Referrals to Channel

The request was refused by Cheshire Constabulary.

Dear Cheshire Constabulary,

Please can you tell me the number of referrals made since January 2915 through the multi-agency counter-radicalisation 'Channel' process that were made specifically for individuals allegedly at risk of being drawn into 'extremism' through involvement in anti-fracking campaigns?

Yours faithfully,

Kevin Blowe

Freedom of Information,

Dear Mr Blowe

 

I acknowledge receipt of your correspondence received 19/10/2015 which is
being dealt with as a request for information in accordance with the
Freedom of Information Act 2000.

 

I am in the process of dealing with your request and will respond in due
course and in any case by 16/11/2015. Please contact us by e-mail at
[Cheshire Constabulary request email] if you have any further enquiries.

 

Regards

 

 

Tracey Evanson, Freedom of Information Compliance Officer

Information Compliance| Cheshire Constabulary HQ | Clemonds Hey |

Oakmere Road | Winsford | Cheshire | CW7 2UA |

(Office: 01606 364176

 

This communication is intended for the addressee(s) only.
Please notify the sender if received in error. Internet email
is not to be treated as a secure means of communication.
The Constabulary monitors all Internet and email activity
and requires it is used for official communications only. Thank
you for your co-operation.

Freedom of Information, Cheshire Constabulary

1 Attachment

Dear Mr Blowe

 

I refer to your recent request for information under the Freedom of
Information Act 2000, as set out below:

 

Please can you tell me the number of referrals made since January 2915
through the multi-agency counter-radicalisation 'Channel' process that
were made specifically for individuals allegedly at risk of being drawn
into 'extremism' through involvement in anti-fracking campaigns?

 

In accordance with section 1(1) (b) of the Act, our response is as
follows:

 

Cheshire Police can neither confirm nor deny that it holds the information
you have requested as the duty in s1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(2) – National Security Qualified Prejudice based exemption
requiring Harm and Public Interest Test

Section 31(3) -  Law Enforcement Qualified Prejudice based exemption
requiring Harm and Public Interest Test

 

Overall harm for Sections 31 and 24
The publication of specific Channel data would provide information to
those who seek to challenge the process, which would not be in the public
interest. Allegations of ‘spying in the community’ and ‘targeting Muslims’
misrepresent and undermine the intention of Channel and ultimately the
Prevent programme, which seeks to support those individuals vulnerable to
being drawn into violent extremism. Figures on the associations of
participants, when compiled, may fuel perceived grievances such as the
view that certain groups are being targeted or that the issue of political
extremists (e.g. the far-right) are not being tackled. Revealing detailed
site specific statistics could lead to the identification of:

·           individuals who have been referred;
·           those who may have referred individuals to Channel in
confidence;
·           local organisations who are working with us to protect and
safeguard those at risk; and
·           on-going cases which could lead to the withdrawal of
individuals from the process and thus threaten the successful conclusion
of a case.

This would bring the process into disrepute, destroy trust and damage
Prevent at a National level

Channel is a multi-agency process, which aims to support those who may be
vulnerable to being drawn into violent extremism.  It works by providing a
mechanism for:
·           Identifying individuals who may be at risk of and vulnerable
to being drawn into violent extremism.
·           Accessing the nature and extent of the risk
·           Where necessary, referring cases to a multi-agency panel which
decides on the most appropriate support package to divert and support the
individual at risk.

Channel aims to draw vulnerable individuals away from violent extremism
before they become involved in criminal activity.  Effective information
sharing is crucial in ensuring that delivery partners, such as education,
children’s services, probation and local public health agencies and local
community partners are able to build a comprehensive picture of an
individual’s vulnerability, and therefore provide the appropriate type and
level of support to safeguard the individual at risk.  This requires the
local community to work in partnership with the police and other local
agencies and to share information appropriately and responsibly.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and Cheshire Police
will not divulge any information which would undermine National Security
or compromise Law Enforcement. Channel is part of the Prevent strand of
CONTEST, the Governments’ Counter Terrorism Strategy, and the information
held by Cheshire Police in regards to Channel directly relates to
counter-terrorism policing.  In addition, any prejudice to
counter-terrorism policing directly impacts on the police support and the
delivery of CONTEST.

Any detailed breakdown of the agencies, authorities or partners that made
the referrals would lead to these partners disengaging from the referral
process, as well as, potentially in some extreme cases, aid the
identification of those involved in the referral process itself, or of
those referred.

A list of local organisations and agencies who may be involved in Prevent
can be found in the Prevent Strategy: An Updated Guide for Local Partners:

[1]http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.u...

The Channel Factsheet, produced by ACPO (TAM) Prevent Delivery Unit
provides additional information about the partners and stakeholders:

[2]http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/...

Factors favouring disclosure of information for Section 31
There may be a public interest in the release of this information because
it may reassure the public that there are effective processes in place to
ensure that people showing signs or indicators that they are intent to use
violence or other illegal means are monitored effectively and assessed for
the presence of vulnerability. Disclosure of the information would provide
reassurance to the public that the Police have in place protocols to deal
with these types of incidents and offences. The Home Office regularly
publishes national statistical data on Prevent data. It would also
reassure the public that the Police have protocols in place to protect
children from being drawn into violent extremism.
 
Factors against disclosure of information for Section 31
Disclosure of the information would mean that law enforcement tactics
would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of
crime.  More crime would be committed because criminals would know which
forces are focusing on the Channel program. A fear of crime would be
realised because if the terrorists identified more vulnerable areas, they
would target and exploit these areas and the public would be in fear of
more criminal/terrorist activity occurring.  There would be an impact on
police resources because if the measure used by forces to detect terrorist
activities and safeguard children is disclosed and some areas are deemed
to be ‘softer’ at managing this threat, terrorist cells may move to these
areas in order to continue their operations and target vulnerable
individuals. There could be local implications with wrongful
identification of children and families which in turn could lead to
further offences being committed in the community.
 
Factors favouring disclosure of information for Section 24
The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and by
disclosing this information the public would be able to see where public
money is being spent and know that forces are doing as much as they can to
combat terrorism and radicalisation. Revealing this information would
enable the public to have some reassurance that the Governments Counter
Terrorism strategy is robust. This is an issue high on the public agenda
and therefore the release of this information would contribute to an
informed public debate.

Factors against disclosure of information for Section 24
Channel only operates in specific locations. Revealing detailed statistics
may increase interest in cases which could ultimately lead to the identity
of individuals and the organisations we work with, which may assist others
intending to counter such work. Identification of those working locally to
deliver the aims and objectives of Channel could enable those wishing to
counter such work to engage in activity to disrupt and jeopardise the
successful delivery of on-going work.  This could threaten the successful
delivery of Channel and the government’s counter terrorism strategy and
lead to the public being at increased risk from terrorism.  There is also
a potential for such data to be used to increase community tensions in an
area which would not be in the public interest.

Any information shared between agencies (intelligence) has the potential
to cover all aspects of criminal activity, be it threats to National
Security, future planned robberies or intelligence relating to terrorist
activity. Disclosure of the information would enable those intent on
engaging in terrorist activities to determine on a National level which
areas within the UK may be a vulnerable area to target.

Balance test
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police
service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of
an individual at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a
public interest in the transparency of policing operations, information
gathering and in this case providing assurance that the police service is
appropriately and effectively safeguarding those who are vulnerable to
radicalisation and targeting the cells behind the radicalisation, there is
a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and
the integrity of police investigations and operations in the highly
sensitive area of terrorism. 

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is
appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will only be
overridden in exceptional circumstances. Whilst there is a strong public
interest in the transparency of policing programmes and in this case,
providing assurance that the police service and other stakeholders are
appropriately and effectively engaging with one another, combating the
threat posed by individuals with the intent to use violence and other
illegal means, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both
national security and the integrity of the stakeholders within the
programme.

Cheshire Police will not divulge information if it is likely that it will
compromise the work of the Police Service or place members of the public
at risk. It is known that terrorist cells will try to radicalise people
and children so that they believe in their ideology in order to encourage
them to commit acts of terror. Disclosure of the requested information
would highlight which forces may have individuals who are more susceptible
to radicalisation and how each force tackles this within their
communities. This will adversely affect Cheshire Police’s ability to
detect this type of crime as it may alter the behaviours of those preying
on vulnerable individuals. This in itself could put the individual’s life
at risk along with that of National Security. It is therefore our belief
that the balance test lies in favour of not disclosing the information.

 

If I can be any further assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate
to contact me.

 

If you are not satisfied with the decision applied in this case I enclose
for your attention a copy of the Constabulary's appeal procedures.

 

Regards

 

 

Sarah Davies, Freedom of Information Officer

Information Compliance| Cheshire Constabulary HQ | Clemonds Hey |

Oakmere Road | Winsford | Cheshire | CW7 2UA | (Office: 01606 366556

 

 

Important Notice for Journalists

Disclosure of the enclosed information is in pursuant of the Cheshire
Constabulary's duty under Sections 1 and 11 of the Freedom of Information
Act 2000. This consists of copies of or extracts from recorded
information. When re publishing this information it should be made clear
in any article that the source of the information is in response to a
request under the Act. Officers supplying the information are not
Constabulary spokespersons and must not be quoted as though they were. 
Journalists are invited to make contact with the Cheshire Police Press
Desk on 01606 365945 should they wish to put into context their FOI data
with an official comment from a police spokesperson in the business area
they have sought information on.

 

Cheshire Constabulary in complying with their statutory duty under
sections 1 and 11 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to release the
enclosed information will not breach the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988. However, the rights of the copyright owner of the enclosed
information will continue to be protected by law. Applications for the
copyright owner’s written permission to reproduce any part of the attached
information should be addressed to The Force Solicitor, Cheshire
Constabulary HQ, Clemonds Hey, Oakmere Road, Winsford, Cheshire, CW7 2UA.

This communication is intended for the addressee(s) only.
Please notify the sender if received in error. Internet email
is not to be treated as a secure means of communication.
The Constabulary monitors all Internet and email activity
and requires it is used for official communications only. Thank
you for your co-operation.

References

Visible links
1. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.u...
2. http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/...

Dear Cheshire Constabulary,

Please pass this on to the person who conducts Freedom of Information reviews.

I am writing to request an internal review of Cheshire Constabulary's handling of my FOI request 'Referrals to Channel'.

In your response, you said that publishing specific Channel data would “provide information to those who seek to challenge the process”, adding that “allegations of ‘spying in the community’ and ‘targeting Muslims’ misrepresent and undermine the intention of Channel and ultimately the Prevent programme”. This response are particularly strange, as I had not mentioned the targeting of Muslim communities and my question had been specifically about anti-fracking campaigns.

You also said that the release of data could also potentially lead to local partner organisations “disengaging from the referral process” if they are named. Again, as you will note, I had not requested the names of any organisation or any individual that might perhaps provide a link to an organisation.

You also insisted that “figures on the associations of participants, when compiled, may fuel perceived grievances such as the view that certain groups are being targeted.” Bearing in mind that Channel is purportedly a voluntary process, this is positively Kafkaesque: in the context of my specific request about opponents of fracking, this argument means individuals cannot know to what extent their political beliefs and activism leads to referrals to Channel as possible 'domestic extremism', because they might feel understandably aggrieved at finding out their lawful political activity has been targeted.

As I am sure you are already aware, similar requests were made to the other four forces that are part of the North West Counter Terrorism Unit. The responses from all five forces were identical and all ignored the fact that my inquiry was not generalised to Prevent as a whole but very specific – my question was not about 'terrorism' but concerned particularly with individuals' involvement in political opposition to oil and gas exploration and extraction.

The standardised nature of all five responses to questions on Channel strongly suggests individual Freedom of Information requests on this subject are not considered on their merits or on a genuine test of the public interest by the five police forces. Instead, there is evidently a policy of automatic rejection of any FOIA request relating to Channel.

I therefore believe you have failed to carry out a proper public interest test at all in relation to my question on Channel, evidenced by the uniformity of all replies from North West regional police forces, including your own, that contain explanations unrelated to the original question and that point to a joint policy of immediate refusal.

A full history of my FOI request and all correspondence is available on the Internet at this address: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/r...

Yours faithfully,

Kevin Blowe

Freedom of Information, Cheshire Constabulary

1 Attachment

 

Dear Mr Blowe

 

Thank you for your email dated 04/02/2016 in which you express
dissatisfaction with our response to your request under the Freedom of
Information Act 2000, our reference number FOI 6940

 

In view of your comments your request has been forwarded to our
independent appeals/reviewing officer, who has been appointed by the
Authority. In accordance with our current policy, in line with the
requirements of the Act and guidance from the Information Commissioner,
our response to a review will be provided on or before the 03/03/2016.

 

If you require any further information please feel free to contact me,
details below;

 

Regards

 

 

Sarah Davies

Freedom of Information Officer|Cheshire Police HQ| Clemonds Hey|Oakmere
Rd|Winsford |CW7 2UA 

( Office: 01606 366556 |

[1]cid:image001.png@01D12E82.F0927010

 

This communication is intended for the addressee(s) only.
Please notify the sender if received in error. Internet email
is not to be treated as a secure means of communication.
The Constabulary monitors all Internet and email activity
and requires it is used for official communications only. Thank
you for your co-operation.

References

Visible links

Freedom of Information, Cheshire Constabulary

1 Attachment

Dear Mr Blowe,

 

I am writing in response your email dated 4^th February 2016 requesting an
independent appeal against the decision made in relation to your request
for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

 

In line with S45 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Code of
Practice), I have conducted an internal review in relation to your request
for information. In carrying out this review, reference is made to the
legislation guidance, the Code of Practice on the Discharge of the
Functions of Public Authorities under Part 1 of the Freedom of Information
Act. 

 

Original request:

 

Please can you tell me the number of referrals made since January 2015
through the multi-agency counter-radicalisation 'Channel' process that
were made specifically for individuals allegedly at risk of being drawn
into 'extremism' through involvement in anti-fracking campaigns?

 

The Constabulary’s response (11.11.2015):

 

In accordance with section 1(1) (a) of the Act, our response is as
follows:

 

Cheshire Police can neither confirm nor deny that it holds the information
you have requested as the duty in S1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(2) – National Security Qualified Prejudice based exemption
requiring Harm and Public Interest Test

Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement Qualified Prejudice based exemption
requiring Harm and Public Interest Test

 

Overall harm for Sections 31 and 24
The publication of specific Channel data would provide information to
those who seek to challenge the process, which would not be in the public
interest. Allegations of ‘spying in the community’ and ‘targeting Muslims’
misrepresent and undermine the intention of Channel and ultimately the
Prevent programme, which seeks to support those individuals vulnerable to
being drawn into violent extremism. Figures on the associations of
participants, when compiled, may fuel perceived grievances such as the
view that certain groups are being targeted or that the issue of political
extremists (e.g. the far-right) are not being tackled. Revealing detailed
site specific statistics could lead to the identification of:

·           individuals who have been referred;
·           those who may have referred individuals to Channel in
confidence;
·           local organisations who are working with us to protect and
safeguard those at risk; and
·           on-going cases which could lead to the withdrawal of
individuals from the process and thus threaten the successful conclusion
of a case.

This would bring the process into disrepute, destroy trust and damage
Prevent at a National level

Channel is a multi-agency process, which aims to support those who may be
vulnerable to being drawn into violent extremism.  It works by providing a
mechanism for:
·           Identifying individuals who may be at risk of and vulnerable
to being drawn into violent extremism.
·           Accessing the nature and extent of the risk
·           Where necessary, referring cases to a multi-agency panel which
decides on the most appropriate support package to divert and support the
individual at risk.

Channel aims to draw vulnerable individuals away from violent extremism
before they become involved in criminal activity.  Effective information
sharing is crucial in ensuring that delivery partners, such as education,
children’s services, probation and local public health agencies and local
community partners are able to build a comprehensive picture of an
individual’s vulnerability, and therefore provide the appropriate type and
level of support to safeguard the individual at risk.  This requires the
local community to work in partnership with the police and other local
agencies and to share information appropriately and responsibly.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and Cheshire Police
will not divulge any information which would undermine National Security
or compromise Law Enforcement. Channel is part of the Prevent strand of
CONTEST, the Governments’ Counter Terrorism Strategy, and the information
held by Cheshire Police in regards to Channel directly relates to
counter-terrorism policing.  In addition, any prejudice to
counter-terrorism policing directly impacts on the police support and the
delivery of CONTEST.

Any detailed breakdown of the agencies, authorities or partners that made
the referrals would lead to these partners disengaging from the referral
process, as well as, potentially in some extreme cases, aid the
identification of those involved in the referral process itself, or of
those referred.

A list of local organisations and agencies who may be involved in Prevent
can be found in the Prevent Strategy: An Updated Guide for Local Partners:

[1]http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.u...

The Channel Factsheet, produced by ACPO (TAM) Prevent Delivery Unit
provides additional information about the partners and stakeholders:

[2]http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/...

Factors favouring disclosure of information for Section 31
There may be a public interest in the release of this information because
it may reassure the public that there are effective processes in place to
ensure that people showing signs or indicators that they are intent to use
violence or other illegal means are monitored effectively and assessed for
the presence of vulnerability. Disclosure of the information would provide
reassurance to the public that the Police have in place protocols to deal
with these types of incidents and offences. The Home Office regularly
publishes national statistical data on Prevent data. It would also
reassure the public that the Police have protocols in place to protect
children from being drawn into violent extremism.
 
Factors against disclosure of information for Section 31
Disclosure of the information would mean that law enforcement tactics
would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of
crime.  More crime would be committed because criminals would know which
forces are focusing on the Channel program. A fear of crime would be
realised because if the terrorists identified more vulnerable areas, they
would target and exploit these areas and the public would be in fear of
more criminal/terrorist activity occurring.  There would be an impact on
police resources because if the measure used by forces to detect terrorist
activities and safeguard children is disclosed and some areas are deemed
to be ‘softer’ at managing this threat, terrorist cells may move to these
areas in order to continue their operations and target vulnerable
individuals. There could be local implications with wrongful
identification of children and families which in turn could lead to
further offences being committed in the community.
 
Factors favouring disclosure of information for Section 24
The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and by
disclosing this information the public would be able to see where public
money is being spent and know that forces are doing as much as they can to
combat terrorism and radicalisation. Revealing this information would
enable the public to have some reassurance that the Governments Counter
Terrorism strategy is robust. This is an issue high on the public agenda
and therefore the release of this information would contribute to an
informed public debate.

Factors against disclosure of information for Section 24
Channel only operates in specific locations. Revealing detailed statistics
may increase interest in cases which could ultimately lead to the identity
of individuals and the organisations we work with, which may assist others
intending to counter such work. Identification of those working locally to
deliver the aims and objectives of Channel could enable those wishing to
counter such work to engage in activity to disrupt and jeopardise the
successful delivery of on-going work.  This could threaten the successful
delivery of Channel and the government’s counter terrorism strategy and
lead to the public being at increased risk from terrorism.  There is also
a potential for such data to be used to increase community tensions in an
area which would not be in the public interest.

Any information shared between agencies (intelligence) has the potential
to cover all aspects of criminal activity, be it threats to National
Security, future planned robberies or intelligence relating to terrorist
activity. Disclosure of the information would enable those intent on
engaging in terrorist activities to determine on a National level which
areas within the UK may be a vulnerable area to target.

Balance test
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police
service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of
an individual at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a
public interest in the transparency of policing operations, information
gathering and in this case providing assurance that the police service is
appropriately and effectively safeguarding those who are vulnerable to
radicalisation and targeting the cells behind the radicalisation, there is
a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and
the integrity of police investigations and operations in the highly
sensitive area of terrorism. 

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is
appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will only be
overridden in exceptional circumstances. Whilst there is a strong public
interest in the transparency of policing programmes and in this case,
providing assurance that the police service and other stakeholders are
appropriately and effectively engaging with one another, combating the
threat posed by individuals with the intent to use violence and other
illegal means, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both
national security and the integrity of the stakeholders within the
programme.

Cheshire Police will not divulge information if it is likely that it will
compromise the work of the Police Service or place members of the public
at risk. It is known that terrorist cells will try to radicalise people
and children so that they believe in their ideology in order to encourage
them to commit acts of terror. Disclosure of the requested information
would highlight which forces may have individuals who are more susceptible
to radicalisation and how each force tackles this within their
communities. This will adversely affect Cheshire Police’s ability to
detect this type of crime as it may alter the behaviours of those preying
on vulnerable individuals. This in itself could put the individual’s life
at risk along with that of National Security. It is therefore our belief
that the balance test lies in favour of not disclosing the information.

 

If I can be any further assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate
to contact me.

 

If you are not satisfied with the decision applied in this case I enclose
for your attention a copy of the Constabulary's appeal procedures.

 

 

Appeal (04.02.2016):

In accordance with section 1(1) (a) of the Act, our response is as
follows:

 

In line with S45 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Code of
Practice), I have conducted an internal review in relation to your request
for information. In carrying out this review, I have referred to the
legislation guidance, the Code of Practice on the Discharge of the
Functions of Public Authorities under Part 1 of the Freedom of Information
Act. I have also taken into account the ACPO Freedom of Information Act
Manual of Guidance and your email dated 4^th February 2016 in relation to
your request for the review.

 

I would advise that after considering the original request along with the
associated response, the original decision of the Constabulary dated 11^th
November 2015 is upheld.

 

Please note that public authorities have two initial obligations under the
Freedom of Information Act 2000, namely to confirm or deny whether the
information is held and secondly, provide the information, subject to the
application of any exemptions.

 

In line with S17 of the Act, a public authority can refuse to respond to a
request and in refusing to provide such information (because the
information is exempt), to provide a notice which a) states that fact, b)
specifies the exemption in question and c) state why the exemption
applies.

 

Cheshire Constabulary neither confirms nor denies that it holds any
information by virtue of the following exemptions:

 

Section 24(2) – National Security Qualified Prejudice based exemption
requiring Harm and Public Interest Test

Section 31(3) -  Law Enforcement Qualified Prejudice based exemption
requiring Harm and Public Interest Test

 

Overall harm for Sections 31 and 24
The publication of specific Channel data would provide information to
those who seek to challenge the process, which would not be in the public
interest. Allegations of ‘spying in the community’ and ‘targeting Muslims’
misrepresent and undermine the intention of Channel and ultimately the
Prevent programme, which seeks to support those individuals vulnerable to
being drawn into violent extremism. Figures on the associations of
participants, when compiled, may fuel perceived grievances such as the
view that certain groups are being targeted or that the issue of political
extremists (e.g. the far-right) are not being tackled. Revealing detailed
site specific statistics could lead to the identification of:

·           individuals who have been referred;
·           those who may have referred individuals to Channel in
confidence;
·           local organisations who are working with us to protect and
safeguard those at risk; and
·           on-going cases which could lead to the withdrawal of
individuals from the process and thus 

            threaten the successful conclusion of a case.

This would bring the process into disrepute, destroy trust and damage
Prevent at a National level

Channel is a multi-agency process, which aims to support those who may be
vulnerable to being drawn into violent extremism.  It works by providing a
mechanism for:
·           Identifying individuals who may be at risk of and vulnerable
to being drawn into violent 

             extremism.
·           Accessing the nature and extent of the risk
·           Where necessary, referring cases to a multi-agency panel which
decides on the most

             appropriate support package to divert and support the
individual at risk.

Channel aims to draw vulnerable individuals away from violent extremism
before they become involved in criminal activity.  Effective information
sharing is crucial in ensuring that delivery partners, such as education,
children’s services, probation and local public health agencies and local
community partners are able to build a comprehensive picture of an
individual’s vulnerability, and therefore provide the appropriate type and
level of support to safeguard the individual at risk.  This requires the
local community to work in partnership with the police and other local
agencies and to share information appropriately and responsibly.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and Cheshire Police
will not divulge any information which would undermine National Security
or compromise Law Enforcement. Channel is part of the Prevent strand of
CONTEST, the Governments’ Counter Terrorism Strategy, and the information
held by Cheshire Police in regards to Channel directly relates to
counter-terrorism policing.  In addition, any prejudice to
counter-terrorism policing directly impacts on the police support and the
delivery of CONTEST.

Any detailed breakdown of the agencies, authorities or partners that made
the referrals would lead to these partners disengaging from the referral
process, as well as, potentially in some extreme cases, aid the
identification of those involved in the referral process itself, or of
those referred.

A list of local organisations and agencies who may be involved in Prevent
can be found in the Prevent Strategy: An Updated Guide for Local Partners:

[3]http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.u...

The Channel Factsheet, produced by ACPO (TAM) Prevent Delivery Unit
provides additional information about the partners and stakeholders:

[4]http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/...

Factors favouring disclosure of information for Section 31
There may be a public interest in the release of this information because
it may reassure the public that there are effective processes in place to
ensure that people showing signs or indicators that they are intent to use
violence or other illegal means are monitored effectively and assessed for
the presence of vulnerability. Disclosure of the information would provide
reassurance to the public that the Police have in place protocols to deal
with these types of incidents and offences. The Home Office regularly
publishes national statistical data on Prevent data. It would also
reassure the public that the Police have protocols in place to protect
children from being drawn into violent extremism.
 
Factors against disclosure of information for Section 31
Disclosure of the information would mean that law enforcement tactics
would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of
crime.  More crime would be committed because criminals would know which
forces are focusing on the Channel program. A fear of crime would be
realised because if the terrorists identified more vulnerable areas, they
would target and exploit these areas and the public would be in fear of
more criminal/terrorist activity occurring.  There would be an impact on
police resources because if the measure used by forces to detect terrorist
activities and safeguard children is disclosed and some areas are deemed
to be ‘softer’ at managing this threat, terrorist cells may move to these
areas in order to continue their operations and target vulnerable
individuals. There could be local implications with wrongful
identification of children and families which in turn could lead to
further offences being committed in the community.
 
Factors favouring disclosure of information for Section 24
The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and by
disclosing this information the public would be able to see where public
money is being spent and know that forces are doing as much as they can to
combat terrorism and radicalisation. Revealing this information would
enable the public to have some reassurance that the Governments Counter
Terrorism strategy is robust. This is an issue high on the public agenda
and therefore the release of this information would contribute to an
informed public debate.

Factors against disclosure of information for Section 24
Channel only operates in specific locations. Revealing detailed statistics
may increase interest in cases which could ultimately lead to the identity
of individuals and the organisations we work with, which may assist others
intending to counter such work. Identification of those working locally to
deliver the aims and objectives of Channel could enable those wishing to
counter such work to engage in activity to disrupt and jeopardise the
successful delivery of on-going work.  This could threaten the successful
delivery of Channel and the government’s counter terrorism strategy and
lead to the public being at increased risk from terrorism.  There is also
a potential for such data to be used to increase community tensions in an
area which would not be in the public interest.

Any information shared between agencies (intelligence) has the potential
to cover all aspects of criminal activity, be it threats to National
Security, future planned robberies or intelligence relating to terrorist
activity. Disclosure of the information would enable those intent on
engaging in terrorist activities to determine on a National level which
areas within the UK may be a vulnerable area to target.

Balance test
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police
service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of
an individual at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a
public interest in the transparency of policing operations, information
gathering and in this case providing assurance that the police service is
appropriately and effectively safeguarding those who are vulnerable to
radicalisation and targeting the cells behind the radicalisation, there is
a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and
the integrity of police investigations and operations in the highly
sensitive area of terrorism. 

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is
appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will only be
overridden in exceptional circumstances. Whilst there is a strong public
interest in the transparency of policing programmes and in this case,
providing assurance that the police service and other stakeholders are
appropriately and effectively engaging with one another, combating the
threat posed by individuals with the intent to use violence and other
illegal means, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both
national security and the integrity of the stakeholders within the
programme.

Cheshire Police will not divulge information if it is likely that it will
compromise the work of the Police Service or place members of the public
at risk. It is known that terrorist cells will try to radicalise people
and children so that they believe in their ideology in order to encourage
them to commit acts of terror. Disclosure of the requested information
would highlight which forces may have individuals who are more susceptible
to radicalisation and how each force tackles this within their
communities. This will adversely affect Cheshire Police’s ability to
detect this type of crime as it may alter the behaviours of those preying
on vulnerable individuals. This in itself could put the individual’s life
at risk along with that of National Security. It is therefore our belief
that the balance test lies in favour of not disclosing the information.

 

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, you have further recourse for
appeal, if required, to the Information Commissioner. Information can be
obtained about the appeal procedure from:

 

The Information Commissioner

Information Commissioner’s Office

Wycliffe House

Water Lane

Wilmslow

Cheshire

SK8 5AF

 

If I can be any further assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate
to contact me.

 

Regards,

 

Rachel Walsh

Information Compliance| Cheshire Constabulary HQ | Clemonds Hey |

Oakmere Road | Winsford | Cheshire | CW7 2UA |

(Office: 01606 364241 |  *:  [5][email address]

 

 

This communication is intended for the addressee(s) only.
Please notify the sender if received in error. Internet email
is not to be treated as a secure means of communication.
The Constabulary monitors all Internet and email activity
and requires it is used for official communications only. Thank
you for your co-operation.

References

Visible links
1. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.u...
2. http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/...
3. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.u...
4. http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/...
5. mailto:[email address]

Requests, Cheshire Constabulary

2 Attachments

Dear Mr Blowe,

 

In line with the First Tier Tribunal’s Decision Notice dated the
05/06/2018 (ref: EA/2016/0297-0301) I have considered the below mentioned
request afresh, without reliance on s24(2).

 

I have provided the details of your initial request and our revised
response below. Details of further correspondence received regarding this
request is attached for your reference.

 

YOUR REQUEST:

 

Please can you tell me the number of referrals made since January 2915
through the multi-agency counter-radicalisation 'Channel' process that
were made specifically for individuals allegedly at risk of being drawn
into 'extremism' through involvement in anti-fracking campaigns?

OUR RESPONSE:

In accordance with section 1(1) (b) of the Act, our response to your
request is as follows;

I can confirm that the Constabulary does hold the information that you
have asked for, but in this case we will not be providing it to you as it
is exempt from disclosure by virtue of the following exemptions:

 

S24 (1) National Security

1.    Information which does not fall within section 23(1) is exempt
information if exemption from section 1(1)(b) is required for the purpose
of safeguarding national security.

S31 (1) Law Enforcement

1.    Information which is not exempt information by virtue of section 30
is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be
likely to prejudice –

a.    (a) the prevention or detection of crime

b.    (b) the apprehension or prosecution of offenders

Both S24 National Security and S31 Law Enforcement are qualified
exemptions and prejudice-based which means that evidence of harm and a
public interest test must be provided for both.

 

Evidence of Harm (For Sections 24 and 31)

 

The international security landscape is increasingly complex and
unpredictable.  The UK faces serious and sustained threat from violent
extremists and this threat is greater in scale and ambition than any of
the terrorist threats in the past.  Since 2006, the UK Government has
published the threat level, based upon current intelligence.  The current
security level for England and Wales is severe.

 

Channel is a multi-agency process, which aims to support those who may be
vulnerable to being drawn into violent extremism.  It works by providing a
mechanism for:

 

·         Identifying individuals who may be at risk of and vulnerable to
being drawn into violent extremism.

·         Accessing the nature and extent of the risk

·         Where necessary, referring cases to a multi-agency panel which
decides on the most appropriate support package to divert and support the
individual at risk.

Channel aims to draw vulnerable individuals away from violent extremism
before they become involved in criminal activity.  Effective information
sharing is crucial in ensuring that delivery partners, such as education,
children's services, probation and local public health agencies and local
community partners are able to build a comprehensive picture of an
individual's vulnerability, and therefore provide the appropriate type and
level of support to safeguard the individual at risk. This requires the
local community to work in partnership with the police and other local
agencies and to share information appropriately and responsibly.

 

This request is directed at recorded information concerning the number of
statutory referrals made to Channel specifically for individuals at risk
through involvement in anti-fracking campaigns. Due to the very low number
of referrals that are likely to be made because of the specific
geographical location of fracking sites (and therefore protests), the risk
of the identification of informers and persons referred is substantial and
could have a catastrophic impact on individuals, their family and their
communities. It could also lead to inaccurate speculation around
individuals who have been wrongly identified and potentially identify
local organisations who work with police to protect and safeguard those at
risk.

 

A release of the referral figures sought could expose police tactics and
afford terrorists or extremist valuable information that will enable them
to either disrupt the police’s activity, or indicate to them that there
are vulnerable people that could be exploited. It could also inform
extremist activists by allowing them to avoid areas where police activity
may be taking place. This request has the potential to reveal where
counter terrorism police resources or informants are engaged. Each
request could act as a piece of a jigsaw to map out a national picture of
potential ‘safe havens’ or vulnerable areas and therefore risking national
security.

 

Such adverse consequences would bring the process into disrepute, destroy
trust and damage Prevent at a national level

 

Factors favouring disclosure of information for Section 31

 

This is an issue high on the public agenda and therefore the release of
this information would contribute to an informed public debate. The
release of this information may reassure the public that there are
effective processes in place to ensure that people showing signs or
indicators that they are intent to use violence or other illegal means are
monitored effectively and assessed for the presence of vulnerability.
Disclosure of the information would provide reassurance to the public that
the Police have in place protocols to deal with these types of incidents
and offences.

 

Factors against disclosure of information for Section 31

 

Disclosure of the information could result in individuals and informers
being identified and therefore putting them at risk. Law enforcement
tactics may be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection
of crime. More crime could be committed because criminals may know which
forces are focusing on the Channel program and could target their actions
accordingly. Terrorists would have the potential to identify vulnerable
areas which they could target and exploit in order to continue their
operations and target vulnerable individuals. There could be local
implications with wrongful identification of individuals and families
which in turn could lead to further offences being committed in the
community.

 

Revealing the information sought could lead to the identity of individuals
and in turn the organisations the police work with. This could enable
those wishing to counter such activity to engage in activity to disrupt
and jeopardise the successful delivery of ongoing work. This could
threaten the successful delivery of Channel and the government's counter
terrorism strategy and lead to the public being at increased risk from
terrorism.

 

Factors favouring disclosure of information for Section 24

 

It is recognised that there is a general public interest in knowing the
scope, focus and extent of the threat posed by individuals at risk of
becoming involved in terrorism and fracking protests who may need support
from the Channel process.

 

Factors against disclosure of information for Section 24

 

The arguments against disclosure under Section 24 link closely to those
previously outlined for Section 31, as an adverse impact on law
enforcement will increase the risk to national security from potential
terrorists. The potential identification of persons referred to Channel,
as well as informers and family members, could put them at risk of harm
and serve to reduce the trust and confidence of the public that contact or
engagement with the Channel process would remain confidential. Such a loss
in trust and confidence would undermine the Channel scheme and its ability
to protect the public.

 

Balance Test

 

There is a general public interest in the disclosure of information and
transparency of policing operations, information gathering and in this
case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and
effectively safeguarding those who are vulnerable to radicalisation and
targeting those behind the radicalisation. However, this needs to be
balanced against a very strong public interest in safeguarding both
national security and the integrity of police investigations and
operations in the highly sensitive area of terrorism. 

 

Taking into account all the circumstances of this case it is determined
that the balance of the public interest favours withholding the
information requested.

 

It is important to note that the exempted information could include a ‘0’
figure.

 

Regards,

 

 

Stuart Basford – Information Officer

Cheshire Constabulary and Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service Joint Corporate
Services

Information Compliance | Cheshire Constabulary | Clemonds Hey | Oakmere
Road | Winsford | Cheshire | CW7 2UA

Phone: 01606 365585 | Visit [1]www.cheshire.police.uk |
[2]www.cheshirefire.gov.uk | Follow [3]@cheshirepolice and @CheshireFire
on Twitter | Like [4]Cheshire Police and Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service
on Facebook

 

[5]cid:image001.png@01D336C2.D0FEEF40

 

This communication is intended for the addressee(s) only. Please notify
the sender if received in error. Internet email is not to be treated as a
secure means of communication. The Constabulary monitors all Internet and
email activity and requires it is used for official communications only.
Thank you for your co-operation.

References

Visible links
1. http://www.cheshire.police.uk/
2. http://www.cheshirefire.gov.uk/
3. http://www.twitter.com/cheshirepolice
4. http://www.facebook.com/cheshirepolice