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LAND FORCES - TEMPLATE FOR STRATEGIC RISK ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY IMPACTS OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES 
 
KEY CHANGE / 
POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS 
ASSESSMENT 
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED 
RESPONSIBILITY 
ISSUE 
OF RISK 
FOR ACTION 
(high, med, 
low) 
A.  ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES & PERSONNEL 
 
 
 
 
 
• Roles, 
•  Failing to identify fully how existing 
 
● Safety responsibilities, and the 
 
responsibilities & 
roles, responsibilities & key safety 
Likelihood 
requirements to meet those 
TLBs 
key activities 
activities are discharged before 
Med 
responsibilities, should be sufficiently 
 
removing or changing them 
 
articulated on job specifications. 
•  Failing to clarify new roles & 
Impact 
 
responsibilities (particularly where 
High 
●   Should Safety be considered as 
whole layers are removed and/or 
 
the ‘9th DLoD’ to ensure its full 
personnel take on substantial new 
Overall 
consideration during change 
responsibilities) 
Med 
management? 
 
•  Can result in unclear/unfilled safety 
responsibilities and/or loss of key 
safety activities 

 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Training, skills &  •  A lack of training, skills and capability   
●   Consider standardised training 
SSD&C 
capability 
development for personnel eg staff 
Likelihood 
package for senior/key staff 
TLBs 
development 
who are more empowered 
Med 
 
•  Inadequate training needs analysis 
 
 
and competence assessment 
Impact 
 
High 
•  Can result in inability to discharge 
 
safety roles & responsibilities. 
Overall 
 
Med  
 
 
Likelihood 
 
 
• Reductions 
in 
•  Excessive reductions in personnel 
Med 
●   Respective CESOs should assess 
TLBs 
personnel with 
with key competencies  
 
impact of loss of safety SQEP posts 
key 
 
Impact 
and/or staff and highlight risks 
competencies 
Can result in inexperienced staff exposed 
High 
to safety risks or them exposing others to 
 
safety risks. 
Overall 
 
Med 
Page 1 of 
DBR‐09‐02‐03 [DA‐07A‐11] 
 

KEY CHANGE / 
POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS 
ASSESSMENT 
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED 
RESPONSIBILITY 
ISSUE 
OF RISK 
FOR ACTION 
(high, med, 
low) 
B. LEADERSHIP 
AND 
AUTHORITY 
 
 
 
 
 
• Leadership, 
•  Failure to recognise fully the 
Likelihood 
●   Requirement to improve our 
TLBs 
priorities & focus 
importance of safety leadership 
Low 
understanding and management of 
and/or how this is achieved or 
 
risk at all levels 
maintained before making changes 
Impact 
●   Importance of maintaining safety 
 
High 
support for leaders 
•  Can result in a lack of safety 
 
    
leadership manifested by eg lack of 
Overall 
focus on key aspects of the safety 
Med 
regime, lack of visibility and/or dilution 
and distraction from the priority on 
safety, warning signs and trends not 
being spotted, and an ongoing, 
overall weakening of the systems and 
culture supporting safety 

 
 
 
 
 
 
• Operational 
•  Downgrading levels of responsibility 
Likelihood 
●   Importance of maintaining safety 
TLBs 
authorisation 
and/or Duty Holders and/or 
Low 
support for leaders 
 
authorising personnel at lower levels 
 
 
without adequate experience, 
Impact 
assessment or support, and/or too 
Med 
quickly 
 
 
Overall 
•  Can result in inability to discharge 
Med 
safety roles & responsibilities and/or 
loss of focus on, or quality of, key 
safety mechanisms and processes. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 

Page 2 of 
DBR‐09‐02‐03 [DA‐07A‐11] 
 

KEY CHANGE / 
POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS 
ASSESSMENT 
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED 
RESPONSIBILITY 
ISSUE 
OF RISK 
FOR ACTION 
(high, med, 
low) 
C. SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS AND CORPORATE MEMORY 
 
 
 
 
 
• Safety 

Failure to understand the 
Likelihood 
●  The safety assurance mechanism 
TLBs 
Management 
implications of the change on 
Med 
should focus on this during transition 
System  
each element of the Safety 
 
and highlight potential erosion. 
Management System: 
Impact 
 
Med 

Policy 
 

Organisation 
Overall 

Planning & Implementing 
Med 

Monitoring 

Audit & Review 
 

Can result in system weaknesses 
in one or more of the key 
elements for safety management
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Corporate 
•  Failure to recognise that important 
Likelihood 
●   They key here is not just capturing 
TLBs 
memory 
information (including lessons 
Low 
and retaining information but 
learned) is lodged with key individuals 
 
exploiting it.  This is time and (SQEP) 
and is not retained in durable records 
Impact 
manpower heavy so there should be 
and/or that systems are not in place 
Low 
particular priority on ‘protecting’ this 
to capture and retain information 
 
capability. 
 
Overall 
•  Can result in loss of key safety 
Low 
information and recurring incidents 
that could, and should, have been 
prevented. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 3 of 
DBR‐09‐02‐03 [DA‐07A‐11] 
 

KEY CHANGE / 
POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS 
ASSESSMENT 
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED 
RESPONSIBILITY 
ISSUE 
OF RISK 
FOR ACTION 
(high, med, 
low) 
D.  IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANGE – PROCESS, TIMING, AND COMMUNICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Speed of change  •  The adoption of unrealistic 
Likelihood 
●   Arguably the critical issue and 
DESB 
expectations about the speed of 
High 
should be a high level agenda item for 
TLBs 
change - including failing to take 
 
DESB on every occasion. 
account of the need for transition 
Impact 
management and the associated 
High 
resource implications 
 
 
Overall 
•  Can result in confusion and declining 
High 
safety performance and can also 
compound other effects 

 
 
 
 
 
 
• Large 
scale 
•  Failure to clarify the roles of departing 
Likelihood 
●   Provide briefing packs and 
TLBs 
redundancies, 
and incoming personnel 
High 
handover notes as standard 
redeployment or 
•  Hand-over periods insufficient to 
 
●   Establish appointment mentor 
internal staff 
allow new or transferred individuals to 
Impact 
framework and ‘reachback’ capability 
transfers 
acquire experience, information and 
Med 
(including to those departing). 
skills 
 
●   Establish ‘skills’ hub to provide 
•  Inadequate supervision of personnel 
Overall 
mentoring and supervision. 
during their induction period 
Med 
 
•  Can result in confusion and declining 
safety performance and can also 
compound other effects 

 
 
 
 
 
• Communications •  Failure to fully explain and justify the 
Overall 
● Key that the leadership is seen to 
TLBs 
change to staff in simple language. 
Med 
voice and explains the change.   The 
 
‘townhall’ format is most effective 
Can result in resentment and resistance if 
allowing feedback. 
the benefits to both Dept and individuals 
●  Exploit the capabilities of the TUs 
not clearly stated.  
to communicate the desired 
messages. 
 
NOTE – some of the above points are clearly related, and in some cases interconnected. But, the aim is to ensure that all are considered one way or 
another. 
Page 4 of 
DBR‐09‐02‐03 [DA‐07A‐11]