable and accurate intelligence.
Furthermore, law enforcement bodies would become dependent on more costly
and time consuming methods of collecting intelligence.  

Confirming or denying whether any other information is held could lead to
the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or
infrastructure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public,
rendering security measures less effective.

Taking into account the current security climate within the United
Kingdom, there should be no confirmation or denial that information is or
is not held where confirmation or denial may aid a terrorist and their
activities. To what extent confirmation or denial may aid a terrorist is
unknown, but it is clear that it is likely to have an impact on a force's
ability to monitor terrorist activity.

The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from information
requests would be even more impactive when linked to other information
gathered from various sources. The more information disclosed over time
will give a more detailed account of the tactical infrastructure of not
only a force but also the country as a whole.

Irrespective of what information is or isn't held, the public entrust the
Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety
and protection. The only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what
is placed into the public domain and in this case, neither confirming or
denying whether information is held.  

Partial Neither Confirm Nor Deny - Section 30(3) Investigations and
Proceedings conducted by the authority

Section 30 is a class-based qualified exemption which means that the
public interest must be considered.

Public Interest Considerations

Considerations favouring confirming or denying whether further information
is held

Confirming or denying whether additional information exists could promote
public trust in providing transparency and demonstrating openness and
accountability into how investigations take place. It could also provide
reassurance to the public that the Police Service takes all reports of a
crime seriously and conducts investigations appropriately. To confirm
whether information is held could allow the public to have a better
understanding of the effectiveness of the Police Service.

Considerations against confirming or denying whether further information
is held

Under the Act there is a requirement to comply with Section 1(1)(a) and
confirm what information is held. However in some cases, it is that
confirmation or not, which could disclose harmful facts. The Police
Service will never confirm or deny whether information is held if doing so
could identify investigative activity and therefore undermine their
investigations. To do so would hinder the prevention or detection of
crime. This is also relevant in relation to information sharing among
Governmental Departments and other law enforcement agencies both within
the UK and abroad. Anything which places that confidence at risk would
undermine the trust that members of the public, as well as other agencies
have in the Police Service. As much as there is public interest in knowing
that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national
security, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

Balancing Test

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and
detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The security of
the country is of paramount importance, and the Police Service will not
divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so would place the
safety of individuals at risk or undermine national security and
compromise law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the
transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the
police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat
posed by terrorists and criminals, there is a very strong public interest
in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police
operations when delivering effective operational law enforcement to ensure
the prevention and detection of crime is carried out and the effective
apprehension or prosecution of offenders is maintained. Any confirmation
or denial statement made by the MPS that places the security of the
country at risk, no matter how generic, would undermine any trust or
confidence that individuals have in us. Therefore, at this moment in time,
it is our opinion that for these reasons the balance test favours neither
confirming nor denying whether additional information is held relevant to
your request.

This response should not be taken as an inference that there is or is not
any further information held pertinent to your request other than that
which has been disclosed or withheld.

LEGAL ANNEX

Section 17(1) of the Act provides:

(1) A public authority which, in relation to any request for information,
is to any extent relying on a claim that any provision in part II relating
to the duty to confirm or deny is relevant to the request or on a claim
that information is exempt information must, within the time for complying
with section 1(1), give the applicant a notice which-
(a) states the fact,
(b) specifies the exemption in question, and
(c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption
applies.

Section 23(5) of the Act provides:

(5) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that,
compliance with section 1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any
information (whether or not already recorded) which was directly or
indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the
bodies specified in subsection (3).

Section 24(2) of the Act provides:

(2) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that,
exemption from section 1(1)(a) is required for the purpose of safeguarding
national security.

Section 30(3) of the Act provides:

(3) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information
which is (or if it were held by the public authority would be) exempt
information by virtue of subsection (1) or (2).

Section 31(3) of the Act provides:

(3) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that,
compliance with section 1(1)(a) would, or would be likely to, prejudice
any of the matters mentioned in subsection (1).

Section 40(5A) of the Act provides:

(5A) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information
which is (or if it were held by the public authority would be) exempt
information by virtue of subsection (1).

Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act provides:

(1) Information which is not exempt information by virtue of section 30 is
exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be
likely to, prejudice-
(a) the prevention or detection of crime,
(b) the apprehension or prosecution of offenders,

Section 40(2)(3A)(3B) & (4A) of the Act provides:

(2) Any information to which a request for information relates is also
exempt information if-
(a) it constitutes personal data which do not fall within subsection (1),
and
(b) either the first or the second condition below is satisfied.

(3A) The first condition is that the disclosure of the information to a
member of the public otherwise than under this Act-
(a) would contravene any of the data protection principles, or
(b) would do so if the exemptions in section 24(1) of the Data Protection
Act 2018 (manual unstructured data held by public authorities) were
disregarded.

(3B) The second condition is that the disclosure of the information to a
member of the public otherwise than under this Act would contravene
Article 21 of the GDPR (general processing: right to object to
processing).

(4A) The third condition is that-
(a) on a request under Article 15(1) of the GDPR (general processing:
right of access by the data subject) for access to personal data, the
information would be withheld in reliance on provision made by or under
section 15, 16 or 26 of, or Schedule 2, 3 or 4 to, the Data Protection Act
2018, or
(b) on a request under section 45(1)(b) of that Act (law enforcement
processing: right of access by the data subject), the information would be
withheld in reliance on subsection (4) of that section.

In complying with their statutory duty under sections 1 and 11 of the
Freedom of Information Act 2000 to release the enclosed information, the
Metropolitan Police Service will not breach the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act 1988. However, the rights of the copyright owner of the
enclosed information will continue to be protected by law.  Applications
for the copyright owner's written permission to reproduce any part of the
attached information should be addressed to MPS Directorate of Legal
Services, 10 Lambs Conduit Street, London, WC1N 3NR.
 
COMPLAINT RIGHTS

Are you unhappy with how your request has been handled or do you think the
decision is incorrect?

You have the right to require the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to
review their decision.

Prior to lodging a formal complaint you are welcome to discuss the
response with the case officer who dealt with your request.  

Complaint

If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of
the MPS made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding
access to information you can lodge a complaint with the MPS to have the
decision reviewed.

Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from
the date of the refusal notice, and addressed to:

FOI Complaint
Information Rights Unit
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
[email address]

In all possible circumstances the MPS will aim to respond to your
complaint within 20 working days.

The Information Commissioner

After lodging a complaint with the MPS if you are still dissatisfied with
the decision you may make application to the Information Commissioner for
a decision on whether the request for information has been dealt with in
accordance with the requirements of the Act.

For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner
please visit their website at www.ico.org.uk.  Alternatively, write to or
phone:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Phone: 0303 123 1113

References

Visible links
1. https://m.facebook.com/metpoliceuk

J Roberts left an annotation ()

Three-judge panel dismisses 5 appeals:

GIA/918/2020(V),GIA/920/2020(V), GIA/921/2020(V),GIA/922/2020(V)& GIA/923/2020(V)

It says the Respondent is 'The Insurance Commissioner' (it should be 'The Information Commissioner')

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk...

J Roberts left an annotation ()