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Wiltshire and Swindon
Local Resilience Forum
CBRNe Response Plan
Version 2.1 – Draft
PROTECT (Official)
0.0 Version control
Version
Date
By Whom
0.1
April 2014
Melanie Wilkey/CBRNe sub-group
0.2
June 2014
Melanie Wilkey/CBRNe sub-group
1.0
August 2014
Melanie Wilkey/CBRNe sub-group
1.1
August 2014
Melanie Wilkey/CBRNe sub-group
2.0
September 2014
Melanie Wilkey/CBRNe sub-group
2.1
February 2016
Alan Harper/CBRNe Sub Group
Publication
This plan is classified as OFFICIAL due to the nature of the information contained herein.
However it should not be publicly accessible.
Freedom of Information Act
This document is not subject to any exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
Principal National Guidance Documents
Name
Descriptor
A model response to CBRN events
Home Office document
Initial Operational Response to a CBRN
JESIP
incident
Thanks to:
Name
Avon & Somerset LRF
Hampshire and Isle of Wight LRF
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1.0 Introduction
This plan is designed to support multi-agency partners’ response to a CBRNe incident, and
there are two levels to this response plan
o Strategic
o Tactical
It should be considered in conjunction with the Home Office document – A model response
to CBRN events (restricted) and JESIP Initial Operating Response to a CBRN Incident.
The Wiltshire and Swindon response will be established around the 9 key tasks as outlined
in the Home Office document
This plan will
not cover:
The generic response arrangements detailed in the EMAP
Planning assumptions as included in National Risk Assessment and/or National Risk
Planning Assumptions
Interoperability processes as defined by the JESIP programme
Activation of Multi-Agency Activity, covered by Operation LINK
2.0 Objectives
Strategic Objectives
Tactical Objectives
Preserve life
Contain the incident
Prevent harm
Decontamination and treatment of
Minimise the impact of the incident
casualties (including worried well)
Warn and inform the public
Protect responders
Recovery
Safeguard the environment
Identification and investigation
Decontamination of fatalities
Dignified recovery of the dead
Preservation of evidence
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3.0 Access to Advice in Initial Stages
Source
Advice available
Contact details
ECOSA
Specialist advice before STAC is
Via local PHE centre,
established
details in Op Link
STAC
Public health, science and technical
Established by SCG
advice will be made available to the
SCG by the STAC.
The purpose of the cell is to ensure that
debate is contained within the cell so
that the SCG receives the best possible
advice based on the available
information in a timely, co-ordinated
and understandable fashion
SAGE
Scientific and technical advice provided Not accessible to local
to the national response
responders
Scientific Advice to the Government in
Emergencies.
PHE
Specialist advice before STAC is
Via local PHE centre, use
established
contact details from Op
Link
CRCE
Specialist advice before STAC is
Via local PHE centre, use
established
contact details from Op
Link
PHE/DSTL
Specialist advice before STAC is
Via local PHE centre, use
Porton Down
established
contact details from Op
Link
Police National
For technical and other advice on use
Via Police Control Room,
CBRN Centre
of PPE, working times etc.
use contact details from
Op Link
MetOffice
Advice concerning weather conditions
Via Fire Control Room,
which may affect the spread of
use contact details from
contamination
Op Link
FireMET/CheMET
Government
Advice on sources of specialist
Decontamination
contractors and resources involved in
Service
the decontamination of buildings,
transport assets, objects and the
environment.
Environment
Advice on environmental issues and
Via EA on call, use
Agency
run off of contaminated water.
contact details from Op
Oversight of disposal of contaminated
Link
materials and pollution prevention
guidance for protection of the water
environment1
Activation of Air Quality Cell - Air
Quality monitoring advice and support
for Major incidents
1 The EA and water companies will advise on the disposal of contaminated water in line with the
Water UK protocol
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Source
Advice available
Contact details
Local Authority
General environmental health advice
Via LA on call, use
Environmental
contact details from Op
Health Officers
Link
FRS DIM units
Decontamination, identification and
Via Fire Control Room,
monitoring units. Need to come from
use contact details from
Avon
Op Link
Police DIM units
Decontamination, identification and
Via Police Control Room,
monitoring units. Need to come from
use contact details from
Dorset or Avon & Somerset
Op Link
Water
Information on water supply, sewerage Via on call contacts
companies
and drainage to local areas
MoD
Technical and scientific advice on the
Via JLRO, use contact
options for the Render Safe of a CBRN
details from Op Link
threat
Advice concerning the provision of
military aid in support of the response
to a CBRN threat
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4.0 CBRNe Specific Roles and Responsibilities
This is not intended to replicate the generic roles and responsibilities of agencies as detailed
in the Wiltshire and Swindon Emergency Multi-Agency Procedures (EMAP)
Organisation
Responsibilities
Police
Co-ordination of the overall multi-agency response
Investigation of the incident
Survivor Management (with LA Support)
Fire and Rescue
Provision of mass decontamination
Service
Control of health and safety
Search & rescue of casualties
Provision of Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM) Team
for substances involved
Ambulance Service
Assist the FRS search & rescue of casualties within the Hot
(incl. HART)
Zone, only when HART available, providing ‘first strike’ medical
assistance prior to retrieval for decontamination
Triage, treatment and transport to hospital of the injured
Decontamination of injured and disabled
Local Authorities
Provision of transport to Survivor Reception Centre(s) / Rest
(incl. Public Health)
Centre(s)
Care and welfare of decontaminated uninjured people (part of
Survivor Management)
Technical and other support to the Emergency Services
Management of the strategic Recovery Co-ordinating Group
Provision of Public Health Advice
Public Health
Advice concerning nature of threat from contamination
England
Monitoring long term effects upon those involved in the incident
Provision of Public Health Advice
NHS England (incl
NHS England
broader health
Co-ordination of NHS response and resources
community)
Acute Hospitals:
Treatment of casualties including those self-presenting
Decontamination of self-presenters
111
Provision of health messages to affected and worried well
Primary & Community Care
Advice/support to self-presenters on decontamination
Reassurance of worried well
Environment
Assess the environmental risk
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Organisation
Responsibilities
Agency
Notify stakeholders (affected abstractors etc.)
Activate AQC to provide Air Quality advice if appropriate
Advise on measures to prevent/minimise environmental impacts
including:
the location of decontamination facilities;
containment techniques and equipment
appropriate disposal of wash water and management of waste,
including suitable sites for disposal;
Specialist contractors available with the support of the GDS
clean-up/restoration of the environment
Government
Facilitation of decontamination of buildings and the environment
Decontamination
mitigation of long term impacts through the provision of
Services (GDS)
appropriate advice
Category 2
Maintenance and restoration of affected services
Organisations (incl.
water and transport
companies)
MoD
Supporting the civil authorities through the provision of EOD
capability including CBRN elements, together with more
generalist military capabilities.
Resilience and
Provision of a framework for reporting to Central Government
Emergencies
Co-ordination of assistance at regional and national levels
Division South
(REDS)
Coroner
Determining the cause of death of any fatalities
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5.0 Nine Key Tasks
The response to a CBRN incident is designed around 9 key tasks:
These are not discrete tasks and would not be enacted in isolation or sequentially, many will
overlap.
Key Task
Activities
Command,
Police will lead the response in line with EMAP
Control and
Fire would not lead a CBRNe incident, although they would lead a
Coordination
HAZMAT incident.
This task should include communication, with multi-agency
partners and the public
Ensure the early convening of a Recovery Coordinating Group
Mobilisation
Operation Link should be utilised for the mobilisation of multi-
agency partners
Relevant assets should be requested via the national structures of
the individual agencies
If required Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Areas (MASHA) should
be established (see MASHA plan). Locations of these are attached
in Appendix 5
Set up tactical holding areas
Establish rendezvous points
Identify forward control point
Arrival at scene
Police will be responsible for coordination of asset deployment to
the scene
Arrival of resources will be a continuous process and will need to
be managed by individual Agency Command Vehicles.
Ensure communication between Operational and Tactical
coordinators.
Ensure effective management and control of resources and assets
arriving at scene
Utilise the JESIP principles
Scene
This will utilise the METHANE mnemonic as outlined in EMAP:
Assessment
M
Major
Major Incident declared
Incident
E
Exact
Exact location as possible, post
code, grid reference
T
Type
Type of incident
H
Hazard
Hazards present
A
Access
Access and egress
N
Number of
No of casualties and type of
Casualties
injuries
E
Emergency
Emergency services on scene
services
and required.
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Key Task
Activities
Further utilisation of the dynamic risk assessment and joint
decision-making model (JESIP principles)
Ensure reference to appropriate powers and procedures are
included, specifically the power to set cordons under the Terrorism
Act.
Scene
Crowd management. There is added complexity for a CBRN
Management
incident. People at scene could be:
o Contaminated
o Potentially contaminated
o Anxious
Need to consider psychosocial impacts
Crime scene/protection of scene
Initial decontamination
o Dry decontamination – FRS/Ambulance
o Casualty decontamination – Ambulance
Mass decontamination if required will be undertaken by FRS
Health and safety of responders
Dynamic risk assessments
Potentially multiple scenes
Implementation of appropriate cordons. Utilisation of military to
maintain cordons alongside Police
Sampling and investigation (undertaken in response to ID
substance)
Safe routes in and out of scene (blue routes?)
Shelter of people prior to evacuation (stay in etc.)
Identification of vulnerable individuals
Deliberate
Deploy appropriately trained and resourced responders into the
Reconnaissance
hazardous environment
All blue light services have specialist, trained responders –
HART/DIM/Police CBRN
Rescue and
Management of casualties and survivors.
Triage
Rescue is the responsibility of FRS with support from HART.
Triage is the responsibility of the Ambulance service
Decontamination of self-presenters – responsibility of health
providers which will predominantly be acute hospitals
Pre-decontamination triage
Post-decontamination triage
Casualty clearance
Casualty evacuation
Decontaminated people evacuation – Survivor Reception Centres
Identification of vulnerable individuals
Decontamination
Mass decontamination – if required
First responders
Hospital lockdown – self-presenters
Hospital evacuation (if required)
Casualties
Clothes and personal effects
Deceased
Buildings, vehicles, resources - GDS
Environment – GDS
CRCE recovery guidance
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Key Task
Activities
Pets/Livestock/Food chain
Survivor
Ensure that there is clarity between casualties and survivors
Management
Ongoing management of both casualties and survivors
Have resources to support the psychosocial response
Information collection
criminal
long term health monitoring
6.0 Additional considerations
Area
Additional considerations
Communications Media management
Social media
Public communications
Spread of CBRN
Availability of specialised modelling available via the Met Office,
materials
ECOSA and/or STAC
Environment Agency modelling
Management of
Decontamination of bodies
fatalities
Dignified recovery
Human audit area
Involvement of coroner
Body storage/emergency mortuary arrangements
Body disposal/transportation
Removal and
Role of GDS
disposal of
Contact routes
contaminated
Expectations
materials
PPE
Evidence retention
Clothing and personal effects
Livestock
Contaminated water from wet decontamination
(Note: emergency permitting via EA)
Role of LA – specialist waste disposal etc.
Response costs
Bellwin and other schemes
7.0 Training and Exercising
The Wiltshire and Swindon LRF training and exercising of CBRNe will be managed via the
Training and Exercising sub-group, based on the current training needs analysis. Any
support from the Police CBRN training team can be accessed via this route.
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Appendix 1 – Sample SCG Agenda
Initial Agenda
Membership
o Nominate Chair
o Health and Safety Brief
o Introductions / Roles / Responsibilities / Capabilities / Assets
o Are other organisations required?
Current Situation Analysis
o Are there urgent items for attention?
o Consider Risks/Threats – consider SDI (Scale, Duration, Impact) model
o Are there imminent/potential threats to Critical Infrastructure?
o Are there imminent/potential threats to Neighbouring Counties?
o Provide organisational updates
o Implement command and control structure
Aim and Objectives
o Set Tactical Aim and Objectives (in line with SCG Aim and Objectives if
set)
o Communicate Aim and Objectives to Bronze Commanders or operational
leads
o Develop tactical plans to meet the Strategic Aim and Objectives.
Supporting Groups
o Consider the need for / access to supporting groups in conjunction with
SCG
o Consider Involvement of Category 2 Responders, voluntary agencies
Communications
o Consider Shared Situational Awareness. Communicate relevant
information to SCG for inclusion on CRIP.
o Develop communication requirements with SCG / Bronze
Cdrs/Operational Leads
o Implement SCG Communications Strategy
o Implement SCG Media Management Strategy
o Identify ‘talking heads’ at tactical level
o Consider wider warning and informing Issues
Logistics and Administration
o Staff welfare including support groups
o Continuity and resilience of TCG
o Consider tactical logistical issues
o Consider requirement for Mutual Aid
AOB
Confirm Decisions / Actions
Date/Time/Venue/Set Agenda of Next Meeting
Considerations for Future Meetings
Review Actions / Impact
Review CRIP
Review Tactical Aim and Objectives
Updates from Supporting Groups
Recovery Issues
Consider further Resource Requirements
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Appendix 4 – Risk Assessment Matrix for Tactical Commanders
Risk Assessment Matrix
For use by scene commanders to assist in dynamic and operational risk assessment.
Additional factors to be considered:
Location of incident i.e. postbox, commercial premises etc.
Any specific threat received
Previous history
Contaminated casualties and/or presenting symptoms
Weather conditions
Any other significant or relevant details
Stage One
Consider current threat levels from either CBRN-based possibility of attack or the threat from
international terrorism in the UK; whichever is the highest. (Police will be able to ascertain this
information)
Sub-total Stage 1 Max. 5
Stage Two
Score one factor from each of the following 1a, 1b, 1c, 2, 3a and 3b. No matrix grouping may be
higher than the maximum shown.
1. Recipient/Victim/Location (building/facility)
a) Nationality
b) Employment status of recipient
c) Prominence of individual
Sub-total Stage Two 1 a) + b) + c) Max. 80
2. Sender (if package)
Sub-total Stage Two 2 Max. 20
3. Package
a) Origin of package/substance
b) Nature of package
Sub-total Stage Two 3 a) + b) max. 40
TOTAL STAGE ONE AND STAGE TWO (max. 145)
If package is received at either an ‘at risk’ location or by an ‘at risk’ individual then multiply the total
Stage One and Stage Two score by two.
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TOTAL SCORE (max. 290)
0 - 80 Category ‘No Risk’
Undertake suitable waste disposal bearing in mind nature of product
80 – 145 Category ‘Low Risk’
Refer to LRF Hazardous Materials Guide and multi-agency response plans
145 – 290 Category ‘High Risk’
Consider LRF and national CBRN response plans
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Appendix 8 - Glossary of terms
AWE
Atomic Weapons Establishment
CCC
Civil Contingencies Committee
CCG
Clinical Commissioning Group
CCS
Civil Contingencies Secretariat
COBR
Cabinet Office Briefing Room
CBRNe
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive
CRIP
Common Recognised Information Picture
DCLG
Department of Communities & Local Government
Defib
Defibrillator
DIM
Detection, Identification and Monitoring
DPH
Director of Public Health
DSTL
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
EA
Environment Agency
ECC
Emergency Communications Centre
ECOSA
Emergency Coordination of Scientific Advice
EMAP
Emergency Multi-Agency Procedures
ERD
Emergency Response Department, PHE, Porton Down
FCC
Force Contact Centre
FCP
Forward Control Point
GLO
Government Liaison Officer
ICS
Incident Command System
IT
Information Technology
HAZMAT
Hazardous Materials
HF
High Frequency
HM
Her Majesty’s
HQ
Headquarters
JRLO
Joint Regional Liaison Officer
LRF
Local Resilience Forum
MACA
Military Aid to Civil Authorities
MASHA
Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area
MERIT
Medical Emergency Response Incident Team
MTPAS
Mobile Telephone Privileged Access Scheme
NHS
National Health Service
PHE
Public Health England
RAYNET
Radio Amateur Network
RED
Resilience Emergencies Division
ResCG
Response Coordinating Group (DCLG RED)
RWG
Recovery Working Group
SAGE
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies
SCC
Strategic Coordinating Centre
SCG
Strategic Coordinating Group
SDI
Scale, Duration, Impact
SIO
Senior Investigating Officer
STAC
Scientific Technical Advice Cell
STEEPLE
Social, Technological, Economic, Ethical, Political, Legal, Environmental
TCG
Tactical Coordinating Group
UHF
Ultra High Frequency
VASEC
Voluntary Aid Societies
VHF
Very High Frequency