Our Ref: 165-08-647
Your Ref:
Dr J Levy
[FOI #4692 email]
Information Access Team
01483 630007
19th July 2010
Dear Dr Levy
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST REFERENCE NO: 165-08-647
I write in connection with your request for information dated 11th December 2008
. You
asked:
I am seeking information on anthrax or white powder Hoaxes utilizing the postal
system in 2003.
Following receipt of decision notice FS50246819 from the Information
Commissioner’s Office, on 25th May 2010 I can now confirm that information relevant
to your request is held by Surrey Police. May I apologise for the delays incurred by
Surrey Police’s initial approach in seeking to protect the information with the use of a
neither confirm nor deny response. The ICO has ruled that Surrey Police was wrong
to do so.
Your request for information has now been reconsidered and I am not obliged to
release this information as the duty in Section 1(1)(b) of the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:
•
Section 30(1)(a)(b)(c) Investigations
Qualified & Class Based
•
Section 38(1)(a)(b) Health and Safety
Qualified & Prejudice Based •
Section 40(2) Personal Information Absolute & Class Based
Section 17(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 requires Surrey Police, when
refusing to provide such information (because the information is exempt) to provide
you the applicant with a notice which: (a) states that fact, (b) specifies the exemption
in question and (C) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption
applies. This letter acts as such a notice.
Police Headquarters, Mount Browne, Sandy Lane, Guildford, Surrey, GU3 1HG
Tel 01483 630007 Fax 01483 634911
Email [email address]
Website www.surrey.police.uk
Overall Evidence of Harm
Prejudice based exemptions require me to evidence the harm that disclosure will
cause or would be likely to be cause.
Offences of this nature fall under the category of National Extremism and are
considered to be and are investigated as terrorist incidents. The threat from terrorism
and extremism cannot be ignored and should not be underestimated. It should be
recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and
unpredictable. It is acknowledged that the information requested here relates to
information that at the time of the request was 5 years old. However, it is not unusual
for offences of this nature, because of their complexity and the meticulous linking and
cross referencing that is involved in such investigations, to take much longer to bring
to trial than conventional volume crime investigations.
The UK faces a sustained threat from terrorists and violent extremists whose tactics
have included the sending of devices and material through the postal system with the
intent to injure, kill or disrupt the lives of those individuals and organisations who have
been targeted. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level,
based upon current intelligence and that threat has remained at the second highest
level, ‘severe’, except for two short periods during August 2006 and June and July
2007, when it was raised to the highest threat, ‘critical’, and in July 2009, when it was
reduced to ‘substantial’.
The substances that are used in these attacks can range from inert white powders at
one end of the scale, to Anthrax and Ricin at the other. These substances are
considered so dangerous that they are included in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001 Part 7 regarding their security. The following extract from the
legislation demonstrates the seriousness with which the legislators take this threat:
Sec 58(3)
The Secretary of State may not add any pathogen or toxin to that Schedule unless he is satisfied that the
pathogen or toxin could be used in an act of terrorism to endanger life or cause serious harm to human
health.
Tiny amounts of these substances can be lethal following contact with the skin or
through ingestion or inhalation. In each case a CBRN operation will be put in place,
until such time as it can be confirmed that the substance is harmless. Apart from the
obvious physical injury that can be caused there will invariably be a psychological
impact on the victim.
Modern-day policing is intelligence led, and intelligence changes on a day-by-day
basis. Current investigations are in many case reliant on intelligence gleamed from
similar previous and continuing investigations and information from such investigations
is held on national databases for this purpose. Disclosures under the Freedom of
Information Act are disclosures to the world, not just to the individual making the
request. To release the requested information would disclose the levels of police
activity and whether particular offences are still being actively investigated or
otherwise. This would provide information that would be of use to the offender about
the current status of an investigation. If an individual, or a group knew they were
being investigated this would lead to them going ‘underground’, destroying evidence
or moving their operations to different locations, or avoiding those areas where police
activity is concentrated. This would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations
and future prosecutions. Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could
be used to the advantage of offenders. Information that undermines the operational
integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative
impact on both national security and law enforcement.
The Police Service may choose to not publicise information about specific attacks, or
series of attacks for tactical purposes. Inevitably, some information may find its way
into the public domain, this usually occurs where the level of disruption is so significant
that it is widely reported or it may be necessary for public safety to release some
information. It may also be when the public are asked for assistance of one sort or
another. Disclosure in all other cases would harm our ability to be able to deal
effectively with investigations which may or may not still be under investigation. Even
in cases which are currently not being actively investigated, but remain open, material
from them may be inexorably linked to other and more recent offences or series of
offences. Disclosure would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing
service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
Investigations of this type are rarely limited to one policing area. They will, in most
cases extend across police borders and may even have an international element to
them. As a result of this it is difficult to identify the full extent of the harm that
disclosure will or would be likely to cause. That said, I believe that, for the reasons
articulated above, there is strong evidence to show the type of harm and the likelihood
of it occurring, if the material requested were to be disclosed.
Public Interest tests for each of the Qualified exemptions.
Qualified exemptions are subject to the application of a public interest test. Even
when such exemptions are engaged, the information must be disclosed unless the
public interest in maintaining the exemption is greater that the public interest in
disclosing it.
Factors favouring disclosure for S30 – The investigation of this type of offence, even if
it transpired to have been a hoax, is a highly emotive subject area often attracting
high profile media and public interest. Disclosure of information relating to this subject
could provide reassurance to the general public that the investigation of such offences
and the attempts to identify the offenders is conducted appropriately. The release of
such information would provide an insight into the police service and enable the public
to have better understanding of the effectiveness of the police. The release of
information could allow the public to make informed decisions about police procedures
and the money spent in this business area promoting informed debate. By disclosing
the information held in respect of Anthrax or white powder hoaxes, it could make
those at risk more aware of the threat and therefore be more alert when they receive
unexpected or suspicious packages. Better public awareness may reduce crime or
lead to more information from the public. Disclosure could add to the level of
accountability, the public would see where public funds are being spent.
Factors against disclosure for S30 – Disclosing the information held in respect of such
investigations would hinder the prevention or detection of crime. As identified in the
harm section above, information of this sort would be invaluable to an offender who
may be prompted to change his or her modus operandi or acting on the information,
take steps to remain at large. This would impact on police resources and increase the
risk of further similar offences being committed, placing individuals and the
community at additional risk. In addition, in those cases which remain undetected
disclosure would be very likely to harm any future judicial process. It is widely known
that investigations of this nature employ a whole range of tactics many of which have
been developed to stay one step ahead of the offenders. In many cases there may be
a covert or technical element employed. It may be that a particular tactic can only be
used a limited number of times and if it were to be compromised the investigative
edge that currently keeps the community safe would be eroded. This would invariably
make the job of the law enforcement teams more difficult and impact on resources and
already limited budgets.
Factors favouring disclosure for S38 – The public may feel safer if they were aware of
those locations that had previously been targeted and the nature of the offences.
They would be able to make informed choices as to whether they should avoid
particular locations. Disclosure of this information may lead to better informed public
awareness and debate.
Factors against disclosure for S38 – Attacks of this kind, are by their very nature
designed to either cause injury or death or in the case of a hoax alarm distress and
disruption. Disclosing information of the sort requested would be likely to lead to the
diminution of the services ability to disrupt attacks which are currently being planned.
This would increase the risk of the offenders remaining undiscovered and there would
be substantial harm to the public if their criminal activities were allowed to continue
undetected.
Balance test
The most compelling reasons for disclosure in this case revolve around accountability,
and public awareness and debate. This has to be balanced against the strongest
reasons for not disclosing the information which are Investigations and Health and
safety.
There is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing
assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the
threat posed by terrorists and extremists. Also, in this case providing assurance that
the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by
the threat and disruption caused by an anthrax or white powder attack whether it be
substantive or a hoax. there is a very strong public interest in protecting the integrity of
police investigations and operations in this highly sensitive area. All police forces
provide links to the
National Counter Terrorism Security Office where advice is readily
available. In addition, on the Surrey Police Website there are a series of booklets
available to download here (scroll down page) which give advice on specific locations
and activities and how to stay safe etc. Those persons or organisations that are felt to
be at particular risk will have been made aware of any likely threat and given relevant
advice. I believe that because of the measures described above that are already in
place to keep the public aware of the threat and how to counter it, that the disclosure
of the information held would add little or nothing to the debate. As much as there is
public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters
such as this, it will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.
The Police Service is charged with the protection of life and property, enforcing the
law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The
security of the country is of paramount importance and the police service would be
irresponsible to divulge information if to do so, would be likely to place the safety of
an individual or the community at risk or to undermine national security.
Qualified exemptions are subject to the application of a public interest test to assess if
the public interest in disclosing the information is greater than the public interest in
maintaining the exemption. The ‘public interest’ is not however, what the public may
find interesting, there must be some tangible benefit to the community. Having
weighed up the arguments for and against disclosure I have decided that it is not in
the public interest to disclose the requested information in this case.
Surrey Police provides you the right to request a re-examination of your case under its
review procedure. How to do this is set out in the attached Appeals Notice. Having
followed the full procedure, if you are still dissatisfied, then you have the right to direct
your comments to the Information Commissioner who will give your case
consideration.
I would like to thank you for your interest in Surrey Police and should you have any
further inquiries concerning this matter, please write or contact us on telephone
number 01483 – 630007 quoting the reference number above.
Yours sincerely
D/Inspector Tony Smith
Information Access Manager