Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 - relating to hpw used to monitor those with a mental health condition

The request was refused by Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).

Dear Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),

This request concerns applications made under Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) whereby the sole purpose is to monitor the whereabouts and/or intercept the communications of those members of the public diagnosed with a mental health (MH) condition.

The period in question is limited to January 2017 - December 2017

(1) In the year January - December 2017 how many applications were made under the above act for authorised interception of communications where the sole or main purpose was to trace vulnerable persons?

(2) In the same period how many said applications were approved?

(3) In the same period how many times were applications made in order to trace those deemed as high risk missing persons (MISPERS)?

(4) In the same period how many in (3) were approved?

(4) In the same period how many applications were made via or following referral to the Fixated Risk Assessment Centre (FRAC) that is run in conjunction with the Department of Health?

(5) In the same period how many applications were made to Tribunal to rescind or remove or lodge a complaint regarding use of RIPA to monitor those with a MH condition?

(6) Please provide the data as to how many people in total are being monitored under the above act solely for the reasons of being able to track whereabouts ( rather then because identified as risk by FRAC)

Yours faithfully,

Alea Iacta Est ( real name )

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Dear Mr/Ms Alea Iacta Est
Freedom of Information Request Reference No: 2018030000015
I write in connection with your request for information which was received
by Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 26/02/2018.
DECISION
I have decided that, in accordance with Section 8 of the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 (the Act), your enquiry is not considered a valid
request.
REASON FOR DECISION
A request under the Act is required by statute to include your name and an
address for correspondence.  I do not believe you have met this
requirement and therefore I have decided that you have not satisfied
Section 8(1)(b).
I have reviewed and considered guidance produced by the Information
Commissioner's Office (ICO) in respect of the validly of a request and in
the consideration of the identity of the applicant.  These guidance
documents can be found at the following links:

* Recognising a request made under the Freedom of Information Act
(Section 8) -
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisatio...
* Consideration of the identity or motives of the applicant -
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisatio...

Is a requestor required to provide their real name in order to meet the
criteria under section 8 of the Act?
I refer to paragraphs 15 and 16 of the ICO guidance document entitled
"Recognising a request made under the Freedom of Information Act (Section
8)" which states the following:
"15. In our view, the intention of the legislation is for the requester to
provide their real name so their request could be processed in accordance
with the requirements of the FOIA.
16. This is supported by the fact that there are circumstances under the
FOIA where a requester’s true identity can be relevant, for example, where
an authority is considering aggregating the cost of requests or refusing a
request as vexatious or repeated."
Should the public authority check the requestor's identity?
I refer to paragraph 17 of the ICO guidance document entitled "Recognising
a request made under the Freedom of Information Act (Section 8)" which
states the following:
"17. if the public authority is not considering (S12 or S14), and there is
no obvious indication that the requester has not used their real name,
then we don't suggest that the authority takes steps to check the
requester's identity. In most cases it will be appropriate to accept the
name that has been provided at face value and respond to the request in
the normal way"
Therefore checks are not suggested unless there is an obvious indication
that the requestor has not used their real name.  In respect of your
request you first gave your name as "Alea", upon challenging this you gave
your name as "Alea Iacta Est".   This is unusual and in order to ensure we
record your title correctly (Mr or Ms) the name "Alea" was searched on
google.  The results show that Alea is a girls name with some sites noting
that it is an Israeli name and others indicating it is a Polynesian name.
 However it became apparent that when entering Alea the search term "Alea
Iacta Est" appears as this is a notable Latin phrase.  This has led me to
consider whether this is your real name or a pseudonym and I believe that
there is an obvious indication that you have not used your real name.
Can an applicant make a request under a pseudonym?
I refer to paragraphs 28 and 29 of the ICO guidance document entitled
"Recognising a request made under the Freedom of Information Act (Section
8)" which states the following:
"28. If the requester has used a pseudonym then their request will be
invalid
29. In some cases it will be immediately obvious that a pseudonym is being
used, for example where the request has been signed in the name of a
famous fictional character, such as 'Mickey Mouse', an inanimate object,
like 'Mirrorball', or by location, for instance as 'disgruntled of
Stockport'. Pun names such as Sue D Nym may also fall into this category"
Can the public authority enquire about a requestor if there is doubt
whether or not a real name has been provided?
I refer to paragraphs 14 and 15 of the ICO guidance document entitled
"Consideration of the identity or motives of the applicant" which states
the following:
"14. If the requester;

*  fails to provide a name;
* can't be identified from the name provided (for example because they
have only used their first name or initials); or,
* is using an obvious pseudonym,        

then their request won’t meet the requirements of section 8(1)(b) and will
technically be invalid.
15. It will therefore be permissible for a public authority to enquire
about the identity of a requester if it has reason to believe that they
haven't provided their real name. Before doing this however we would
recommend that a public authority refers to our guidance Recognising a
request made under the Freedom of Information Act (section 8)."
CONCLUSION
The name you have provided is recognised as a notable Latin phrase and as
such I consider it to be an obvious pseudonym.  The MPS will not be
responding to your requests until we are satisfied that "Alea Iacta Est"
is your real name.  You can prove your name by the submission of
identification documents however it should be noted that the
whatdotheyknow website is not a secure means of transmitting such
documentation.  We would advise that documentation is submitted via the
post to:
Freedom of Information
Information Rights Unit
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
We will consider your resubmitted request upon receipt as long as it meets
the requirements stated above. You will receive a response within the
statutory timescale of 20 working days as defined by the Act.
Should you have any further enquiries concerning this matter, please
contact me on 0207 161 3583 or via email at [email address],
quoting the reference number above.
Yours sincerely

David Edwards
Information Rights Unit
 
LEGAL ANNEX
Section 8(1) of the Act provides:
(1)         In this Act any reference to a "request for information" is a
reference to such a request which-
(a) is in writing,
(b) states the name of the applicant and an address for correspondence,
and
(c) describes the information requested.
(2)        For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), a request is to be
treated as made in writing where the text of the request-
(a) is transmitted by electronic means,
(b) is received in legible form, and
(c) is capable of being used for subsequent reference.

 
COMPLAINT RIGHTS
Are you unhappy with how your request has been handled or do you think the
decision is incorrect?
You have the right to require the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to
review their decision.
Prior to lodging a formal complaint you are welcome to discuss the
response with the case officer who dealt with your request.  
Complaint
If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of
the MPS made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding
access to information you can lodge a complaint with the MPS to have the
decision reviewed.
Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from
the date of the refusal notice, and addressed to:
FOI Complaint
Information Rights Unit
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
[the Met request email]
In all possible circumstances the MPS will aim to respond to your
complaint within 20 working days.
The Information Commissioner
After lodging a complaint with the MPS if you are still dissatisfied with
the decision you may make application to the Information Commissioner for
a decision on whether the request for information has been dealt with in
accordance with the requirements of the Act.
For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner
please visit their website at www.ico.org.uk.  Alternatively, write to or
phone:
Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Phone: 0303 123 1113

Consider our environment - please do not print this email unless
absolutely necessary.

NOTICE - This email and any attachments may be confidential, subject to
copyright and/or legal privilege and are intended solely for the use of
the intended recipient. If you have received this email in error, please
notify the sender and delete it from your system.  To avoid incurring
legal liabilities, you must not distribute or copy the information in this
email without the permission of the sender. MPS communication systems are
monitored to the extent permitted by law.  Consequently, any email and/or
attachments may be read by monitoring staff. Only specified personnel are
authorised to conclude any binding agreement on behalf of the MPS by
email. The MPS accepts no responsibility for unauthorised agreements
reached with other employees or agents.  The security of this email and
any attachments cannot be guaranteed. Email messages are routinely scanned
but malicious software infection and corruption of content can still occur
during transmission over the Internet. Any views or opinions expressed in
this communication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).

 

Find us at:

Facebook: Facebook.com/metpoliceuk

Twitter: @metpoliceuk

Dear Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),

Thank you for your rather lengthy response.

Alea Iacta Est is my formal legal name as changed by deed poll and you have accepted it before with the relevant ID for an SAR within the last 12 mnths.

The comment 'I believe that there is an obvious indication that you have not used your real name' is ermm...clumsy and ... .

However, I am very happy to provide you with my ID yet again. You can then cross check it with all databases at your disposal

Kind regards,
Alea Iacta Est

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Dear Alea Iacta Est,

Thank you for your email. In light of the below perhaps the quickest way of resolving this would be to locate the Subject Access Request, I've had a quick check - we use the same system for SARs and FOIs - but have not been successful. Do you have your SAR reference number? It would be a 13 digit number starting with the year the request was received so 2018xxxxxxxxx or 2017xxxxxxxxx.

Regards,

David.

show quoted sections

Dear David
Did have SAR ref number but request made as hard copy and cant find.
Will send you all relevant ID docs to the address you have given- please confirm that is correct and will then post recorded delivery this week,

Many Thanks,

Alea

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Hi Alea,

Ok we will await your ID, I can confirm the address is:

Freedom of Information
Information Rights Unit
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF

Regards,

David.

show quoted sections

Dear Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),

ID Sent today recorded delivery

Yours faithfully,

Alea

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Dear Ms Iacta Est

Freedom of Information Request Reference No: 2018040000713

I write in connection with your request for information which was received
by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 05/04/2018.  I note you seek
access to the following information:

"This request concerns applications made under Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) whereby the sole purpose is to monitor the
whereabouts and/or intercept the communications of those members of the
public diagnosed with a mental health (MH) condition.

The period in question is limited to January 2017 - December 2017

(1) In the year January - December 2017 how many applications were made
under the above act for authorised interception of communications where
the sole or main purpose was to trace vulnerable persons?

(2) In the same period how many said applications were approved?

(3) In the same period how many times were applications made in order to
trace those deemed as high risk missing persons (MISPERS)?

(4) In the same period how many in (3) were approved?

(4) In the same period how many applications were made via or following
referral to the Fixated Risk Assessment Centre (FRAC) that is run in
conjunction with the Department of Health?

(5) In the same period how many applications were made to Tribunal to
rescind or remove or lodge a complaint regarding use of RIPA to monitor
those with a MH condition?

(6) Please provide the data as to how many people in total are being
monitored under the above act solely for the reasons of being able to
track whereabouts ( rather then because identified as risk by FRAC)"

Your request will now be considered in accordance with the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 (the Act).  You will receive a response within the
statutory timescale of 20 working days as defined by the Act.  

If you have any further enquiries concerning this matter, please contact
us at [the Met request email] or on the phone at 0207 161 3500, quoting the
reference number above. Should your enquiry relate to the logging or
allocations process we will be able to assist you directly and where your
enquiry relates to other matters (such as the status of the request) we
will be able to pass on a message and/or advise you of the relevant
contact details.

Yours sincerely

R. Loizou
Support Officer - Freedom of Information Triage Team
 
COMPLAINT RIGHTS

Are you unhappy with how your request has been handled or do you think the
decision is incorrect?

You have the right to require the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to
review their decision.

Prior to lodging a formal complaint you are welcome to discuss the
response with the case officer who dealt with your request.  

Complaint

If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of
the MPS made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding
access to information you can lodge a complaint with the MPS to have the
decision reviewed.

Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from
the date of the refusal notice, and addressed to:

FOI Complaint
Information Rights Unit
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
[the Met request email]

In all possible circumstances the MPS will aim to respond to your
complaint within 20 working days.

The Information Commissioner

After lodging a complaint with the MPS if you are still dissatisfied with
the decision you may make application to the Information Commissioner for
a decision on whether the request for information has been dealt with in
accordance with the requirements of the Act.

For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner
please visit their website at www.ico.org.uk.  Alternatively, write to or
phone:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Phone: 0303 123 1113

Consider our environment - please do not print this email unless
absolutely necessary.

NOTICE - This email and any attachments may be confidential, subject to
copyright and/or legal privilege and are intended solely for the use of
the intended recipient. If you have received this email in error, please
notify the sender and delete it from your system.  To avoid incurring
legal liabilities, you must not distribute or copy the information in this
email without the permission of the sender. MPS communication systems are
monitored to the extent permitted by law.  Consequently, any email and/or
attachments may be read by monitoring staff. Only specified personnel are
authorised to conclude any binding agreement on behalf of the MPS by
email. The MPS accepts no responsibility for unauthorised agreements
reached with other employees or agents.  The security of this email and
any attachments cannot be guaranteed. Email messages are routinely scanned
but malicious software infection and corruption of content can still occur
during transmission over the Internet. Any views or opinions expressed in
this communication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).

 

Find us at:

Facebook: [1]https://m.facebook.com/metpoliceuk 

Twitter: @metpoliceuk

References

Visible links
1. https://m.facebook.com/metpoliceuk

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Dear Mr/Ms Iacta Est

Freedom of Information Request Reference No: 2018040000713

I write in connection with your request for information which was received
by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 05/04/2018.  I note you seek
access to the following information:

This request concerns applications made under Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) whereby the sole purpose is to monitor the
whereabouts and/or intercept the communications of those members of the
public diagnosed with a mental health (MH) condition.

The period in question is limited to January 2017 - December 2017

(1) In the year January - December 2017 how many applications were made
under the above act for authorised interception of communications where
the sole or main purpose was to trace vulnerable persons?

(2) In the same period how many said applications were approved?

(3) In the same period how many times were applications made in order to
trace those deemed as high risk missing persons (MISPERS)?

(4) In the same period how many in (3) were approved?

(4) In the same period how many applications were made via or following
referral to the Fixated Risk Assessment Centre (FRAC) that is run in
conjunction with the Department of Health?

(5) In the same period how many applications were made to Tribunal to
rescind or remove or lodge a complaint regarding use of RIPA to monitor
those with a MH condition?

(6) Please provide the data as to how many people in total are being
monitored under the above act solely for the reasons of being able to
track whereabouts ( rather then because identified as risk by FRAC)

I am sorry to inform you that we have not been able to complete our
response to your request by the date originally stated.

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act), we have 20 working
days to respond to a request for information unless we are considering
whether the request  is covered by one of the 'qualified exemptions'.

Where we are considering the public interest test against the application
of relevant qualified exemptions, Section 17(2)(b) provides that we can
extend the 20 day deadline.  Please see the legal annex for further
information on this section of the Act.

For your information we are considering the following exemption(s):

Section 24 National security
Section 23 Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies
Section 30 Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities

I can now advise you that the amended date for a response is 31st May
2018.

May I apologise for any inconvenience caused.

Please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether
or not information in relation to the requested information is held.

Yours sincerely

Jennifer Powell
Freedom of Information Manager

LEGAL ANNEX

Section 17(2) provides:

(2) Where-

a) in relation to any request for information, a public authority is, as
respects any information, relying on a claim-
i) that any provision of Part II which relates to the duty to confirm or
deny and is not specified in section 2(3) is relevant to the request, or
ii) that the information is exempt information only by virtue of a
provision not specified in section 2(3), and
b) at the time when the notice under subsection (1) is given to the
applicant, the public authority (or, in a case falling within section
66(3) or (4), the responsible authority) has not yet reached a decision as
to the application of subsection (1)(b) or (2)(b) of section 2,
the notice under subsection (1) must indicate that no decision as to the
application of that provision has yet been reached and must contain an
estimate of the date by which the authority expects that such a decision
will have been reached.

 
COMPLAINT RIGHTS

Are you unhappy with how your request has been handled or do you think the
decision is incorrect?

You have the right to require the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to
review their decision.

Prior to lodging a formal complaint you are welcome to discuss the
response with the case officer who dealt with your request.  

Complaint

If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of
the MPS made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding
access to information you can lodge a complaint with the MPS to have the
decision reviewed.

Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from
the date of the refusal notice, and addressed to:

FOI Complaint
Information Rights Unit
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
[the Met request email]

In all possible circumstances the MPS will aim to respond to your
complaint within 20 working days.

The Information Commissioner

After lodging a complaint with the MPS if you are still dissatisfied with
the decision you may make application to the Information Commissioner for
a decision on whether the request for information has been dealt with in
accordance with the requirements of the Act.

For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner
please visit their website at www.ico.org.uk.  Alternatively, write to or
phone:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Phone:  0303 123 1113

Consider our environment - please do not print this email unless
absolutely necessary.

NOTICE - This email and any attachments may be confidential, subject to
copyright and/or legal privilege and are intended solely for the use of
the intended recipient. If you have received this email in error, please
notify the sender and delete it from your system.  To avoid incurring
legal liabilities, you must not distribute or copy the information in this
email without the permission of the sender. MPS communication systems are
monitored to the extent permitted by law.  Consequently, any email and/or
attachments may be read by monitoring staff. Only specified personnel are
authorised to conclude any binding agreement on behalf of the MPS by
email. The MPS accepts no responsibility for unauthorised agreements
reached with other employees or agents.  The security of this email and
any attachments cannot be guaranteed. Email messages are routinely scanned
but malicious software infection and corruption of content can still occur
during transmission over the Internet. Any views or opinions expressed in
this communication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).

 

Find us at:

Facebook: [1]https://m.facebook.com/metpoliceuk

Twitter: @metpoliceuk

References

Visible links
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Dear Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),

Typo noted in request - please amend to FTAC Fixed Threat Assessment Centre

Your comments are noted.
As your legal team have no doubt advised interception of communications where the sole or main purpose was to trace vulnerable persons and their family and associates,whereby there was no assessed risk to others nor association with national security or criminal activity, would be unlawful as not covered by RIPA.

If you apply blanket exemptions to this request it is tantamount to admittance that the Metropolitan police have unlawfully intercepted communications of those deemed mentally ill whereby there are no issues other than vulnerability. That becomes a very serious breach of law and becomes a matter public interest . So presumably you would only block such a request with a view to protecting the Met from legal action from individuals affected.

The figures on this - except where FTAC or other risk to others assessments exist - should be zero. That you wont confirm it is zero draws attention . If there are other powers used to trace vulnerable people and their family and associates on a long term basis then the Met should reveal these.

Figures denoting applications under RIPA are not disclosing anything other than figures and as such can hardly be considered as posing a threat. Presumably you have to submit these figures to parliamentary scrutiny in some way .

It is somewhat bizarre that you would take this approach if what you were doing was lawful. At this stage - and by inference that you are free to correct- you seem to be implying that the Met police are applying unlawful measures simply on the basis that someone has a MH condition .

Yours faithfully,

Alea

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Dear Ms Iacta Est

Freedom of Information Request Reference No: 2018040000713

I write in connection with your request for information which was received
by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 05/04/2018.  I note you seek
access to the following information:

This request concerns applications made under Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) whereby the sole purpose is to monitor the
whereabouts and/or intercept the communications of those members of the
public diagnosed with a mental health (MH) condition.

The period in question is limited to January 2017 - December 2017

(1) In the year January - December 2017 how many applications were made
under the above act for authorised interception of communications where
the sole or main purpose was to trace vulnerable persons?
(2) In the same period how many said applications were approved?
(3) In the same period how many times were applications made in order to
trace those deemed as high risk missing persons (MISPERS)?
(4) In the same period how many in (3) were approved?
(4) In the same period how many applications were made via or following
referral to the Fixated Risk Assessment Centre (FRAC) that is run in
conjunction with the Department of Health?
(5) In the same period how many applications were made to Tribunal to
rescind or remove or lodge a complaint regarding use of RIPA to monitor
those with a MH condition?
(6) Please provide the data as to how many people in total are being
monitored under the above act solely for the reasons of being able to
track whereabouts ( rather then because identified as risk by FRAC) .

DECISION
The Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm nor deny whether it
holds the information that you requested as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of
the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of
the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) Information relating to the Security bodies;
Section 24(2) National Security;
Section 30(3) Investigations;
Section 31(3) Law enforcement;

Please see the Legal Annex for the sections of the Act that are referred
to in this response.

Please note this response should not be taken to as an indication of
whether or not the requested information is held.

Should you have any further enquiries concerning this matter, please
contact me  via email at [email address] , quoting the
reference number above.

Yours sincerely

Jennifer Powell
 Freedom of Information Manager

LEGAL ANNEX

Section 17(1) of the Act provides:

(1)        A public authority which, in relation to any request for
information, is to any extent relying on a claim that any provision in
part II relating to the duty to confirm or deny is relevant to the request
or on a claim that information is exempt information must, within the time
for complying with section 1(1), give the applicant a notice which-

(a) states the fact,
(b) specifies the exemption in question, and
(c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption
applies.

Section 23(5) of the Act provides:
Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security
matters.
(5) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that,
compliance with section 1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any
information (whether or not already recorded) which was directly or
indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the
bodies specified in subsection (3).

Sections 23 is an absolute exemption, which means that the legislators
have identified that harm would be caused by any release.  In addition
there is no requirement to consider the public interest test.

Section 24(2) of the Act provides:
National security
(2)The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that,
exemption from section 1(1)(a) is required for the purpose of safeguarding
national securit

Section 30(3) of the Act provides:
Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities
(3)The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information
which is (or if it were held by the public authority would be) exempt
information by virtue of subsection (1) or (2).

Section 31(3) of the Act provides:
Law enforcement
(3)The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that,
compliance with section 1(1)(a) would, or would be likely to, prejudice
any of the matters mentioned in subsection (1).

Harm in Confirming or Denying Information is Held
Every effort should be made to release information under the Act.
 However, to confirm or deny many of the police actions around RIPA and in
particular specialist tactical areas would undermine ongoing
investigations, reveal policing techniques, risk the identification of
individuals, the possibility of revealing involvement of any exempt bodies
and the risk in undermining National Security. Revealing information, by
citing an exemption or stating 'no information held' that a RIPA
application has been created in order to carry out surveillance on a group
of people would highlight to the general public that covert surveillance
has or hasn't taken place.  This would be in breach of Regulation 19 of
RIPA.
 
In addition, this awareness would help individuals who are intent on
carrying out criminal behaviour avoid detection and inhibit the prevention
and detection of crime. This would lead to the identification of a
specific case and would present a real risk of identifying the resources
available to individual departments to covertly monitor groups or
individuals, who are likely to be committing offences under their remit.
 In any case due to the legal constraints under Chapter 2 of Part II of
the RIPA legislation (Surveillance) it may actually be a criminal offence
to do so (under Section 19).
 
In order to counter criminal and terrorist behaviour it is vital that the
police and other agencies have the ability to work together, where
necessary covertly, in order to obtain intelligence within current
legislative frameworks to ensure the successful arrest and prosecution of
those who commit or plan to commit acts of terrorism. In order to achieve
this goal, it is vitally important that information sharing takes place
with other police forces and security bodies within the UK and
Internationally in order to support counter terrorism measures in the
fight to deprive international terrorist networks of their ability to
commit crime.
The MPS is committed to demonstrating proportionality and accountability
regarding surveillance techniques to the appropriate authorities. However,
if the MPS were to either confirm or deny that information exists, other
covert surveillance tactics will either be compromised or significantly
weakened. If the MPS denies a tactic is used in one request but then
exempts for another, requesters can determine the 'exempt' answer is in
fact a technique used in policing.  The impact could undermine national
security, any ongoing investigations and any future investigations, as it
would enable targeted individuals/groups to become surveillance aware.
This would help subjects avoid detection, and inhibit the prevention and
detection of crime.
The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which
policing is built and the police have a clear responsibility to prevent
crime and arrest those responsible for committing crime or those that plan
to commit crime. To do this the police require evidence and that evidence
can come from a number of sources, some of which is obtained through
covert means. Having obtained sufficient evidence offenders are charged
with offences and placed before the courts. By confirming or denying that
information pertinent to this request exists could directly influence the
stages of that process, and jeopardise current investigations or prejudice
law enforcement.
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used
to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations.  Information
that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will
adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national
security and law enforcement.
 

Public Interest Considerations
Section 24(2) National Security
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming that
information is held
The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and resources
distributed within an area of policing.  To confirm whether information
exists relating to a specific tactic would enable the general public to
hold the MPS to account where RIPA applications are concerned.  In the
current climate of cuts and with the call for transparency of public
spending this would enable improved public debate.  
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming or denying
 information is held        
Security measures are put in place to protect the communities we serve.
 As evidenced within the harm to confirm detail of specific types of RIPA
authorities would reveal covert investigative activity that may or may not
have taken place and would highlight to terrorists and individuals intent
on carrying out criminal behaviour, covert policing activity.  This would
ultimately increase the risk of harm to the general public and
significantly undermine any ongoing or future operations to protect the
security or infrastructure of the United Kingdom and increase the risk of
harm to the public.
Taking into account the current security climate within the United
Kingdom, no information (such as the citing of an exemption which confirms
information pertinent to this request is held, or conversely, stating 'no
information is held') which may aid a terrorist should be disclosed.  To
what extent this information may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is
clear that it will have an impact on a force's ability to monitor
terrorist activity.
Irrespective of what information is or isn't held, the public entrust the
MPS to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and
protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what
is placed into the public domain.
The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various
sources would be even more impactive when linked to other information
gathered from various sources about terrorism.  The more information
disclosed over time will give a more detailed account of the tactical
infrastructure of not only a force area but also the country as a whole.
Any incident that results from such a disclosure would by default affect
National Security.  
In addition, other organisations outside the MPS are widely engaged in
submitting RIPA applications and therefore by confirming or denying that
information is held would harm the close relationship that exists with
such organisations, where trust and confidence in this specific area has
been built up in the exchange of information and financial assistance
during the Criminal Justice process.  
To confirm or deny whether the MPS hold information would allow inferences
to be made about the nature and extent of national security related
activities which may or may not take place.  This could enable a terrorist
group(s) to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or
denial would be damaging to National Security.
By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would
render national security measures less effective.  This would lead to the
compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or
infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

Section 30(3) Investigations
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming that
information is held
Confirming or denying that information exists relevant to this request
would lead to a better informed public improving their knowledge and
understanding of how the MPS adhere to the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 for specific cases under Part II Charter 2 of RIPA
generally.  
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming or denying that
information is held
By its very nature, information held relating to covert policing and
tactics is sensitive in nature.  Under the Act there is a requirement to
comply with Section 1(1)(a) and confirm what information is held.  In some
cases it is that confirmation, or not, which could disclose facts harmful
to covert policing and in such cases the MPS takes advantage of its
ability under the FOI legislation, to, where appropriate, neither confirm
or deny that the information requested, is or is not held.  The MPS will
never disclose information which could identify investigative activity and
therefore undermine their investigations.  To do so would hinder the
prevention or detection of crime.  
Confirmation that information is held would prejudice how investigations
are carried out in the future by revealing covert investigative activity.
 This would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and affect the
MPS's law enforcement capabilities.  Confirmation would also undermine the
partnership approach to investigations.

Section 31(3) Law Enforcement
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) - confirming information
is held  
By confirming or denying that information relevant to the request exists,
would lead to better public awareness into the intricacies of RIPA
legislation and applications submitted under Part II Chapter 2 of RIPA.
 This may lead to more information (intelligence) being submitted from the
public which may culminate in a reduction of crime
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming or denying that
information is held
By confirming or denying that information exists would compromise the
effective delivery of operational law enforcement.  Tactics could be
compromised which could hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More
crime could be committed and individuals placed at risk.
Balancing Test
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will
not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so could
undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement. Whilst there is
a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this
case providing assurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively
engaging with the threat posed by the criminal fraternity, there is a very
strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the
integrity of police investigations and operations in this area.
 
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity,
particularly applications under RIPA legislation, is appropriate and
balanced in matters of national security, this will only be overridden in
exceptional circumstances.
In this case there is also no requirement to satisfy any public concern
over the legality of police operations and the tactics we may or may not
use. The MPS is already held to account by independent bodies such as The
Office of the Surveillance Commissioner and The Interception of
Communications Commissioners Office. These inspections assess each
constabulary's compliance with the legislation and a full report is
submitted to the Prime Minister and Scottish Ministers containing
statistical information. Our accountability is therefore not enhanced by
confirming or denying that information pertinent to this request is held.
None of the above can be viewed as an inference that information does or
does not exist.
COMPLAINT RIGHTS

Are you unhappy with how your request has been handled or do you think the
decision is incorrect?

You have the right to require the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to
review their decision.

Prior to lodging a formal complaint you are welcome to discuss the
response with the case officer who dealt with your request.  

Complaint

If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of
the MPS made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding
access to information you can lodge a complaint with the MPS to have the
decision reviewed.

Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from
the date of the refusal notice, and addressed to:

FOI Complaint
Information Rights Unit
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
[the Met request email]

In all possible circumstances the MPS will aim to respond to your
complaint within 20 working days.

The Information Commissioner

After lodging a complaint with the MPS if you are still dissatisfied with
the decision you may make application to the Information Commissioner for
a decision on whether the request for information has been dealt with in
accordance with the requirements of the Act.

For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner
please visit their website at www.ico.org.uk.  Alternatively, write to or
phone:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Phone:  0303 123 1113

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Dear Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),

This is a question predominately about the Met police using RIPA to monitor the movement of those people in society diagnosed with a mental health condition.

I request an internal review.

I will reduce the request to one issue given that it is clear the role of FTAC is being used to conflate .

The basis of the question is very simple: Are police using RIPA to trace vulnerable people who may have never committed any crime or ever been suspected of OR are police bypassing the use of RIPA and using unlawful tracking methods ?

Unlawful tapping of telephones for eg is a serious issue and your response bolsters the beliefs that the police are using these methods without legal application in mental health.

The requests I would like internally reviewed are as follows. I have dropped the remainder:

(1) In the year January - December 2017 how many applications were made
under the above act for authorised interception of communications where
the sole or main purpose was to trace vulnerable persons? ( NOTE: This is about tracing people because they are vulnerable NOT because they are considered as stalking risk under the terms of FTAC's remit)

(2) In the same period how many said applications were approved?

(3) In the same period how many times were applications made in order to
trace those deemed as high risk missing persons (MISPERS)? NOTE: As above annotation again applies

(4) In the same period how many in (3) were approved?

(5) In the same period how many applications were made to Tribunal to
rescind or remove or lodge a complaint regarding use of RIPA to monitor
those with a MH condition?

I have deliberately removed all questions associated with the role of FTAC.

Your responses make it seem as though the police may be using FTAC as a 'tool' to justify applying RIPA when no risk of stalking applies. This would obviously be a serious misuse and unlawful so it would be very helpful that if I have misunderstood this reading of the matter you explain how

Yours faithfully,

Alea

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Dear  Ms Iacta Est

Freedom of Information Review Reference No: 2018080001080

I write in connection with your request for a review of the handling
and/or decision relating to  2018040000713 which was received by the
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on  22/08/2018.  

A review will now be conducted in accordance with the Code of Practice
issued under Section 45 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act).
 The reviewing officer will reconsider the original request before
responding to you with their findings.

There is no statutory time limit in relation to the completion of an
Internal Review.  However, the MPS aim to complete Internal Reviews within
20 working days or in exceptional cases, within 40 working days.  This is
based upon guidance published by the Information Commissioner.

If it is not possible to complete the Internal Review within this
timescale you will be informed at the earliest opportunity.

If you are unhappy with the outcome of an Internal Review you may wish to
refer the matter to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).

For information on how to make an application to the Information
Commissioner please visit their website at www.ico.org.uk.  Alternatively,
write to or phone:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Phone:  0303 123 1113

Yours sincerely

Peter Deja
Support Officer - Freedom of Information Triage Team

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email without the permission of the sender. MPS communication systems are
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email. The MPS accepts no responsibility for unauthorised agreements
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Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Dear Ms Iacta Est,

 

With reference to your recent request, can you please note the following
information and redefine the request, taking these factors into
consideration:

 

Interception of Communications is a specific part of the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act (part1 Ch1) and the MPS would generally not get
an interception warrant for such activity as you have highlighted (this
activity requires serious crime).

Furthermore the act actually prohibits us from disclosing the existence of
any interception warrant, so we would not be able to provide that
information.

 

After receiving your reply, your request will then be considered and you
will receive a response within the statutory timescale of 20 working days.

However, if the requested additional information is not received by
04/10/2018, I will assume that you no longer wish to proceed with this
request and will treat it as withdrawn.

If you would like to discuss your request further, please contact me via
email at [email address].

With thanks and best regards,

Suzanne Mason
Information Manager

 

Suzanne Mason | Information Manager | Information & Insight | Strategy &
Governance | MetHQ |
Metropolitan Police Service

MetPhone 762926 | Telephone 020 7230 2926 |
[1][email address]
Address - Information Rights Unit, PO Box 57192, London SW6 1SF
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Recipients of this email should be aware that all communications within
and to and from the Metropolitan Police Service are subject to
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Information Act and Environmental Information Regulations. The MPS will
consider information for release unless there is are valid and
proportionate public interest reasons not to, therefore, sensitive
information not for public disclosure must be highlighted as such. Further
advice can be obtained from the Information Rights Unit - 0207 161 3500.

 

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Dear Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),

Thank you for the clarity.

If I modify the request maybe there is some chance of the detail I have requested. The police use monitoring methods to track and trace vulnerable people and continue this monitoring at length. An example would be individuals deemed as high risk who have a history of being reported as a high risk missing person (MISPER)

Given that RIPA would be an unlawful method of monitoring vulnerable people whereby no crime or risk of crime is considered please explain what legislation is enacted that allows the police to :

(a) request phone records from utility companies in order to check call history and look in to an individuals' phonebook ( for eg on a mobile telephone);

(b) access names and addresses in said phonebooks;

(c) Live access in real time;

(d) continue said survelillance when there were no further concerns ( eg after a high risk missing person has been found)

(d) apply a 'tap' to a telephone whereby RIPA is not appropriate

(e) In the time period stated in the original request how many times has the Metropolitan Police applied this tactic legitimately using legislation provided

(f) How many individuals who had their telephones and communication systems monitored during this time period continued to be monitored after the incidents that raised concerns

(g) Please provide copies of protocols and policies that apply to all of the above

Yours faithfully,

Alea

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Dear Ms Iacta Est,

 

Please accept my apologies for the delay in responding to your request. 

 

I have been chasing a response and hope to be able to get back to you
within the next few days.

 

Thanking you for your patience in the meantime.

 

Kind regards,

Suzanne

 

 

 

Suzanne Mason | Information Manager | Information & Insight | Strategy &
Governance | MetHQ |
Metropolitan Police Service

MetPhone 762926 | Telephone 020 7230 2926 |
[1][email address]
Address - Information Rights Unit, PO Box 57192, London SW6 1SF
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Recipients of this email should be aware that all communications within
and to and from the Metropolitan Police Service are subject to
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Information Act and Environmental Information Regulations. The MPS will
consider information for release unless there is are valid and
proportionate public interest reasons not to, therefore, sensitive
information not for public disclosure must be highlighted as such. Further
advice can be obtained from the Information Rights Unit - 0207 161 3500.

 

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the intended recipient. If you have received this email in error, please
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email. The MPS accepts no responsibility for unauthorised agreements
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Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Dear Ms Iacta Est

Freedom of Information Request Reference No: 2018100000301

I write in connection with your request for information which was received
by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 22/08/2018.  I note you seek
access to the following information:

"This request concerns applications made under Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) whereby the sole purpose is to monitor the
whereabouts and/or intercept the communications of those members of the
public diagnosed with a mental health (MH) condition.
The period in question is limited to January 2017 - December 2017
(1) In the year January - December 2017 how many applications were made
under the above act for authorised interception of communications where
the sole or main purpose was to trace vulnerable persons?
(2) In the same period how many said applications were approved?
(3) In the same period how many times were applications made in order to
trace those deemed as high risk missing persons (MISPERS)?
(4) In the same period how many in (3) were approved?
(4) In the same period how many applications were made via or following
referral to the Fixated Risk Assessment Centre (FRAC) that is run in
conjunction with the Department of Health?
(5) In the same period how many applications were made to Tribunal to
rescind or remove or lodge a complaint regarding use of RIPA to monitor
those with a MH condition?
(6) Please provide the data as to how many people in total are being
monitored under the above act solely for the reasons of being able to
track whereabouts ( rather then because identified as risk by FRAC)"

Your request will now be considered in accordance with the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 (the Act).  You will receive a response within the
statutory timescale of 20 working days as defined by the Act.  

If you have any further enquiries concerning this matter, please contact
us at [the Met request email] quoting the reference number above. Should your
enquiry relate to the logging or allocations process we will be able to
assist you directly and where your enquiry relates to other matters (such
as the status of the request) we will be able to pass on a message and/or
advise you of the relevant contact details.

Yours sincerely

R. Loizou
Support Officer - Freedom of Information Triage Team
 
COMPLAINT RIGHTS

Are you unhappy with how your request has been handled or do you think the
decision is incorrect?

You have the right to require the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to
review their decision.

Prior to lodging a formal complaint you are welcome to discuss the
response with the case officer who dealt with your request.  

Complaint

If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of
the MPS made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding
access to information you can lodge a complaint with the MPS to have the
decision reviewed.

Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from
the date of the refusal notice, and addressed to:

FOI Complaint
Information Rights Unit
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
[the Met request email]

In all possible circumstances the MPS will aim to respond to your
complaint within 20 working days.

The Information Commissioner

After lodging a complaint with the MPS if you are still dissatisfied with
the decision you may make application to the Information Commissioner for
a decision on whether the request for information has been dealt with in
accordance with the requirements of the Act.

For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner
please visit their website at www.ico.org.uk.  Alternatively, write to or
phone:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Phone: 0303 123 1113

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email without the permission of the sender. MPS communication systems are
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email. The MPS accepts no responsibility for unauthorised agreements
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any attachments cannot be guaranteed. Email messages are routinely scanned
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during transmission over the Internet. Any views or opinions expressed in
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Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

1 Attachment

Dear Ms Iacta Est

 

Please see attached FOIA internal review response.

 

Thank you

 

 

Yvette Taylor - Information Manager - Freedom of Information Team,
Information Rights Unit (IRU)
STRATEGY & GOVERNANCE, MetHQ
Metropolitan Police Service

MetPhone 780074 | Telephone 020 7161 0074 | E-Mail:
[1][email address]   
Address - Information Rights Unit, PO Box 57192, London SW6 1SF
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consider information for release unless there is are valid and
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information not for public disclosure must be highlighted as such. Further
advice can be obtained from the Information Rights Unit - 0207 161 3500.

 

 

 

 

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Dear Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),

The question was rephrased so to make it VERY clear that I was asking specifically about the Metropolitan Police legal authority to interfere with communications of those deemed to be vulnerable whereby criminal activity was NOT of issue and whereby the incident that provoked interception of communications had passed.

You were asked on what legal authority the police relied on to track, trace and interfere with communications of people diagnosed with severe mental health conditions. That you would refuse this request when the MPS undertakes this approach as standard is VERY VERY telling in itself. Be VERY VERY clear we are NOT talking about individuals being suspected of crime or terrorism or any of the criminal activities you refer to in your refusal notice. For you to default to labelling those with a mental health condition as criminals is offensive and an 'interesting' defence in law. We are talking about vulnerable people who may have come to the attention of the police on a stand alone incident such as the example given to you ie being a missing person.

Your response is such that it indicates that the MPS knows it has no legal authority to interfere with communications and is acting unlawfully. To discriminate against a particular group in society to this extent and effectively criminalise them ( as your detailed response has also de facto done) opens the MPS up for legal challenge. Had you had lawful authority to interfere with communications of people by virtue of the fact they had a disability and by this alone you would have stated so.

Thank you for confirming what many people have known all along - the Metropolitan Police have taken an unlawful position in clear breach of all legislation to interfere with communications of those with mental health conditions . Including placing permanent taps on individuals' phones and accessing their address books in order to monitor and presumably you have extended this to all social media communications as well. Using criminality as an excuse for MPS doing so confirms discriminatory views and approaches that discredit you.

Presumably you wont mind this link being shared and will be happy to explain in a court of law why this level of harmful interference happens. Had you been acting lawfully you would have stated so.

Yours faithfully,

Alea

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Case reference: 2018100000301

Dear Ms Iacta,

Please accept my sincere apologies for the delay in responding to your
request.

I should be in a position to respond within the next few days.

Thanking you for your patience in the matter.

Kind regards,

Suzanne Mason
Information Manager

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the intended recipient. If you have received this email in error, please
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legal liabilities, you must not distribute or copy the information in this
email without the permission of the sender. MPS communication systems are
monitored to the extent permitted by law.  Consequently, any email and/or
attachments may be read by monitoring staff. Only specified personnel are
authorised to conclude any binding agreement on behalf of the MPS by
email. The MPS accepts no responsibility for unauthorised agreements
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Dear Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),

I modified my request on 22nd September 2018 as requested. The internal review has failed to address this modified request and instead reviewed the first request.

Please respond to the modified request. At the moment it is looking like a massive cover up of unlawful MPS action -action that actually significantly harms vulnerable people .

You may want to report back to the MPS mental health leads that all with severe enduring MH issues know they are subject to police monitoring.It means many turn off their phone at a time they desperately need it to communicate with those supporting them in crisis. So the policy harms.

It is also seemingly being applied unlawfully by your response. The legal team advising may want to consider the advice they're giving because it is widespread and often contributes to catastrophic harm.

Some transparency would be helpful

Yours faithfully,

Alea

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Dear Ms Iacta Est

Thank you for your email.
Suzanne Mason is the Information Manager dealing with your revised request. Our reference 201810000301 refers.
I have asked Suzanne to provide you with and update or the response as soon as possible.

Kind Regards

Yvette Taylor - Information Manager - Freedom of Information Team, Information Rights Unit (IRU)
STRATEGY & GOVERNANCE, MetHQ
Metropolitan Police Service
MetPhone 780074 | Telephone 020 7161 0074 | E-Mail: [email address]   
Address - Information Rights Unit, PO Box 57192, London SW6 1SF

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show quoted sections

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Case reference: 2018100000301

Dear Ms Iacta Est,

Please note that I am awaiting final approval so that a response can be
sent  to you.  I am hopeful that this will be received before the end of
this week.  

I apologise once again for the lengthy delay in responding to your request
and hope to be in a position to do so within the next few days.

Kind regards,

Suzanne Mason
Information Manager

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NOTICE - This email and any attachments may be confidential, subject to
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the intended recipient. If you have received this email in error, please
notify the sender and delete it from your system.  To avoid incurring
legal liabilities, you must not distribute or copy the information in this
email without the permission of the sender. MPS communication systems are
monitored to the extent permitted by law.  Consequently, any email and/or
attachments may be read by monitoring staff. Only specified personnel are
authorised to conclude any binding agreement on behalf of the MPS by
email. The MPS accepts no responsibility for unauthorised agreements
reached with other employees or agents.  The security of this email and
any attachments cannot be guaranteed. Email messages are routinely scanned
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this communication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
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Dear Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),

OK

Many thanks

Yours faithfully,

Alea

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Case reference: 2018100000301

Dear Ms Iacta Est,

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST REFERENCE NO: 2018100000301

Thank you for your request for information which was received by the
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 22/9/2018.  This was a redefined
request, following a previous request (Ref: 2018080001080), seeking access
to the following information:

Dear Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),

Thank you for the clarity.

If I modify the request maybe there is some chance of the detail I have
requested. The police use monitoring methods to track and trace vulnerable
people and continue this monitoring at length. An example would be
individuals deemed as high risk who have a history of being reported as a
high risk missing person (MISPER)

Given that RIPA would be an unlawful method of monitoring vulnerable
people whereby no crime or risk of crime is considered please explain what
legislation is enacted that allows the police to :

(a) request phone records from utility companies in order to check call
history and look in to an individuals' phonebook ( for eg on a mobile
telephone);

(b) access names and addresses in said phonebooks;

(c) Live access in real time;

(d) continue said survelillance when there were no further concerns ( eg
after a high risk missing person has been found)

(d) apply a 'tap' to a telephone whereby RIPA is not appropriate

(e) In the time period stated in the original request how many times has
the Metropolitan Police applied this tactic legitimately using legislation
provided

(f) How many individuals who had their telephones and communication
systems monitored during this time period continued to be monitored after
the incidents that raised concerns

(g) Please provide copies of protocols and policies that apply to all of
the above

Yours faithfully,

Alea

In the first instance, please accept my sincere apologies for the lengthy
delay in responding to your request.

DECISION
The Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm nor deny whether it
holds the information that you requested as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of
the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of
the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) Information relating to the Security bodies
Section 24(2) National Security
Section 30(3) Investigations
Section 31(3) Law enforcement

Please see the Legal Annex for the sections of the Act that are referred
to in this response.

Please also note the following:

Part 1, Chapter 2 of RIPA contains a number of purposes for which
communications data may be acquired. This includes the purpose at section
22(2)(g), which makes clear that communications data may be acquired by a
relevant public authority:
for the purpose, in an emergency, of preventing death or injury or any
damage to a person's physical or mental health, or of mitigating any
injury or damage to a person's physical or mental health;

We (i.e. gov, LEAs and other relevant authorities) have previously used
this publicly via case studies, public statements etc to demonstrate the
importance of communications data retention and acquisition in saving
lives.

Please note that this response should not be taken to as an indication of
whether or not the requested information is held.

Should you have any further enquiries concerning this matter, please
contact me via email at [email address], quoting the reference
number above.
Kind regards,

Suzanne Mason
Information Manager

LEGAL ANNEX

Section 17(1) of the Act provides:
(1)        A public authority which, in relation to any request for
information, is to any extent relying on a claim that any provision in
part II relating to the duty to confirm or deny is relevant to the request
or on a claim that information is exempt information must, within the time
for complying with section 1(1), give the applicant a notice which-
(a) states the fact,
(b) specifies the exemption in question, and
(c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption
applies.

Section 23(5) of the Act provides:
Information supplied by, or relating to the Security Bodies  
(5) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that,
compliance with section 1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any
information (whether or not already recorded) which was directly or
indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the
bodies specified in subsection (3).

Sections 23 is an absolute exemption, which means that the legislators
have identified that harm would be caused by any release and there is
therefore no requirement to consider the public interest test.

Section 24(2) of the Act provides:
National security
(2)The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that,
exemption from section 1(1)(a) is required for the purpose of safeguarding
national security

Section 30(3) of the Act provides:
Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities
(3)The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information
which is (or if it were held by the public authority would be) exempt
information by virtue of subsection (1) or (2).

Section 31(3) of the Act provides:
Law Enforcement
(3)The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that,
compliance with section 1(1)(a) would, or would be likely to, prejudice
any of the matters mentioned in subsection (1).

Harm in Confirming or Denying Information is Held

Every effort should be made to release information under the Act.
 However, to confirm or deny any of the police actions around RIPA and in
particular, specialist tactical areas, may undermine ongoing
investigations, reveal policing techniques, risk the identification of
individuals, the possibility of revealing involvement of any exempt bodies
and the risk in undermining National Security. Revealing information by
citing an exemption or stating 'no information held' that a RIPA
application has been created in order to carry out surveillance on a group
of people would highlight to the general public that covert surveillance
has or hasn't taken place.  This would be in breach of Regulation 19 of
RIPA.

In addition, this awareness would help individuals who are intent on
carrying out criminal behaviour avoid detection and inhibit the prevention
and detection of crime. This would lead to the identification of a
specific case and would present a real risk of identifying the resources
available to individual departments to covertly monitor groups or
individuals, who are likely to be committing offences under their remit.
 In any case due to the legal constraints under Chapter 2 of Part II of
the RIPA legislation (Surveillance) it may actually be a criminal offence
to do so (under Section 19).

In order to counter criminal and terrorist behaviour it is vital that the
police and other agencies have the ability to work together, where
necessary covertly, in order to obtain intelligence within current
legislative frameworks to ensure the successful arrest and prosecution of
those who commit or plan to commit acts of terrorism. In order to achieve
this goal, it is vitally important that information sharing takes place
with other police forces and security bodies within the UK and
Internationally in order to support counter terrorism measures in the
fight to deprive international terrorist networks of their ability to
commit crime.

The MPS is committed to demonstrating proportionality and accountability
regarding surveillance techniques to the appropriate authorities. However,
if the MPS were to either confirm or deny that information exists, other
covert surveillance tactics will either be compromised or significantly
weakened. If the MPS denies a tactic is used in one request but then
exempts for another, requesters can determine the 'exempt' answer is in
fact a technique used in policing.  The impact could undermine national
security, any ongoing investigations and any future investigations, as it
would enable targeted individuals/groups to become surveillance aware.
This would help subjects avoid detection, and inhibit the prevention and
detection of crime.

The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which
policing is built and the police have a clear responsibility to prevent
crime and arrest those responsible for committing crime or those that plan
to commit crime. To do this the police require evidence and that evidence
can come from a number of sources, some of which is obtained through
covert means. Having obtained sufficient evidence offenders are charged
with offences and placed before the courts. By confirming or denying that
information pertinent to this request exists could directly influence the
stages of that process, and jeopardise current investigations or prejudice
law enforcement.

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used
to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations.  Information
that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will
adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national
security and law enforcement.

Public Interest Considerations

Section 24(2) National Security
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming that
information is held
The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and resources
distributed within an area of policing.  To confirm whether information
exists relating to a specific tactic would enable the general public to
hold the MPS to account where RIPA applications are concerned.  In the
current climate of cuts and with the call for transparency of public
spending this would enable improved public debate.  
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming or denying
 information is held      
 
Security measures are put in place to protect the communities we serve.
 As evidenced within the harm, to confirm details of specific types of
RIPA authorities would reveal covert investigative activity that may or
may not have taken place and would highlight to terrorists and individuals
intent on carrying out criminal behaviour, covert policing activity.  This
would ultimately increase the risk of harm to the general public and
significantly undermine any ongoing or future operations to protect the
security or infrastructure of the United Kingdom and increase the risk of
harm to the public.
Taking into account the current security climate in the United Kingdom, no
information (such as the citing of an exemption which confirms information
pertinent to this request is held, or conversely, stating 'no information
is held') which may aid a terrorist should be disclosed.  To what extent
this information may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is clear that it
will have an impact on a force's ability to monitor terrorist activity.

Regardless of what information is or isn't held, the public entrust the
MPS to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and
protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what
is placed into the public domain.

The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various
sources would be even more impactful when linked to other information
gathered from various sources about terrorism.  The more information
disclosed over time will give a more detailed account of the tactical
infrastructure of not only a force area but also the country as a whole.

Any incident that results from such a disclosure would, by default, affect
National Security.  

In addition, other organisations outside the MPS are widely engaged in
submitting RIPA applications and therefore by confirming or denying that
information is held would harm the close relationship that exists with
such organisations, where trust and confidence in this specific area has
been built up in the exchange of information and financial assistance
during the Criminal Justice process.  

To confirm or deny whether the MPS hold information would allow inferences
to be made about the nature and extent of national security-related
activities which may or may not take place.  This could enable a terrorist
group(s) to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or
denial would be damaging to National Security.

By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would
render national security measures less effective.  This would lead to the
compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or
infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

Section 30(3) Investigations
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming that
information is held

Confirming or denying that information exists relevant to this request
would lead to a better informed public improving their knowledge and
understanding of how the MPS adhere to the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 for specific cases under Part II Charter 2 of RIPA
generally.  

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming or denying that
information is held
By its very nature, information held relating to covert policing and
tactics is sensitive in nature.  Under the Act there is a requirement to
comply with Section 1(1)(a) and confirm what information is held.  In some
cases it is that confirmation, or not, which could disclose facts harmful
to covert policing and in such cases the MPS takes advantage of its
ability under the FOI legislation, to, where appropriate, neither confirm
or deny that the information requested, is or is not held.  The MPS will
never disclose information which could identify investigative activity and
therefore undermine their investigations.  To do so would hinder the
prevention or detection of crime.  

Confirmation that information is held would prejudice how investigations
are carried out in the future by revealing covert investigative activity.
 This would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and affect the
MPS's law enforcement capabilities.  Confirmation would also undermine the
partnership approach to investigations.

Section 31(3) Law Enforcement
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) - confirming information
is held  

By confirming or denying that information relevant to the request exists,
would lead to better public awareness into the intricacies of RIPA
legislation and applications submitted under Part II Chapter 2 of RIPA.
 This may lead to more information (intelligence) being submitted from the
public which may result in a reduction of crime.

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming or denying that
information is held

By confirming or denying that information exists, would compromise the
effective delivery of operational law enforcement.  Tactics could be
compromised which could hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More
crime could be committed and individuals placed at risk.

Balancing Test
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will
not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so could
undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement. Whilst there is
a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this
case providing assurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively
engaging with the threat posed by the criminal fraternity, there is a very
strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the
integrity of police investigations and operations in this area.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity,
particularly applications under RIPA legislation, is appropriate and
balanced in matters of national security, this will only be overridden in
exceptional circumstances.

In this case, there is also no requirement to satisfy any public concern
over the legality of police operations and the tactics we may or may not
use. The MPS is already held to account by independent bodies such as The
Office of the Surveillance Commissioner and The Interception of
Communications Commissioners Office. These inspections assess each
constabulary's compliance with the legislation and a full report is
submitted to the Prime Minister and Scottish Ministers containing
statistical information. Our accountability is therefore not enhanced by
confirming or denying that information pertinent to this request is held.

None of the above can be viewed as an inference that information does or
does not exist.

COMPLAINT RIGHTS

Are you unhappy with how your request has been handled or do you think the
decision is incorrect?

You have the right to require the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to
review their decision.

Prior to lodging a formal complaint you are welcome to discuss the
response with the case officer who dealt with your request.  

Complaint
If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of
the MPS made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding
access to information you can lodge a complaint with the MPS to have the
decision reviewed.

Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from
the date of the refusal notice, and addressed to:

FOI Complaint
Information Rights Unit
PO Box 57192
London
SW6 1SF
[the Met request email]
In all possible circumstances the MPS will aim to respond to your
complaint within 20 working days.

The Information Commissioner
After lodging a complaint with the MPS if you are still dissatisfied with
the decision, you may make application to the Information Commissioner for
a decision on whether the request for information has been dealt with in
accordance with the requirements of the Act.
For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner
please visit their website at www.ico.org.uk.  Alternatively, write to or
phone:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF
Phone:  0303 123 1113

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NOTICE - This email and any attachments may be confidential, subject to
copyright and/or legal privilege and are intended solely for the use of
the intended recipient. If you have received this email in error, please
notify the sender and delete it from your system.  To avoid incurring
legal liabilities, you must not distribute or copy the information in this
email without the permission of the sender. MPS communication systems are
monitored to the extent permitted by law.  Consequently, any email and/or
attachments may be read by monitoring staff. Only specified personnel are
authorised to conclude any binding agreement on behalf of the MPS by
email. The MPS accepts no responsibility for unauthorised agreements
reached with other employees or agents.  The security of this email and
any attachments cannot be guaranteed. Email messages are routinely scanned
but malicious software infection and corruption of content can still occur
during transmission over the Internet. Any views or opinions expressed in
this communication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).

 

Find us at:

Facebook: [1]https://m.facebook.com/metpoliceuk

Twitter: @metpoliceuk

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