

**RESTRICTED – LANTERN PROJECT  
BOARD MEMBERS ONLY**

**National Policing Improvement Agency**  
**New Kings Beam House**  
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**London SE1 9QY**  
**Switchboard 0208 358 5678**



**Lantern Project Board Minutes and Actions**

Date: 16<sup>th</sup> April 2008  
14:00 – 16:00

Location: Meeting room 08-7, New Kings Beam House, London

**Present:**

ACC Peter Goodman – SRO, Derbyshire Police (PG)  
Chris Wheeler – Head of Fingerprint Identification, NPIA (CW)  
[REDACTED] – Lantern Project Manager, NPIA (GH)  
[REDACTED] – Police Liaison (Biometrics), NPIA (SR)  
[REDACTED] – CI of Traffic Operations, Met Police (DM)  
[REDACTED] – Programme Development Unit, NPIA (MB)  
[REDACTED] – Procurement Manager, NPIA (LS)  
[REDACTED] – Work Package Manager, NPIA (CH)  
[REDACTED] – Lantern Project Support, NPIA (BD)

**Apologies:**

[REDACTED] – Pilot Service Rollout Manager, NPIA  
[REDACTED] – Lancashire Police

**IMPORTANT NOTE**

**These Minutes contain commercially sensitive information and therefore must not be circulated beyond those persons identified above without the prior and explicit approval of ACC Goodman, Project SRO.**

**1. Summary of actions from last meeting**

- 1.1 The previous minutes were agreed as an accurate record of the 11<sup>th</sup> December 2007 Project Board.
- 1.2 The outstanding actions were then discussed. See updated action list.

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## **2. Discussion Topics**

### 2.1 Pilot Expansion (CCN040) Progress Update

■ explained that City of London had completed their training on 31<sup>st</sup> of March and that ■, with support from a BTP trainer, was currently training Avon and Somerset and Thames Valley. ■ informed the board how the devices had been allocated within City of London and how they were being used by officers on the street. He also explained that Suffolk had declined the opportunity to participate in the Pilot and had been replaced by Durham.

It was noted that the Mark II devices were returning quicker results and use a simpler HCI than the Mark I deployed in the initial pilot.

PG asked if there was funding for the Pilot moving forward and added that we needed to be building a log of credible benefits information. He added that the devices would be 8 months old by the time the roll-out came about and asked whether the pilot could be extended to the next generation of devices. CW replied that the additional devices had effectively been provided free of charge under the CCN40 contract extension so further upgrades during the pilot period would be unlikely. He also said that ■ would be engaging NG on extending the period of the pilot beyond December 2008, so that it continued to the point where the National rollout had commenced or completed, depending on the point in the rollout by which the pilot forces received their replacement devices.

**Action: ■ to engage with NG to negotiate an extension of the Lantern Pilot service beyond December 2008.**

PG also asked whether there was any way of extending the use of the devices so that the 20 pilot Forces could collaborate with other forces, thus increasing the number of officers that had the opportunity of using the device. This would enable other forces to realise the benefits of the devices. ■ said this could be achieved but there would be contractual issues with NG, in that they were contracted to support a maximum of 20 Forces.

PG/CW asked ■ to look at creating the opportunity for officers from non-pilot Forces could visit pilot Forces premises and have "hands on" experience of how the device works. Another possible option was to explore the opportunity of changing the participating Forces and using a contract extension with NG to ensure continuous service.

It was deemed difficult to remove the devices from pilot Forces and reallocate them but that we do need to encourage Forces to work collaboratively. PG also highlighted the importance of correctly marketing the Lantern project to all levels of Forces.

**Action: ■ to consider how best to involve non-participating Forces in the**

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**pilot so that they could at least recognise the extent of the benefits possible.**

**Action: ■ to explore the opportunity of changing the participating Forces and to do it in line with a contract extension.**

CW mentioned that part of the objective of the pilot was to examine what else the device could be used for. The focus at the moment has been on ANPR and a traffic-moving environment and we needed to establish if the device had been used differently i.e. by foot patrols etc. He also mentioned an idea that had been raised at the NFB Development Work Group meeting earlier that day; i.e. Lantern triggering the CRO number of the suspect to be sent to the fingerprint bureau in real time for a ■ search to be initiated by the fingerprint bureau and a response provided to the officer whilst still engaged with the suspect. This was however considered to be unrealistic at this time.

■ explained how Lantern devices had been used for identifying fans travelling to the England v France football match and how Lantern had correctly identified 2 high risk offenders, missed by passport scanning. He highlighted the fact that currently the data could not access data held by other agencies i.e. UK Border Agency, Passport Office, etc and that it would be advantageous to have such data available for searches.

PG commented that the current commonly held understanding is that the device is an excellent facility when used for ANPR work.

### 2.2 CCN50 Evaluation and Recommendations

■ explained the history behind CCN50, which arose from a request from Peter Neyroud to roll out a large number of the existing devices as quickly as possible.

The CCN50 proposal received from NG was found to be very expensive, to the extent that it may be unaffordable, as NPJA did not have this amount of money and that much of the cost would need to be passed on to Police Forces. ■ was asked whether the proposal would provide a hardware refresh during its duration and therefore the opportunity to remain "state of the art". ■ explained that the proposal was to supply the current Sagem device over the next three years. The advantage of this was that it is a known and proven product – the disadvantage was that it would not benefit from advances made in sensor technology, integration with other hardware or device miniaturisation.

■ explained the costs included within the CCN were not the whole cost of implementation and on-going operation, in that additional costs (e.g. for software licences, project management and support, testing and PNC warning flags) needed to be included. He added that the proposed solution was based on a single function device (essentially the Mark II device implemented Nationally) and that the Board would need to decide if that was what the Forces wanted, or if they are looking for a smaller, lighter multi-functional device, such as an enhanced PDA.

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■ also explained that there would almost certainly be an expectation that Forces would be required to contribute towards the funding of the device and therefore meeting their requirement for a multi-functional device became even more necessary. This had been borne out by the recent survey by Forces which showed that, if the forces had to pay for the current single function devices, the number of required was far lower than expected (currently estimated to be some 600 with a few forces, including the Met, yet to respond).

■ said that, under the circumstances, the Met would require 100 devices at most but needed more clarity about the cost and whether it would be capital or revenue. He added that Territorial Support Group's would like them as well as the Borough command.

CW mentioned that he was unimpressed with some elements of the NG proposal and disappointed that, although NG have a substantial contract with NPIA for IDENT1, they have come back with a surprisingly high figure for the Lantern development. There was no future proofing, no evidence of any research and development being conducted and no new technology was being offered. The Board concluded that the proposed solution would be out of date very quickly and that they had expected NG to have been much more innovative in their approach and provide a device that in the future supported more than one function.

The Board summarised the conclusions, i.e. that CCN050 appeared to be an extremely expensive option for what would be only an interim solution in a Policing environment where money was very tight and the need for Value for Money was paramount (whilst noting that the proposed costs for providing User Level Authentication might be incurred irrespective of whatever solution was pursued).

The Board rejected the proposal for CCN050 and redirected the project team resources to identifying and delivering an alternative approach.

**Action: PG to write to Peter Neyroud explaining the reasoning for the Project Board's rejection of CCN050 and to seek assurances of future and genuine commitment to funding an alternative approach.**

**Action: ■ to provide wording for advising NG of the Project Board's decision.**

### 2.3 The Way Forward and Recommendations

■ explained that this paper was designed to explain to the Project Board its options for moving forward. He summarised the background and explained the different options.

It was agreed that Option 1 (to keep the same device and provider and expand to all Forces), had been proven through NG's proposal for CCN50 to be unaffordable.

■ stated that, for Option 3 (fingerprint matching service and devices provided by independent companies; IDENT1 provides the database with raw fingerprint data),

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there was some concern about whether NG had exclusive rights to provide parts of the IDENT1 service ■■■ was asked by the Board to seek clarification from NPPIA's lawyers.

**Action: LS to get legal opinion on potential exclusivity clauses in the IDENT1 contract.**

CW added that we might be able to move NG into an improved pricing position if we aim for Option 3, because it introduces a competitive element that is currently missing. ■■■ pointed out that assumptions had to be made on how much the back end service (i.e. the database and matchers) would cost, because NG have only provided aggregated costings.

■■■ proceeded to explain the OJEU procurement process and how to get the best out of it. It could be applied to either Option 2 or Option 3. ■■■ added that using the OJEU route to the marketplace would give NPPIA the opportunity to identify other companies that could provide an end to end service as identified in Option 3 at a much lower cost than NG.

PG asked how IDENT1 worked, to help him get a better understanding of Option 2. CW explained the workings of IDENT1, including the use of subsets of the database in the future. He explained that ACPO owns the data but that we do not manage it as NG has been contracted to provide that service. NPPIA are a "Data Controller" under the Data Protection Act 1998.

■■■ then outlined the issues NPPIA needed to address in the shorter term.

### 2.3.1 Sensor Technology

■■■ explained the difficulties of not having a small and light fingerprint reader and that this may be an issue which would need to be addressed when delivering the national capability. Officers are currently using a prismatic optical sensor device under the Lantern pilot which is much bulkier than is desirable for effective day to day use. Recently capacitive sensors had been personal identification verified (PIV) approved by the FBI for one to one searching. These sensors by design enable the device to be much smaller than the prismatic sensors. A proposal was made to the project Board for trials of the two sensor technologies be conducted which would better inform the project team on suitability of devices when going out to OJEU.

CW asked LS if there was any problem putting forward the requirements to OJEU before July 08 when the sensor test results were to be delivered. ■■■ explained that only an outline high level statement of our requirements was needed for the initial OJEU Notice.

The board approved Recommendation 1 – to evaluate the comparative accuracies of the prismatic optical and capacitive sensor technologies from devices currently in use by the police by the end of July 2008.

### 2.3.1 User Level Authentication

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█ explained that one of the main obstacles to a National roll out at present was the lack of user level authentication. He added that current arrangements for the pilot (i.e. accessing the device by a shared pin number) will not be acceptable for a national rollout. He added that IDENT1 needs to be able to identify the officer requesting the data and check the level of authentication that they have, before commencing a search of the IDENT1 database.

He also pointed out that the expense of obtaining the user level authentication from NG was circa £9million. He then explained how the Mobile Information project is addressing the ULA for their devices and that the Lantern project team would work closely with them and the IAM (Identity and Access Management) project team to define the user access security architecture for now and subsequently. Although the likelihood is that the IAM team would not have the level of Authentication for Lantern ready in the timeframes for roll out.

PG asked on how the device accessed the data, and █ explained on how the inquiry was transferred between IDENT1 and the device.

CW added that PNC would only give access to the warning flags on their database if we had ULA level of access.

The Project Board approved Recommendation 2 – for the Lantern project team to work closely with the Mobile Information programme and to produce system security and connectivity documents to prove that ULA can be implemented effectively. Also to report back to the Project Board by the end of July 2008 with findings and recommendations.

**ACTION: █ to examine the mobile information programme of work to see how it dovetailed into the revised Lantern roll out.**

**Action: █ to liaise with System Engineers to ensure that recommendation 2 was feasible in the available timescale.**

█ then proceeded to explain the re-examination of Options 1-3 including the advantages and disadvantages of using IDENT1. CW asked █ to include more substance into the recommendation for Option 3 and to consider whether it was feasible to achieve within 18 months, given that suitable skilled resources are made available.

PG said that he would be seeking assurances from Nick Deyes that sufficient resources (people and finance) would be made available to achieve the 18 month timescale. █ said that the key tasks and dates would be added to Recommendation 3 – to initiate OJEU procurement.

**Action: GH to add key tasks and dates to Recommendation 3.**

PG questioned what would happen if we could not deliver the roll out to the required timescale and █ asked if there was a facility for people to get more of the current devices if necessary. █ responded by stating that it was possible to

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add up to another 300 devices to the 200 already being deployed under the pilot. The marginal cost of providing these would probably be circa £5000 per device, which is unlikely to be acceptable to Forces.

The Board accepted Recommendation 3 and authorised its initiation.

### 2.3.3 Other Issues

■ explained that if it was decided that IDENT1 would provide the 'backend' matching service there could be an issue with the sizing of the matching capacity. He explained that NG would need to revisit their capacity planning work for Lantern and update their "Lantern Performance and Scalability Report".

■ added that if we went for option 2 we would use the OJEU procurement to find one or more suppliers to provide the front end, with NG continuing to provide the back end. This would mean that we would ask NG for what we want rather than what they chose to provide. CW stated that NG would have to give access to IDENT1 to whoever wins the OJEU procurement.

The Board accepted Recommendation 4 – that NG rework their previous performance and scalability work based on the last year's worth of Lantern device transactions.

**Action: PG asked ■ and ■ to provide him with an urgent breakdown of resource and cost information to identify the order of magnitude expenditure forecast for each year of the proposed service.**

CW commented that purchasing the devices through OJEU procurement could be achieved directly by Forces or by NPJA on their behalf.

PG asked if we needed to write to the Forces around overall service funding. ■ replied he is speaking with ■ of Mobile Information on how their strategy is to be implemented and would update the Board accordingly.

**Action : ■ to discuss with the Mobile Information programme and report back**

PG said that there was a credibility issue with Lantern if we were now to say to the forces we cannot deliver in line with their expectations which might look bad on the NPJA.

PG asked whether we were happy that the product we will have in 9 months time will be cost effective. ■ replied that, whilst no guarantees can be given, using OJEU to generate a genuine competition was the best way of driving down the costs of the front end device(s). ■ added that we already know that the single supplier route (i.e. through NG) has shown not to be cost effective. The expensive part is going to be the 'backend' element and it is difficult to provide indicative costs for it at this time. CW added that true costs would only be identified if we went to the market.

PG asked what the future device might look like and whether it would be an

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additional piece of equipment that the officer would have to carry. ■■ replied that as well as a multi-functional fingerprinting device, they would look for suppliers that offer peripheral devices with a reader that could be added to a Blackberry or a PDA, as not everyone would need a device. As an example, he explained that, if a force bought 15,000 Blackberry devices because of cost effectiveness and only 3,000 officers needed the mobile fingerprinting device, economies of scale could be achieved by using 3,000 peripheral devices attached to 3,000 of the Blackberry devices.

### 2.4 PID/Outline Business Case

■■ stated that, in the light of the Board's decisions, the PID and Outline Business Case would need to be updated to reflect the revised approach to service delivery. In effect, the project is back at the stage before Peter Neyroud's intervention.

**Action : GH to update the PID and Outline Business Case**

### 2.5 Gateway 2 Style Health check

■■ explained the background to the health check and stated that it would have been the option to adopt had the Board not made the decisions on the revised approach. It might still be valid prior to a full OGC Gateway review; because we would get external assurance that we had all the necessary documentation and processes in place. He requested authorisation from the Board for the go ahead to carrying out a health check if required.

The Board approved this approach.

### 2.6 Legislation

PG commended ■■ on a well-written legislative paper. ■■ explained how the paper identified the continuing disparities of the current legislation on fingerprints, specifically that there is no longer a power to take fingerprints for identification purposes for non-recordable offences. The legislation contained within the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (s117) also no longer meets the needs of the police service, and if introduced had the potential to undo current best practice with relation to fixed penalty notices. PACE is undergoing an extensive review, and it is important that the project ensures that changes are made to reflect the identified shortcomings of the current legislation. CW asked ■■/PG to speak to ■■■■■■■■■■ at the Home Office on the process to amend the legislation and also to speak with the PACE review team to ensure the revised PACE wording reflects the identified changes needed.

**Action: ■■ and PG to speak to Eric Downham about possible redrafting of legislation.**

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## **3. Standard Discussion Items**

### 3.1 Highlight Report

█ explained the Highlight report, pointing out that the milestone table was now redundant, and needed to be rebaselined. He explained that whilst most of the team have been concentrating on CCN050, the achievements of CCN040 should be acknowledged.

Issues – 1) the lack of Funding for 2008/09 had been addressed and can be closed, 2) Peter Neyroud's request to examine the feasibility of deploying a rapid National roll out have been addressed through CCN50 and can be closed, 3) Identity management (user level authentication) remains an issue, as discussed earlier.

Key Risks – 1) delay in deploying a National capability causing Forces to purchase from other suppliers. This will be addressed as part of the Communications workstream and the OJEU procurement. 2) Commercial issues occurring if not going to tender is not longer relevant and can be closed.

### 3.2 Finance Report

The finance report was also explained. There had been an under spend in year 2007/08 due to Lantern getting free devices as compensation from NG as they had under performed on IDENT1. And the saving of consultancy fees for updating the Outline Business Case as this will be done in-house.

## **4. AOB**

CW asked for the Quorum group to remain as per the last Project Board so that, when necessary, urgent decisions could be made quickly.

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**5. Date of next board meeting**

24 June 2008 (14.00-16.00)  
New Kings Beam House,  
London SE1 9QY