LAND FORCES - TEMPLATE FOR STRATEGIC RISK ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY IMPACTS OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES
KEY CHANGE /
POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS
ASSESSMENT
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED
RESPONSIBILITY
ISSUE
OF RISK
FOR ACTION
(high, med,
low)
A. ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES & PERSONNEL
• Roles,
• Failing to identify fully how existing
● Safety responsibilities, and the
responsibilities &
roles, responsibilities & key safety
Likelihood
requirements to meet those
TLBs
key activities
activities are discharged before
Med
responsibilities, should be sufficiently
removing or changing them
articulated on job specifications.
• Failing to clarify new roles &
Impact
responsibilities (particularly where
High
● Should Safety be considered as
whole layers are removed and/or
the ‘9th DLoD’ to ensure its full
personnel take on substantial new
Overall
consideration during change
responsibilities)
Med
management?
•
Can result in unclear/unfilled safety
responsibilities and/or loss of key
safety activities
• Training, skills & • A lack of training, skills and capability
● Consider standardised training
SSD&C
capability
development for personnel eg staff
Likelihood
package for senior/key staff
TLBs
development
who are more empowered
Med
• Inadequate training needs analysis
and competence assessment
Impact
High
•
Can result in inability to discharge
safety roles & responsibilities.
Overall
Med
Likelihood
• Reductions
in
• Excessive reductions in personnel
Med
● Respective CESOs should assess
TLBs
personnel with
with key competencies
impact of loss of safety SQEP posts
key
Impact
and/or staff and highlight risks
competencies
Can result in inexperienced staff exposed
High
to safety risks or them exposing others to
safety risks.
Overall
Med
Page
1 of
4
DBR‐09‐02‐03 [DA‐07A‐11]
KEY CHANGE /
POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS
ASSESSMENT
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED
RESPONSIBILITY
ISSUE
OF RISK
FOR ACTION
(high, med,
low)
B. LEADERSHIP
AND
AUTHORITY
• Leadership,
• Failure to recognise fully the
Likelihood
● Requirement to improve our
TLBs
priorities & focus
importance of safety leadership
Low
understanding and management of
and/or how this is achieved or
risk at all levels
maintained before making changes
Impact
● Importance of maintaining safety
High
support for leaders
•
Can result in a lack of safety
leadership manifested by eg lack of
Overall
focus on key aspects of the safety
Med
regime, lack of visibility and/or dilution
and distraction from the priority on
safety, warning signs and trends not
being spotted, and an ongoing,
overall weakening of the systems and
culture supporting safety
• Operational
• Downgrading levels of responsibility
Likelihood
● Importance of maintaining safety
TLBs
authorisation
and/or Duty Holders and/or
Low
support for leaders
authorising personnel at lower levels
without adequate experience,
Impact
assessment or support, and/or too
Med
quickly
Overall
•
Can result in inability to discharge
Med
safety roles & responsibilities and/or
loss of focus on, or quality of, key
safety mechanisms and processes.
Page
2 of
4
DBR‐09‐02‐03 [DA‐07A‐11]
KEY CHANGE /
POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS
ASSESSMENT
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED
RESPONSIBILITY
ISSUE
OF RISK
FOR ACTION
(high, med,
low)
C. SAFETY
MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS AND CORPORATE MEMORY
• Safety
-
Failure to understand the
Likelihood
● The safety assurance mechanism
TLBs
Management
implications of the change on
Med
should focus on this during transition
System
each element of the Safety
and highlight potential erosion.
Management System:
Impact
Med
-
Policy
-
Organisation
Overall
-
Planning & Implementing
Med
-
Monitoring
-
Audit & Review
-
Can result in system weaknesses
in one or more of the key
elements for safety management
• Corporate
• Failure to recognise that important
Likelihood
● They key here is not just capturing
TLBs
memory
information (including lessons
Low
and retaining information but
learned) is lodged with key individuals
exploiting it. This is time and (SQEP)
and is not retained in durable records
Impact
manpower heavy so there should be
and/or that systems are not in place
Low
particular priority on ‘protecting’ this
to capture and retain information
capability.
Overall
•
Can result in loss of key safety
Low
information and recurring incidents
that could, and should, have been
prevented.
Page
3 of
4
DBR‐09‐02‐03 [DA‐07A‐11]
KEY CHANGE /
POTENTIAL EFFECT & RISKS
ASSESSMENT
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED
RESPONSIBILITY
ISSUE
OF RISK
FOR ACTION
(high, med,
low)
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANGE – PROCESS, TIMING, AND COMMUNICATION
• Speed of change • The adoption of unrealistic
Likelihood
● Arguably the critical issue and
DESB
expectations about the speed of
High
should be a high level agenda item for
TLBs
change - including failing to take
DESB on every occasion.
account of the need for transition
Impact
management and the associated
High
resource implications
Overall
•
Can result in confusion and declining
High
safety performance and can also
compound other effects
• Large
scale
• Failure to clarify the roles of departing
Likelihood
● Provide briefing packs and
TLBs
redundancies,
and incoming personnel
High
handover notes as standard
redeployment or
• Hand-over periods insufficient to
● Establish appointment mentor
internal staff
allow new or transferred individuals to
Impact
framework and ‘reachback’ capability
transfers
acquire experience, information and
Med
(including to those departing).
skills
● Establish ‘skills’ hub to provide
• Inadequate supervision of personnel
Overall
mentoring and supervision.
during their induction period
Med
•
Can result in confusion and declining
safety performance and can also
compound other effects
• Communications • Failure to fully explain and justify the
Overall
● Key that the leadership is seen to
TLBs
change to staff in simple language.
Med
voice and explains the change. The
‘townhall’ format is most effective
Can result in resentment and resistance if
allowing feedback.
the benefits to both Dept and individuals
● Exploit the capabilities of the TUs
not clearly stated.
to communicate the desired
messages.
NOTE – some of the above points are clearly related, and in some cases interconnected. But, the aim is to ensure that all are considered one way or
another.
Page
4 of
4
DBR‐09‐02‐03 [DA‐07A‐11]