Mae hwn yn fersiwn HTML o atodiad i'r cais Rhyddid Gwybodaeth 'Welcoming back in to service of men convicted of manslaughter and murder'.



  Army Headquarters  
Secretariat  
IDL 24 
Marlborough Lines 
Monxton Road  
ANDOVER 
SP11 8HJ 

E-mail: xxxxxxxxxxxx@xxx.xx 
Website:      www.army.mod.uk 
 
 
Ms L Mowday 
w h a t d o t h e y k n o w . c o m  
Our Reference: Army/Sec/03/12 
Via 
 
Date:                 28 September 2012     
 
      
 
Dear Ms Mowday 
 
FOI REQUESTS – VARIOUS 
 
On 9 and 10 September 2012 you raised 20 separate requests for information under the Freedom 
of Information Act 2000.  You then raised an additional 10 questions on 26 September.   
 
Under the Appropriate Limit and Fees Regulations, public authorities are able to aggregate two or 
more requests if they are received within 60 working days and "relate, to any extent, to the same or 
similar information".  In this case, the requests on the enclosed table (a total of 22) relate to the 
Armed Forces Act, and related conduct of the Service Justice System and military discipline, and 
they were all received within a period of sixty working days.  These requests have therefore been 
aggregated.   
 
In line with the regulations, the estimated cost of complying with any of the requests is taken to be 
the total costs of complying with all of them.  I can confirm that we may hold some information on 
the subjects you have requested.  However, it has been assessed that the costs for which we are 
permitted to charge in providing this information will exceed the appropriate limit.  This appropriate 
limit is specified in regulations and for central government is set at £600.  This represents the 
estimated cost of one person spending three and a half working days in determining whether the 
Department holds the information, and locating, retrieving and extracting the information.  Under 
the terms of Section 12 of the FOI Act, this means that we are not obliged to comply with your 
requests. 
 
It may help if I explain that in reaching this assessment we have been required to take into account 
that you have made a substantial number of individual questions, many of which would exceed the 
appropriate cost limit in their own right.  For example, in a number of the questions you have 
requested ‘all’ information held about an issue over a wide timescale.  The volume of data involved 
is immense since many of the issues relate to Defence polices and incidents, would involve Tri-
Service as well as Head Office engagement.  In addition, there has been substantial reorganisation 
across the Department since the early 1990s, which will have an effect on the time it will take to 
locate material.  It is estimated that to collect, collate and examine all of these papers, including 
retrieving boxed material from archives, would be excessive.  The MOD may be able to provide 
information if you reduce or refine your request to bring the cost of compliance under the limit.  For 
example, if you were to ask for the final copies of a specific paper, or for minutes of a type of 
meeting within a specified timeframe.  It may also help you to narrow the timescale of your 
requests.  Unfortunately, depending on your question, I still cannot guarantee that we will be able 
to positively respond. 
 


In addition, while Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act gives an applicant the right to access 
recorded information held by public authorities at the time the request is made, it does not require 
public authorities to answer questions, provide explanations or give opinions, unless this is 
recorded information held.  Many of your requests fall into this category.   
 
You should also note that, while they have not been engaged, a number of exemptions could have 
been applied to your individual requests.  These include information that could be withheld under 
Section 42 as it would be legally privileged, Section 35 as it pertains to the development of 
Government policy and Section 36 (Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs).  In particular, at 
least two of your requests relate to the Service Complaint process.  To be helpful I should explain 
statistical information relating to the performance of the process is provided in the Service 
Complaint Commissioner’s Annual Reports which are available on her website at: 
http://armedforcescomplaints.independent.gov.uk/ .  Section 21 (Information accessible to the applicant 
by other means) would therefore have been applicable for information to 2011; I understand that 
2012 data will be published in March, Section 22 (Information intended for future publication) would 
have applied to this.  
 
You may find it helpful to know that the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) publishes 
guidance on how to make requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act in the 
ICO Charter for Responsible Freedom of Information Requests.  This is available on the ICO 
website at the following address: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/practical_application/its_public_infor
mation_foi%20charter_final.pdf
 
If you are not satisfied with this response or you wish to complain about any aspect of the handling 
of your request, then you should contact me in the first instance. If informal resolution is not 
possible and you are still dissatisfied then you may apply for an independent internal review by 
contacting the Head of Corporate Information, 2nd Floor, MOD Main Building, Whitehall, SW1A 2HB 
(e-mail xxxxxxxxxx@xxx.xx).  Please note that any request for an internal review must be made 
within 40 working days of the date on which the attempt to reach informal resolution has come to 
an end. 
 
If you remain dissatisfied following an internal review, you may take your complaint to the 
Information Commissioner under the provisions of Section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act. 
Please note that the Information Commissioner will not investigate your case until the MOD internal 
review process has been completed. Further details of the role and powers of the Information 
Commissioner can be found on the Commissioner's website, http://www.ico.gov.uk
 
 
 
 
Army Secretariat 
 
 
 
Enclosure: 
 
Table of Questions 
 
 


AGGREGATED QUESTIONS:  ARMED FORCES ACT AND THE CONDUCT OF THE SERVICE JUSTICE SYSTEM (MILITARY DISCIPLINE) 
 
FOI Case 
Applicant’s 
Serial 
Details 
Reference 
Reference 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000:  
 
During Operation BANNER, the Armed Forces’ operation in Northern Ireland from August 1969 to July 2007: 
1. How many people were killed by members of the Armed Forces, and how many of these were under the age 
of 18? 
2. In how many cases were members of the Armed Forces convicted of manslaughter? 
3. In how many cases were members of the Armed Forces convicted of murder? 
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4. In cases where members of the Armed Forces were convicted of manslaughter, on how many occasions 
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were those personnel permitted to continue serving in the Armed Forces following their release from prison? 
5. In cases where members of the Armed Forces were convicted of murder, on how many occasions were 
those personnel permitted to continue serving in the Armed Forces following their release from prison? 
6. In all cases where members of the Armed Forces were convicted of manslaughter or murder following 
killings in Northern Ireland, and were permitted to continue serving in the Armed Forces following their release 
from prison, please provide minutes of the Army Board. meetings at which the decision was taken to permit 
them to rejoin the Army and continue serving. 
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Please provide all copies of Army Legal Services Journal (produced by Directorate Army Legal Services), from 

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January 2000 to August 2012. 
Until the Armed Forces Act 1996, the Army had the power to impose a form of ‘house arrest’ on military 
personnel, which effectively imprisoned them on camp. Until the 1950’s this was called ‘Confined to Barracks’, 
or ‘CB’ in service jargon. From the 1950’s until 1997 this was called Restrictions Of Privileges (ROPs). This 
punishment was only awarded following a formal judicial process, either a court martial, or summary hearing, a 
judicial hearing without lawyers, internal to a battalion or regiment. The Armed Forces Act 1996 significantly 
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amended this form of punishment (ROPs), removing that aspect of it which confined personnel to barracks, i.e. 
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the ‘house arrest’ provision. Modern ROPs require service personnel to undertake specified work, and attend 
parades at specified times. 
 
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000: 
 
1.  Please provide all information from the drafting of the Armed Forces Act 1996 regarding the evolution of the 
punishment of Restriction of Privileges, in to a format whereby it no longer entailed confinement to barracks. 
2. During the Football World Cup in South Africa, 11 June to 11 July 2010, Commander 20th Armoured 
Brigade placed a ‘curfew’ on soldiers at Paderborn/Sennelager, confining them to camp during certain 
weekends. Please release all documents held by both HQ 20 Armd Bde and HQ UK Support Command 
(Germany) regarding both this ‘curfew’ and any other imposed on personnel in any regiment during the period 
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FOI Case 
Applicant’s 
Serial 
Details 
Reference 
Reference 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
(d) 
2001-2011. 
3. What powers do Army commanders have to impose ‘pre-emptive collective punishment’, for example, by 
banning soldiers from leaving barracks in case a small minority misbehave? 
4. Under what powers was the so-called ‘curfew’ referred to above issued, and enforced? 
5. For each of the years 2001-2011, please provide details of the overall numbers of British Forces based in 
Germany, and the number of Royal Military Police (RMP) personnel based in Germany. If releasable, for each 
year, please also indicate the average proportion of the latter deployed on operations. Please release all 
internal communications held by HQ UK Support Command (Germany), HQ 1st (UK) Armoured Division, 
Regimental HQ RMP, and the RMP career managers at the Army Personnel Centre, Glasgow, regarding 
requests for additional RMP manpower in Germany. 
In the aftermath of the deaths of four recruits at Princess Royal Barracks, Deepcut, a number of reviews were 
carried out which severely criticised the British Army concerning its treatment of service personnel. Armed 
Forces Continuous Attitude Surveys (AFCAS) consistently indicate that actual levels of bullying are higher than 
reported levels (See for example Hansard, HC (2004-05) 63-II, pages 296-301 and HC (2004-05) 63-I, paras 
267-274 for discussion on levels of bullying at training establishments), and that Service personnel do not 
report complaints because they do not believe they will be resolved: in December the 2004-April 2005 Armed 
Forces Continuous Attitude Survey, 35% of respondents chose not to complain of unfair treatment, 
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discrimination, harassment or bullying because they ‘did not believe anything would be done...’. The same 

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percentage of recipients did not complain because they ‘believed such a step would adversely affect... their 
career’ (Select Committee on Armed Forces, First Report, dated 26 Apr 06, Section 6 - Redress of complaints 
and Service inquiries). The Armed Forces Act 2006 introduced a Service Complaints system. This was 
considerably weaker than the ombudsman system which Nicholas Blake QC, who investigated the Deepcut 
deaths, recommended. The current system comprises investigations of the Army, by the Army and for the 
Army.  
 
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000:  
For each of the three services, and for each of the years 2008-2012 (for 2012, please adopt whatever 
methodology is easiest for the department: i.e. Jan-Jun only, entire year to date, etc), please list: 
a. The number of service complaints submitted, broken down in to those made under JSP 831 alone, or under 
JSPs 831 and 736 (i.e. bullying and harassment). 
b. The number of service complaints resolved, broken down in to those which were upheld and those which 
were not. 
c. The number of service complaints escalated to level 2, broken down in to those which were upheld and 
those which were not. 
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FOI Case 
Applicant’s 
Serial 
Details 
Reference 
Reference 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
(d) 
d. The number of service complaints escalated to a service complaints’ panel, broken down in to those 
which were upheld and those which were not. 
e. The average time taken from submission of a complaint until it is decided. 
f. All information not already encompassed by (a)-(e) held by MOD, Army HQ, Navy Command, and HQ Air 
regarding the time taken for individual complaints to be resolved. 
Background. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides a right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. This includes the freedom to change a religion or belief, and to manifest a religion or 
belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance, subject to certain restrictions that are "in accordance with 
law" and "necessary in a democratic society" 
 
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000: 
a. What rules are there in Queen’s Regulations regarding religion, and are these compatible with Article 9 of 
the ECHR? 
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b. Do service personnel have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion? 
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c. Are Commanding Officers permitted to order subordinates to attend church services? 
d. Are Commanding Officers permitted to order subordinates to attend church services, under the expedient of 
designating such an attendance ‘parade’? 
e. If ‘no’ to (c) or (d), would the use of military command authority (i.e. issuing orders) to order personnel to 
attend church be a breach of the service personnel’s Article 9 rights? 
f. If ‘no’ to (c) or (d), would the use of military command authority (i.e. issuing orders) to order personnel to 
attend church lead to action being against the commander issuing the improper order(s)? 
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000:  
 
Please provide copies of all training material relating to Human Rights, including but not exclusive to ‘The right 
to a fair trial’, ‘the right to a private life’, and ‘the right to freedom of association’, delivered to Army 
L Mowday 11-09-
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Commanding Officers (COs) on the Commanding Officers’ (Designate) course, which COs undertake prior to 

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assuming command of their units.   
 
Please ask HQ Air and HQ Navy Command to provide the equivalent information, mutatis mutandis (e.g. from 
whatever training courses their station/ship/unit commanders receive prior to assuming command) of their 
units. 
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000:  
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2012-114015-010
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Please provide all policy documentation or guidelines for commanders held by MOD, and Army HQ in Andover, 
regarding the application and impact of Article 8 - the right to a private life - on the MOD and service personnel.  
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FOI Case 
Applicant’s 
Serial 
Details 
Reference 
Reference 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Please ensure that you release all appropriate material, including policy analyses, from MOD Main Building, 
Army HQ, PS2(A), the Army’ disciplinary branch, HQ Navy Command, Office of the Naval Secretary, and HQ 
Air, Air Personnel Casework, the RAF’s equivalent. 
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000: 
 
Please provide all information held by the MOD, regarding the application and impact of Article 6 – a ‘fair trial’– 
on the MOD and service personnel.  Please provide all information held by the MOD, including Army HQ, HQ 
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Navy Command and HQ Air regarding the application and impact of Article 6 - fair trial - on the MOD and 
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service personnel. 
Please ensure that you release all appropriate material, including policy analyses, from MOD Main Building, 
Army HQ, PS2(A), the Army’s disciplinary branch, HQ Navy Command, Office of the Naval Secretary, and HQ 
Air, Air Personnel Casework, the RAF’s equivalent. 
The Advisory branch of Army Legal Services is usually the sole source of legal advice to the Army’s chain of 
command, when dealing with service personnel issues such as bullying, victimisation, harassment, sexual 
harassment and assault. In-house legal practice presents special challenges with regard to professionalism. 
Every lawyer owes his clients the sometimes-conflicting duties of loyalty and professional independence, but 
that conflict is exacerbated in the in-house context, where exercising independent judgment and maintaining 
objectivity are more difficult, and even greater loyalty is demanded by the employer. The lawyer's economic 
well-being depends on continued good relations with a single employer. In the military, in-house lawyers may 
be torn by the potential for conflicts between the interests of the military chain of command and the interests of 
service personnel. In other words, maintaining high professional standards can conflict with career objectives. 
A number of attributes of the job potentially foster neglect, or even disregard, of professional obligations. This 
is particularly true in the Armed Forces where, for example, Army Legal Services have in the past told their 
officers that they are ‘Army Officers first; lawyers second’. This is particularly the case when performance 
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reviews and appraisal reports are written by non-lawyers, who may not recognize, understand or share the 

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lawyer's ethical obligations. For example, Army Legal Services officers' appraisal reports are routinely written 
by their superiors in the mainstream Army. These appraisal reports are the means by which officers' careers, 
assignments, promotions, and 'contract extensions' are determined. For example, as Channel 4 News reported 
in Oct 11: 
 
‘Top army lawyer slams MoD over human rights abuses. The army's top lawyer during the Iraq war tells 
Channel 4 News his superiors blocked him when he tried to make British forces treat prisoners in a lawful 
way… [report includes distressing video of abuse of Iraqi civilians by British troops – initially covered up by the 
British Army] Shami Chakrabarti of Liberty describes him as "a human rights hero and a military hero as well. A 
man of principle and a credit to both the legal profession and the corps of officers in the British Army." One 
imagines that Lt Col Nicholas Mercer's former superiors in the Ministry of Defence might choose different 
words.  Lt Col Mercer was the commander legal of the British land forces that invaded Iraq at the start of the 
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FOI Case 
Applicant’s 
Serial 
Details 
Reference 
Reference 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
(d) 
war in 2003. He was, in other words, the army's top lawyer in Iraq. A successful and well-regarded career 
officer, it was his job to make sure British troops stayed within the law. But Lt Col Mercer's efforts to do that job 
were to cost him his dear. And in an exclusive interview with Channel 4 News he describes how he was 
blocked, harassed and mocked by his superiors in the MoD as he tried to make sure British forces treated 
prisoners in a lawful and humane way had the procedures he proposed been implemented, it is likely that 
innocent Iraqi hotel worker Baha Mousa - who died after 36 hours of abuse snd beating at the hands of British 
soldiers - would still be alive. Had he been listened to, Britain would have saved tens of millions of pounds paid 
out in compensation and legal fees. And - many argue - had his professional advice been taken, Britain's 
reputation would not have been tarnished by the allegations of  torture and mistreatment which continue to 
surround operations in Iraq and have tarnished the UK's reputation around the world. So why did this happen? 
Mercer argues that the root cause is what he calls an attitude of "moral ambivalence" about Britain's human 
rights obligations which goes right to the top of the MoD.’ 
 
Source: http://www.channel4.com/news/top-army-lawyer-slams-mod-over-human-rights-abuses
 
 Finally, the risk of sanction, disciplinary action or malpractice liability is comparatively low for lawyers working 
for the military as opposed to their privately-employed counterparts who are more closely scrutinised by the 
Solicitor’s Regulatory Authority and Bar Standards Board. 
 
Army Legal Services officers’ responsibilities are primarily towards their single employer, the British Army. Not 
only, as the unfortunate Lt Col Mercer found out, does that expose honest personnel to their employer’s wrath, 
it can inculcate a sense of impunity where personnel are accused of, for example, negligence or assault, may 
be treated with undue leniency, at the expense of victims. For example, Dr Freddy Patel was employed by the 
Metropolitan Police for many years until the death of Ian Tomlinson brought to light his incompetence (Source: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2191525/Ian-Tomlinson-Dishonest-G20-pathologist-struck-botched-
post-mortem-contained-68-errors.html). 
      
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000: 
a. Please provide a copy of the 2006 Army Legal Service Study, [‘The Mason Report’], dated November 2006. 
b. Please provide all documentation regarding possible options for greater Army Legal Services independence 
from the Army chain of command, including but not exclusive to analyses conducted in the aftermath of the 
deaths of young recruits at Deepcut, the killings by Parachute Regiment personnel of joyriders in Kosovo, and 
 
the killing of Baha Mousa and allegations regarding the killing of multiple Iraqi prisoners in the aftermath of the 
so-called "Danny Boy incident", and alternative models for provision of legal advice to the Army, such as a 
lawyers being seconded from the Government Legal Service.  
 
Please include, where held, any comparative examples of military legal provision in other countries. 
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FOI Case 
Applicant’s 
Serial 
Details 
Reference 
Reference 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Under the Armed Forces Acts 2006 and 2011, Commanding Officers can conduct 'summary hearings' to 
decide on criminal charges against their subordinates. Subordinates have the right to elect for court martial, but 
most appear not to do so. Subordinates may be geographically isolated and unable to see a solicitor, let alone 
pay for legal advice. The only source of advice provided to subordinates is an Assisting Officer who usually 
works for the Commanding Officer (who is in effect both the prosecutor and the judge). A conviction by a 
Commanding Officer is identical in its effects to that of conviction by a normal criminal court: fines, 
imprisonment, and a criminal record which may, for example, block soldiers from receiving British citizenship. 
For example, as Channel 4 News reported on, inter alia, 26 Jul12, ‘Under current rules Foreign and 
Commonwealth troops can claim British citizenship after four years of military service. But a new law, which 
appears to be increasingly used against foreign soldiers who have been disciplined at commanding officer 
10 
level, is leaving them without basic rights or status. Foreign and Commonwealth soldiers who are dealt with 
summarily for minor charges while serving are finding that when they leave the Armed Forces those 
misdemeanours are being treated as civil crimes. Having a criminal record then precludes them from getting 
NIL 
citizenship or legal right to remain in the UK. Once identified as "illegals" they become subject to deportation.’ 
As one solider in that report stated, “They sent me back while my scars were still open. I was in the Army you 
know, so whatever they say, you will follow. I don't really complain a lot. I just do it.” Private Epeli 'Pex' 
Uluilakeba’ (Source: http://www.channel4.com/news/disciplined-fc-soldiers-should-have-british-citizenship)  
 
L Mowday 10-09-
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000:  
2012-153429-016
 
a. What legal advice is provided at public cost to subordinates being charged with an offence under the 
summary hearing system? 
b. What mandatory training is provided to Assisting Officers, recognising that they are usually the sole source 
of advice provided by the Army for subordinates being charged with an offence under the summary hearing 
system? 
 
c. What guarantees are Assisting Officers given that they will not be penalised for acting in accordance with the 
law, and in the interests of justice and their consciences, even if so doing inconveniences the chain of 
command, and that their actions and decisions when acting as Assisting Officers will not be used in appraisal 
 
reports and promotion recommendations? (In other words, similar to the so-called "Morris direction" given to 
board members in courts martial - following Morris v UK [2002] ECHR 162 (26 Feb 02)). 
 
 
d. How many summary hearings (at all levels: sub-unit, unit and formation) were conducted in each of the 
years 2000-2011? For each year, please break down the number of hearings by service, and rank range (Army 
ranks listed for ease): Junior Non-Commissioned Officers (Pte-Cpl), Senior Non-Commissioned Officers (Sgt-
WO1), Junior Officers (2Lt-Capt), Field Officers (defined for these purposes as Maj-Col), and General Officers 
(defined for these purposes as Brig-Gen).  
 
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FOI Case 
Applicant’s 
Serial 
Details 
Reference 
Reference 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
(d) 
1) For each year, and in each rank range, how many defendants pled 'Not Guilty', and how many pled 'Guilty'?  
 
2) For each year, and in each rank range, of those defendants who pled 'Not Guilty', how many were 
convicted?  
 
3) For each year, and in each rank range, of those defendants who pled 'Not Guilty', and were convicted, how 
many subsequently appealed to the Summary Appeals Court?  
 
4) For each year, and in each rank range, of those defendants who pled 'Not Guilty', were convicted, and 
subsequently appealed to the Summary Appeals Court, how many were acquitted, or had their sentence 
reduced (please articulate each category separately)? 
During the development of the Armed Forces Act 2006, the MOD apparently considered removing the powers 
of legally-untrained and legally-unqualified military Commanding Officers to conduct criminal judicial 
proceedings and to imprison (or acquit) their subordinates, in lieu of moving all judicial powers to legally-
qualified, independent and impartial judges, such as judge advocates who preside over courts martial. Instead, 
a decision was made to retain these powers, but unify and equalise the powers of RN, Army and RAF 
commanders.  
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11 
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120909/06 
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000:  
 
Please provide copies of all MOD documentation which analyses or otherwise refers to the possibility of 
moving away from the summary hearing system, for example to a system of legally-qualified 'military 
magistrates', or any other system removing judicial powers from the mainstream Army. This includes, but is not 
exclusive to, all policy analyses conducted by, and alternative models considered by, the Armed Forces Bill 
teams who drafted the Armed Forces Acts 2006 and 2011 
Modern courts martial provide an independent and impartial tribunal the same as civilian criminal courts - a "fair 
trial" in plain English. The MOD was forced to radically revise its procedures consequent to losing many court 
attempts, at taxpayers expense, to preserve its previous system (for example, Findlay v UK (1996) 21 E.H.R.R. 
CD7 (25 February 1997), Coyne v UK [1997] ECHR 73 (25 September 1997), Smith and Ford v The UK [1999] 
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12 
ECHR 79 (29 Sep 1999), Hood v UK (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 365 (18 February 1999), Cable v UK (2000) 30 
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E.H.R.R. 1032 (18 February 1999), Moore v UK (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 728 (29 September 1999), Morris v UK 
[2002] ECHR 162 ( 26 February 2002), Grieves v UK [2003] ECHR 683 (16 December 2003), Thompson v UK 
(2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 11 (15 June 2004), Martin v UK (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 31 (24 October 2006).) Further to s1(1) 
of the Freedom of Information Act 2000:  
a. What legal advice is provided at public cost to subordinates being charged with an offence under the courts 
martial system? 
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FOI Case 
Applicant’s 
Serial 
Details 
Reference 
Reference 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
(d) 
b. How many courts martial were conducted in each of the years 2000-2011?  
For each year, please break down the number of hearings by service, and rank range (Army ranks listed for 
ease): Junior Non-Commissioned Officers (Pte-Cpl), Senior Non-Commissioned Officers (Sgt-WO1), Junior 
Officers (2Lt-Capt), Field Officers (Maj-Col), and General Officers (defined for these purposes as Brig-Gen).  
 
(1) For each year, and in each rank range, how many defendants pled 'Not Guilty', and how many pled 'Guilty'?  
 
(2) For each year, and in each rank range, of those defendants who pled 'Not Guilty', how many were 
convicted?  
 
(3) For each year, and in each rank range, of those defendants who pled 'Not Guilty', and were convicted, how 
many subsequently appealed to the Court Martial Appeal Court - i.e. the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)?  
 
(4) For each year, and in each rank range, of those defendants who pled 'Not Guilty', were convicted, and 
subsequently appealed to the Court Martial Appeal Court - i.e. the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), how 
many were acquitted, or had their sentence reduced (please articulate each category separately, and provide 
the case name and neutral citation references)? 
There is no organisation with independent and impartial oversight of the Royal Military Police (RMP), 
empowered to investigate individual cases of alleged misconduct (RAF Police and RN Police also come under 
MOD control). For Home Office police forces this function is provided by the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC). This lack of oversight is despite criticisms of: resourcing, influence by the mainstream 
Army, and integrity of senior officers (the high court warning of the colonel who was second-in-command RMP 
in 2010, that "It is our view that any court seized of those proceedings should approach his evidence with the 
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greatest caution.") These issues have been questioned following incidents such as the deaths of young recruits 
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at Deepcut, the killings by Parachute Regiment personnel of joyriders in Kosovo, the killing of Baha Mousa in 
Iraq, and allegations regarding the killing of multiple Iraqi prisoners in the aftermath of the so-called "Danny 
Boy incident".  
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000: Please provide all documentation regarding 
consideration of independent and impartial oversight of the RMP, including but not exclusive to analyses 
conducted in the aftermath of the above incidents, and as part of the drafting of the Armed Forces Acts 2006 
and 2011. 
Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary (“HMIC”) are appointed under section 54 of the Police Act. Under 
that section HMIC have statutory functions of inspecting, and reporting to the Secretary of State on, Home 
Office police forces. The purpose of section 4 of the Armed Forces Act 2011 is to provide a similar requirement 
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in relation to the service police forces, but focussed on the independence and effectiveness of investigations by 
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those forces. This provides that HMIC are to inspect, and report to the Secretary of State on, the independence 
and effectiveness of investigations carried out by each service police force. It should be noted that this will not 
provide an avenue of redress for individual complainants akin to the IPCC, rather it provides quality assurance 
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of overall military police integrity/competence. This section of the Armed Forces Act 2011 has not yet been 
brought in to effect, and no date articulated as to when it will be brought in to force. Further to s1(1) of the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000:.  
a. Why has section 4 of the Armed Forces Act 2011 not been brought in to force? 
b. When will it be brought in to force? 
c. Please provide all documentation held by MOD and Army HQ regarding both the rationale behind section 4, 
and the delays in bringing it in to force.  
d. Please, in particular, provide all copies of discussions regarding the costs of bringing this measure in to 
force, and all discussion documents and email trails between MOD and the Army/RMP regarding funding to 
enable this measure. 
Royal Military Police (RMP) soldiers' and officers' appraisal reports are routinely written by their superiors in the 
mainstream Army, despite the fact that the RMP may be investigating colleagues of senior officers in that 
mainstream Army. These appraisal reports are the means by which soldiers' and officers' careers, 
assignments, promotions, and 'contract extensions' are determined. Furthermore, under section 3 of the Armed 
Forces Act 2011, the head of the Royal Military Police (the 'Provost Marshall) is responsible to the Defence 
Council, which includes the chiefs of the Armed Forces. In the event of alleged serious misconduct, the chiefs 
of the Armed Forces are concerned, inter alia, with maintaining military morale and minimising damage to the 
Armed Forces's reputation  
 
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Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000:  
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Please provide all documentation regarding possible options for greater RMP independence from the Army 
chain of command, including but not exclusive to analyses conducted in the aftermath of the deaths of young 
recruits at Deepcut, the killings by Parachute Regiment personnel of joyriders in Kosovo, and the killing of 
Baha Mousa and allegations regarding the killing of multiple Iraqi prisoners in the aftermath of the so-called 
"Danny Boy incident", and alternative models for military policing such as a fully-independent police force 
outwith the MOD's control.  
 
Please include, where held, any comparative examples of military policing in other countries.  
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During the 2012 Olympic Games the Armed Forces successfully provided security, in conjunction with Home 
Office (i.e. civilian) police forces.  Under the 'Army 2020' plan to redesign the British Army, announced in July 
2012, the Army's role will expand to conduct 'UK engagement and military aid to homeland resilience as a UK-
based Army' and 'regional responsibilities in order to deliver military support to homeland resilience and 
engagement with UK society'. If a police officer behaves unprofessionally towards a member of the public, the 
latter may complain to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), an independent and impartial 
organisation with powers to both investigate and recommend sanction. This is part of a system of checks and 
balances to ensure democratic control of national institutions.  
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Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000:  
1. If a member of the military behaved unprofessionally towards a member of the public, to what independent 
and impartial organisation with powers to both investigate and recommend sanction, could that person 
complain? 
2. Would the MOD support the extension of the current Service Complaints Commissioner's jurisdiction to 
include complaints by members of the public against the military, as is done in other countries with their military 
ombudsman? If not, why not? 
A Channel 4 News investigation in 2010 discovered that the conviction rate for rape investigations in the 
military justice system is less than half that of the civilian system – which itself, has a deplorable record. During 
the investigation Channel 4 News tried repeatedly to elicit from the Ministry of Defence basic but critical 
information about its track record on investigating rape. The answers Channel 4 News eventually received 
raise serious questions about the military's ability to effectively deal with allegations of rape. Channel 4 News 
asked the MoD how many allegations of rape had been made to the military police. After a two month delay - 
which the MoD said was due to a re-organisation of how offences were recorded - Channel 4 News was told 
that between 2007 and 2009, 76 allegations of rape were investigated by the Armed Forces. But just two cases 
ended in conviction. A rate of 2.6 per cent. By comparison, the conviction rate when civilian police investigate 
is around 6 per cent.  (Source: http://www.channel4.com/news/military-investigations-fail-rape-victims
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Rape victims in the Armed Forces have numerous additional hurdles in attempting to seek justice, compared to 
their civilian counterparts: 
 
1. Royal Military Police (RMP) independence, resourcing and training and attitudes. Questions over RMP 
independence have been raised extensively by organisations such as Public Interest Lawyers. Of equal, if not 
greater concern, is that RMP resources are controlled by the Army. The dangers inherent in the organisation 
whose personnel are being investigated controlling the budget and staffing levels of the organisation 
responsible for said investigations should be obvious. (An analogy to demonstrate this would be if News 
International controlled the Leveson Inquiry’s or Metropolitan Police budget and staffing levels.) Finally, RMP 
personnel are ‘soldiers first, police officers second’ – the effect      of this mindset on attitudes towards rape 
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victims can neither be quantified, nor monitored, as the RMP are not subject to oversight by the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission. Police training, and attitudes to rape, are crucial, as was first demonstrated in     
the BBC documentary series Police in 1982, in episode three of which, 'A Complaint of Rape', a woman with a 
history of psychiatric treatment claims she has been raped by three strangers and is, in turn, bullied and 
cajoled by three male officers who dismiss her story out of hand. "This is the biggest bollocks I've ever heard," 
erupts one officer. The woman remains unseen as the camera assumes her point-of-view, trapped in the 
claustrophobic confines of the interrogation room. As she is subjected to the most hostile questioning, the 
accusing officers fill the frame in penetrating close-ups and the viewer gains some sense of her double 
violation.  Transmitted soon after an infamous court decision (in which a judge had accused a hitchhiker of 
"contributory negligence" in her own rape), 'A Complaint of Rape' caused a public outcry and led to a change in 
the way police forces handled rape cases. Within months, a new rape squad of five female officers was formed 
in Reading.  "The most we can hope is that people will rethink their assumptions - including policemen," said 
the producer. (Source: http://www.screenonline.org.uk/tv/id/464502/index.html).  Questions about RMP 
independence were, for example, highlighted by Law in Action on 4 Nov 10: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00vkxh9
 
2. Army Legal Services training and experience. Army Legal Services (ALS) prosecutors are notoriously 
inexperienced, and civilian barristers routinely run rings around them. This is a problem admitted to off-the-
record by senior ALS officers, and even Bruce Houlder QC, the Director of Service Prosecutions warned Law 
In Action in 2010 that the quality of his prosecutors was insufficient: ‘Joshua Rozenburg: Bruce Houlder QC is 
the first civilian to head service prosecutions.  Bruce Houlder revealed that the new Armed Forces Bill would 
give him power to recruit civilian prosecutors, and it's a power he says he won't hesitate to use if he doesn't get 
the support he needs. Houlder: "I have no intention here to civilianise this organisation. I know there is a 
provision to be taken in the next bill that would allow me, if it became necessary, to appoint a civilian as a 
prosecutor. In taking that provision I have made clear that I have no intention of doing that, so long as the 
services are able to continue to furnish me with sufficiently and appropriately skilled prosecutors. You asked 
me if I want some changes: yes, I do. I want properly-trained prosecutors. The trouble is at the moment they 
don't come here fully-trained. They come here as very clever, bright, and independent-minded lawyers but 
some of them have no experience in the criminal law and the training starts when they come here. Now that 
really is not satisfactory. I'm not a training organisation, I'm a prosecuting authority. I have no control over who 
comes here, how long they stay here, and where they go afterwards. But there we are, that's the world I 
operate in, I'm prepared to do my best with what I've got, but ask me if I'd like some changes, yes I would. I 
would like this organisation, and the work we do, to be more respected, as the specialist which it undoubtedly 
is.' (From BBC Radio 4, Law in Action on 4 Nov 10, at 17 mins 10 secs onwards:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00vkxh9) The statute permitting recruitment of civilian prosecutors is 
Section 21 of the Armed Forces Act 2011, see http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/18/section/21 and 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/18/notes/division/5/21
      
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3. Judge Advocate training and experience. The role of the judge advocate (the term used for the equivalent of 
crown court judge in courts martial) is vital. At present, many judge advocates lack both the training and 
experience of their civilian counterparts, with predictable consequences in terms of their ability to control robust 
defence counsel. As one news report highlights, trials themselves force rape victims to relive the experience, 
and their treatment is in the hands of the judge: 'Would you have expected the judge to intervene at the point 
where the defence tried to claim that he hadn't penetrated her and that it wasn't rape? "I really wish," she says, 
"and most officers would, that judges would intervene more. But they don't, unfortunately." "…it is tough that 
the victim becomes a victim twice. When a large proportion of women who have been through that procedure 
say that  the court experience was worse than the rape itself, there is something wrong. Something needs to 
be addressed…" Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/aug/07/gender.uk. Anecdotal evidence from 
one female officer who sat on a court-martial board (‘jury’) was that the court martial was stacked against the 
victim, and that the judge advocate permitted intrusive questioning in to the victim’s sexual history which 
poisoned the minds of the (otherwise entirely male board/jury) against the victim. The female officer’s 
description of defence counsel conduct implied that both the judge advocate and the Army Legal Services 
prosecutor neither understood nor enforced the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 designed 
to protect victims from brutal cross-examination designed to undermine them in the jury’s eyes. (See 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/bad_character_evidence/#character). 
 
Attempts to mitigate this problem have been enacted in Schedule 2 of the Armed Forces Act 2011, which 
permits Judge Advocates to sit in civilian courts so as to gain further experience – this will provide no comfort 
to victims in the immediate future, however.  Schedule 2 AFA11:  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/18/schedule/2 and 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/18/notes/division/6/2. 
 
4. Proportion of female board (‘jury’) members in courts martial.  Male board members are – arguably, and 
certainly in the perception of rape complainants – more likely to a) identify with the defendant rather than the 
victim, b) to evince ‘traditional attitudes’ towards victim’s so-called responsibility for being raped, and c) be 
unable to appreciate the trauma of rape. The Armed Forces are overwhelmingly male, and thus the pool from 
which courts martial boards are selected reflects this.  
 
5. Rank of female board (‘jury’) members in courts martial. Even if there is a minimum number of female(s) on 
a court martial board, due to the military’s demographic imbalance, and relative inability to retain female 
service personnel beyond their early years of service, female personnel on a court martial board are likely to be 
the most junior, and therefore their ability to contribute to the discussions of the board are constrained by the 
military reflecting a cultural element articulated by Professor, and TA brigadier, Richard Holmes (1995) that 
“the value of the opinion expressed in the British Army is directly related to the rank of the person expressing 
it”. Source: Kirke, C. M. S. ‘ Military Law, Justice, and Culture in the British Army’, 2008 (2) Law, Social Justice 
&  Global Development Journal (LGD). 
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http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2008_2/kirke/kirke.pdf
      
6. Military attitudes towards ‘complaining’, and belief in misogynistic stereotypes. The overarching climate 
towards complainants in the Armed Forces is reflected by reports of the Service Complaints Commissioner. 
Her, extremely-limited, remit encompasses non-criminal actions of – in relative terms – far less contentious 
nature than possible rape charges. It is reasonable to infer that the procrastination, victimisation and inaction 
experienced by complainants in these comparatively minor, but at least reported, complaints, is a microcosm of 
that experienced by rape victims. 
      
7. Inability of any external organisation to review Royal Military Police or Army Legal Services decisions. There 
are ongoing concerns over possible misuse of military judicial powers to cover-up criminal conduct. These 
were first highlighted in the Deepcut Review, in which Sir Nicholas Blake QC, explaining what powers an 
Armed Forces Ombudsman needed, recommended (p403 para 12.101(iii)) that: 
      
Where appropriate, the Commissioner should be consulted on decisions as to whether to bring disciplinary 
action...including where it is intended that no such action is to be taken. ...In an important case, the 
Commissioner should be able to institute legal proceedings to set aside legally flawed decisions not to 
prosecute.’ (Source: Sir Nicholas Blake QC, The Deepcut Review, A review of the circumstances surrounding 
the deaths of four soldiers at Princess Royal Barracks, Deepcut between 1995 and 2002, p403.  
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc07/0795/0795.pdf
      
The MOD rejected this out-of-hand, asserting that: 
      
‘The proposal that a commissioner might have the right to be consulted in disciplinary matters, or have the 
ability to intervene to institute legal proceedings against decisions not to prosecute, would undermine the role 
and independence of the prosecuting authorities. There is no precedent in the civilian criminal justice system 
for such intervention. The independent prosecuting authorities make their decisions on the basis of evidential 
tests and public or Service interest tests, under the general superintendence of the Attorney General.’ 
(Government's response to the Deepcut Review, 29 Sep 06, http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/25DDEF96-
F9E8-4C70-8B63-8EE8B3CD5496/0/GovtResponsetotheDeepcutReview.pdf

      
The Roman poet Juvenal cautioned, ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’, literally translated as "Who will guard the 
guards themselves?". In the Army’s case, that question is met with a deathly silence.  
 
 
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act  
1. How many board (‘jury’) members must sit on a court martial board where the defendant is charged with 
 
 
 
rape? 
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2. In the case of, for example, a Junior NCO, being charged with rape: what ranks would the court martial 
board comprise? 
3. What rules, if any, are there mandating the minimum number of females on a court martial board in a rape 
case? 
4. What rules, if any, are there mandating the minimum rank of females on a court martial board in a rape case, 
compared to other board members? 
5. How many rape cases were reported to Royal Military Police in each of the years 2002-2012? 
6. How many rape cases proceeded to courts martial in each of the years 2002-2012? 
7. In how many rape cases in each of the years 2002-2012 did the Service Prosecuting Authority, or its pre-
Armed Forces Act 2006 antecedents, secure a conviction? 
“The imperatives of military discipline are clearly of the essence of any effective national defence force, but the 
entitlement to due process of those subject to military law and discipline is not only a fundamental right but is 
also in itself a basic component of service morale.” Professor Hilaire McCoubrey, Due Process and British 
Courts Martial: A Commentary upon the Findlay Case, Journal of Armed Conflict Law 83 (1997), p89. 
      
The military is unique, and it can be difficult to transfer military qualifications to civilian life. Discharged service 
personnel are deprived of the opportunity to exercise the sole profession for which they have a calling, for 
which they have been trained and in which they have acquired skills and experience.  Under the Army’s 
internal sanctions regime, the chain of command’s personal whims are imposed upon subordinates through the 
exercise of arbitrary discretion. 
 
Army General and Administrative Instructions, Chapter 67, known as ‘AGAI 67’ is the Army’s internal sanctions 
regime. AGAI 67 allows the Army to take action against personnel if, in the opinion of the deciding officer, they 
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have breached the Service Test: ‘Have the actions or behaviour of an individual adversely impacted or are they 
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likely to impact on the efficiency or operational effectiveness of the Service?’, for the purposes of which 
operational effectiveness is defined as ‘the ability of a unit or formation to function as a cohesive force to 
perform the  operations, missions or actions for which it is organised or designed’. In plain English, the Service 
Test merely says ‘Is this bad for the Army?’ – a very wide margin for personal opinions and morals.  The 
dangers inherent in this approach are obvious: it confers upon the deciding officer almost complete discretion.  
Senior Army Legal Services (ALS) officers have noted the dangers of the chain of command’s personal 
morality being imposed upon subordinates through the exercise of arbitrary discretion; Colonel  Nigel Jones, 
both then and now the senior ALS officer at HQ Army,  wrote in Army Legal Services Journal 2007:  
      
     ‘Boards of Inquiry came and went, and ‘sex, lies and videotape’  continued to preoccupy the wider army in 
its endless quest for ever tighter Values and Standards, of which we receive daily reminders and about which 
people continue to go into endless huddles with as many views emerging as hot risottos cooked by Jamie 
Oliver. The law was never meant to be about morals – or so Public Law at the University of Newcastle upon 
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Tyne had it, albeit many moons ago when that University’s Law Faculty was ‘affiliated’ to the infinitely more 
prestigious Faculty of Law at Durham. All this goes out of the window at Land Command (now HQ Army) 
where the message is heavily garnished with moral rectitude and its ever resilient modern military embodiment, 
AGAI 67. Nodding jostles with ‘real law’ are comparatively few but nevertheless greatly appreciated when they 
come’. 
      
As Colonel Jones highlights, interpreting AGAI 67 generates, ‘as many views as hot risottos’. As a foreseeable 
consequence, the law (AGAI 67) is neither intelligible, clear, nor predictable.  Therefore, decisions such as 
whether service personnel lose their livelihood, are resolved not by the application of law, but by the exercise 
of individual discretion – that of potentially biased and partisan deciding officers, and/or the ‘endless huddles’ of 
which Colonel Jones warns. 
      
Furthermore, AGAI 67 confers absolute power on the chain of command in decisions such as whether to 
permit service personnel to challenge the evidence against them in an oral hearing, power over the minutiae of 
those proceedings, the decision to admit and exclude evidence at will, deny legal representation, refuse 
witnesses, protect favoured colleagues, senior or otherwise, and comprehensively stack the deck in the chain 
of command’s favour. In plain English AGAI 67 proceedings are ‘kangaroo courts’ controlled by a small clique 
of individuals. AGAI 67 can, and has been used to punish junior personnel for making criminal allegations 
against  senior officers, even if those the criminal allegations were supported by evidence collected by the 
military police – who, under the Army’s rules, subsequently had to hand it over to the mainstream Army for 
them to do as they wished with. It is, in sum, a “bullies’ charter”, and has been used vigorously by the Army in 
cases documented by the Employment Appeals Tribunal to harass service personnel for having the temerity to 
complain about being abused by the chain of command, for example in the case of LBdr Kelly Fletcher: 
http://j.mp/fletcherEAT
      
The right to remain in a particular employment sector is a civil right within article 6(1) of the European 
Convention. Lady Hale: 
     ‘Are we here concerned with a civil right at all? This is uncontroversial… the scope of the concept of civil 
rights has been greatly expanded from the sorts of dispute which the original framers of the Convention had in 
mind. But since 1981 it has been held to include the right to practise one's profession… The right to remain in 
the employment one currently holds must be a civil right.’  
 
Essentially, in ordinary disciplinary proceedings, where all that could be at stake was the loss of a specific job, 
article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights will not be engaged.  However, where the effect of the 
proceedings could be to deprive an employee of the right to practise his or her profession, the article would be 
engaged. This decision affects any public sector employer that enjoys an effective monopoly in the 
employment market within a particular profession. In, for example, Kulkarni the public sector employer in 
question was the NHS. The British Army is very clearly even more of a ‘monopoly employer’ in its respective 
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field, than the NHS is in medicine. The applicability of Article 6 must be determined on the basis of the 
jurisdiction and powers of the tribunal rather than its ultimate decision. The applicable test is whether 
administrative or disciplinary proceedings ‘would directly determine or exert a substantial influence over’ the 
decision to terminate someone’s career. Since AGAI 67 includes the power to dismiss someone from the 
military, or impose sanctions which could lead to that effect, and it lacks any appeal mechanism, it can clearly 
directly determine or exert a substantial influence over someone’s ability to continue their military career.  
 
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000: 
 
Does Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (the right to a ‘fair trial’) apply to proceedings 
 
 
 
taken by the Army against service personnel under AGAI 67 Major Administrative Action? 
“The imperatives of military discipline are clearly of the essence of any effective national defence force, but the 
entitlement to due process of those subject to military law and discipline is not only a fundamental right but is 
also in itself a basic component of service morale.” Professor Hilaire McCoubrey, Due Process and British 
Courts Martial: A Commentary upon the Findlay Case, Journal of Armed Conflict Law 83 (1997), p89. 
      
Army General and Administrative Instructions, Chapter 67, known as ‘AGAI 67’ is the Army’s internal sanctions 
regime. AGAI 67 allows the Army to take action against personnel if, in the opinion of the deciding officer, they 
have breached the Service Test: ‘Have the actions or behaviour of an individual adversely impacted or are they 
likely to impact on the efficiency or operational effectiveness of the Service?’, for the purposes of which 
operational effectiveness is defined as ‘the ability of a unit or formation to function as a cohesive force to 
perform the operations, missions or actions for which it is organised or designed’. In plain English, the Service 
Test merely says ‘Is this      bad for the Army?’ – a very wide margin for personal opinions and morals. The 
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dangers inherent in this approach are obvious: it confers upon the deciding officer almost complete discretion.  
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Senior Army Legal Services (ALS) officers have noted the dangers of the chain of command’s personal 
morality being imposed upon subordinates through the exercise of arbitrary discretion; Colonel Nigel Jones, 
both then and now the senior ALS officer at HQ Army, wrote in Army Legal Services Journal 2007: 
 
‘Boards of Inquiry came and went, and ‘sex, lies and videotape’ continued to preoccupy the wider army in its 
endless quest for ever tighter Values and Standards, of which we receive daily reminders and about which 
people continue to go into endless huddles with as many views emerging as hot risottos cooked by Jamie 
Oliver. The law was never meant to be about morals – or so Public Law at the University of Newcastle upon 
Tyne had it, albeit many moons ago when that University’s Law Faculty was ‘affiliated’ to the infinitely more 
prestigious Faculty of Law at Durham. All this goes out of the window at Land Command (now HQ Army) 
where the message is heavily garnished with moral rectitude and its ever resilient modern military embodiment, 
AGAI 67. Nodding jostles with ‘real law’ are comparatively few but nevertheless greatly appreciated when they 
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come’. 
 
As Colonel Jones highlights, interpreting AGAI 67 generates, ‘as many views as hot risottos’. As a foreseeable 
consequence, the law (AGAI 67) is neither intelligible, clear, nor predictable.  Therefore, decisions such as 
whether service personnel lose their livelihood, are resolved not by the application of law, but by the exercise 
of individual discretion – that of potentially biased and partisan deciding officers, and/or the ‘endless huddles’ of 
which Colonel Jones warns. 
      
Furthermore, AGAI 67 confers absolute power on the chain of command in decisions such as whether to 
permit service personnel to challenge the evidence against them in an oral hearing, power over the minutiae of 
those proceedings, the decision to admit and exclude evidence at will, deny legal representation, refuse 
witnesses, protect favoured colleagues, senior or otherwise, and comprehensively stack the deck in the chain 
of command’s favour. In plain English AGAI 67 proceedings are ‘kangaroo courts’ controlled by a small clique 
of individuals. AGAI 67 can, and has been used to punish junior personnel for making criminal allegations 
against senior officers, even if those criminal allegations were supported by evidence collected by the military 
police – who, under the Army’s rules, subsequently had to hand it over to the mainstream Army for them to do 
with as they wished. It is, in sum, a “bullies’ charter”, and has been used vigorously by the Army in cases 
documented by the Employment Appeals Tribunal to harass service personnel for having the temerity to 
complain about being abused by the chain of command, for example in the case of LBdr Kelly Fletcher: 
http://j.mp/fletcherEAT
      
AGAI 67 has also been used against junior personnel for reporting senior officers to military police for criminal 
offences, with the latter using the sanctions regime to punish a female victim who had reported an assault, with 
the Lt Col’s AGAI 67 complaint statement asserting: ‘I wish this to be my formal statement of complaint [for] her 
subsequent decision to falsely claim that I had assaulted her, in order to protect herself, causing me to be 
suspended, and to suffer reputational damage, embarrassment and stress.’ A chilling effect is the term used to 
describe the inhibition or discouragement of the legitimate exercise of a statutory right – in that case, 
submission of a police report to the Royal Military Police – by the threat of punitive sanctions. It refers to 
actions that would cause people to hesitate to exercise their rights for fear of the consequences. Predictably, 
such cases have had just such a chilling effect. The Army should encourage genuine reporting, and be very 
careful of taking action against even people who have made misconceived complaints. I would argue that it is 
contrary to the public interest to act against an accuser who made a report in good faith. AGAI 67 has no 
safeguards, and is a punishment regime which can be used liberally to penalise service personnel who are – 
initially at least – too naïve to realise their impotence in the face of untrammelled power. 
 
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000: 
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For each of the years 2000-2012: 
      
1. Please list how many cases were initiated under AGAI 67 Major Administrative Action (MAA). 
2. Please list in how many of these the service person pled ‘not guilty’, in other words denied the allegations. 
3. Please list in how many cases the allegations against the service person were deemed to have been proven 
by the chain of command – i.e. the accused was ‘convicted’. 
4. Please list, in categories, the sanctions imposed on service personnel following AGAI 67 MAA proceedings. 
Suggested categories are those contained in AGAI 67: dismissal, reduction in rank, rebuke, et cetera, but I am 
prepared to be flexible in order to minimise OSC(A)/PS2(A) staff work. 
 
 
 
5. Please list in how many cases following a ‘guilty’ finding, the service person requested a “review” of the first-
instance decision, noting that under AGAI 67 the Army denies service personnel the right to a de novo appeal, 
in favour of a documentary review by the first-instance decision-maker’s immediate superior. 
6. Of the cases in which service personnel requested a ‘review’, please document in how many they were 
successful in i) reversing the finding of guilt, or ii) reducing the sanction imposed.  
7. Please provide full copies of the RN’s and RAF’s equivalent of AGAI 67 – i.e. the procedures under which 
they take action against their personnel for non-criminal/non-AFA 06 offences. 
8. Please release the same information documented at (1)-(6) for both the RN’s and RAF’s equivalents of AGAI 
67 MAA. 
“The privilege of command is a fleeting sensation. Those who are commanded are the beneficiaries of the 
system, as their lives—their very existences—are placed uniquely in the care of the commanding officer. They 
have a right to expect that their leader will be held to exacting standards of professionalism and personal 
accountability. Their parents, husbands, wives, children, and friends should also expect this to be so, as the 
commander is entrusted with the treasured life of their loved-ones. ”  Command Responsibility and 
Accountability, Lt Col J Doty PhD US Army and Capt C Doty US Navy, Military Review, Feb 12. 
 
The Armed Forces (Pensions and Compensation) Act 2004 gives the Secretary of State for Defence the power 
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to establish schemes in respect of a person’s service in the armed forces and to make provision for benefits 
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payable on retirement. Such schemes are made by Order, specifically in this case, The Armed Forces 
(Redundancy, Resettlement and Gratuity Earnings Schemes) Order 2010, which established the Armed Forces 
Redundancy Scheme 2010, the Armed Forces Gratuity Earnings Scheme 2010, the Armed Forces 
Resettlement Commutation Scheme 2010 and the Armed Forces Resettlement Grants Scheme 2010. (See 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/345/contents/made and 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/345/pdfs/uksiem_20100345_en.pdf
      
Compared to any public or private schemes of similar scale, these are extremely generous packages which are 
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designed to compensate Service Personnel who, through no fault of their own, are being made redundant: 
“Those personnel who will be returning to civilian life through redundancy will receive full support from their 
chain of command along with a comprehensive resettlement package to aid their transition.”  Source: Service 
personnel selected for Tranche 2 Redundancy Programme, MOD, 12 Jun 12, 
     
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/ServicePersonnelSelectedForTr
anche2RedundancyProgramme.htm
      
Following the deaths of Army personnel at the Princess Royal Barracks in Deepcut during the period 1995-
2002, four enquiries took place, leading to reports by: the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, the 
Adult Learning Inspectorate, the Directorate of Operational Capability, and Sir Nicholas Blake QC. The last of 
these reports specifically examined the deaths of Sean Benton, Cheryl James, Geoff Gray, and James 
Collinson. Those reports were the catalyst for the Service Complaints process, the purpose of which is:  
“[The Armed Forces Act 2006] introduces an independent element into the process, to give Service personnel 
greater confidence in the system and in recognition of the recommendations of both the House of Commons 
Defence Committee (in its third report of session 2004-05, published on 14 March 2005) and Mr Nicholas Blake 
QC in his Deepcut Review report (printed by Order of The House of Commons on 29 March 2006, reference 
HC 795) which placed firmly in the public eye the importance of demonstrating that bullying, harassment and 
other forms of inappropriate behaviour have no place in the armed forces and are effectively and openly dealt 
with.”  
      
Source: Explanatory memorandum to the Armed Forces (Redress of Individual Grievances) Regulations 2007 
and the Armed Forces (Service Complaints Commissioner) Regulations 2007. See 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/52/part/14/crossheading/redress-of-individual-grievances
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/52/notes/division/6/1/2
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/3353/contents/made, and 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/3353/pdfs/uksiem_20073353_en.pdf
      
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000: 
      
1. Please release any MOD PR briefing material issued in the period 2002-2007 (i.e. in the aftermath of the 
Deepcut deaths, and the four inquiries which followed), which claims that “bullying, harassment and other 
 
 
 
forms of inappropriate behaviour have no place in the armed forces and are effectively and openly dealt with” – 
or assertions to that effect. 
2. Please release within the period 1 Jan 10 to 24 Sep 12, all policy documentation, internal communications, 
and minutes of meetings, within Army HQ, PS2(A), MOD DCDS(Pers), and the offices of SofS, MinAF and 
Min(DPWV), concerning the granting of redundancy packages to Senior Army Officers (defined for these 
purposes as Field and General officers, i.e. Major-General) accused of misconduct and/or criminal offences, or 
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who were Respondents (‘Defendants’) in Service Complaints. 
3. Please clarify: 
 
a. Would Senior Army Officers under investigation for alleged criminal conduct offences (per Section 42 of 
the Armed Forces Act 2006) committed during their service remain under the jurisdiction of the Service 
Prosecuting Authority when then are discharged from the Army? 
      
b. Would Senior Army Officers under investigation as a result of Service Complaints being filed against 
them (per ss334-339 Armed Forces Act 2006) remain under the jurisdiction of the Army Board or Service 
Complaints Panel (i.e. the Level 3 Decision-makers under the relevant legislation) when then are 
discharged from the Army? 
4. In the period 2009-2012, how many Service Complaints have been made against officers of the rank of 
brigadier or above? Please break down the complaints by year, and detail both the resolution and time taken to 
reach resolution. 
5. Please release all policy documentation, internal communications, and minutes of meetings, which concern 
the circumstances in which the MOD would be prepared to grant redundancy – and concomitant financial 
remuneration packages – to service personnel outside of the normal boarding and selection  processes 
conducted by the Army Personnel Centre. 
6. In how many cases has the MOD granted actually redundancy – and concomitant financial remuneration 
 
packages – to service personnel outside of the normal boarding and selection processes conducted by the 
Army Personnel Centre? 
7. Where the MOD did indeed grant redundancy – and concomitant financial remuneration packages – to 
service personnel outside of the normal boarding and selection processes conducted by the Army Personnel 
Centre, in how many cases were the recipients “respondents” (i.e. Defendants) in Service Complaints? 
8. Where the MOD did indeed grant redundancy – and concomitant financial remuneration packages – to 
service personnel outside of the normal boarding and selection processes conducted by the Army Personnel 
Centre, in cases where the recipients were “respondents”     (i.e. Defendants) in Service Complaints, which 
ministers were informed? 
9. Please release the minutes of the Army Board meeting at which it was decided to a) ‘pay off’ a brigadier who 
was the subject of a Service Complaint by granting him redundancy – and concomitant financial remuneration 
package – rather than b) investigating the complaint, making a decision and punishing the alleged offender – 
one of their peers – if found guilty, in accordance with the Service Complaints legalisation detailed in 
‘Background’, above. 
      
(Further, personalised, details of this may be provided if the MOD insists, however, my focus is on the policy 
issues this exposes: I have no desire to expose the individuals involved unless MOD intransigence compels 
such a course of action.) 
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10. How compatible was a) the Army Board’s decision to apparently shield a brigadier from the consequences 
of his alleged actions with b) MOD claims that “bullying, harassment and other forms of inappropriate 
behaviour have no place in the armed forces and are effectively and openly dealt with”? 
11. Please supply all documentation concerning consideration of the issue of the use of statutory powers by 
the Army Board to ‘pay off’ senior officers accused of misconduct. Please include all documentation which 
considered the extent to which the above action denied victims justice, covered-up misconduct, defrauded the 
taxpayer, and suborned parliamentary intent per ss334-339 Armed Forces Act 2006, and rendered the Service 
 
Complaints framework meaningless.  
12. Please clarify how parliament can trust the thousands of Junior Officers and Field Officers to exercise their 
immense powers over their subordinates lawfully, and to diligently and conscientiously discharge their 
responsibilities towards vulnerable service personnel under Service Complaints legislation, if General Officers 
on the Army Board, the very pinnacle of the British Army’s ‘leadership’, consciously and wilfully suborn said 
responsibilities and legislation. 
13. Did the actions of the Army Board in this case constitute malfeasance in public office? 
Background. In the 1990’s, following widespread revelations and world-wide coverage such as ‘British Army 
Stung by Tales of Brutality in Ranks’ in the New York Times [1] there were widespread concerns expressed, 
including by parliament [2]. As the Times reported, ‘the Government [resisted] demands that an independent 
inquiry be undertaken or that an ombudsman be appointed’. In addition to this, racism and sexism were rife, 
including serious physical assaults. Recognising that – by mandating that service personnel were barred from 
anything except closed, internal proceedings which were used by the Army to cover-up racial and sexual 
harassment, and protect the perpetrators, organisations such as the Equal Opportunities Commission and 
Commission for Racial Equality, fought to permit victims of such treatment to seek access to independent, 
impartial tribunals. That battle was eventually won, and service personnel alleging discrimination (but not just 
bullying or harassment) – at least those with sufficient resilience to endure months or years of Army abuse – 
can now access Employment Tribunals. For example, see the experience of LBdr Kerry Fletcher 2009, 
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documented in distressing detail here: http://j.mp/fletcherEAT
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In 1993, as part of the Army’s [failed] attempts to prevent future victims such as LBdr Fletcher having access to 
Employment Tribunals, the Army attempted to articulate reasons why it should not be subject to the normal law 
of the land. These included a number of internal papers, one of which is the subject of this question. 
      
Sir Nicholas Blake QC’s report in to the Deepcut killings also, along with a number of other authorities, 
recommended the creation of an Armed Forces ombudsman. The MOD, determined to resist the threat that 
transparency posed to senior officers’ untrammelled power, regardless of the benefits to victims of abuses of 
power, refused those recommendations. 
      
Sources: 
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[1] http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/06/world/british-army-stung-by-tales-of-brutality-in-
ranks.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
      
[2] Selected examples: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1987/mar/23/bullying-army
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1987/jul/10/army-bullying
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1987/nov/06/army-personnel-bullying
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1988/feb/22/bullying
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1988/jun/28/bullying
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1988/nov/29/bullying
      
1988: Mr Jack Ashley MP ‘Fearful young soldiers—and nobody knows how many there are—need an impartial, 
independent person such as an ombudsman to whom they can turn. The Ministry of Defence apparently 
believes that this would have an adverse effect on the Army's own efforts to look after its soldiers. I disagree. 
The good COs, whose immediate responsibility this is, will continue as they do now. The less effective ones, 
who are oblivious of what is going on or condone mistreatment, could be jolted into early preventive action.  I 
propose an ombudsman not as a panacea—there is none available—but as the best and most important step 
that can be taken in the present circumstances.’  
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1988/jan/26/the-army#S6CV0126P0_19880126_HOC_239
      
2002: Lord Ashley of Stoke ‘We have a fine army, and we need tough, well trained soldiers. However, is my 
noble friend aware that the announcement made in 1988 was designed to eradicate bullying from the Army?  
Recent events, including suicides at Deep Cut barracks, indicate that the policy is not working.’ 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldhansrd/vo021121/text/21121-02.htm
      
2006: The Deepcut deaths were too high profile for the MOD to ignore them or suppress demands for an 
inquiry. In The Deepcut Review - A review of the circumstances surrounding the deaths of four soldiers at 
Princess Royal Barracks, Deepcut between 1995 and 2002, one of Nicholas Blake QC’s key recommendations 
was the establishment of an Armed Forces Ombudsman: ‘the establishment of the office of a ‘Commissioner of 
Military Complaints’ (or Armed Forces Ombudsman) is now an essential step in improving confidence, 
transparency and justice… The Review considers that at least four functions need to be assigned to the 
Commissioner…’ 
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc07/0795/0795.asp
      
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000: 
 
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1. Please release the ‘Standards and Discipline Paper’, subtitled ‘The Military Ethos (The Maintenance of 
Standards)’, produced in 1993. 
2. Please release all MOD documents during the period 2002-2012 discussing the creation of an ombudsman. 
 
 
 
This specifically includes minutes of Army Board and Defence Council meetings, and briefing notes written for 
ministers in answer to parliamentary questions. I am specifically seeking all documents which provide 
evidence for the MOD’s refusal to appoint an ombudsman

 
Background. The Royal Military Police (RMP) Journal, which is published three times each year (April, August 
and December), is the house Journal of the RMP. It includes articles of a historical or technical (Police) nature. 
**The Journal has a major role to play in recording events and views for future historians and in that respect 
has a valuable function to discharge hence it is essential that moments of historical research significance are 
properly recorded and presented for publication.** The Journal is distributed to all regular Officers and NCOs in 
the RMP, to TA Provost Units and to subscribers. A number of each print run are used for RMP Public 
Relations purposes and as such are sent to each Chief Officer of Police of all UK Home Office and specialised 
LSM/FOI/ 
Police Forces as well as some foreign and Commonwealth Military Police Corps and their Associations. (my 
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emphasis) 
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Source: Selected extracts from Army website, http://www.army.mod.uk/agc/provost/6060.aspx (Accessed 23 
Sep 12) 
      
Further to s1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000: 
 
Please provide all copies of RMP Journal from January 2000 to the most recent issue. 
 
 
 
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Document Outline