S. 1 (1) (a) (iii) of the Malicious Communications Act 1988

Dear Sir or Madam,

Will you confirm or deny that Judges and court officers, including
solicitors and barristers are subject to S. 1 (1) (a) (iii) of the
above Act.

Yours faithfully,

fred robinson

Dear Hopkins, Tony,

The Legal Aid Commission tell me, as a person who qualifies for
Legal Assistance, that it would be unjustified to ask a the
Commission to fund a solicitor to discover the answer to questions
that could be put directly to the party from whom the information
is sought.

In the light of the above can you please give me cogent reason to
consult a solicitor that I can present to the Legal Aid Commission
that will justify funding from them to have my question regarding
the role of the Ministry of Justice in the control or otherwise of
court officers and, who appear do not have any legal advice
available to them, clarified.

Judges and court officers who knowingly breach the Act, are
employees of the crown and presumably are subject to the terms of
their employment or contract with their employers who, as far as I
know is the ministry of Justice.

Yours sincerely,

fred robinson

Dear Hopkins, Tony,

I request an internal review and draw you attention to the CPR and
The Law Societies rules regarding the conduct of legal procedure by
court officers and all relevant Acts of Parliament.

Yours sincerely,

fred robinson

Dear Hopkins, Tony,

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

Freedom of Information Good Practice Guidance No. 5

Time limits on carrying out internal reviews

following requests for information under the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has produced
this guidance as part of a series of good practice guidance
designed to help understand and apply the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 (FOIA). FOIA makes reference to complaints procedures at
section 45 (concerning the Code of Practice) and at section 50;
both relate to circumstances where an applicant wishes to complain
about the response of a public authority to a request for
information. The reference at section 50 concerns the discretion
that the Commissioner is allowed to exercise not to make a decision
in cases where a complainant has not exhausted a public authority’s
complaints procedure (also referred to as internal review). The
Commissioner considers it important that internal reviews are
completed as promptly as possible and so is introducing this
guidance setting out what he considers to be a reasonable timescale
for public authorities to undertake an internal review following a
request by an applicant. Section VI of the Section 45 Code of
Practice states that “each public authority should have a procedure
in place for dealing with complaints .... in relation to its
handling of requests for information.” This comprises desirable
practice for the purposes of FOIA, but it should be noted that
under the Environmental Information Regulations it is a requirement
for public authorities to consider representations made by
applicants for information. Consequently, most public authorities
under FOIA should already have the procedures in place to allow
them to perform an internal review. It is also important to note
that Refusal Notices must include either details of the public
authority’s complaints procedure or a statement that it does not
have one. This will assist the Commissioner in determining whether
or not an applicant, on making a complaint under section 50, has
exhausted the complaints procedure of the public authority.

The spirit of the Code is that internal reviews should be completed
as soon as possible. For example:

• a complaints procedure should be designed to allow prompt
determination of complaints (para 39) • target times should be set
for dealing with complaints (para 42).

• the code also recommends that the target times are reviewed
regularly and that each authority should publish them together with
information on its success in meeting those targets.

• there is also an implied recommendation, supported by guidance
issued by the Department for Constitutional Affairs, that the
complainant should be kept fully informed throughout the review
process. The Commissioner supports these recommendations and
intends, from time to time, to monitor conformity with them. Some
other factors to be noted are as follows:

• FOIA requires a request to be complied with “promptly and in any
event not later than the twentieth working day following the date
of receipt” which suggests that internal reviews should also be
completed promptly.

• Internal review is an important second opportunity for the public
authority to engage with an applicant and there are clear benefits
to both parties if the review is concluded within a reasonable
timeframe.

• The Freedom of Information Act (Scotland) 2002 stipulates an
internal review should be completed within 20 working days
following receipt of the request for review.

In view of all the above the Commissioner considers that a
reasonable time for completing an internal review is 20 working
days from the date of the request for review. There may be a small
number of cases which involve exceptional circumstances where it
may be reasonable to take longer. In those circumstances, the
public authority should, as a matter of good practice, notify the
requester and explain why more time is needed.

In our view, in no case should the total time taken exceed 40
working days. In such cases we would expect a public authority to
be able to demonstrate that it had commenced the review procedure
promptly following receipt of the request for review and had
actively worked on the review throughout that period. Some public
authorities have complaints procedures which have a number of
stages or levels. The Commissioner does not expect an internal
review of a response to an FOI request to have more than one stage.
Given that this is a review of a statutory process with clear
rights for requesters and obligations on public authorities, a
degree of formality is expected.

Enforcement

The Commissioner wants to ensure that a complainant has exhausted a
public authority’s internal review procedure, but at the same time
the complainant should not be unreasonably delayed in having his
complaint considered under section 50. Equally, it will be
beneficial to both complainant and public authority if an internal
review leads to a prompt and satisfactory outcome such that a
subsequent complaint to the Commissioner is not required. The
Commissioner has therefore set out above what he regards as
“reasonable” in terms of the timescale for completing an internal
review. He is keen to ensure that the time limit is adhered to and
that there are no unreasonable delays in carrying out reviews.

Internal reviews are referred to in the Code of Practice, and
significant or repeated unreasonable delays in dealing with
internal reviews may lead to monitoring by the Enforcement team
and, in some instances, structured intervention, for example, the
issuing of a Practice Recommendation. The Commissioner’s
Enforcement Strategy provides more detail about practice
recommendations and structured intervention.

More information

If you need any more information about this or any other aspect of
freedom of information, please contact us.

Phone: 08456 30 60 60 01625 54 57 45 (National rate) E-mail: please
use the online enquiry form on our website

Website: www.ico.gov.uk

Yours sincerely,

fred robinson

Dear TONY HOPKINS

FOR YOUR INFORMATION REGARDING WHAT SEFTON KNEW IN FEBRUARY 2003:

LETTER TO SEFTONS LEGAL DIRECTOR JANUARY 24TH 2003

Will you please send me ALL information held by yourselves to which
I am entitled to request under the Freedom of Information
legislation now in force. I request copies of ALL my correspondence
to the Council to check what you have and have not received to
compare it with the information you send. I request ALL information
you hold on any claims and settlement of claims held by your
Finance Department and allegedly made by myself.

LETTER TO SEFTON COUNCIL 1ST FEBRUARY 2003

Will you please send me ALL information held by yourselves to which
I am entitled to request under the Data Protection legislation now
in force. I request copies of all my correspondence with regard to
claims and settlement of claims held by your Finance Department,
also information of how the alleged settlement of a claim,
regarding my gable wall in 1997, referred to by Mr Barr on January
2000, (Ref: GRB/JBJ/HSG1187) was made and to whom ? I have none of
this correspondence. I also request a copy of a letter from the
Council to Maritime Housing stating I had made a claim for damage
to my gable wall in 1993.

LETTER TO MS ELWOOD SEFTONS FEBRUARY 8TH 2003

With regard to my request for ALL information I am entitled to
under the DATA PROTECTION ACT I enclose a cheque for £10 which I
believe is the correct fee. I especially request that ALL
information regarding claims against the Council and their
settlement be forwarded to me with any correspondence regarding
these claims that was sent to third parties and any notes which
were added to files or computer records.

LETTER TO SEFTON FEBRUARY 14TH 2003

Will you write to me and confirm that you have received both my
application and payment of £10 for information under the DATA
PROTECTION ACT, dated February 8th 2003.

LETTER TO SEFTONS LEGAL DIRECTOR FEBRUARY 20TH 2003

I asked not only for information held by the finance department. I
asked for ALL information I was entitled to under the data
protection act to be provided. This means All information not only
that held with regard to claims held by the Finance Department as
you appear to believe. I have been told by the Finance department a
summons was issued against me regarding Council Tax;- Summons No
2340104 at - The Law Court, Albert Road, Southport. I have written
to the court and they state "the summons No you have quoted does
not relate to one of our cases". Consequently I will not be
attending court.

LETTER TO SEFTONS LEGAL DIRECTOR FEBRUARY 22ND 2003

I formally request that SMBC's letter to MHA, dated between 1st and
10th February 1999, be provided to me as part of my request, and
payment, for information under the Data Protection Act. I believe
that the Council has committed breaches of The Data Protection Act
and ask that you give a reasoned respond to the following to
explicate the matter.

Background

1. In about June 1993 I visited Sefton Councils (SMBC) Planning
department and saw plans for a proposed development of a new
housing estate on land adjacent to my property. This was proposed
to occur after the demolition of buildings adjoining my property
then in situ on the land. These plans show the gardens of the
proposed houses extending to my gable wall - evidently after the
removal of a nib wall and footings.

2. In August and September 1993 I expressed concern in writing to
SMBC I stated it appeared, from the plans, a nib wall and old
footings abutting my gable wall were to be removed during the
forthcoming development. On October 1st 1993, SMBC (Mr Barr) told
me the nib wall and footings abutting my gable wall should not be
interfered with during the development. This fully resolved the
matter.

3. On March 7th 1994 SMBC (Mr Barr) arranged to survey and
photographed my property. The nib wall is shown on some of these
photographs. This survey does not record any damage, cracking or
deterioration to my gable wall. At the outset of demolition of
buildings adjoining my property - [which occurred between March
14th and April 6th 1994] - the nib wall and footings were
photographed in situ.

4. On April 6th and 21st 1994 I reported to SMBC that my property
had been damaged during the demolition of the adjoining buildings -
[It was acknowledged on April 15th 1994 (pp Mr Barr), the one dated
April 21st 1994 was not.] There was no mention of demolition of a
nib wall in this correspondence. - [The nib wall was witnessed by
SMBC's contractors in situ on April 21st 1994.]

5. On July 4th 1998 I wrote to my solicitors reporting latent
damage to my property due to the demolition of the nib wall. This
damage was located at the point where the nib wall had been.

6. On January 27th 1999 I wrote to Maritime Housing Association
(MHA) regarding my property.

7. On February 1st 1999: MHA's Director of Development and Property
Services. (Mr Quayle) wrote to me that MHA's records showed the
land had been transferred to them in "mid 1995" and, citing SMBC as
their consultants, stated he would write to SMBC regarding the nib
wall. - [Between February 1st and 10th 1999 SMBC had clearly
responded to MHA.]

8. On February 10th 1999 MHA (Mr Quayle,) after receiving
correspondence from SMBC, wrote to me with regard to the nib wall,
that. "Matters surrounding this particular wall began as early as
1993."

9. On March 4th 1999 MHA (Mr Quayle) wrote to me that ;- It was
Fawley Construction Ltd - MHA's building contractor. - "Who was
responsible for our development at Kepler Street."

We (MHA and Fawley) are "all convinced that the "nib" wall was not
in existence when we took possession of the site." - [Possession
has been given by MHA, Fawley and SMBC as March 14th 1994.]

That I should be aware that MHA. "Were not responsible for the
demolition of the maisonette blocks which previously occupied the
site, following demolition by Sefton Council."

That "On the evidence I have it would appear, therefore, that the
"nib" wall was removed during the demolition contract." - [This
evidence would appear to be, based on SMBC\s letter of February
1999 to MHA attesting that SMBC were responsible for the damage to
my property caused by the demolition of the nib wall and, had
demolished it and the adjoining buildings in 1993 and, had owned it
until "mid 1995."]

That "I am taking the opportunity of copying this letter to Mr G
Barr at Sefton Council, so that he is fully aware of the
correspondence that has passed between us."

10. On March 10th 1999 MHA (Mr Quayle) confirms that; "The
demolition of the maisonette blocks was carried out, under contract
by Metropolitan Borough of Sefton. I have previously confirmed that
this Association took possession of a cleared site."

"I am aware now of the nature of your enquiry, in that you are
alleging the "nib" wall was demolished after the site was cleared."

"Once again I am taking the opportunity of copying both your letter
and my response to George Barr at Sefton and also to Fawley
Construction." - [Thus SMBC (Mr Barr) knew in March 1999 that I was
alleging the nib wall was not demolished during the demolition of
buildings adjoining my Property in 1993 and, MHA were holding SMBC
responsible for its demolition prior to their possession.]

11.On October 22nd 1999 MHA (Mr Quayle) wrote stating he had.
"Found a letter from Sefton, written to me in February 1999 in
which it is stated;" - [From the above it was apparently written by
Mr Barr.]

"The whole issue of damage to your gable wall appears to go back to
1993."

"That you had a claim against Sefton Council at that time." [i.e.
In 1993.]

That this claim was due to. "Cracking and deterioration of your
gable wall" which had occurred due to. "Demolition of adjoining
buildings".

This letter from MHS to myself quotes verbatim from my
correspondence with SMBC dated August and September 1993. This
correspondence was written solely regarding SMBC's apparent
proposal to demolish the nib wall and remove the footings. - [There
was no demolition adjoining my property in 1993. No mention of the
nib wall is made between 1994 and 1998.]

12. On November 24th 1999 SMBC's Director of Technical Services (Mr
Williams, Mr Barrs superior) states, regarding SMBC's
correspondence to MHA of February 1999 that;

"As the appointed agents of Maritime Housing in respect of the
redevelopment scheme we have a contractual obligation to provide
information to them in respect of work carried out on their behalf;
and also in respect of any matter material to their interest in the
land being developed."

"Mr Barr had, on behalf of Sefton merely complied with his
contractual obligations."

That this information was supplied by SMBC to MHA in "good faith."
- [I also refer you to correspondence to Messrs Barr, Williams and
Heywood, SMBC's CEO, dated respectively; Barr
16/10/99-30/10/99-6/12/99. Williams 29/11/99. Heywood 18/1/00.]

Conclusions

With regard to the above it appears that the Council have breached
the following Principles of "The Data Protection Act 1998." The
reference numbers I use in brackets below are from the December
2001 issue of the "Legal Guide to the Data Protection Act". I
presume you are is au fait with the above1998 Legal Guide.

First Principle: (3.1) (i) SMBC did not obtain my consent (3.1.5)
to disclose to MHA the personal date (2.2) contained in my letters
of 1993 to them.

(ii) That it was known to SMBC that the provision of this personal
data to MHA was regarded by myself as being prejudicial to me.

(iii) The data was not provided to MHA in a fair and lawful manner
(3.1 and 3.1.4) and, did not protect my vital interests, in fact it
worked against them. This I stated to SMBC in November 1999.

(iv) That the data provided to a third party (MHA) was not provided
within a reasonable timescale (3.1.7.7)

Second Principle: (3.2) (i) SMBC had obtained the data in 1993 for
the sole purpose of resolving the matter of their apparent proposed
demolition of the buildings adjoining my property. This matter was
fully resolved by Mr Barrs letter to me dated October 1st 1993.

(ii) The data was used for a different, incompatible, unfair and
unlawfully purpose (3.1. 4) when it was stated by SMBC to MHA in
February 1999 to have been the basis of a claim for damage to my
property in 1993 which had not occurred in 1993.

Third Principle: (3.3) That the data supplied to MHA by SMBC was
irrelevant and excessive in relation to the purpose it was provided
to MHA for.

Forth Principle: (3.4) The data supplied to MHA by SMBC was
incorrect and misleading with regard to the reason stated by SMBC.
i.e. that it was a claim. This incorrect and misleading assertion
was not withdrawn by Mr Williams in November 1999 (3.4 [b].)

Fifth Principle: (3.5) The data was kept for longer that it was
necessary for the purpose it was provided for. - i.e. 6 years.

Sixth Principal: (3.6) The data was not processed with regard to my
rights (3.6.b[ii]) and has caused damage and distress to me.

Seventh Principle: (3.7) The data which was passed to MHA by SMBC
was done so in an unauthorised and unlawful manner.

LETTER TO MS ELWOOD SEFTONS LEGAL DIRECTOR FEBRUARY 26TH 2003

I write with regard to my letters to you dated 1st, 8th and 22nd
February 2003 concerning my request for ALL data I am entitled to
under the Data Protection Act. This letter should be read in
conjunction with my previous letters on the matter and deals with
SMBC's insurance managers AON.

Background 1. I have been notified by AON. (Mr Pearson, Claims
Adjuster) that, with regard to an "incident" dated January 1st
1994, a "public liability claim" (My Ref: W215732) was issued to
AON by SMBC. It is evident that this claim contained data which
caused AON to write to me advising me that I "seek legal advice in
connection with the same". This claim would appear to be connected
with damage to my property.

2. As January 1st 1994 was a bank holiday it is extremely unlikely
that any work was carried out on that day by SMBC - or anybody else
on its behalf - that would have given SMBC the legitimate reason to
send data, which identified me to AON, regarding the "incident"
alluded to and on which I should take - "legal advice."

3. Regarding the date of January 1st 1994, again, as it was a bank
holiday, there would have been no post that day and, therefore, it
may be that the claim for the "incident" had been delayed in the
Christmas post and, was the alleged claim notified to MHA in
February 1999 by SMBC as damage to my "gable wall," caused by the
"demolition of building adjoining my property in 1993".

4. If the "incident" reported to AON occurred on the land adjoining
my property, i.e. the Kepler Street site, and was that which
damaged my "gable wall" and was caused by the demolition of
"adjoining building in 1993" by SMBC. It is abundantly clear that,
that "incident" occurred prior to December 24th 1993 because, for
SMBC to make a legitimate public liability claim. This claim would
have had to have been made prior to SMBC's public liability
indemnity and any contractual obligation to AON - e.g. for any
claims regarding the land, a nib wall or my gable wall - ceasing on
December 24th 1993 and liability passing from SMBC to MHA on
[allegedly] December 24th 1993. [See letters to me from; MHA dated
February 1st 1999, Mr Williams dated September 26th 2000, Ms Swale
dated June 19th and August 8th 2001 and Mr Heywood dated May 1st
2002.]

I request that the data supplied to AON, which established January
1st 1994 being applied to the above claim, is sent to me as part of
my request and payment for information under the Data Protection
Act.

Conclusion With regard to data supplied by SMBC to AON, which
clearly allowed AON to identify me, SMBC appear to have breached
The Date Protection Act as follows. References to the Act are again
in brackets.

First Principle: (3.1) (i) SMBC did not obtain my consent
(3.1.1-3.1.5) to disclose to AON the personal data (2.2) [whether
true or false] to them.

(ii) This personal data SMBC provided to AON [whether true or
false] was prejudicial to me.

(iii) The data [whether true or false] was not provided to AON by
SMBC in a fair and lawful manner (3.1 and 3.1.4) and, did not
protect my vital interests, in fact it worked against them.

(iv) the data supplied to AON by SMBC [whether true or false,] was
not fair (3.1.7-3.1.7.1-3.1.7.2-3.1.7.3)

Second Principle: (3.2) (i) If SMBC had obtained the data in 1993
for the sole purpose of resolving the matter of their apparent
proposed demolition of the buildings adjoining my property. This
matter was fully resolved by Mr Barrs letter to me dated October
1st 1993.

(ii) If (i) above is true. The data was used for a different,
incompatible, unfair and unlawfully purpose (3.1.4) when it was
stated by SMBC to AON to have been the basis of a public liability
claim, which may have been for damage to my property in 1993. NB,
SMBC have not given me a reason for this claim.

Third Principle: (3.3) That the data supplied to AON by SMBC was
irrelevant and excessive in relation to the purpose it was provided
to SMBC for, i.e. the resolution of SMBC's intentions regarding the
nib wall and footings.

Forth Principle: (3.4) The data supplied to AON by SMBC was
incorrect and misleading with regard to the reason stated by SMBC.
i.e. that it was a public liability claim.

Sixth Principal: (3.6) The data was not processed with regard to my
rights (3.6.b[ii]) and has caused damage and distress to me
(4.2-4.2.1)

LETTER TO MS ELWOOD SEFTON’S LEGAL DIRECTOR MARCH 1ST 2003

I write with regard to my letters to you dated 1st, 8th 22nd and
26th February 2003 concerning my request for ALL data I am entitled
to under the Data Protection Act. This letter should be read in
conjunction with previous letters on the matter and deals with
SMBC's insurers Royal SunAlliance (RSA.)

Background

1. I have been notified by RSA of a "public liability claim" (Claim
Number RR98XN,) with regard to an "incident" dated January 17th
1994 and told it was being handled by RSA on behalf of SMBC. RSA
gave me no indication what this claim was for. It is evident that
this claim contained data which allowed RSA to write to me asking
me to advise them if I was "represented in this claim". This
"incident", i.e. event or occurrence, would appear to be connected
with damage to my property on January 17th 1994.

2. As January 17th 1994 was, and still is, given by RSA as the
"incident" date regarding a public liability claim against SMBC, it
would appear the data that was supplied to RSA came from SMBC and
allowed RSA to identify me from it.

3. The reason for this public liability claim to RSA is not known
to me, however, It is abundantly clear that, the "incident" - which
occurred on January 17th 1994 - could not be the subject of a
legitimate public liability claim by SMBC because, for SMBC to make
a legitimate public liability claim. The "incident" which caused
the claim would have had to have been made prior to SMBC's public
liability indemnity ceasing on December 24th 1993 and, as you know,
liability passing from SMBC to MHA on December 24th 1993. [See
SMBC's (Mr Heywood, CEO) letter to me dated May 1st 2002.]

I request that the data supplied to RSA, identifying me and,
causing January 17th 1994 being applied to the above claim, is sent
to me as part of my request and payment for information under the
Data Protection Act.

Conclusion

With regard to data supplied by SMBC to RSA, which clearly allowed
RSA to identify me, SMBC appear to have breached The Date
Protection Act as follows. References to the Act are again in
brackets.

First Principle: (3.1) (i) SMBC did not obtain my consent
(3.1.1-3.1.5) to disclose to RSA my alleged personal data (2.2)
[whether true or false] to them, i.e. that I had made a claim.

(ii) This personal data SMBC provided to RSA [whether true or
false] was prejudicial to me.

(iii) The data [whether true or false] was not provided to RSA by
SMBC in a fair and lawful manner (3.1 and 3.1.4) and, did not
protect my vital interests, in fact it worked against them.

(iv) The data supplied to RSA by SMBC [whether true or false] was
not fair (3.1.7-3.1.7.1-3.1.7.2-3.1.7.3)

Second Principle: (3.2) (i) SMBC had not obtained the data
regarding an incident dated January 17th 1994 from myself or
anybody representing me, therefore by that virtue it could not be
used in a compatible, fair and lawfully manner (3.1.4) when it was
stated by SMBC to RSA to have been the basis of a public liability
claim.

Third Principle: (3.3) That the data supplied to RSA by SMBC was
irrelevant and excessive.

Forth Principle: (3.4) The data supplied to RSA by SMBC was
incorrect and misleading.

Sixth Principal: (3.6) The data was not processed with regard to my
rights (3.6.b[ii]) and has caused damage and distress to me
(4.2-4.2.1.)

LETTER TO MS ELWOOD SEFTONS LEGAL DIRECTOR MARCH 5TH 2003

I write with regard to false and misleading and damaging
information supplied by the Council (SMBC) to Fawley Construction
Ltd and my former solicitors Canter Levin & Berg (CLB) between
January and March 1995 and Mr Benton MP on January 12th 2000.

1. In November 1991 a survey was conducted on my property by a
structural surveyor. This survey found no damage whatsoever to my
gable wall. He noted the gables structural fragility due to it
being free standing.

2. On February 7th and 16th 1994 I wrote to SMBC noting that
"demolition has now started on the development" and warning SMBC -
with regard to 1 above - of the problems demolition of adjoining
building may cause to my property especially my gable wall. This
demolition was the commencement of the first phase of the
development of the Kepler Street site. SMBC acknowledged my letters
on February 28th 1994.

3.On March 7th 1994 SMBC - as a result of 2 - above conducted a
survey of my property. This survey found no damage whatsoever to my
gable wall. - The above proves incontestably that SMBC knew the
development of the Kepler Street site had commenced prior to March
7th 1994 and at that time their own survey proved that there was no
damage to my gable wall.

4. Between March 14th and April 6th 1994 my property was damaged by
the demolition of buildings adjoining my property. On April 6th and
21st 1994 I notified and described this damage to SMBC's Technical
Services. - The above proves incontestably that SMBC's Technical
Services knew that my property was damaged by the demolition of
adjoining buildings between March 14th and April 6th 1994.

5. On April 15th 1994 SMBC's Technical Services acknowledged the
damage in 4 above. On October 24th 1994 I had this damage
quantified by a structural surveyor. Using SMBC's survey, taken on
March 7th 1994 during the development, he found some 30 changes for
the worse in my property. He recommended, in order to prevent a
claim, SMBC be contacted to ask them to provide a grant to repair
my property.

6. On January 26th 1995 my solicitors wrote to SMBC solely
regarding my structural surveyors report and my correspondence of
April 1994. Both regarding damage caused by the demolition of
buildings adjoining my property between March 14th and April 6th
1994. They suggested meeting to discuss the matter.

7. On February 17th 1995 SMBC (Mr Waddelow) wrote to CLB stating
that "damage if attributable to development is essentially a matter
between Householders and the developer concerned" The matter was
then passed to Technical Services. At this time Technical Services
had constructive knowledge my property had been damaged during
development due to my letters of April 1994.

8. Technical Services referred the matter to Fawley, MHA's
builders. Mr Fawley visited me on March 1st 1995 and states that
his visit was prompted by "a letter Sefton Council had received
from your solicitors dated 26th January 1995 regarding the
condition of your gable wall." He also states that I had told him
regarding my gable wall that "considerable worsening had occurred
during the demolition of the adjoining buildings." - There is no
mention of cracks to my gable wall in CLB's letter to SMBC of
January 26th 1995.

9. On March 7th 1995 Mr Barr stated to CLB that survey information
was taken of the property before redevelopment. In effect Mr Barr
is stating the survey by SMBC - taken on March 7th 1994 - had
occurred prior to development. - Mr Barr states that a claim for
damage to my gable wall was "settled off" in 1997.

11. On March 4th 1999, in a letter copied to Mr Barr, MHA (Mr
Quayle) states they have evidence that the demolition of buildings
adjoining my property occurred prior to their possession of the
site. - This evidence, which is clearly untrue, is confirmed by
MHA's CEO as being obtained by discussions with SMBC and Fawley and
from MHA's, SMBC's and Fawleys records. It will not be confirmed by
SMBC or Fawley.

Under 4.2 and 4.2.1 of the Data Protection Act - Date Subject
Notice. I request that SMBC ceases to process any information you
have obtained from Fawley Construction Ltd regarding myself as it
is untrue and misleading and has, and is likely to, cause me damage
and distress. I request that you notify all the other parties it
has been passed to that it is misleading and untrue. I also request
that SMBC ceases to process the information that a claim by me
regarding my gable wall was settled off in 1997 as it is untrue and
misleading, and inform my MP Mr Benton and any other parties it has
been passed to of this fact.

I request that you send me details of any further rights of access
to information under the Freedom of Information Act which may have
come into effect in March 2003, or where I may obtain a copy of
them.

LETTER TO MS ELWOOD SEFTONS LEGAL DIRECTOR MARCH 6TH 2003

I write regarding correspondence between Fawley Construction Ltd
and the Council (SMBC) between January and March 1995. This
correspondence resulted in SMBC making false unjustified and
unsupported assertion to their insurance representatives regarding
a claim against SMBC. I refer you to my letters of February this
year to yourself related to the matter.

Background

1. On January 26th 1995 SMBC received a letter from my solicitors,
Canter Levin & Berg (CLB). This letter requested that SMBC indicate
- by reference to my previous correspondence with SMBC dated April
6th and 21st 1994 - whether they would consider funding repairs to
my property solely for alleged damage caused during the demolition
of building adjoining my property. What this alleged damage was,
and its cause, was known to SMBC from my correspondence to
Technical Services of April 1994. To resolve the matter CLB
suggested a meeting between my surveyor and SMBC. SMBC did not, as
requested, indicate if they would be prepared to fund repair to my
property or not but, state that this letter was a claim holding
SMBC responsible for "crack fractures" to my property which
allegedly only became known on receipt of this letter. [See above]

2. After telling my solicitors that the matter of damage to my
property was not essentially SMBC's responsibility but that of the
developers. SMBC contacted Fawley Construction Ltd. Fawley,
Maritime Housing Associations (MHA - the developers) building
contractors who, are said by SMBC's insurers, to be the ones
responsible for the alleged damage to my property between March
14th and April 6th 1994. In a letter copied to Mr Barr from MHA
dated March 4th 1999 it is clearly stated by MHA that. "The
Associations building contractor who was responsible for our
development at Kepler Street." This responsibility was stated by
MHA to have begun on possession by Fawley. Possession is given by
MHA, Fawley and SMBC as March 14th 1994. MHA have also stated to me
that. In March 1994 "Fawley took possession of the site." SMBC
assert the site was "handed back" to MHA on April 1st 1994. By whom
this handing back was done they will not say, however, it is
abundantly clear it was not "handed back" by SMBC as SMBC were
neither the owners or in possession of the site on April 1st 1994.
[See 2 above and SMBC's (Mr Heywood CEO) letter to me of May 1st
2003.]

3. On March 1st 1995 I was visited by Mr D Fawley, he did not
identify himself or give his name to me. He did however refer to my
solicitors letter to SMBC of January 26th 1995. Based on this
reference to SMBC I assumed he was a representative of SMBC. When
Mr Fawley - with regard to a "report" he stated he was to make -
began to ask me what I considered inappropriate questions about my
property I referred him, under my solicitors advice not to answer
verbal questions, to my solicitors for the answers. He then left.

4. On the day of the above visit by Mr Fawley, March 1st 1995, I
telephoned my solicitors and reported to them that a member of SMBC
had visited me and I had referred him to them. This message clearly
records that I did not wish SMBC to make the "report" referred to
by Mr Fawley. There is no mention of me arranging a meeting and,
given SMBC had already been asked to attend a meeting in my
solicitors letter, no logical reason why SMBC would ask Fawley to
arrange one to include SMBC.

5. On March 7th 1995 SMBC (Mr Barr) wrote to my solicitors
confirming that Mr Fawley had visited me "with a view to arranging
a meeting so the property could be inspected by all relevant
parties." Mr Barr states that (undated and unknown to me) survey
information was taken "before the redevelopment works" i.e. prior
to January 17th 1994, and it indicates that the "primary cause" of
damage to my property occurred "before the redevelopment works
commenced" i.e. prior to January 17th 1994. What this damage was or
what caused it is not mentioned. It appears to be damage SMBC state
to MHA, occurred in 1993.

6. In a letter to myself dated May 25th 1999 MHA state that,
"particular issues" over the matter of the nib wall, had been
"resolved." Clearly this is in line with Mr Barrs assertion of
January 12th 2000 when he refers to "damage to your gable wall
arising from the removal of the nibwall." And, confirms that SMBC's
Finance Department has a record of the "settling off" of a claim
for damage to my gable wall in August1997.

To better understand the reason why SMBC would refer my solicitors
letter (said by SMBC to be a claim against SMBC,) to Fawley. I
request that all correspondence regarding this matter and causing
Mr Fawley to visit me in 1995 are included in my request for
information under The Data Protection Act. It may transpire that
SMBC have breached The Data Protection Act by providing data to
Fawley regarding a claim against SMBC which identified me.

Letter to Ms Elwood Seftons legal Director March 6th 2003

I write regarding correspondence between Fawley Construction Ltd
and the Council (SMBC) between January and March 1995. This
correspondence resulted in SMBC making false unjustified and
unsupported assertion to their insurance representatives regarding
a claim against SMBC. I refer you to my letters of February this
year to yourself related to the matter.

Background

1. On January 26th 1995 SMBC received a letter from my solicitors,
Canter Levin & Berg (CLB). This letter requested that SMBC indicate
- by reference to my previous correspondence with SMBC dated April
6th and 21st 1994 - whether they would consider funding repairs to
my property solely for alleged damage caused during the demolition
of building adjoining my property. What this alleged damage was,
and its cause, was known to SMBC from my correspondence to
Technical Services of April 1994. To resolve the matter CLB
suggested a meeting between my surveyor and SMBC. SMBC did not, as
requested, indicate if they would be prepared to fund repair to my
property or not but, state that this letter was a claim holding
SMBC responsible for "crack fractures" to my property which
allegedly only became known on receipt of this letter. [See above]

2. After telling my solicitors that the matter of damage to my
property was not essentially SMBC's responsibility but that of the
developers. SMBC contacted Fawley Construction Ltd. Fawley,
Maritime Housing Associations (MHA - the developers) building
contractors who, are said by SMBC's insurers, to be the ones
responsible for the alleged damage to my property between March
14th and April 6th 1994. In a letter copied to Mr Barr from MHA
dated March 4th 1999 it is clearly stated by MHA that. "The
Associations building contractor who was responsible for our
development at Kepler Street." This responsibility was stated by
MHA to have begun on possession by Fawley. Possession is given by
MHA, Fawley and SMBC as March 14th 1994. MHA have also stated to me
that. In March 1994 "Fawley took possession of the site." SMBC
assert the site was "handed back" to MHA on April 1st 1994. By whom
this handing back was done they will not say, however, it is
abundantly clear it was not "handed back" by SMBC as SMBC were
neither the owners or in possession of the site on April 1st 1994.
[See 2 above and SMBC's (Mr Heywood CEO) letter to me of May 1st
2003.]

3. On March 1st 1995 I was visited by Mr D Fawley, he did not
identify himself or give his name to me. He did however refer to my
solicitors letter to SMBC of January 26th 1995. Based on this
reference to SMBC I assumed he was a representative of SMBC. When
Mr Fawley - with regard to a "report" he stated he was to make -
began to ask me what I considered inappropriate questions about my
property I referred him, under my solicitors advice not to answer
verbal questions, to my solicitors for the answers. He then left.

4. On the day of the above visit by Mr Fawley, March 1st 1995, I
telephoned my solicitors and reported to them that a member of SMBC
had visited me and I had referred him to them. This message clearly
records that I did not wish SMBC to make the "report" referred to
by Mr Fawley. There is no mention of me arranging a meeting and,
given SMBC had already been asked to attend a meeting in my
solicitors letter, no logical reason why SMBC would ask Fawley to
arrange one to include SMBC.

5. On March 7th 1995 SMBC (Mr Barr) wrote to my solicitors
confirming that Mr Fawley had visited me "with a view to arranging
a meeting so the property could be inspected by all relevant
parties." Mr Barr states that (undated and unknown to me) survey
information was taken "before the redevelopment works" i.e. prior
to January 17th 1994, and it indicates that the "primary cause" of
damage to my property occurred "before the redevelopment works
commenced" i.e. prior to January 17th 1994. What this damage was or
what caused it is not mentioned. It appears to be damage SMBC state
to MHA, occurred in 1993.

6. In a letter to myself dated May 25th 1999 MHA state that,
"particular issues" over the matter of the nib wall, had been
"resolved." Clearly this is in line with Mr Barrs assertion of
January 12th 2000 when he refers to "damage to your gable wall
arising from the removal of the nibwall." And, confirms that SMBC's
Finance Department has a record of the "settling off" of a claim
for damage to my gable wall in August1997.

To better understand the reason why SMBC would refer my solicitors
letter (said by SMBC to be a claim against SMBC,) to Fawley. I
request that all correspondence regarding this matter and causing
Mr Fawley to visit me in 1995 are included in my request for
information under The Data Protection Act. It may transpire that
SMBC have breached The Data Protection Act by providing data to
Fawley regarding a claim against SMBC which identified me.

Yours sincerely,

fred robinson

Dear Hopkins, Tony,

FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

ALMOST EVERYTHING I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO EXTRACT FROM THE MANY
AUTHORITIES OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS OR SO IS ROOTED IN A FALSE
INSURANCE CLAIM REFERENCED W215732 DATED 1993, A CLAIM ALLEGEDLY
MADE BY ME AGAINST SEFTON COUNCIL FOR THE DEMOLITION OF NONE
EXISTENT BUILDINGS, AND BECAUSE OF THAT FALSE CLAIM, MANY
"AUTHORITIES" HAVE BEEN DRAWN IN AND BECOME INSTRUMENTAL IN
ASSISTING SEFTON IN THE CONCEALMENT OF, OR THE UPHOLDING OF THIS
INANE UNFOUNDED CLAIM, AND THE OTHER FRAUDULENT CLAIMS THAT FLOWED
FROM IT.

THIS IS INEVITABLY DONE BY "AUTHORITIES" EITHER PROVIDING ME WITH
FALLACIOUS INFORMATION WHICH, WILL NOT, EVEN WHEN THE "AUTHORITIES"
ARE CONFRONTED WITH THE EVIDENCE OF ITS UNTENABILITY ADMIT ITS
FALLACIOUS, AND CENSURE ME FOR ATTEMPTING TO HAVE IT DISCLOSED OR
PASS IT AROUND LIKE THE BAD SMELL IT IS IN THE HOPE IT WILL NOT
COME BACK, OR LIKE THE IC AND SEFTON, ACT AS IF IT IS I WHO AM IN
THE WRONG AND VEXATIOUS FOR DARING TO ASK FOR THE INFORMATION AGAIN
AND AGAIN AND AGAIN WITH NO CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE BEING GIVEN OR,
BEING TOLD THAT I HAVE BEEN GIVENTHE INFORMATION.

AUTHORISES LIKE THE IC, WHO DENIED ME OF MY RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON
SEFTON'S BEHALF, CULMINATING WITH THE PROVISION OF THE CONTENTION
THAT IT WAS NOT HELD IN A 'RELEVANT FILING SYSTEM' WHEN, SEFTON -
IF NOT THE COMMISSION - KNEW, IT WAS NOT HELD AT ALL AS IT WAS ,
APART FROM A HANDFUL OF MY PERSONAL INFORMATION FROM 1994, NONE
EXISTENT.

THE COVERT INFORMATION PROVIDED TO SEFTON BY THE COMMISSION,
ALLOWED SEFTON TO UPHOLD THE FALLACIOUS CONTENTION THAT I MADE AN
INSURANCE CLAIM AGAINST SEFTON IN 1993 TO REMAIN THE PRIME CAUSE OF
WHY MY HOUSE HAS A CHARGE ON IT BY ROYAL & SUNALLIANCE AND I OWE
TENS OF THOUSANDS OF POUNDS TO SEFTON COUNCIL AND OTHER PARTIES WHO
HAVE AIDED THEM, AGAIN, ALL DUE TO CLAIM W215732 DATED 1993.

IF THE REAL BILL TO THE PUBLIC FOR EVERTHING THAT HAS FLOWED FROM
THAT FALSE CLAIM, POSSIBLE FRAUDULENT SALE OF LAND AND TIME WASTED,
WAS ADDED UP. IT MUST BE IN THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF POUNDS BY
NOW WITH NO END IN SIGHT WITHOUT DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.

MY PERSONAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN CYNICALLY PASSED FROM ONE
AUTHORITY TO ANOTHER FOR YEARS, INCLUDING PASSING BETWEEN THE IC
AND SEFTON MBC TO MY HUGE DISADVANTAGE AND COST.

THE ONLY WEAPON A CITIZEN HAS IS ACCURATE INFORMATION TO DEFEAT
AUTHORITIES WHO HAVE A HORRIBLE EFFECTS ON HIS HIS LIFE.

IT IS THEREFORE A GRIM IRONY THAT THE BODY CHARGED WITH THE
PROVISION OF INFORMATION, SEEKS TO DENY ITS ACCESS ON THE SAME
BASIS AS SEFTON AND THE COURTS - VEXATION.

NOTWITHSTANDING THE VEXATION I HAVE BEEN PUT TO BY THE ACTIVITIES
OF BOTH "AUTHORITIES NONE DISCLOSURE OF MY PERSONAL DATA AT THE
RELEVANT TIME.

I KNOW ITS HARD FOR A PERSON TO CONTEMPLATE DISMISSLE FROM YOUR JOB
AND PERHAPS CRIMINAL CHARGES, BUT THATS NOT MY FAULT AS THAT PERSON
CHOSE TO DO AS HE, OR SHE DID.

NOR SHOULD IT BE SEEN TO BE BY THE CONSTANT DENIAL OF ONE SIMPLE
TRUTH THAT WILL UNDO THE MATTER.

THAT SIMPLE TRUTH LIES AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER AND IS:

HOW COULD I HAVE MADE A LEGITIMATE CLAIM FOR THE DEMOLITION OF NONE
EXISTENT BUILDINGS WHEN I LIVED IN A MID TERRACE LOCATION IN LIME
GROVE ?

WHICH LEADS TO, THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE LAND REGISTRY PROVIDING ME
WITH FALSE TITLE PLANS AND SUPPORT THAT 19 AND 21 LIME GROVE WERE
ADJOINED AND THE OS DENYING THEIR OWN MAPPING.

TURNING TO YOUR E-MAIL BELOW FEIGNING IGNORANCE OF THE CONSTANT
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE COMMISSION FOR YEARS:

Thank you for your correspondence dated 24 December, however it is
not clear what further information you are seeking. In your email
you ask how we can conclude that a request can be deemed to be
vexatious under the FOIA without knowing the identity of “an
authority.” In your email of 19 December you had asked us to
“please confirm or deny that a first time request, that has never
been asked before and, therefore, never been answered within the
confines of the Act, can be vexatious under any section of the
Act.” This is a general question about the Act itself and not about
the decision of a particular public authority and thus in answering
it we would not need to know the identity of any authority as the
Act applies the same to all public authorities.

TO ANSWER PART OF THAT QUESTION IN TERMS OF THE FOIA AND DPA:

Two of he "authority" were the "IC's" Mr Andrew Damm's who engaged
in correspondence with the other "authority" Sefton Council
regarding two boxes of my data allegedly from 1994 held by Sefton.

Ultimately Sefton used and passed onto Royal & SunAlliance, the
contention - given to them by Mr Damms - that my information from
1994 fell under the 'Durant' ruling as it was not held in a
relevant filing system and consisting of some 700 documents held by
Sefton's Technical Services and Insurance Sections.

The evidence provided by Mr Damns was referred to by myself in
claim W215732 on April 16th 2005 preventing Sefton from using it
with regard to 'Durant' it in the same manner as Royal &
SunAlliance had done in February 2005 to deny me access to my
personal data held by them regarding another fraudulent claim
RR98XN dated January 17th 1994 and, appear to have persuaded two
District Judge's, to strike out my claims against both Sefton and
Royal & SunAlliance on the basis of 'Durant" and deny me access to
my personal information to the font of my January 1994 'claims'.

I HAVE RECENTLY MADE FIRST TIME FOI REQUESTS TO THE IC, AND SEFTON
REGARDING THE TIME WHEN THE PROPER DISCLOSURE TO ME SHOULD HAVE
BEEN MADE REGARDING THEIR "COVERT CORRESPONDENCE" AND MEETINGS THEM
REGARDING MY DPA APPLICATION - ALLEGEDLY REGARDING 700 DOCUMENTS
DATED 1994.

BOTH THE COUNCIL AND THE IC NOW RELY ON EACH OTHER NOT TO CONFIRM
OR DENY WHAT IN FACT THEY KNOW AND IT WILL COME TO TRANSPIRE THAT
ANY ACTION SEFTON TAKE IN NOT RESPONDING TO MY FOI REQUESTS, NOT
ONLY WILL, BUT MUST, BE SUPPORTED BY THE IC AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE
PAST AND WHO KNOWS - EVEN NOW THERE MAY BE COVERT INFORMATION
FLOWING BETWEEN THE IC AND THE COUNCIL AGAIN IN PREPARATION.

FOR YOUR FURTHER INFORMATION - SOME CORRESPONDENCE FROM 2003 TO
2005 REGARDING THESE 700 DOCUMENTS NOT HELD IN A "RELATIVE FILING
SYSTEM" AND THE PERNICIOUS EFFECT OF THE CONCEALMENT OF WHAT THE IC
AND SEFTON KNEW, AND COLLUDED ABOUT DURING THAT TIME.

As you see below I am reliant on the information being fed to me by
the being true.

LETTER TO SEFTONS MR HUFF APRIL 10TH 2003

I still await a response to my allegations of breaches of the act
which was promised to me by the Councils Legal Director on March
4th 2003. I would point out that there are many letters to and from
the Housing and Environmental Departments missing from my data.
Will you send them? I most especially request a copy of my letter
to the Council dated 17/12/98 and responded to by DSOM/402/98/CG on
22/12/98. RSVP

LETTER TO SEFTONS MR HUFF MAY 25TH 2003

I refer you to past correspondence regarding the assertion by the
Council I am not entitled to data you hold on me. I have been
informed by the information commission today that you are in breach
of the act. I have requested ALL of the information I am entitled
to and this has not been provided. I have also been told my
assertions, you have breached the act, would be addressed, this has
not occurred. I have requested an explanation of this and have
received none. I contend that the information I seek is being
withheld against my right to obtain it with the purpose of avoiding
censure. I formally request you address these matters and inform me
why you believe I am not entitled to the information I have
requested and, to address the matter of breaches of the act.

LETTER TO MR HUFF JUNE 13TH 2003

With regard to my recent application under The Data Protection Act,
I formally request that you provide me with ALL copies of my
correspondence with the following Council Departments between the
dates I now provide. I am told by The Information Commission that
you cannot assume I have my own copies. I request copies of my
correspondence with:

The Planning Department between September 1999 and the present.

The Environmental Protection Department (Mr Cannon) between May
2001 and December 2002.

The Housing Department between December 2001 and December 2002.

Building Control Services (Mr Woods and Mr Edgerton and Mr Heywood
CEO - related to this correspondence) between September and
November 2000 also that to Ms Gillard, Housing Maintenance, Pendle
Drive, Litherland.

I still await a copy of my letter to the Council dated 17/12/98
which was answered by Mr Mc Lennan on December 22nd 1998, ref:
DSMO/402/98/CG.

I look forward to the provision of these copies and a response to
my correspondence with you dated 10/4/03 - 25/5/03 - 15/5/03.

I REMIND YOU THAT THE DATA (MUCH OF IT FALSE) YOU HOLD WITH REGARD
TO MYSELF IS PART OF A 'SET' AND PARTS OF IT CANNOT BE WITHHELD, I
THEREFORE REQUEST ALL OF MY CORRESPONDENCE FROM 1994 TO MR BOARDMAN
AND MR BARR BE COPIES TO ME. [6 items]

NB I would also request any 'fax' messages and memos associated
with the above on the basis that these are also part of a 'set' of
data. I also request ALL documents to and from third parties with
regard to the above.

I wish to complain that some documents sent to me already have been
'cropped', this appears to have been done to remove information
from them. The normal copying process does not reduce the size of
the copy paper.

LETTER TO MR HUFF NOVEMBER 1ST 2003: DATA PROTECTION FORMAL REQUEST
FOR DATA

With regard to my letter to you dated June 31st 2003 I request you
send me the data I requested, and am entitled to. BY LAW.

WITH REGARD TO THE DATA FROM 1994 I REQUEST THAT YOU SEND ME COPIES
OF MY LETTERS TO SMBC WHICH WERE ACKNOWLEDGED ON FEBRUARY 28TH 1994
BY MRB/HMB/HSG1197AR. AND FROM APRIL 6TH 1994 ACKNOWLEDGED BY
MRB/HSG/1197AR DATED APRIL 15TH 1994.

WITH REGARD TO A CLAIM - I ALLEGEDLY MADE IN 1993 AGAINST SMBC
UNDER POLICY: SEFPPL93 WITH AON CLAIMS MANAGERS - AND WHICH IS ALSO
KNOWN BY THE REFERENCE W215732 - ROBINSON. I REQUEST COPIES OF ANY
CORRESPONDENCE WITH AON* BETWEEN AUGUST 1993 AND MARCH 1996 WHICH
REFERS TO CLAIM REFERENCE W215732 - ROBINSON.

I also request details of a claim said - by Mr Barr, ref:
GRB/JBJ/HSG1187 and dated 12th January 2000 - to have been "settled
off" in August 1997, which was made by me against SMBC with regard
to my gable wall related to demolition of a "nib wall."

* Aon/Rollin Hudig Hall.

LETTER FILED AT COURT IN CLAIM LV360271 ROBINSON V SEFTON MBC ON
APRIL 15TH 2005

RELEVANT FILING SYSTEM - INFORMATION COMMISSION

WITH REGARD TO THE DATA REFERRED TO IN THE LETTER WRITTEN TO THE
COURT ON OCTOBER 11TH 2004 BY MR GIBSON. THE DATA THAT THE
INFORMATION COMMISSION AFFIRM IS NOT HELD IN A RELEVANT FILING
SYSTEM IS SOLELY THAT FROM 1994. IT APPEARS THAT THIS DATA HAS
ALLEGEDLY BEEN 'LOST' BY THE COUNCIL IN ANY CASE. THE INFORMATION
COMMISSION CONFIRMS TO ME THAT MY OWN CORRESPONDENCE CANNOT BE
WITHHELD FROM ME - WHICH IS THE CASE REGARDING MY CORRESPONDENCE
WITH THE COUNCIL OF 1994. SEFTON HAVE NOT CONFIRMED TO THE COURT
THEY HAVE THIS CORRESPONDENCE FROM 1994.

THE INFORMATION COMMISSION HAS NOT MADE ANY ASSESSMENT REGARDING
DATA AFTER 1994. THEIR VIEW, WITH REGARD TO THE NUMBERED
DOCUMENTATION I CLAIMED I HAD NOT HAD, IS THAT THE COUNCIL MAY HAVE
PROVIDED IT TO ME IN AN UN-NUMBERED FORM. THIS VIEW IS STATED TO ME
BY THE INFORMATION COMMISSION IN A LETTER DATED NOVEMBER 25TH 2003
AND SEEMINGLY CONFIRMED BY MYSELF, AS DURING THE BUILDING OF THE
FILE FOR THE COURT CASE, I STRIPPED ALL THE HUNDRED OF DOCUMENTS
THAT COMPRISE MY OWN FILES, COMPLAINT FILES AND VARIOUS
CORRESPONDENCES, DURING THE COURSE OF WHICH I DISCOVERED MANY MORE
COPY DOCUMENTS THAT INDEED I DO HAVE IN NUMBERED, TWICE NUMBERED
WITH DIFFERENT NUMBERS, AND UN - NUMBERED FORM. FROM WHAT I NOW
HAVE, IT IS POSSIBLE TO EXTRAPOLATE SOME OF THE NUMBERED DOCUMENTS
I DO NOT HAVE.

THE COUNCIL STATE A LIST OF NUMBERED DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE
INFORMATION COMMISSION. THIS MAY HAVE CONFIRMED THE COMMISSIONERS
VIEW I HAD COPIES OF THEM. THE DOCUMENTS BETWEEN OCTOBER 1993 AND
JANUARY 1995 ARE NOT NUMBERED.

14 UNDISCLOSED TO ME, DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO AUGUST 1993 ARE NUMBERED.

THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONS LETTER TO ME OF NOVEMBER 25TH 2003, MAY
WELL HAVE BEEN COPIED TO SEFTON MBC AS, ON THAT DATE MR GIBSON
WROTE TO ME STATING THAT, WITH REGARD TO "MY FILE" HE WANTED TO
MEET ME REGARDING LETTERS I HAD WRITTEN TO THE LEGAL AND TECHNICAL
SERVICES DIRECTORS ON NOVEMBER 20TH 2003 - COPIES OF WHICH I
ATTACH.

WITH REGARD TO DATA PROVIDED TO ME BY ROYAL & SUNALLIANCES
HOXWORTH,

COUNCIL DOCUMENTATION REGARDING THE KEPLER STREET DEVELOPMENT,
WHICH I AM NOT ENTITLED TO UNDER THE DATA PROTECTION ACT EMERGED.
IT MAY WELL BE THAT THIS IS THE DATA THAT THE COUNCIL REFER TO AS
THAT OF 1994.

IN SHORT, MY UNDERSTANDING FROM MY CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE
INFORMATION COMMISSION, IS THAT.

NO DATA REGARDING FALSE CLAIMS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY MYSELF ARE
ASSESSED BY THE INFORMATION COMMISSION TO BE EXEMPT UNDER THE ACT.
THIS IS CONFIRMED IN THEIR LETTER TO ME DATED AUGUST 6TH 2002 WHICH
I SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ON DECEMBER 17TH 2003 TO PROVE THE COURT
HAD JURISDICTION IN MY CLAIM.

WITH REGARD TO THE DATA SEFTON HOLD IN THEIR CARDBOARD BOXES IT
APPEARS - AS WITH THE DATA FROM 1994 - THAT THIS DATA FORMS NO PART
OF THE DATA SUPPLIED TO ME UNDER THE ACT BECAUSE IT IS PRIVILEGED
AND NOT NUMBERED.

IT ALSO APPEARS THAT THE COUNCILS MISLEADING ASSERTION THAT THE
INFORMATION COMMISSION ALLEGEDLY ENDORSED THE VIEW THAT 'NO DATA'
WAS HELD IN A RELEVANT FILING SYSTEM - PROVIDED TO THE COURT ON
OCTOBER 11TH 2004 AFTER THE SEFTON AND ROYAL & SUNALLIANCE CASES
HAD BEEN COMBINED - IS THE 'EVIDENCE' ROYAL & SUNALLIANCE RELIED ON
WITH REGARD TO THE 'DURANT CASE' IN MY CLAIM AGAINST THEM.

CLEARLY THIS ALLEGED EVIDENCE WAS NOT, NOR COULD BE, EVIDENCE
RELIED ON IN ANY APPLICATION TO THE COURT PRIOR TO OCTOBER 11TH
2004 BY EITHER DEFENDANT.

SEFTON, BY NEVER MAKING AN APPLICATION OR DEFENCE, HAVE NEVER
STATED ANYTHING THEY RELY ON AS EVIDENCE.

I WILL HAND DELIVER A COPY OF THIS LETTER TO SEFTON MBC.

Yours sincerely,

fred robinson

Dear HOPKINS TONY

FOR INFORMATION

A FEW SIMPLE FACTS PRESENTED TO ME:



1. ON DECEMBER 24TH 1993 MARITIME HOUSING ASSOCIATION BOUGHT
THE
LAND AT KEPLER STREET / MAPLE CLOSE - THE KEPLER STREET SITE -
FROM
SEFTON COUNCIL WITH A FORGED MAP WHICH DID NOT SHOW THE NIB
OR
SCREEN WALL.



2. ON MARCH 29TH 1994 SEFTON AND MARITIME INSPECTED THE SITE
AND
PROPOSED TO GIVE ME A ONE METRE WIDE STRIP OF LAND ALONG MY
GABLE
WALL. AT THIS TIME THE NIB WALL WAS IN SITU. THIS PROPOSAL
WAS TO
BE AMENDED TO THE SITE PLANS BY MARITIME’S CONTRACTOR’
FAWLEY.



3. PRIOR TO PLANNING PERMISSION FAWLEY CONSTRUCTION - AT
THE
WRITTEN REQUEST OF SEFTON, MARITIME'S APPOINTED AGENTS
-SUBMITTED
PLAN 417/01 FOR PLANNING PERMISSION USING A SEFTON
DRAWING HSG
1187.1A WHICH THEY CONFIRM DID NOT SHOW THE NIB OR
SCREEN WALL.



MARITIME STATE THE ONE METRE STRIP OF LAND WAS FENCED OFF:



"On the authority of this Association and Sefton Council as
our
consultants...clearly as the land was in our ownership we did
not
require your permission"



4. A DISTRICT JUDGE HAS FOUND THE NIB WALL WAS DEMOLISHED
BETWEEN
MARCH AND SEPTEMBER 1994.



5. SEFTON HAVE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE NIB WALL IN SITU DATED MARCH
7TH
1994 AND I HAVE A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE NIB WALL IN SITU TAKEN
AFTER
APRIL 21ST 1994. FAWLEY HAVE A PHOTOGRAPH SHOWING NO NIB WALL
WHICH
THEY SAY WAS TAKEN IN SEPTEMBER 1994.



6. ON JUNE 28TH 1994 PLANNING PERMISSION FOR PLANS 417/01 TO
417/17
WERE GRANTED TO MARITIME HOUSING AND FAWLEY CONSTRUCTION.
INCLUDED
IN THOSE PLANS WAS THE PROPOSED ONE METRE STRIP OF LAND
ALONG MY
GABLE WALL WITHOUT THE NIB WALL, AS VERIFIED BY SEFTONS
DRAWING HSG
1187. 1A AND WHICH SEFTON PASSED.



7. ON AUGUST 31ST 1994 THE LAND REGISTRY REGISTERED THE
KEPLER
STREET SITE TO MARITIME HOUSING ASSOCIATION USING A FORGED
OS MAP
THAT SHOWED THE SCREEN WALL IN SITU.



Nobody has said the maps referred to above are not forged.



I REFER YOU TO THE BUILDING ACT 1984

SECTION

6

Passing or rejection of plans



(1) Where plans of any proposed work are, in accordance
with
building regulations, deposited with a local authority, it is
the
duty of the local authority, subject to any other section of
this
Act that expressly requires or authorises them in certain
cases to
reject plans, to pass the plans unless

(a) they are
defective


(2) 
(2) If the plans



(a) are defective



(b) the local authority may



(i) reject the plans, or



(ii) subject to subsection (4) below, pass them.



(3) The conditions mentioned in subsection (2) above are—



(a) that such modifications as the local authority may
specify
shall be made in the deposited plans, and



(b) that such further plans as they may specify shall be
deposited.



(4) A local authority may only pass plans subject to a
condition
such as is specified in subsection (3) above if the
person by whom
or on whose behalf they were deposited



(a) has requested them to do so, or



(b) has consented to their doing so



(5) A request or consent under subsection (4) above shall be
in
writing



(6) The authority shall within the relevant period from the
deposit
of the plans give notice to the person by whom or on whose
behalf
they were deposited whether they have been passed or
rejected



(8) A notice that plans have been passed shall



(a) specify any condition subject to which they have been
passed,
and


(b) state that the passing of the plans operates as an approval
of
them only for the purposes of the requirements of



(9) Where the deposited plans are accompanied by



(a) a certificate given by a person approved for the purposes
of
this subsection to the effect that the proposed work, if
carried
out in accordance with the deposited plans, will comply
with such
provisions of the regulations prescribed for the purposes
of this
subsection as may be specified in the certificate, and



(b) such evidence as may be prescribed that an approved
scheme
applies, or the prescribed insurance cover has been or will
be
provided, in relation to the certificate



(10) In any case where a question arises under this section
between
a local authority and a person who proposes to carry out
any work

(a) whether plans of the proposed work are in conformity
with
building regulations, or



(b) whether the local authority are prohibited from rejecting
plans
of the proposed work by virtue of subsection

(9) above, that person
may refer the question to the Secretary of
State for his
determination; and an application for a reference
under this
subsection shall be accompanied by such fee as may be
prescribed.



(11) Where


(a) deposited plans accompanied by such a certificate and
such
evidence as are mentioned in subsection

(9) above are passed by the
local authority, or



(b) notice of the rejection of deposited plans so accompanied
is
not given within the relevant period from the deposit of the
plans,
the authority may not institute proceedings under section 35
below
for a contravention of building regulations that


(i) arises out of the carrying out of the proposed work
in
accordance with the plans, and



(ii) is a contravention of any of the provisions of the
regulations
specified in the certificate.



(12) For the purposes of this Part of this Act, “the
relevant
period”, in relation to the passing or rejection of plans,
means
five weeks or such extended period (expiring not later than
two
months from the deposit of the plans) as may before the
expiration
of the five weeks be agreed in writing between the
person
depositing the plans and the local authority.



Section 16

Passing or rejection of plans



(1) Where plans of any proposed work are, in accordance
with
building regulations, deposited with a local authority, it is
the
duty of the local authority, subject to any other section of
this
Act that expressly requires or authorises them in certain
cases to
reject plans, to pass the plans unless



(a) they are defective



(2) If the plans



(a) are defective


(b) 
(b) the local authority may



(i) reject the plans, or



(ii) subject to subsection (4) below, pass them subject to
either
or both of the conditions set out in subsection (3) below.



(3) The conditions mentioned in subsection (2) above are



(a) that such modifications as the local authority may
specify
shall be made in the deposited plans, and



(b) that such further plans as they may specify shall be
deposited.



(4) A local authority may only pass plans subject to a
condition
such as is specified in subsection (3) above if the
person by whom
or on whose behalf they were deposited


(a) has requested them to do so, or



(c) has consented to their doing so.



Section 31

Proposed departure from plans



(1) Where plans of any proposed work have been passed under
section
16 above by a local authority, the person by or on whose
behalf the
plans were in accordance with building regulations
deposited with
the authority may, and in such cases as may be
prescribed shall,
for the purpose of obtaining the approval of the
authority to any
proposed departure or deviation from the plans as
passed, deposit
plans of the departure or deviation.



(2) Section 16 above applies in relation to plans deposited
under
subsection (1) above as it applies in relation to the
plans
originally deposited.



CLEARLY THE AMENDMENT SHOWN ON PLAN 417/01 WAS NOT REGARDED
AS
BEING DEFECTIVE UNDER THE ACT AS IT WAS PASSED.



BY THE TIME THE NIB WALL (SCREEN WALL) WAS FILED ONTO THE TITLE
BY
THE LAND REGISTRY ON AUGUST 31ST 1994 (AND, ACCORDING TO
THE
DISTRICT JUDGE), IT COULD HAVE BEEN ACCURATE.



BY SEPTEMBER 1994 IT WAS FOUND BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE TO HAVE BEEN

DEMOLISHED.


Yours sincerely,

fred robinson

Dear Hopkins, Tony,

FOR INFORMATION 

I REFER YOU TO THE "EQUAL TREATMENT BENCH BOOK"



Chapter 1.3 Unrepresented parties - Key points

The ‘litigant in
person’

Most unrepresented parties are stressed and worried,
operating in
 an alien environment in what for them is a foreign
language.

They
 are trying to grasp concepts of law and procedure about which
they
may be totally ignorant. They may well be experiencing
feelings of
fear, ignorance, frustration, bewilderment and
disadvantage,
especially if appearing against a represented party.

The outcome of
the case may have a profound effect and long-term
consequences upon
their life.

They may have agonised over whether the case was worth
 the risk to
their health and finances, and therefore feel 
passionately about
their situation.



Role of the judge



Judges and those who chair tribunals must be aware of the
feelings 
and difficulties experienced by unrepresented parties and
be ready 
and able to help them, especially if a represented party
is being
 oppressive or aggressive.

Maintaining patience and an even-handed
approach is also important
where the unrepresented party is being
 oppressive or aggressive
towards another party or its
 representative or towards the court.

The judge should, however,
 remain understanding so far as possible
as to what might lie behind
their behaviour.

Maintaining a balance between assisting and 
understanding what the
unrepresented party requires, while
 protecting their represented
opponent against the problems that
can be caused by the
unrepresented party ’s lack of legal and
procedural knowledge, is
the key.



1.3.1 Introduction



There are a number of reasons why individuals may choose to

represent themselves rather than instruct a lawyer.

Many do not
 qualify for public funding, either financially or
because of the 
nature of their case.

Some cannot afford a solicitor and even
 distrust lawyers.

Others believe that they will be better at
 putting their own case
across.



This section aims to identify the difficulties faced (and caused)

by litigants in person before, during and after the litigation

process, and to provide guidance to judges with a view to
ensuring
that both parties receive a fair hearing where one or both
is not
represented by a lawyer.

This chapter supplements and should be
 read in conjunction with
Chapter 1.1.

Subject to the law relating to vexatious litigants,
everybody of
full age and capacity is entitled to be heard in
person by any
 court or tribunal which is concerned to adjudicate
in proceedings
in which that person is a party.

But on the whole those who 
exercise this personal right find that
they are operating in an
alien environment.

The courts and tribunals have not traditionally
 been receptive to
their needs.

All too often the litigant in person 
is regarded as a problem for
judges and for the court system rather 
than a person for whom the
system of civil justice exists.



Lord Woolf, Access to Justice, Interim Report June 1995



It is curious that lay litigants have been regarded … as
problems,
almost as nuisances for the court system. This has meant
that the 
focus has generally been upon the difficulties that
litigants in 
person pose for the courts rather than the other way
around.



Prof. John Baldwin, Monitoring the Rise of the Small Claims
Limit



Unrepresented parties are likely to experience feelings of
fear,
ignorance, anger, frustration and bewilderment.

They will feel at a
profound disadvantage, despite the fact that
the outcome may have a 
profound effect and long-term consequences
on their lives.

The aim
 of the judge or tribunal chair should be to ensure that
the parties 
leave with the sense that they have been listened to
and had a fair
hearing – whatever the outcome.

In what follows,
the term ‘unrepresented party’ encompasses those 
preparing a case
for trial, those conducting their own case at
 trial and those
wishing to enforce a judgement or to appeal.



Disadvantages faced



The disadvantages faced by unrepresented parties stem from their

lack of knowledge of the law and court procedure.

For many
 their perception of the court environment will be based
on what 
they have seen on the television and in films.

They tend to:

be unfamiliar with the language and specialist
vocabulary of legal 
proceedings;

have little knowledge of the procedures involved and
 find it
difficult to apply the rules even if they do read them;


lack objectivity and emotional distance from their case;

be 
unskilled in advocacy and unable to undertake cross-examination
or 
test the evidence of an opponent;

be ill-informed about the 
presentation of evidence;

be unable to understand the relevance of
 law and regulations to
their own problem, or to know how to
 challenge a decision that
they believe is wrong.



All these factors have an adverse effect on the preparation
and
presentation of their case.

Equally, there are other unrepresented
parties who are familiar
with the requirements of the process.



Numbers



Increasing numbers of people are now also representing themselves

in the civil and family courts.



The small claims procedure in the county court is
designed
specifically to assist the public to pursue claims without
recourse 
to legal representation and has created a huge increase
in the 
number of unrepresented parties.

The vast majority of defended
civil actions in the county court are
dealt with under this procedure
dure and it is a sign of its
success that its jurisdiction was 
increased (subject to certain
exceptions in personal injury cases) 
from claims of up to £1,000,
to claims of up to £5,000.

With the 
consent of the parties, cases of a certain type can
encompass
substantially greater claims.

Public funding has never been 
available for small claims.



Unrepresented parties also appear with increasing frequency in
the
Court of Appeal in criminal, civil and family cases.

Some have represented themselves at first instance.

Others, having had lawyers
 appear for them in the court below,
take their own cases on appeal,
often through a withdrawal of
public funding after the first
 instance hearing.



Ways to help



The aim is to ensure that unrepresented parties understand what
is
going on and what is expected of them at all stages of
the
proceedings – before, during and after any attendances at
a
hearing.



This means ensuring that: the process is (or has been) explained
to
them in a manner that they can understand; they have access
to
appropriate information (e.g. the rules, practice directions
and
guidelines – whether from publications or websites); they are

informed about what is expected of them in ample time for them to

comply; wherever possible they are given sufficient time
according
to their own needs.

1.3.2

Particular areas of difficulty



Those who are involved in legal proceedings without
legal
representation may face a daunting range of problems of
both
knowledge and understanding...

...

Information



...

Many unrepresented parties believe that the court staff are
there 
to give legal advice.

Under the Courts Charter court staff can only
 give information on
how a case may be pursued; they cannot give
 legal advice under any
circumstances.



1.3.3 Before the court appearance



Statements of case and witness statements

Unrepresented parties
may make basic errors in the preparation of
civil cases by:

failing to choose the best cause of action or
defence; overlooking
limitation periods;

not appreciating that they 
are witnesses in their own cases;

failing to file their own witness
s statements in advance of trial
(and not understanding that in
consequence they may not be able to
give evidence).



The individual’s level of knowledge should be taken into account
in
 civil cases when deciding whether to make allowances for such

failures.

A flexible approach ought to be adopted where possible,
even if
this involves an adjournment.



Some of these problems are addressed in the Protocols of the
Civil
Procedure Rules (CPR).

The Court Service has produced a new series
 of leaflets for
unrepresented parties in the light of the CPR.



Directions and court orders



Unrepresented parties often do not understand pre-hearing

directions (in particular those imposing time deadlines and
‘unless
 orders’) or the effect of court orders so:



ensure that they leave a directions hearing appreciating exactly

what is required of them;

involve them in the process of giving 
those directions (e.g.
asking them how much time they need to take
a particular step and
why) so that they realise that the directions
 relate to the
conduct of their own case;

explain fully the precise
meaning of any particular direction or
court order.



Sometimes they believe that if the other side has failed to
comply 
with such directions, that in itself is evidence in support
of 
their own case, or the opponent should be prevented from
defending
 or proceeding further.

They often feel upset at what they regard as 
an over-tolerant
attitude by the courts to delays by solicitors.



Documentary evidence



A common problem is lack of understanding about the use
and
application of documents and bundles.

Experience shows that
 unrepresented parties:



tend not to make sufficient use of documentary or
photographic
evidence in their cases;

fail to appreciate the need for maps and
plans of any location
relevant to the case.



Preliminary hearings represent an opportunity to give guidance on

these matters.



Disclosure of documents



The duty to disclose documents is frequently neglected by
unrepresented parties.

Some will have little or no appreciation
that they should adopt a
‘cards on the table’ approach.


Consequently there can be delay, either because of the need to

adjourn or because the judge or the other side requires time at
the 
hearing to read recently disclosed documents.

When a pre-trial 
hearing takes place, a short clear explanation of
the duty of
 disclosure and the test as to whether or not a
document needs to be 
disclosed helps both parties and the court in
terms of time saved.



Preparing bundles



Many unrepresented parties do not have access to office facilities

and have difficulties in photocopying documents, preparing bundles

and typing witness statements.

They have little concept of the need
 for documents to be in
chronological order and paginated.

Putting 
the case back is often the sensible course to take, in the
event of 
litigants coming to court with their bundles in other
than proper
order.



Producing documents



All too often unrepresented parties do not bring relevant
documents
with them to the hearing.

The court or tribunal is faced with the
comment:

‘I can produce it – it is at home’, but it is then too
 late and an
adjournment is likely to be expensive and will usually 
be
refused.



The party should have been warned in advance not only to
disclose
relevant documents to the other side but to produce the
originals 
at the hearing.



Sources of law



Most unrepresented parties do not have access to legal textbooks
or
libraries where such textbooks are available and may not be able
to
down-load information from a legal website.

Why not let an
 individual, accompanied by a member of the court
staff, have access
to the court library or to a particular book?



Sometimes unrepresented parties do not understand the role of
case
law and are confused by the fact that the judge or tribunal
appears
 to be referring to someone else’s case.



A brief explanation of the doctrine of precedent will enable
an
unrepresented party to appreciate what is going on and why.

A
re presented party’s lawyer should be told to produce any

authorities to be relied on at the outset.

An unrepresented party
 must be given proper opportunity to read
such authorities and make
 submissions in relation to them.



Live evidence



Judges and tribunal chairs are often told: ‘All you have to do is

to ring Mr X and he will confirm what I am saying.’

When it is
 explained that this is not possible, unrepresented
parties may 
become aggrieved and fail to understand that it is for
them to
prove their case.



They should be informed at an early stage that they must prove
what
they say by witness evidence so may need to approach witnesses
in
advance and ask them to come to court.

The need for expert evidence
 should also be explained and the fact
that no party can call an
 expert witness unless permission has
been given by the court, 
generally in advance.



When there is an application to adjourn, bear in mind
that
unrepresented parties may genuinely not have realised just
how
important the attendance of such witnesses is.

If the application
is refused a clear explanation should be
given.



Adjournments



Un represented parties may not appreciate the need to obtain
an
adjournment order if a hearing date presents them with

difficulties.



It is a common misconception that it is sufficient to write to
the 
court without consulting the other side, merely asking for the
case
to be put off to another date, or that no more than a day’s
notice
of such a request is required.

Conversely, unrepresented parties 
may find it difficult to
understand why cases need to be adjourned
 if they over- run
because of the way in which they or others have
 presented their
cases, or why their cases have not started at the
time at which
they were listed.

..

...The hearing



The judge or chair of a tribunal is a facilitator of justice
and
may need to assist the unrepresented party in ways that are
not
 appropriate for a party who has employed skilled legal
advisers and 
an experienced advocate.

This may include:



attempting to elicit the extent of the understanding of that party

at the outset and giving explanations in everyday language;

making
clear in advance the difference between justice and a just
trial on
 the evidence (i.e. that the case will be decided on the
basis of
 the evidence presented and the truthfulness and accuracy
of the 
witnesses called).



Explanations by the judge



Basic conventions and rules need to be stated at the start of a

hearing.

The judge’s name and the correct mode of address should
be
clarified. Individuals present need to be introduced and their

roles explained... An unrepresented party who does not understand

something or has a problem with any aspect of the case should be

told to inform the judge immediately so that the problem can be

addressed.

The purpose of the hearing and the particular matter or
 issue on
which a decision is to be made must be clearly stated.

A
 party may take notes but the law forbids the making of
personal
tape-recordings. If the unrepresented party needs a short
break for
personal reasons, they only have to ask. The golden rule
is that 
only one person may speak at a time and each side will
have a full
opportunity to present its case.

..

...1.1.

Purpose of hearing



The purpose of a particular hearing may not be understood.
For
example, the hearing of an application to set aside a judgement
may
be thought to be one in which the full merits of the case will
be 
argued.

The procedure following a successful application should be 
clearly
explained, such as the need to serve the proceedings on
the
defendant, for a full defence to be filed and directions which
may
be given thereafter so that the parties know what is going to

happen next.



The judge’s role 

It can be hard to strike a balance in assisting
an unrepresented
 party in an adversarial system. An unrepresented
party may easily
 get the impression that the judge does not pay
sufficient attention
 to them or their case, especially if the
other side is represented
 and the judge asks the advocate on the
other side to summarise the 
issues between the parties.



Explain the judge’s role during the hearing.

If you are doing
 something which might be perceived to be unfair
or controversial in
 the mind of the unrepresented party, explain
precisely what you are
 doing and why.

Adopt to the extent necessary an inquisitorial role
 to enable the
unrepresented party fully to present their case (but
 not in such a
way as to appear to give the unrepresented party an
undue
advantage).



The real issues



Many unrepresented parties will not appreciate the real issues in

the case. For example, a litigant might come to court believing

that they are not liable under a contract because it is not in

writing, or that they can win the case upon establishing that the

defendant failed to care when the real issue in the case is
whether
or not the defendant’s negligence caused the loss.



At the start of any hearing it is vital to identify and if
possible
 establish agreement as to the issues to be tried so that
all
 parties proceed on this basis. Time spent in this way can
shorten 
the length of proceedings considerably.



Compromise



Unrepresented parties may not know how to compromise or even
that
they are allowed to speak to the other side with a view to
trying
to reach a compromise.



Tell them, particularly in civil proceedings, that the role of the

court is dispute resolution – explanations as to forms of

alternative dispute resolution (ADR) may be appropriate.

Ask them
 whether they have tried to resolve their differences by
negotiation 
and, if possible, spell out the best and worst
possible outcomes at 
the outset.

This can lead to movement away from the idea that to 
negotiate is
a sign of weakness.

Remind them to tell the court in 
advance if their case has been
settled.



Advocacy



Often unrepresented parties phrase questions wrongly and some
find
 it hard not to make a statement when they should
be
cross-examining.

Explain the difference between evidence and
 submissions, and help
them put across a point in question form.



Unrepresented parties frequently have difficulty in
understanding
 that merely because there is a different version of
events to their
 own, this does not necessarily mean that the other
side is lying.


Similarly, they may construe any suggestion from the other side

that their own version is not true as an accusation of lying.

Be 
ready to explain that this is not automatically so.



Where one party is represented, invite this advocate to make
final
submissions first, so that an unrepresented party can see how
it
 should be done.



Criminal cases

Under Article 6(3) of the European Convention of
Human Rights,
everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
right to defend
him or herself in person or through legal
assistance of his or her
 own choosing or, if he or she has not
sufficient means to pay for 
legal assistance, to be given it free
where the interests of
 justice so require.



Those who dispense with legal assistance do so, almost
always,
because they decline to accept the advice which they have
been
 given, whether as to plea or the conduct of the trial.

A firm hand 
almost always persuades such defendants that they are
much better 
advised to retain their representatives.

If this does not work the 
problem for the judge is to do with
retaining control over the 
proceedings rather than sensitive
explanation to the defendant of
 the rules of procedure and
evidence.



Cross-examination



Throughout a trial a judge must be ready to assist a defendant
in
 the conduct of their case.

This is particularly so when the
 defendant is examining or
cross-examining witnesses and giving 
evidence:



always ask the defendant whether they wish to call any witnesses;


be ready to restrain unnecessary, intimidating or humiliating

cross-examination;

be prepared to discuss the course of proceedings
with the defendant
in the absence of the jury before they embark on 
any
cross-examination;

note the statutory prohibitions on
 cross-examination by an
unrepresented defendant.



Conduct of the defence



Paragraph 5 of the Practice Direction Crown Court
(Defendant’s
Evidence) [1995] 2 Cr App R 192 puts a duty on a judge
to address 
an unrepresented defendant at the conclusion of the
evidence for
 the prosecution and in the presence of the jury as
follows:



You have heard the evidence against you. Now is the time for you
to
make your defence.

You may give evidence on oath, and be
 cross-examined like any
other witness.

If you do not give evidence
 or, having been sworn without good
cause, refuse to answer any
 question, the jury may draw such
inferences as appear proper.

That 
means they may hold it against you.

You may also call any witness
or witnesses whom you have arranged
to attend court.

Afterwards you 
may also, if you wish, address the jury by arguing
your case from 
the dock.

But you cannot at that stage give evidence.

Do you now
 intend to give evidence?



Summing up



In the course of summing up a case to a jury in which the
defendant
is unrepresented, tell the jury that it was always open
to
 defendants to represent themselves and that the jury should
bear
 in mind the difficulty for defendants in properly presenting
their 
case.

In some cases, such comments may be more appropriate at
the
outset.



Adjournments



Sometimes a defendant in a criminal case becomes an
unrepresented
party during the case either by reason of the
defendant’s
representatives withdrawing or because they are
dismissed by the
defendant.



Bear in mind that you may exercise your discretion in deciding

whether or not to grant an adjournment to enable fresh
legal
representatives to be instructed.

That decision should be based on
 what is in the interests of
justice having regard to the interests
 of the witnesses, the
public and the defendant, the stage reached
 in the trial and the
likely ability of the defendant to conduct the 
defence case
properly.

Bear in mind also the duty to warn a 
defendant against any course
that might not be in that defendant’s 
best interests, but if the
defendant decides to go on alone, allow
t hem to do so.



1.3.5 Assistance and representation



A party to civil or family proceedings may wish to be assisted by
a
‘friend’ at a hearing or even represented by a person without

rights of audience.



In a climate where legal aid is virtually unobtainable and
lawyers
disproportionately expensive, the McKenzie friend and
lay
representative make a significant contribution to access to

justice.

But reported cases tend to concentrate upon reasons why 
they
should not be allowed rather than circumstances where they may
be
of assistance to a party and the court.

The judge has to 
identify those situations where such support is
beneficial and
 distinguish circumstances where it should not be
allowed.



In addition the need for a litigation friend must be recognised
and 
this has changed with the introduction of a new mental
capacity
 jurisdiction (see further Chapter 5.4, section 5.4.3).



‘McKenzie friend’



This term refers to an assistant or friend (whether lawyer or
not) 
who assists in presenting the case by taking notes, quietly
making
suggestions or giving advice.

The role differs from that of the 
advocate in that the McKenzie
friend does not address the court or 
examine any witnesses and is
generally permitted at trials or full
 hearings although the
‘friend’ can be excluded if unsuitable (e.g.
someone who is
pursuing their own or an unsuitable agenda).

It may
be less appropriate to allow such assistance in private
(chambers) 
hearings because the judge generally then provides more
assistance 
to an unrepresented party.



A McKenzie friend may not act as the agent of the litigant in

relation to the proceedings nor manage the case outside court
(e.g.
by signing court documents).



The Court of Appeal summarised the principles in Paragon
Finance
plc v Noueiri [2001] EWCA Civ 1402, [2001] 1 WLR 2357, as
follows:



A McKenzie friend had no right to act as such: the only right
was
 that of the litigant to have reasonable assistance.



A McKenzie friend was not entitled to address the court: if he
did
 so, he would become an advocate and require the grant of a
right of
audience.



As a general rule, a litigant in person who wished to have a

McKenzie friend should be allowed to do so unless the judge was

satisfied that fairness and the interests of justice did not so

require.

However, the court could prevent a McKenzie friend from
 continuing
to act in that capacity where the assistance he gave
 impeded the
efficient administration of justice.



See also R v Bow County Court ex p Pelling [1999] 1 WLR 1811 and
Re
G (Chambers proceedings: next friend) [1999] 2 FLR 59, CA.



A differently constituted Court of Appeal in Re O (Children):
Re
W-R (A Child): Re W (Children) [2005] EWCA Civ 759; [2005] 2
FLR
967 (Thorpe LJ, Wall LJ) has since offered this guidance in
family
proceedings:



There is a strong presumption in favour of a litigant in person

being allowed the assistance of a McKenzie friend.

A request should
 not be refused without compelling reasons, even
where the
 proceedings relate to a child and are being heard in
private.

The
fact that the unrepresented party appears to be capable
of
conducting his case does not begin to outweigh the
strong
presumption in favour of allowing such assistance.

The fact that a
 proposed McKenzie friend belongs to an
organisation that promotes a 
particular cause is no reason for not
allowing him to undertake the
 role.

It was not for the litigant in person to justify his desire 
to
have a McKenzie friend but for the objecting party to rebut the

presumption in favour of allowing it.

There is no justification for 
refusing to allow a McKenzie friend
simply because it is a 
directions hearing.

Proposed McKenzie friends should not be
 excluded from the
courtroom or chambers whilst the application for
 assistance is
being made.

The proposed McKenzie friend should 
produce a short CV or
statement about himself confirming that he
 has not interest in the
case and understands his role and the duty
 of confidentiality.



In February 2005, the President of the Family Division
produced
guidance to judges in family proceedings and this is
reproduced in
 the following pages.



Rights of audience

The Courts and Legal Services Act 1990,
section 27 regulates the
 right to appear in court.

General rights of audience (advocacy 
rights) are granted to duly
qualified barristers or solicitors (and
certain others) and
employees of solicitors may appear at hearings
in ‘private’.

In addition:

 the court may refuse to hear a person (for reasons
which relate to
 him as an individual) who would otherwise have a
right of audience 
but must give reasons;

a court has discretionary power to grant an
 unqualified person a
right of audience in relation to particular 
proceedings before
that court;

a special provision is made for lay 
representatives in the small
claims track of the county court.


There is a right of audience in the presence of the party at the

hearing itself but the court may in its discretion hear a lay

representative in the absence of the party – Civil Procedure
Rules
1998, PD27 para. 3.2;

Lay Representatives (Right of Audience) Order
1999.



Lay representative



The term ‘lay representative’ relates to a person who does not

possess advocacy rights and may not even be a lawyer, but to whom

the court grants a right of audience on behalf of a party in

relation to the proceedings before that court.

The party must apply 
at the outset of a hearing if he wishes an
unqualified individual to
 be granted a right of audience, and
parties cannot consent to an
 unqualified person exercising a right
of audience – Clarkson v
Gilbert [2002] 2 FLR 839 (CA);

D v S (Rights of Audience) [1997] 2
FCR 206; [1997] 1 FLR 724
(CA).



It may, however, be appropriate to grant a right of audience on a

one-off basis (e.g. where a party is inform and cannot afford the

services of a lawyer).

The following guidance was offered by Lord 
Woolf in Clarkson v
Gilbert & ors (see above):



“Now that legal aid was not available as readily as it had been
in
the past, there were going to be situations where litigants
were
 forces to bring proceedings in person where they would need

assistance. ... litigants in person had to indicate why they
needed
some other person who was not qualified to act on their
behalf. ...
it would be for them to satisfy the court that it was
appropriate. 
If somebody’s health did not, or might no enable them
to conduct
 proceedings themselves, and if they lacked means, those
were the 
sort of circumstances that could justify a court saying
that they
 should have somebody who could act as an advocate on
their behalf.
... the objections to someone setting themselves up
as an
 unqualified advocate did not exist where a husband was
merely
 seeking to assist his wife.

”

But the party should still be present unless there is a
justifiable 
reason for absence. It may even in some circumstances
be helpful to
 a court or tribunal to recognise the representative
as Neuberger J.
pointed out in Izzo v Philip Ross & Co (2001) The
Times, 9 August
2001:



“In some circumstances common sense and experience suggests that
a
relatively inarticulate and unknowledgeable litigant prompted at

every turn results in the case taking far longer than if the
friend
 speaks directly for him. Every time the court raises a
point or 
puts a point to the litigant in person it has to be
explained to
 the litigant which often takes longer than explaining
it to his 
friend. Then the litigant has to have the answer
explained to him
 by the friend, where after the litigant passes
the answer to the
court. This is a process which self-evidently
prolongs the hearings
and, like chinese whispers, is fraught with
potential
 misunderstanding.”



Once the privilege has been granted it is difficult to withdraw it

even if the representative turns out to be unsuitable.

Problems 
arise where an unqualified person is seeking to provide
general
 advocacy services, or appears to be pursuing a separate
agenda.

In
Paragon Finance plc v Noueiri (see above) the Court of Appeal

offered guidance:



The discretion to grant rights of audience to individuals who did

not meet the stringent requirements of the 1990 Act were only to
be
exercises in exceptional circumstances and after careful

consideration.

The courts had to consider carefully whether to
 grant rights to
individuals who made a practice of seeking to 
represent otherwise
unrepresented litigants.

The person to be 
represented should normally justify the request
and be present at
 the hearing when personal interests are
involved.



Conducting litigation



There is a distinction between the conduct of litigation on behalf

of a party and advocacy at hearings.

The former relates to the 
claim form, statement of case and any
applications made during the
course of the hearing.

A ‘statement of truth’ will generally be
required to support such
documents and must be signed by the party
(or litigation friend) or
the legal representative – CPR
r.22.1(6)(a).

Special provision is made in respect of companies –
see PD 22 para
3 and r.39.6.



The Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, section 28 regulates the

right to conduct litigations.



In Paragon Finance plc v Noueiri (see above) the Court of Appeal

also offered the following guidance as to right of an
unqualified
person to conduct litigation in the courts on behalf of
a party:


the existence of such right is determined solely in accordance with

Part II of the 1990 Act; section 28(2)(c) permits a court to
grant
 an otherwise unqualified person the right to conduct
litigation in
 relation to particular proceedings and to remove
that right if it
 is being abused;

the grant of the right should be carried out 
having regard to the
same considerations as the grant of a right of 
audience.



Attorneys

The court controls its own procedures and principles
for agency do
 not apply, so a power of attorney cannot confer a
right to conduct
 litigation or of audience – Gregory v Turner, R
(on application of
 Morris) v North Somerset Council [2003] EWCA
Civ 183; [2003] 1 WLR
1149 (CA).



Official Solicitor



The Official Solicitor represents parties prior to proceedings who

are without capacity, deceased or unascertained when no other

suitable person or agency is able and willing to do so.

The purpose
is to prevent a possible denial of justice and
safeguard the
welfare, property or status of the party.



He usually becomes formally involved when appointed by the
Court,
and may act as his own solicitor, or instruct a private firm
of 
solicitors to act for him.

The vision statement of the Official
 Solicitor’s Office is:

“...

to be an organisation delivering high quality customer focused

legal services for vulnerable persons, where those services need
to
be provided by the public sector ...

”

Enquiries are frequently made by the judiciary and members of
the
legal profession and the Official Solicitor can be contacted
at:

81 Chancery Lane London WC2A 1DD DX 141150 London/Chancery
Lane WC2
Tel.: 020 7911 7127 Fax.: 020 7911 7105
Email:
enquiries@offsol.gsi.gov.uk Website:
www.offsol.demon.co.uk



Representing adults who lack capacity



An order directing the Official Solicitor to act as a
legal
representative in a civil court for an incapacitated party
will
 either be made with his prior consent or only take effect if
his 
consent is obtained.

The Official Solicitor needs to be satisfied 
that his involvement
will be consistent with the Vision Statement
 and in appropriate
cases he will also require security that his 
charges and expenses
will be met before agreeing to act.



Assisting the civil courts



The Official Solicitor may also be called on to give confidential

advice to judges, to instruct counsel to appear before a judge to

assist the court as advocate to the court, or to investigate any

matter on which the court needs a special report...

...Personal Support Unit & Citizens’ Advice Bureau



Litigants in person should also be aware of the services
provided
 by local Personal Support Units and Citizen’s Advice
Bureaux. The
PSU at the Royal Courts of Justice in London can be
contacted on
 020 7947 7701, by email at [email address] or at the
enquiry desk.


The CAB at the Royal Courts of Justice in London can be contacted

on 020 7947 6880 or at the enquiry desk.

1.3.6

After the hearing



Having won or lost the case, the unrepresented party will need
to
understand what has happened and the options available or steps

that can still be taken.



Explaining the decision



Unrepresented parties often do not understand the outcome of the

case and the reasons for it.

The following guidance is particularly
 important, therefore, if
they have lost.



Always set out clearly the reasons for the decision.

If possible,
provide an unrepresented party with a copy of the
order before
 leaving the court.

If judgement is reserved, or the order is to be
 sent on, tell the
unrepresented party approximately when they can
 expect to hear
further from the court and why there may be a delay.



Costs



Unrepresented parties are frequently unaware that they may
recover
costs, either from public funds in criminal matters or from
the 
losing side in civil cases.

If such party is entitled to costs but
 says nothing, consider
drawing the question of costs to their 
attention, without offering
advice, so that any relevant costs 
application can be made.

If an application is made that an
unrepresented party pays the
costs, an explanation must be given
 with an opportunity to argue
against this.



Appeal



Unless the unrepresented party has been wholly successful in
the
case, explain the requirement to seek leave to appeal, if

applicable. Tell the unrepresented party to consider their rights

of appeal, but explain that the court cannot give any advice as
to
the exercise of those rights.



Enforcement



An unrepresented party may be wholly unaware of the fact
that
although a civil judgement has been secured, it still has to
be 
enforced.

It is important, therefore:

to explain this in general terms at
the end of the case and to make
it clear that the court cannot
advise on enforcement, but that
 leaflets are available at the
court office; to explain the 
alternatives and that, short of
giving advice, the court staff are
 always willing to try to help
on matters of enforcement.

I HOPE THIS ASSISTS

Yours sincerely,

fred robinson

Dear Hopkins, Tony,

I refer you to The Prosecutor Pledge

Where there is an identifiable victim the prosecutor will:

Take into account the impact on the victim or their family when
making a charging decision.

In doing so the prosecutor will ensure that the charge adequately
reflects the criminality of the offending. Where there are
identified victims the prosecutor will, when selecting a charge,
listen to the voice of the victim through their witness statement
and, where the numbers of victims allow, through the victim
personal statement.

Inform the victim where the charge is withdrawn, discontinued or
substantially altered.

The prosecutor will establish with each victim whether they wish to
be kept informed of the withdrawal or dismissal of charges and will
write and keep them so informed if they do.

Where practical, seek a victim’s view or that of the family when
considering the acceptability of a plea.

In deciding on the acceptability of pleas the prosecutor will keep
in mind any views expressed by any of the witnesses who are
considered to be victims.

Address the specific needs of a victim and where justified seek to
protect their identity by making an appropriate application to the
court.

The prosecutor will form a judgment and, where appropriate, make an
application for “special measures” to ensure that victims are able
to give “best evidence” before the court. In appropriate
circumstances the prosecutor may also make an application to
protect the identity of the victim or prevent inappropriate
reporting in the media.

Assist victims at court to refresh their memory from their written
or video statement and answer their questions on court procedure
and processes.

A member of prosecution staff will introduce themselves to the
victim at court and whilst not permitted to discuss their evidence
will answer any questions on procedure and processes. The victim
will also be given an opportunity to read their statement or see
their video taped statement before giving evidence.

Promote and encourage two-way communications between victim and
prosecutor at court.

The prosecutor will ensure that during the course of the court
hearing any victim who so requests is kept informed of the progress
of the case. The prosecutor will promote two-way communication to
enable a victim to pass to the prosecutor any information that may
assist in the conduct of the prosecution or have a bearing on an
assertion made by the defence.

Protect victims from unwarranted or irrelevant attacks on their
character and may seek the court’s intervention where cross
examination is considered to be inappropriate or oppressive.

The prosecutor will be alert during the course of the trial to
unwarranted or irrelevant attacks on the victim’s character and may
seek the court’s intervention where, for example, the prosecutor
considers that cross-examination by the defence is inappropriate or
oppressive.

On conviction, robustly challenge defence mitigation which is
derogatory to a victim’s character.

At the sentencing stage, the prosecutor will challenge any
assertion by the defence in mitigation which is derogatory to a
victim’s character and which is considered either false or
irrelevant to proper sentencing considerations.

On conviction apply for appropriate order for compensation,
restitution or future protection of the victim.

The prosecutor will always consider making any relevant application
for ancillary orders such as compensation or restitution and where
appropriate and justified on the evidence encourage the court to
impose a restraining order for the future protection of the victim.

Keep victims informed of the progress of any appeal, and explain
the effect of the court’s judgment.

Where a case is the subject of an appeal to the Court of Appeal
(Criminal) Division the prosecutor will ensure that any identified
victims are advised of the hearing and that the grounds on which
the appeal is made and the effect of the court’s judgement are
properly explained.

Yours sincerely,

fred robinson

Dear Hopkins, Tony,

MY FOI REQUEST:

"Will you confirm or deny that Judges and court officers, including
solicitors and barristers are subject to S. 1 (1) (a) (iii) of the
above Act."

YOUR E MAIL:

"I am out of the office on 24 Feb. If you have a query that needs
to be dealt with urgently please contact Richard Hudson on 0203 334
4760 or email [email address]."

Its the 25th of February 2009 over three months since my FOI
request.

Yours sincerely,

fred robinson