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Independent Police Complaints Commission
Operational Advice Note
In 2005 the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) issued
Statutory Guidance entitled
“Making the new police complaints system work
better” (the Statutory Guidance). It also issued a protocol dealing with the
operational response of the IPCC and that document is now replaced by this
Operational advice note and associated papers.
This operational advice note reflects the development of ECHR case law and
the outcome of recent Judicial Reviews in English Courts regarding the
implications of Article 2 along with the requirement for the Independent
investigation of those cases where Article 2 may be engaged. It also reflects
the provisions of Chapter 7of the new ACPO Manual of Guidance on the
Management, Command and Deployment of Armed Officers1. It is important
that the amendments to the firearms manual regarding post incident
management and conferring should be applied more widely to other incidents
where Article 2 may be engaged.
The operational advice note has been agreed with the Association of Chief
Police Officers (ACPO)2 and should be read in conjunction with the Statutory
Guidance which it supplements and/or updates. The new Statutory Guidance
will incorporate this model when it is issued in late 2009/early 2010.
The advice note comes in the form of an Operational Model that will be
applied to referrals made to the IPCC by the police service and other
agencies. The Operational Model sets out the way in which the IPCC
responds to such referrals and the expectations of delivery by the police and
other agencies for whom the IPCC has responsibility. The model centres upon
the out of hours referral process but is equally applicable to referrals in which
Article 2 may be engaged, made during office hours. Where an incident being
referred actually or potentially engages Article 2 a force is advised to make
personal contact with the relevant IPCC office, in addition to the paper referral
process, to provide the opportunity for an independent assessment to be
undertaken by the IPCC at the earliest possible stage.
1 The new Manual of Guidance issued on the 13th July 2009 following the revision of Chapter 6 of the
ACPO Manual of Guidance Police Use of Firearms – agreed at Chief Constables Council 23 October
2008
2 Agreed at the ACPO Complaints and Misconduct Working Group and ACPO Professional Standards
Committee
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Article 2 – Final version July 2009
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The Human Rights Act 1998 and obligations imposed under Article 2 apply
equally to police forces and others and to the IPCC. Where Article 2 is
engaged, police forces and others have a duty to ensure that they conduct
themselves in a manner that is consistent with the procedural obligations that
the courts have held to exist. These are –
The investigation must be independent of those involved
The investigation must be effective
The investigation must be reasonably prompt
There must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny
The next of kin must be involved to an appropriate extent
So far as this note is concerned it is the first two obligations that are relevant
and which must be observed by the police and the IPCC. In those cases
where Article 2 may be engaged the IPCC will deploy Investigators quickly
and will generally decide to conduct an independent investigation. The police
have an obligation to preserve evidence so that it is available for the IPCC to
enable it to conduct an effective investigation. At the same time a force should
not act in a manner that might compromise the independence of the
investigation. The courts have indicated that where there is a contravention of
Article 2 that contravention cannot be rectified by later actions that are
themselves compliant. What this means in individual cases will depend on
the circumstances of that case. The IPCC will rely upon the police to provide
such detail of the circumstances of the matter being referred as to enable it to
issue appropriate directions in accordance with its powers under the 2002 Act.
The following documentation is not exhaustive, it is a guide focussed
principally upon those matters where the IPCC could be expected to have a
level of oversight. However the principles are applicable to a wide range of
referrals and should be read in that context.
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Independent Police Complaints Commission
Content
Page No.
1.
Operational
Model
4
-
13
2.
Appendix `A` - The power to Direct the use of police
14 - 16
resources
3.
Appendix `B` - Providing Direction regarding not
17 - 19
conferring
4.
Appendix `C` - Advice note issued 31 October 2008
20 – 24
regarding conferring
5.
Appendix `D` - Chapter 7 of the ACPO Manual
25 - 43
of Guidance on the Management,
Command and Deployment of Armed
Officers
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Independent Police Complaints Commission
______________________________________________________________
Article 2
Operational Model3
______________________________________________________________
Table 1 – Managing the initial contact and attendance
3 The content of the operational model is not exhaustive and is meant to address the key elements of
IPCC / Police response
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Initial Contact
POLICE / OTHER AGENCY
IPCC
Provides notification to IPCC – this
Receipt of first contact
should take place at the earliest
possible time. In the case where
The relevant Senior IPCC
Article 2 is or may be engaged this
representative will make an initial
should be as soon as possible and
assessment and determine whether
not more than 2 hours from the time
or not IPCC attendance is required.
of the incident being referred.
Even at this early stage it may be
possible to determine the MoI - ie. a
Notification to ACPO if required
death in custody or a fatal use of
force – but such a decision will not be
Set up Incident handling
made in the absence of sufficient
arrangements – if this is potentially an information.
Article 2 case consultation with the
IPCC must take place regarding this.
There will be early discussion about
action being taken and future
Call out additional staff such as
intentions whether or not IPCC
SOCO, PIM, PSD to assist with the
deployment is to take place.
initial priority actions (without undue
impact on Article 2). Forces should
If deployment is to occur directions
ensure that their processes allow for
will be given over the phone initially
early notification to the IPCC to be
by the relevant Senior IPCC
triggered.
representative and then by the SI/DSI
attending the scene/RVP5
Forces must have regard to the
legislation relating to
the
The senior IPCC representative will
requirement to refer death or
contact the relevant on call SI/DSI
serious injury whether or not a
whose responsibility it will be to make
complaint has been made and must contact with the force and assume
state to the IPCC the basis of the
operational responsibility for the IPCC
referral, i.e. complaint, conduct matter response.
or DSI matter.
SI/DSI will deploy investigators to the
The early notification to the IPCC will
scene with specific instructions
provide the opportunity for the police
provided by them. Once investigators
and the IPCC to determine
have been deployed the SI/DSI will
expectations and establish ground
make their way to the scene.
rules to address what should be done The relevant senior IPCC
prior to the attendance of the IPCC4.
representative will provide a strategic
overview of the referral and support
the SI/DSI by dealing with matters
involving Communications, Legal
Services and Commissioner related
4 This will be the case if Article 2 is engaged which should result in scene attendance by the IPCC
5 A script is provided as an appendix outlining the basis in law that requirements can be made of the
police service in terms of use of their resources
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matters where it is appropriate and
necessary to do so.
In referrals involving fatal use of force
and deaths in custody the SI can
make the MoI decision but should
discuss this with the relevant Director
or the on call IPCC representative.
Early declaration of an independent
investigation where required
IPCC needs to mobilise on call
resources whilst being cognisant of
travel times and resilience matters.
Arrangements for upwards briefing
and MOI confirmation, having regard
to the Commissioner’s role as the
Police to ensure that any material
public face of the organisation (media
recovered by them is appropriately
preparation and Gold Group). The
safeguarded until the arrival of IPCC
relevant senior IPCC representative
investigators.
will coordinate this.
Initial advice regarding CCTV, if
already seized the material is to
remain sealed pending the arrival of
the IPCC staff and
will not be
viewed by officers involved in the
incident/ complaint prior to
discussion with the IPCC
If the referral relates to a firearms
incident it will be necessary to
consider the judgement arising from
recent Judicial Reviews6 regarding
officers conferring prior to the
Police to manage the implication of
provision of a first account. It will also
Chapter 7 of the ACPO Manual of
be necessary to consider the wording
Guidance on the Management,
of Chapter 7 of the ACPO Manual of
Command and Deployment of Armed
Guidance on the Management,
officers and record action taken by
Command and Deployment of Armed
them as this will be required by IPCC
Officers and the IPCC Advice Note
staff.
issued following the amendment to
Chapter 6 of the previous Manual of
Guidance Police Use of Firearms.
6 R (Applications of Charlotte Saunders and Corrina Tucker) –v- The Independent Police Complaints
Commission
7 A script has been prepared as an appendix providing a guide for the words to be used when speaking
to the police contact person in relation to this.
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There will an expectation that the
police will comply with the ACPO
Guidance but if it is necessary to
issue a Direction to the police to
comply with the provisions of Chapter
7 regarding the issue of conferring,
advice is provided in the IPCC advice
note regarding that and such
Directions must be properly recorded.
Additionally the reporting senior
police officer will be advised that if our
direction is not facilitated there will be
a need to provide a written
explanation as to why. It is important
to note that this principle may also
relate to other referrals outside of the
use of firearms where death and
serious injury is an issue but such
referrals must be considered on a
case by case basis. Some forces
have already moved to a position
where the PIM principles in firearms
incidents are being more widely
applied to other matters.
It should be
emphasised that this course of
action is to obtain best evidence,
to preserve the principles of
accountability and independence
and should not be seen as
attributing guilt at an early stage.7
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The Scene/RVP
POLICE / OTHER AGENCY
IPCC
Initial scene attendance and
Provide direction regarding scene(s)
preservation – early discussions
identification, examination and
between the police and the IPCC will
preservation
influence the way in which the police
manage the respective scenes.
Take responsibility for direction and
control where it is appropriate to do
Activation of PIP where appropriate
so and prioritise work which will be
undertaken only by IPCC staff.
Review the work that has been
undertaken by the police.
Where appropriate commence Policy
File and set strategies for family
liaison, media handling, priority
actions, forensic work etc
Initial scene management and seizing Deploy resources to priority actions,
of relevant materials where there is
in consultation with the police as
any risk of these being lost to the
needed to ensure an effective
enquiry through delay.
investigation
Provide SOCO, PIM and PSD single
Oversee the management and
point of contact as a minimum,
handling of the exhibits –
whether local or outside force
Consider the requirement for the
attendance of an independent
Provide exhibits handler’s for each
forensic advisor8
scene as required, including the
mortuary
Set SOCO/FSS strategy for the
scene(s)
Contact Coroner’s Officer in the event
of a death
Determine best option for exhibits
management and
retention/submission (having regard
Liaise with the IPCC regarding any
to proportionality/cost)
proposed press statement
Negotiate accommodation where
Maintain effective communications
required for the team
with the IPCC staff and consult at
each stage.
Ensure effective media management
Other specialist resources as required Consider use of HOLMES or other
to work under the direction and
arrangements for data
8 Work ongoing with the FSS to determine what they can provide – this may be a Forensic Specialist
Advisor
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control of the IPCC.
storage/retrieval.
Commence community assessment
Liaise with the relevant Director and
ahead of Gold Group, calling in
Commissioner to establish IPCC
members of reference group where
resource requirement and budget if
appropriate
appropriate at this early stage.
Define preliminary TORs
Where it is necessary to use police
resources this should be done in a
way that maintains independence.
Therefore, rather than just
overseeing their actions the
oversight should be done in such a
way that is able to demonstrate
influence and direction and control
of what is being done.
Determine action regarding the
principle officers
Consider early meeting with police to
explain the IPCC’s role
Consider the requirement to serve
Regulation 14A notices and
associated support staff notifications
Make contact with PIM
Identify witnesses and their status
Devise a witness appeal/appeal
strategy, linked to press and media
Provide adequate arrangements for
staff welfare and for resilience
purposes, including rest periods,
accommodation and support by other
IPCC investigators.
Carry out witness interviews with
Carry out Significant and Key witness
those witnesses who are not
interviews
classified as either Significant or Key
– those who do not have any direct
evidence relating to the matter
subject of referral - as required by
the IPCC. If it becomes apparent that
the witness knows more than was
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initially thought, this must be drawn to
the attention of the IPCC before
proceeding further. Details of
witnesses should be obtained and
further action in respect of those will
be determined by their status.
Carry out secondary H2H enquiries
Identify the extent to which H2 H
following the determination of sites by needs to be carried out and IPCC.
the IPCC.
Within the parameters identified
determine primary and secondary
sites. IPCC to carry out primary H2H.
If witnesses within the secondary
area clearly have significant evidence
to give discussion should take place
with the IPCC before the police
proceed to secure that evidence. The
presumption will be that the IPCC will
deal with any witness who may have
significant evidence.
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Post Scene
POLICE / OTHER AGENCY
IPCC
Set up Gold Group with effective
Determine the IPCC role in Gold Group
arrangements to ensure liaison with and community related matters
and support for the IPCC
investigation.
Community issues, including the
IPCC as appropriate to address
local tensions
Exhibits to be handled in
Oversee the management and handling
accordance with the IPCC
of the exhibits – consider the
directions, structured handover of
engagement of a Forensic Advisor.
all material to take place if the
Exhibits to be handled in accordance
agreed MoI requires this.
with the IPCC Exhibit Policy with the
security of all exhibits being a primary
Any initial family engagement to be
issue.
discussed with IPCC with a view to
identifying an exit strategy if
necessary
Identify FLM to deal with family issues
Attendance at PM in a death case.
Procure any relevant specialist advice
Ensure formal handover of any material
Conduct and investigation having
regard to proportionality and timeliness,
gathering all relevant evidence from
any source.
Media handling
Interview suspected officers/staff
Liaise with CPS (following discussion
with Legal Services)/ HM Coroner
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Table 2 – Managing the handover and the start of the investigation
Investigation
POLICE / OTHER AGENCY
IPCC
Handover of all relevant material to
Ensure early structured handover
the IPCC
Develop MoU`s to deal with the
Facilitate arrangements for IPCC to
relationship between IPCC
see staff
investigation and any parallel police
investigation.
Provide the requisite level of
cooperation throughout an
Independent investigation.
Early engagement of police staff
If the investigation is managed by the
associations and relevant unions
IPCC carry out the investigation in a
timely manner and submit report
Consider an early findings report and
within the required time frame.
review the MoI at keys stages
Be prepared to deal with the
If appropriate to redetermine, arrange
redetermination of an investigation
hand over to the police
that may result in the investigation
being handed back to the police.
Consider the release of an interim
report
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Post Investigation
POLICE / OTHER AGENCY
IPCC
Implementation of recommendations
Prepare an early interim report
and learning
Preparation and submission of report
Recommendations / Learning
Involvement in criminal / misconduct
process
HMC – Inquest
Family
Consultation history:-
Senior Investigators
Regional Directors
Management Board
Commission
Legal workshop
Director of Legal Services
Copy to Steve Oakley re Operations Manual – 5 November 2008
DCC John Feavyour – ACPO Complaints and Misconduct
ACPO Complaints and Misconduct Committee
ACPO Professional Standards Committee
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Article 2
Operational Model
Appendix `A`
The power to direct the use of police resources
The purpose of this Appendix is to provide information regarding referrals
where Article 2 may be engaged although it is important to note that the
principles are equally as applicable in other referrals where it is necessary to
ensure that an independent perspective is secured. In most cases the
cooperation of the police service will be obtained without difficulty although
there may be cases where it will be necessary to direct action to be taken and
indeed provide direction that certain action should not be taken.
Whether or not cooperation is forthcoming the following information will assist
the relevant Director, Senior investigator (SI) or Deputy Senior Investigator
(DSI) and inform their discussions with police senior officers.
At the time of referral where it appears that Article 2 of Human Rights, ECHR
is engaged the SI / DSI should be mindful of the following:-
Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) appears to be engaged.
That pursuant to paragraph 15 of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform
Act 2002 (‘the 2002 Act’) the IPCC has determined that the matter
will be subject to an independent investigation to be conducted by
an IPCC investigator to be appointed under paragraph 19 of
Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act.
Where it is appropriate the force can be reminded that it is public
authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘the 1998
Act’) under a duty under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998
not to act incompatibly with a person’s Convention rights.
Under the Police Reform Act 2002 as read with the 1998 Act, the
force is obliged to ensure that the preservation and collection of
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evidence by its officers is undertaken in a manner that complies
with Convention rights.
Upon receipt of a referral it may be necessary to require police resources to
carry out tasks that the IPCC feel appropriate. The SI / DSI will confer with the
appointed police senior officer at the time of initial contact and deployment
where it has been necessary to deploy. During those early discussions it may
be necessary to secure the use of police resources to carry out tasks required
by IPCC staff. It is hoped and expected that this can be secured by
cooperation and mutual agreement.
In circumstances where such cooperation is not forthcoming the IPCC have
the power to direct the police to take action and the police have a legislative
responsibility to comply. The legislation providing that authority and
requirement is outlined below;-
In matters of complaint
Paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act imposes on a chief
officer of the force a duty to ensure that all such steps as are
appropriate for the purposes of the complaint for obtaining and
preserving evidence relating to the conduct complained about.
Paragraph 1(6) of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act the IPCC has the power
to direct the force to take specific steps for obtaining and preserving
evidence relating to any conduct that is the subject of the complaint.
In matters of conduct
Paragraph 12(1) of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act imposes on a chief
officer of the force a duty to ensure that all such steps as are
appropriate for the purposes of the conduct matter for obtaining and
preserving evidence relating to the conduct complained about.
Paragraph 12(6) of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act states that the IPCC
has the power to direct the force to take specific steps for obtaining and
preserving evidence relating to any conduct matter.
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In DSI matters
Paragraph 14B(1)9 of Schedule 3 to the 2002 imposes on a chief
officer of the force a duty to ensure that all such steps as are
appropriate for the purposes of the DSI matter for obtaining and
preserving evidence relating to the DSI matter.
Paragraph 14B(6) of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act states that the IPCC
has the power to direct the force to take specific steps for obtaining and
preserving evidence relating to the DSI matter.
These notes are not exhaustive and are produced to assist IPCC staff, they
are not meant to infer that the police will resist IPCC involvement as this is not
the case.
9 As inserted by paragraph 12 of Schedule 12 to the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005
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Article 2
Operational Model
Appendix `B`
Providing the direction that officers should not confer prior to recording
their first account
The issue surrounding officers being allowed to confer following an incident
and in particular a firearms incident, has been a contentious one. However the
recent
Saunders judgement and Chapter 7 of the ACPO Manual of Guidance
on the Management, Command and Deployment of Armed Officers have
provided some clarity. Nevertheless the management of this will still require
careful handling and directions provided to the police service should reflect
our independence and responsibility to ensure accountability but also
acknowledge the significance of this change and consider the welfare of
principle officers.
Again cooperation will hopefully be secured by mutual agreement as the
original amendment to Chapter 6 of the previous Manual of Guidance Police
Use of Firearms regarding the issue of conferring, now reflected in the new
ACPO Manual of Guidance on the Management, Command and Deployment
of Armed Officers has been circulated throughout the police service. However
there may be cases where confusion still exists and we need to be aware of
this. The information outlined below will aid understanding and provide the
necessary information to enable direction to be given should that cooperation
not be forthcoming. How that direction should be given will be a matter for the
individual but it must be clear and appropriately recorded.
An Operational Advice note has already been issued to staff in relation
to the original amendment to Chapter 6 of the previous manual in
relation to conferring and this is attached at Appendix `C` to this
document. It is important to note that the new manual replaces this.
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The decision of the Administrative Court in the case of
R (On the Applications
of Saunders and Tucker) v the IPCC (2008) EWHC 2372 (Admin) indicated
that the force, as a public authority, may not be acting in a manner compliant
with Article 2 of the ECHR if it permits the principal officers to confer before
individually making their initial note of the matter. The court said, “
if the
circumstances of either of these cases were in due course to be considered
by the Court it might very well find that a breach of art.2 had occurred …It
seems to me necessarily to follow from the decision in Ramsahai that the
Court would be very chary of a general practice under which officers who are
key witnesses in an art 2 investigation are expressly permitted to collaborate
in the production of their statements”
Following the judgement ACPO considered the impact of this upon Chapter 6
of the ACPO Manual of Guidance for the Police Use of Firearms and an
amendment in relation to the issue of conferring was made. This has also
been reflected in Chapter 7 of the new ACPO Manual of Guidance on the
Management, Command and Deployment of Armed Officers. Paragraph 7.94
and 7.95 of Chapter 7 now states :-
7.94 As a matter of general practice officers should not confer with others
before making their accounts (whether initial or subsequent accounts).
The important issue is to individually record what their honestly held
belief of the situation was at the time force was used. There should
therefore be no need for an officer to confer with others about what was
in their mind at the time force was used. If, however, in a particular
case a need to confer on other issues does arise then, in order to
ensure transparency and maintain public confidence, where some
discussion has taken place, officers must document the fact that
conferring has taken place, highlighting:
•
Time, date and place where conferring took place.
•
The issues discussed
•
With whom
•
The reasons for such discussion
7.95 There is a positive obligation on officers involved to ensure that all
activity relating to the recording of accounts is transparent and capable
of withstanding scrutiny.
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Our directions in the initial stages of a referral involving the police use of
firearms should therefore reflect the provisions of Chapter 7. It should be
made clear to the reporting officer that it is our expectation that Chapter 7 will
be complied with and we should ascertain whether or not that is the case. If
that is not the case the Senior Officer making the referral and / or the Senior
officer present at the Post Incident Management Procedure should be
Directed to ensure compliance. If the police do not comply they should be
asked to record the reasons for that and provide that record to the senior
IPCC member of staff attending the scene. They should be informed that
failure to comply may result in subsequent criticism and be a potential breach
of Article 2. It will also be appropriate to be clear that this is for the purposes
of obtaining best evidence and demonstrating independence and
accountability and is not an assumption of guilt.
When speaking to the police IPCC staff should consider using the following in
your discussions if it is necessary to do so:-
In accordance with paragraph 1(6), or 12(6), or 14B(6) of Schedule 3 to the
Police Reform Act 2002 to direct the police to ensure that the provisions of the
amended Chapter 6 are complied with. The Direction should be given to the
Chief Officer – the senior officer reporting the referral and / or the senior
officer present at the Post Incident Management suite. The Direction will be
given by the on call IPCC senior representative if the referral is made out of
hours and / or the senior IPCC member of staff deployed to the Post Incident
Management suite.
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Article 2
Operational Model
Appendix `C `
Advice note to Regional Directors, Senior investigators and Deputy
Senior investigators
11 November 200810
______________________________________________________________
Referrals involving the police use of firearms
The purpose of this note is to advise Directors, Senior investigators and
Deputy Senior Investigators of the developments arising from the
Saunders11
judgement regarding conferring and the response to that by ACPO in relation
to the wording of Chapter 7 of the new ACPO Manual of Guidance on the
Management, Command and Deployment of Armed Officers12. This advice
note will assist us in providing a clear and consistent response to the police
service when a referral involving the police use of a firearm is made to the
IPCC.
The judgement in
Saunders indicated that Principal Officers being allowed to
confer prior to a first account being provided may be in breach of the
requirements of Article 2, ECHR. An Operational Model has been developed
internally to outline our response to Article 2 and 3 type referrals and that
document reflects this latest judgement.
Following the judgement in
Saunders ACPO have considered the implications
of that upon Chapter 6 of the ACPO Manual of Guidance Police use of
Firearms current at that time. Those considerations resulted in an amendment
to Chapter 6 and are reflected in Chapter 7 of the new manual. The position
outlined in paragraphs 7.94 and 7.95 of Chapter 7 is as follows:-
As a matter of general practice officers should not confer with others before
making their accounts (whether initial or subsequent accounts). The important
issue is to individually record what their honestly held belief of the situation
was at the time force was used. There should therefore be no need for an
officer to confer with others about what was in their mind at the time force was
used. If, however, in a particular case a need to confer on other issues does
used arise, then, in order to ensure transparency and maintain public
confidence, where some discussion has taken place, officers must
document the fact this has taken place, highlighting:
10 Please see Important Note at the foot of this particular document
11 R (Applications of Charlotte Saunders and Corrina Tucker) –v- The Independent Police Complaints
Commission
12 Issued 13 July 2009
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Time, date and place where conferring took place;
The issues discussed;
With whom;
The reasons for such discussion.13
There is a positive obligation on officers involved to ensure that all
activity relating to the recording of accounts is transparent and
capable
of
withstanding scrutiny14.
Paragraph 7.88 and 7.89 of Chapter 7 relates to the preservation and
securing of evidence and states the following:-
The responsibility for securing evidence and taking appropriate action in an
Article 2 investigation remains with the Police Service until such times as the
independent investigative authority has taken over the investigation15.
The responsibility of the police service being investigated is to facilitate that
investigation through, for example:
•
Identification and preservation of scenes and exhibits
•
Identification of immediately available witnesses
•
Securing of physical evidence
•
The availability of experienced family or witness liaison officers16
We should be mindful that this relates to securing and preserving evidence
and not the conduct of investigation.
Therefore upon receipt of a referral involving the police use of firearms the
IPCC member of staff receiving the initial referral and/or attending the scene
should:
o make clear to the police our expectation that the provisions of Chapter
7 are being complied with and ascertain whether or not the force are
doing so.
o If the police indicate that they do not intend to comply with the new
guidance or are not sure what they will do, make clear that we will
issue a direction to a Chief Officer within para 14B of the Police
Reform Act if they do not comply with the guidance.
13 Paragraph 7.94 Chapter 7 of the ACPO Manual of Guidance on the Management, Command and
Deployment of Armed Officers
14 Paragraph 7.95 Chapter 7 of the ACPO Manual of Guidance on the Management, Command and
Deployment of Armed Officers
15 Paragraph 7.88 Chapter 7 of the ACPO Manual of Guidance on the Management, Command and
Deployment of Armed Officers
16 Paragraph 7.89 Chapter 7 of the ACPO Manual of Guidance on the Management, Command and
Deployment of Armed Officers
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If a Direction is needed, it will be given by the on call IPCC senior
representative - if the referral is out of hours - or by the Senior IPCC person
attending the Post Incident Management process, depending on the
circumstances of the case. A Direction should be made to the force – the
Senior Officer present - in accordance with the provisions of the Police
Reform Act 2002 the details of which are outlined below:-
In Death and Serious Injury (DSI) Matters
Paragraph 14B(1)17 of Schedule 3 to the 2002 imposes on a chief
officer of the force a duty to ensure that all such steps as are
appropriate for the purposes of the DSI matter for obtaining and
preserving evidence relating to the DSI matter.
Paragraph 14B(6) of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act states that the IPCC
has the power to direct the force to take specific steps for obtaining and
preserving evidence relating to the DSI matter.
The Direction must be given to the Senior Officer present as
representative of the Chief Officer. There is no power to enforce the
Direction and no power to provide the Direction to the principal officers
themselves (A form of words is provided for your use at the end of this
document).
All conversations relating to expectations or directions must be appropriately
recorded.
If the force are not complying with the provisions of Chapter 7 regarding the
issue of conferring and do not comply with our Direction to do so the senior
officer present will be asked to record the reason for that and provide the
IPCC member of staff with a copy of that record. If the force indicate that they
will not comply with the provisions of Chapter 7 it should be pointed out that
the consequences of that will expose the risk of challenge as to the
compliance with Article 2, will be the subject of comment in the IPCC’s report
and should create an expectation that officers will be questioned later as to
why the Chapter 7 guidance was not complied with, for example at Inquest
proceedings.
Additional advice for staff
If the indications are that the guidance is not going to be complied with
we should explain to officers that, in relation to the use of lethal force,
they should record their honestly held belief why they used the force
and we should make it clear that conferring is not necessary when
recording their own belief.
We must be clear that we are not seeking for officers to be separated
and we understand that they are entitled to legal advice
17 As inserted by paragraph 12 of Schedule 12 to the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005
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Each case will have to be dealt with on its own merits, the underlying
principle will be to ensure that our investigation is as effective as it
possibly can be
If Investigators are confronted with an unwillingness to comply the
relevant senior IPCC representative should be consulted
It should be pointed out that the adoption of this procedure is to obtain
best evidence, to preserve the principles of accountability and
independence and should not be seen as attributing guilt at an early
stage. We should be mindful that this change in position is new to the
police service and in doing so we should have regard to the recent
comments of Nick Hardwick referred to in the Saunders judgement an
extract of which is reproduced below:-
“… [we] recognise the uniquely difficult and dangerous job performed
by firearms officers. The IPCC is clear that its investigators do not treat
officers as suspects unless there is evidence that an offence has been
committed. We recognise that firearms officers are lawfully carrying
weapons and we do not treat them as suspects in a crime unless there
is evidence to do so. However, when the state takes a life, we believe
that there must be a rigorous investigation and the families and public
are entitled to the fullest possible explanation of what occurred and
why. This is the approach we have taken in all 14 fatal shootings we
have investigated since 2004…”18
If it is necessary to provide a Direction to the Chief Officer the following is a
suggested form of words
“You do not appear to have complied with the provisions of Chapter 6 of the
ACPO Manual of Guidance Police Use of Firearms and have indicated that it
is not your intention not to do so. I am therefore Directing you, in accordance
with Paragraph 14B(6) of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, to
comply with the guidance and issue an instruction to the principle officers in
relation to conferring. I must point out to you that, in accordance with
Paragraph 14B(1) of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, you have a
duty to ensure that all such steps as are appropriate for the purposes of
obtaining and preserving evidence relating to this matter should be taken. If
you do not comply with the provisions of Chapter 6 you should record your
reasons for not doing so along with the reasons for that and provide me with a
written record of that decision and rationale.”
IMPORTANT NOTE TO READER
This advice note was initially circulated to staff on the 11 November 2008 and
referred to amendments made to Chapter 6 of the Manual of Guidance Police
Use of Firearms that was in place at that time.
This manual has now been
18 Extract from press statement by the chair of the IPCC Nick Hardwick in response to MPA report on
the shooting of Mr. de Menezes - July 2008
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replaced by the ACPO Manual of Guidance on the Management,
Command and Deployment of Armed Officers in which references to
post incident procedures are referred to in Chapter 7. In view of this the
advice note has been amended to reflect the changes and replaces the
previous circulation. A copy of Chapter 7 is attached for the purposes of clarity and completion.
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Chapter 7
POST DEPLOYMENT
This chapter describes the post deployment process which applies to situations
where AFOs have been deployed, including issues associated with debriefing and
organisational learning. Where police officers have discharged weapons, or
persons have been killed or injured, the welfare and legal issues, including the
provision of accounts by officers, are outlined. The responsibilities of the key roles
involved in the post deployment process are explained.
CONTENTS
Introduction................................................................................................ 83
Debriefing ........................................................................................... 83
Post Incident Procedures ............................................................................ 84
Criteria for a Post Incident Investigation .................................................. 84
Initial
Action........................................................................................ 85
Post
Incident Roles............................................................................... 85
Immediate
Post
Incident
Command Considerations ................................... 86
Management
at the Scene ..................................................................... 87
Situational or Safety Critical Information ................................................. 89
Post Incident Management.......................................................................... 89
Principal
Officers .................................................................................. 89
The Role of the Post Incident Manager .................................................... 89
Anonymity
of Officers ........................................................................... 90
Weapons
and
Exhibits........................................................................... 90
Welfare Considerations ............................................................................... 91
Medical
Examination ............................................................................. 92
Article 2 ECHR and the Duty to Investigate ................................................. 92
Independent
Investigations ................................................................... 94
Providing Accounts ..................................................................................... 95
Security and Welfare of Officers .................................................................. 96
Officers’
Families and Homes ................................................................. 96
Family Liaison Officer............................................................................ 96
Defusing ............................................................................................. 96
Additional Support................................................................................ 96
Special Leave or Suspension from Duty ................................................... 97
AFOs’
Authorisation .............................................................................. 97
Media
Releases .................................................................................... 97
Progress
of
the Enquiry ......................................................................... 98
Documentation
and Disclosure ............................................................... 98
Post Incident Responsibilities ..................................................................... 98
Operational
Firearms Commander........................................................... 98
Tactical
Firearms Commander ................................................................ 99
Strategic
Firearms Commander .............................................................. 99
ACPO Officer (or Delegated Senior Officer) .............................................. 99
Initial
Investigating Officer .................................................................... 99
Post
Incident Manager .......................................................................... 100
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INTRODUCTION
7.0
This chapter outlines post deployment procedures in a broadly
chronological manner. These procedures are designed to ensure that the
post deployment phase of all armed deployments, irrespective of whether
weapons have been discharged, are conducted in a manner which:
• Ensures the integrity of the legal process in respect of police action,
persons arrested or evidential material seized;
• Enables follow-up action related to any ongoing crime;
• Identifies any operational or safety critical issues in respect of
procedures, training, weapons or equipment used;
• Ensures individual, team and organisational learning takes place and is
addressed both locally and nationally as appropriate.
7.1 The procedures are scalable, and forces should consider their
proportionate application according to the circumstances. The
procedures to be adopted will range from the documentation of
outcomes, through to structured operational debriefing. An auditable log of
each armed deployment must be made and signed-off by an
appropriate supervisor or commander in accordance with force policy.
7.2
The Conflict Management Model provides a structure which
can be
used to ensure that post deployment issues are addressed and can assist
as a structure for any debrief process.
7.3
The following should be considered following deployment of AFOs:
• The community impact of the deployment (see Community Impact
Assessment (6.70 - 6.74));
• Media management (see Media Releases (7.113 - 7.116));
• The nature of any debrief to be undertaken;
• Consideration of an explanation or, where appropriate, an apology to
persons affected by the operation.
7.4
The appropriateness and sequence of the above issues will depend on the
circumstances and whether the criteria for a Incident Investigation (7.10
- 7.13)). If a post incident investigation is to be undertaken, the
appropriateness of any of the above considerations should be discussed
and agreed with the relevant investigative authority. Issues which
become relevant when an investigation is to be conducted are set out
later in this chapter.
DEBRIEFING
7.5
Once an armed deployment has been concluded, a full debrief should be
considered to identify opportunities for operational and organisational
learning. Large or protracted operations should include arrangements for
a specific debriefing session so that any aspect of the command structure,
tactics or equipment used, which demonstrated good practice or caused
a problem, can be identified and lessons learned. Debriefs should be
documented.
7.6
Only in exceptional circumstances should debriefing take place when the
criteria for post incident investigation have been met (see Criteria for
Post Incident Investigation (7.10 - 7.13)), and this should only be with
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the agreement of any investigative authority which is involved. For further
information see Situational or Safety Critical Information (7.40 - 7.41).
7.7 The ACPO Armed Policing Secretariat has a responsibility for
disseminating good practice and lessons learned. Forces are
encouraged to submit early reports to the Secretariat. Contact
[email address]
7.8
There is a range of issues to address in a debriefing process, and not all
will be required in every situation. Each has a different but equally
important purpose. These are:
• Operational and tactical;
• Organisational;
• Evidential.
Prior to officers finishing duty, the senior supervisory officer should also
consider if there are any outstanding issues which need to be
addressed. See also Defusing (7.105).
POST INCIDENT PROCEDURES
7.9
The term post incident is used to describe situations in which shots have
been discharged by the police, or an investigation into police action is to
be conducted. As with post deployment procedures, these procedures are
scalable. For example, the full procedure may not need to take place every
time and will depend on the significance and consequences of the event.
CRITERIA FOR A POST INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
7.10 Post incident investigations will be commenced in all situations where
there has been a discharge of a weapon by police (including those
involving a conventional firearm or less lethal weapon), whether
intentional or unintentional which has, or may have:
• Resulted in death or serious injury;
• Revealed failings in command;
• Caused danger to officers or the public.
7.11 Cases which result in death or serious injury will be subject to mandatory
referral to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, or other
independent investigative authority. Cases which have revealed failings in
command, or have caused danger to the public, or where it is in the public
interest should be referred to the independent investigative authority, as a
voluntary referral. If the above criteria are not met, the force should
consider the proportionate application of these procedures, where
appropriate.
7.12 Where firearms and less lethal weapons have been discharged by police
officers, it is in the interests of the public, the Police Service and everyone
involved in the incident, that subsequent procedures should be open and
transparent, and that the integrity of all action can be demonstrated. The
post incident process will involve an investigation which may be
conducted by the force professional standards department or an
independent investigative authority, such as the Independent Police
Complaints Commission, Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, and in
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Scotland under arrangements set out by the Procurator Fiscal.
Investigations may also be undertaken by the Heath and Safety Executive.
7.13
The
Code of Practice requires chief officers to ensure that operating
protocols exist within their forces that define the action to be taken
throughout the various stages of an investigation. For further information
on investigations, see Article 2 ECHR and the Duty to Investigate (7.72 –
7.82) and Independent Investigations (7.83 - 7.90).
INITIAL ACTION
7.14 Where weapons have been discharged or a person has been shot or
seriously injured during an armed deployment, the force control room or
Tactical Firearms Commander (where appointed) must be immediately
informed. Arrangements should also be made to ensure that the Strategic
Firearms Commander and appropriate ACPO officer on duty or on call is
informed as soon as possible.
7.15 The overall responsibility for post incident procedures should rest with an
ACPO officer or senior officer (who has not been involved in the
operational phase). This officer is responsible for initiating:
• The post incident investigation (including informing the independent
investigative authority);
• Post incident management.
7.16 The relevant independent investigative authority should be informed so
that a decision can be made as to whether the incident meets the criteria
for independent investigation. Where an independent investigation is to
take place, the information given to the investigative authority should
include the action being taken and arrangements made for them to
commence a post incident investigation.
7.17 In situations which do not require investigation by an independent
investigative authority, the incident may be investigated by the
professional standards department of the force concerned, in accordance
with local procedures. The information provided in this chapter is relevant
to any investigation, whether carried out by the force’s professional
standards department or by the relevant independent investigative
authority.
POST INCIDENT ROLES
7.18 There are a number of roles specific to the post incident process.
These are:
• Post Incident Manager (PIM) see The Role of the Post Incident Manager
(7.44 - 7.49);
• Initial Investigating Officer (IIO);
• Investigator from independent investigative authority or force
professional standards department.
7.19 The
responsibilities
of those involved in the post incident process are
outlined in Post Incident Responsibilities (7.121 – 7.126) including the
Strategic, Tactical and Operational Firearms Commanders.
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IMMEDIATE POST INCIDENT COMMAND CONSIDERATIONS
7.20 Following the discharge of a firearm, the Tactical Firearms Commander
should initially establish what has taken place, including the
extent of any casualties and take action, as appropriate, to ensure:
• Resources are adequately deployed to deal with the situation, including
medical aid, welfare and operational and technical support;
• Continuity of command of any ongoing crime-in-action to arrest
offenders;
• Integrity of process in relation to securing best evidence;
• Senior command and independent investigative authorities are notified
of the event;
• The community impact is considered, and where appropriate, action is
taken to address these issues.
7.21 The Strategic Firearms Commander, on being notified of the incident,
should make an assessment regarding continuity of command, and take
action to ensure command resilience. This may involve consideration as to
what command support is required.
7.22 The Strategic Firearms Commander should also consider what strategic
issues need to be addressed in respect of the:
• Incident;
• Community;
• Police force involved and any service-wide considerations.
7.23 Until such time as the Tactical Firearms Commander is relieved of their
responsibilities, or the incident is brought to a conclusion, the Tactical
Firearms Command responsibilities will include identifying and actioning
the following issues:
• Is any person injured – and, if so, are they receiving appropriate
medical attention?
• What action is being taken, or needs to be taken, to secure the scene?
• What additional resources are required?
• Is there an ongoing threat to life or operational imperative that
requires continued action from armed officers at the location of the
incident?
• To what extent have the original operational objectives been met?
• Are there any new or emerging threats or risks outstanding to any
person?
• What control measures are in place in respect of these?
• Are there any critical operational safety issues identified that require
immediate attention?
• Are any subjects at large? What action is required to locate them?
• Have relevant scenes been identified? What action is required to
preserve scenes and evidence?
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• Has an appropriate Post Incident Procedure been implemented?
• Have arrangements been made to hand over to the IIO?
• Has the force professional standards department been notified?
• Has the Strategic Firearms Commander been briefed?
7.24 Where there will be a time delay in the arrival of an investigator, a
command decision should be made as to how and by whom the scene
should be managed and investigatory issues commenced. Initial policing
priorities pending the arrival of the independent investigative authority
include:
• Management of the scene;
• Establishing what took place;
• Identification of witnesses;
• Identification of Principal Officers, see Principal Officers (7.42 – 7.43);
• Identification and securing of exhibits;
• Media management.
The responsibilities in relation to the welfare of all staff involved are
addressed in Welfare Considerations (7.64 – 7.68).
7.25 Consideration should be given to the appointment of an IIO by the force
in which the incident occurred. Where appropriate, this should be done in
consultation with the independent investigative authority (where
involved). The role of the IIO should include all initial investigative issues
pending the hand over to an appointed investigator from an independent
investigative authority or other department.
7.26 The interim arrangements should enable a managed transition from the
operational phase of the incident to the investigation. In this transitional
phase, close liaison is essential between the Tactical Firearms
Commander, the IIO and an officer appointed by the force to manage the
post incident processes. See The Role of the Post Incident Manager (7.44
– 7.49).
MANAGEMENT AT THE SCENE
7.27 When weapons have been discharged, officers should take all necessary
action to ensure that threats are neutralised and that the scene is safe.
The fact that weapons have been discharged and details of any persons
injured or killed should be reported to the control room and/or Tactical
Firearms Commander as soon as practicable. Provision of medical aid is
also a priority. Situational and safety critical information should be relayed
as soon as possible, see Situational or Safety Critical Information (7.40-
7.41). Officers should remain operationally active until stood down.
7.28 Where possible, and without compromise to the security of officers and
persons in the vicinity, action should be taken to secure the scene.
7.29 Securing firearms and ammunition carried by officers is an important part
of the evidence gathering process.
7.30 Weapons which have been fired should, as far as practicable, be
maintained in the condition they were in immediately after being fired,
pending forensic examination. Where any police weapon has failed to fire,
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was discharged unintentionally or is suspected of any malfunction it should
be isolated for forensic examination.
7.31 All firearms which have been discharged, operationally drawn or pointed
during the operation should be identified, as this will be relevant
information in the post incident investigation. The IIO, in conjunction with
the independent investigative authority, will determine which of these
weapons need to be treated as exhibits.
7.32 An officer who is injured, traumatised or in a state of shock should have
their weapon removed by the Operational Firearms Commander, team
leader or other suitably qualified officer. This should, preferably, be
someone who has not been directly involved in the discharge of firearms.
This officer should ensure the weapon’s security. A dual emphasis on
safety and evidential integrity should apply at all times.
7.33 Where a subject has been shot and a weapon is still in their possession, it
should be removed from them and secured. Any other weapons found at
a scene should remain where they are located, unless this compromises
public safety or the security of the exhibit. Wherever possible, weapons
recovered at the scene should not be interfered with or made safe, unless
there is an operational or safety imperative. The position of recovered
weapons should be noted and relayed to the person who is taking charge
at the scene. Where, for operational or security reasons, it has been
necessary to take any action in respect of a recovered weapon, details of
the precise procedures followed should be recorded. For further
information see Chapter 3 Weapons and Exhibits.
7.34 The appointment of a scene manager should be a priority. The scene
manager will be responsible for securing evidence, deploying forensic
experts and ensuring forensic recovery in accordance with the forensic
strategy.
7.35 As far as possible, the positions of officers at the scene of an incident
where firearms have been discharged should be recorded. However,
the deployment of AFOs will often involve rapid movement of officers and
may involve key actions being taken and weapons being discharged by
officers from more than one position during an event which is developing
in very fast time. In addition, officers may become involved in detaining a
subject, action to search and secure any weapons found and/or in the
provision of medial assistance. In these circumstances precise and
accurate recall of where officers were at each stage of the tactical
deployment is often not possible.
7.36 Unless there is a safety critical reason, the police vehicles in which the
Principal Officers attended the scene are not to be removed without the
express authority of the Tactical Firearms Commander or the IIO.
7.37 Where there is an operational imperative to remove a person, vehicle or
equipment from the scene at an early stage, the reason for this should be
recorded along with their initial location, for the purpose of any future
investigation.
7.38 As soon as is practicable after the scene has been secured, AFOs involved
in the incident should return to a police station or other suitable location
where post incident procedures will take place. This will assist in securing
the integrity of the scene, defuse any tensions at the scene and enable
post incident issues, including those of evidence and welfare, to be
attended to.
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7.39 Officers who have been involved in an incident where shots have been
discharged, or where death or serious injury has occurred, should not be
isolated from one another, other than for situation specific reasons such as
preventing forensic cross-contamination.
SITUATIONAL OR SAFETY CRITICAL INFORMATION
7.40 Where officers have discharged weapons, they are permitted, and may be
required to relay situational and safety critical information to those
involved in the ongoing management of the incident or operation.
7.41 On their return to a police station or location where post incident
procedures will take place, arrangements will be made for the initial
welfare and investigative issues to be addressed in a structured and
sensitive manner.
1. POST INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
PRINCIPAL OFFICERS
7.42 Where a post incident investigation is taking place, the independent
investigative authority will at an early stage wish to identify Principal
Officers who were directly related to the decision to use force. As the
investigation unfolds, others involved in the operation, whose actions or
decisions were involved in informing or making critical decisions, may be
regarded as Principal Officers. In the initial stages all actions taken by, and
in respect of, Principal Officers in relation to securing evidence, discussion
undertaken and notes made must be documented.
7.43 Prior to officers providing accounts of what happened, the following issues
should be addressed:
• Weapons and exhibits secured;
• Welfare, including medical and legal advice considerations, see Welfare
Considerations (7.64 – 7.68).
THE ROLE OF THE POST INCIDENT MANAGER
7.44 Post Incident Managers (PIMs) facilitate, manage and ensure the integrity
of the post incident procedure. Their role is not limited to police involved
shootings and may include situations such as deaths in custody and
serious injury traffic collisions involving police officers. Post Incident
Managers often perform their role as part of a PIM team, under the
direction of an overall PIM.
7.45 A PIM will usually be nominated by the force to which the Principal Officers
belong. This will apply to any policing incident or operation, including
those which cross force boundaries. Appropriate support should be
available from the force in which the incident occurs. Forces should
consider the possibility of such occurrences and have appropriate joint
operational force and regional protocols to deal with post incident
procedures.
7.46 An early decision should be made by the Post Incident Manager, in
conjunction with the ACPO officer/delegated senior officer responsible for
the post incident procedures, the Tactical Firearms Commander and the
IIO, as to which officers will be considered Principal Officers; this will vary,
depending on the
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7.47 The PIM’s responsibilities will normally commence following the return of
the Principal Officers to a police station or other area where the post
incident procedures will take place. In some situations, for example, where
officers are delayed at the scene it may be appropriate for the PIM to go to
the scene.
7.48 The PIM’s role is to facilitate the investigation, ensure integrity of process
and that the Principal Officer’s needs are addressed in a manner which
does not compromise the investigative process. This will include keeping
Principal Officers informed of developments and providing appropriate
explanations of procedure, as well as obtaining necessary practical
assistance for them.
7.49 The PIM will establish the basic facts of what happened. In the first
instance the PIM should obtain this information from a source other than
the Principal Officers. If this information is only available from the
Principal Officers, the PIM should remind them of the importance of legal
advice before seeking the information. The PIM will also ensure that the
basic facts are passed to the investigator. For further information on the
roles undertaken by the PIM or a member of the PIM team, see Post
Incident Manager (7.126).
ANONYMITY OF OFFICERS
7.50 The PIM should, where necessary, consider approaching an ACPO officer or
delegated senior officer regarding the need to protect the anonymity of
Principal Officers.
7.51 As with any witness or suspect, concerns for the safety of some Principal
Officers and their families means their anonymity should be addressed at
an early stage.
7.52 Procedures should be in place to consider the anonymity of officers prior to
deployment, if necessary, and subsequently should any shooting occur. It
should be made clear to officers involved that the issue of anonymity may
be the subject of judicial proceedings or challenges and may have to be
reversed at a later stage.
7.53 Suggested measures to preserve the anonymity of Principal Officers
include:
•
Restricting access to systems and documents containing details of
Principal Officers;
•
Using anonymous references (eg, Officer ‘A’) at an early stage (with
a list of such references compiled for inclusion in documents);
•
Omitting officer details and identity from communications and
circulations, including media releases;
•
Advising all officers of their responsibility to maintain confidentiality;
•
Advising independent investigative authority, Crown Prosecution
Service and other agencies.
7.54 The PIM will normally maintain a list of the names of officers involved in
the incident, which should be protectively marked as appropriate. The PIM
should ensure that action is taken to maintain the anonymity of Principal
Officers until such a time as this is deemed to be unnecessary. The PIM
should consult an ACPO officer or delegated senior officer regarding this
issue.
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WEAPONS AND EXHIBITS
7.55 On return to the location where post incident procedures are taking place,
weapons which have been discharged should be identified, as should all
other weapons deployed in the immediate vicinity of the shooting.
7.56 Where
practicable, when weapons are unloaded and exhibited,
consideration should be given to photographing or videoing the process.
Where this is not practicable, a detailed documentary account of the
weapon’s state and the procedure used for unloading should be completed.
The handling and securing of weapons involved in the incident must be
undertaken in a manner which maintains the forensic integrity of these
exhibits.
7.57 All firearms, ammunition, less lethal weapons and specialist munitions
should be accounted for in a manner which ensures that safety, recording
and accountability are properly addressed.
7.58 Initial investigating officers will, in liaison with the independent
investigative authority (where involved), consider which weapons are
required to be secured as exhibits, and whether clothing should be secured
or officers examined for forensic traces. It is good practice for this decision
to be outlined to the officers in person.
7.59 Officers’ weapons should be secured by a different person to the one
securing the subject’s, to avoid any dangers of cross-contamination. Since
AFOs will, invariably, have moved to another location, it is important that
they do not have to await the conclusion of the scene examination before
their firearms are taken for examination.
7.60 Given that officers who train with firearms and visit locations at which
weapons and munitions are used and stored, such exhibits may be of
limited value. Many AFOs train wearing operational clothing, the evidential
value of this clothing for examination is, therefore, likely to be limited. All
officers involved in an incident will be required to assist with the forensic
preservation of their weapons and equipment.
7.61 The PIM or officer coordinating collection of weapon exhibits will ensure
that the weapons are unloaded and handed over, in a controlled manner
and by an appropriately trained officer, to the appointed exhibits officer at
the post incident management suite or other appropriate location.
7.62 Where a weapon is examined and found not to have been fired or is no
longer required as evidence, arrangements should be made, in liaison with
the independent investigative authority (where involved), for it to be
returned to the relevant department as soon as practicable.
7.63 If there is no dispute as to who fired shots, there may be no requirement
for other measures to identify officers. Measures such as the securing of
clothing or taking of swab samples to forensically identify those officers
contaminated by firearms discharge residue will normally only be adopted
in exceptional circumstances. When an investigating officer considers it
necessary to obtain such additional forensic evidence from officers, the
PIM will record the rationale and discuss it with the IIO. If the IIO
requires additional forensic evidence, the PIM will explain the rationale to
the officers concerned and make a record in their policy log. If clothing is
to be taken, suitable, alternative clothing must be provided.
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2. WELFARE CONSIDERATIONS
7.64 The welfare needs of officers should be addressed throughout the post
incident process.
7.65 The welfare needs of officers will include, but should not be limited to:
• Immediate need for first aid and other medical assistance;
• Securing weapons and equipment;
• The provision of refreshments;
• Making phone calls to immediate family members or partners
regarding officers’ wellbeing and possible retention on duty;
• Showering and appropriate change of clothes (provided there are no
forensic matters to be addressed).
7.66 Principal Officers should be supported by their supervisory officers and
given the opportunity to consult representatives of their relevant staff
association as soon as possible. Every effort should be made to ensure
that early professional legal advice is made available in appropriate cases.
This is particularly important where officers have used force as they may
be subject to an investigation which can include potential criminal
offences.
7.67 An incident involving the use of firearms by police officers which results in
death or injury may affect those involved differently and it is not possible
to say who may be affected and to what extent. However, those affected
may include those at the scene, and those who were directing resources
(including control room staff and those involved in making critical
decisions). Officers who have not discharged weapons or suffered injury
may also be traumatised.
7.68 All officers involved in an incident where firearms have been discharged by
police officers, whether or not they are the Principal Officers, should be
able to receive support from the Occupational Health Unit or professional
health advisor employed by the force concerned, if they wish. If possible
this opportunity should be provided within seventy-two hours.
MEDICAL EXAMINATION
7.69 Officers who were in the immediate vicinity of the discharge of firearms or
other munitions should be examined by a registered medical practitioner
as a matter of course, subject to their consent, as they may have suffered
an injury of which they are not aware. All officers should check for such
injuries to themselves and their colleagues.
7.70 Where a registered medical practitioner is called to examine an officer,
they should be briefed about the background of the incident and the
reasons for the examination. Any other information or personal
circumstances which may be relevant to the examination should also be
provided.
7.71 The most appropriate supervising officer to brief the registered medical
practitioner may be the PIM or a member of their team. The content of
any outline of the incident given to the registered medical practitioner
must be documented.
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3. ARTICLE 2 ECHR AND THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
7.72 When the issues in respect of securing weapons, equipment and exhibits
and the welfare issues have been addressed, Post Incident Managers
should explain the nature and implications of an Article 2 ECHR
investigation.
7.73 Under European law there is a procedural requirement on the State to
ensure that where a death occurs at the hands of the State an effective
and independent investigation takes place (this includes any death caused
by or brought about as a result of police action).
7.74 Article 2 places a positive duty on the State to investigate following any death at
the hands of the State. In order to satisfy Article 2 the investigation must be
effective. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held in
Jordan v UK [2003] 37 EHRR 2, and
Edwards v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 19, that it must be:
•
On the State's own initiative (e.g. not civil proceedings);
•
Independent, both institutionally and in practice;
•
Capable of leading to a determination of responsibility and the
punishment of those responsible;
•
Prompt;
•
Allow for sufficient public scrutiny to ensure accountability;
•
Allow the next of kin to participate.
7.75 These principles were approved by the House of Lords in the case of ex
parte Amin (the Zahid Mubarek case) [2003] UKHL 51.
7.76 The requirements under Article 2 ECHR are, therefore, relevant and can
extend to any situation in which death or serious injury occurs during an
incident or operation in which police are involved.
7.77 The essential purpose of an Article 2 investigation is:
• To secure the effective implementation of laws safeguarding the
right to life; and
• In those cases involving agents of the State, to ensure their
accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility.
7.78 The investigation must be capable of leading to a determination of whether
the force used was or was not justified in the circumstances, and to the
identification and punishment of those responsible in appropriate cases.
7.79 Reasonable steps must be taken to secure all relevant evidence, including
witness testimony and forensic evidence.
7.80 Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its capability of
establishing the circumstances of the case or the person responsible is
liable to fall short of the required measure of effectiveness.
7.81 The aim of an investigation into a police-related shooting is, therefore,
twofold:
• To ensure that the applicable law is properly followed and
implemented, ie, so that, where appropriate, effective criminal
proceedings are brought;
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• To ensure police accountability, whether or not criminal proceedings
are brought.
7.82 Where a death does occur at the hand of the State, the burden is on the
detaining authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation
for the death (
Anguelova v Bulgaria, Application No. 38361/97 Judgment
of 13 June 2002). In the absence of such explanation, Article 2 may be
breached.
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS
7.83 The scope of the investigation is likely to be wide ranging. It will not only
include the circumstances of any injury to, or death of, any person who
may have been shot, but also the circumstances leading up to the
discharge of firearms, and all the issues surrounding this such as the
management and planning of the deployment.
7.84 By their very nature, incidents involving the discharge of a firearm by a
police officer give rise to public interest, and can be highly emotive and
stressful for all involved. As a consequence, both the investigative function
and the chief officer’s duty of care to officers and police support staff
involved must be afforded a high priority.
7.85 The duty of care to officers and police staff will extend to welfare, physical,
psychological and medical support. In addition, the police staff
associations have arrangements in place for the provision of advice and
support to officers including legal advice. In facilitating the provision of
these services, investigating officers, Post Incident Managers and staff
association representatives have distinct roles. It is, however, essential
that all officers, Post Incident Managers and those involved in any
debriefing process are able to demonstrate integrity of purpose in all
communications between each other and in record making and debrief
procedures.
7.86 All appropriate steps should be taken by the Police Service in the initial
stages following the discharge of firearms to reduce any possible risks of
the investigation, required under Article 2 ECHR, being undermined by any
deficiencies, such as failing to secure the evidence, including witness
testimony and forensic evidence. The procedures adopted should be
designed so as to demonstrate integrity of purpose in all actions and
discussions between the officers involved.
7.87 Nothing in this section should be interpreted as constraining effective
action by the Police Service or the officers involved in adopting an
operationally necessary procedure to secure best evidence, arrest or bring
to justice those who may be involved in ongoing criminal activity or a
follow up investigative process.
7.88 The responsibility for securing evidence and taking appropriate action in an
Article 2 investigation remains with the Police Service until such time as
the independent investigative authority has taken over the investigation.
7.89 The responsibility of the police force being investigated is to facilitate that
investigation through, for example:
• Identification and preservation of scenes and exhibits;
• Identification of immediately available witnesses;
• Securing of physical evidence;
• The availability of experienced family or witness liaison officers.
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7.90 Early notification to the independent investigative authority will enable
these procedures to be adopted and initial actions being taken by the
police to be agreed at an early stage
4. PROVIDING ACCOUNTS
7.91 Where an initial account is made by officers it should, subject to any legal advice
that they are given, be made as soon as practicable. These accounts should be
recorded in writing, timed, dated and signed.
7.92 Each officer’s initial account should only consist of their individual
recollection of events and should, among other things, address the
question of what they believed to be the facts and why, if relevant, they
considered that the use of force and discharge of firearms was absolutely
necessary.
7.93 Detailed accounts should not normally be made immediately, but can be
left until the officers involved in the shooting are better able to articulate
their experience in a coherent format, normally after at least forty-eight
hours.
7.94 As a matter of general practice, officers should not confer with others
before making their accounts (whether initial or subsequent accounts). The
important issue is to individually record what their honestly held belief of
the situation was at the time force was used. There should, therefore, be
no need for an officer to confer with others about what was in their mind
at the time force was used. If, however, in a particular case a need to
confer on other issues does arise, then, in order to ensure transparency
and maintain public confidence, where some discussion has taken place,
officers must document the fact that this has taken place, highlighting:
• Time, date and place where conferring took place;
• The issues discussed;
• With whom;
• The reasons for such discussion.
7.95 There is a positive obligation on officers involved to ensure that all activity
relating to the recording of accounts is transparent and capable of
withstanding scrutiny.
7.96 Where an officer has any concerns that the integrity of the process is not
being maintained, they must immediately draw this to the attention of the
person in charge of the post-incident process and ensure that this is
documented.
7.97 A person involved in a traumatic or life-threatening encounter will often
experience a range of physiological and psychological responses which
may determine their perception of time, distance, auditory and visual
stimuli and the chronology of key events. This may affect their ability
immediately after the incident to recall what may be important detail.
Where over time officers recall further information, this should be recorded
in a further account.
7.98 There may be circumstances where it is necessary for officers to provide
more detailed information at an earlier stage. This could be to address
issues associated with a person who is now in custody or in relation to an
ongoing criminal investigation, for example, where a person was not
arrested at the scene.
7.99 It is the responsibility of each individual police officer involved in the
incident to ensure that any information that may be relevant to the
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investigation is revealed, recorded and retained. This information should
include an officer’s own observations relating to the incident and any
accounts received from witnesses.
7.100 Once officers involved have been able to make their initial accounts,
arrangements will be made by the PIM to ensure that these accounts are
secured and made available to the investigative authority.
5. SECURITY AND WELFARE OF OFFICERS
7.101 The PIM will initiate an early threat assessment to determine whether
there are any security issues in respect of the Principal Officers involved in
the incident. This will allow the PIM to recommend that the force puts in
place the appropriate control measures to ensure the safety of the
officer(s) and, where necessary, their families. An ongoing threat
assessment process will continue, where necessary, until it is no longer
required.
OFFICERS’ FAMILIES AND HOMES
7.102 Consideration should be given by the force to which Principal Officers
belong, as to whether the welfare, medical and professional support should
be extended to the Principal Officer’s families. Their families should be
alerted to the possible reactions of those involved in such incidents and
should be afforded the opportunity to discuss the situation with the Force
Occupational Health Advisors.
7.103 The security of an officer’s home should be considered at an early stage.
The cost of any appropriate measures, such as the installation of a panic
alarm direct to the nearest police station and improved locks should be
met by the officer’s force. Forces should have a policy on providing
security and anonymity in appropriate cases.
FAMILY LIAISON OFFICER
7.104 In any incident where persons have been killed or injured as a result of
police action, consideration should be given to the use of family liaison
officers. It can also be beneficial to use these officers to support the
families of police officers who have been significantly affected by firearms
incidents, especially where the officer’s identity has become known to the
public.
DEFUSING
7.105 Defusing is a short and informal process, which should be facilitated by
trained people, and is aimed at giving immediate support to staff. It
should take place as soon as possible after the event and, in any case,
prior to conclusion of duty. The defusing process may assist officers and
other staff recognise and manage the reactions and feelings they are or
may experience as a result of what they have been involved in.
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT
7.106 Consideration should be given to having a suitable person, for example a
trusted colleague, assigned to stay with an officer who has been
traumatised or significantly affected during the hours immediately
following the incident. In appropriate cases, this person should
subsequently accompany them home. Consideration should also be given
to supporting the families of officers involved. These considerations should
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also be extended to any other officers or members of staff who are
significantly affected by the incident.
SPECIAL LEAVE OR SUSPENSION FROM DUTY
7.107 When appropriate, special or administrative leave may be granted to a
Principal Officer. There may, however, be circumstances where such leave
is not in an officer’s best interest and consultation with the officer and staff
association is appropriate.
7.108 Suspension from duty should only be necessary in exceptional cases, and
in accordance with force policy. When it is necessary to suspend an officer,
that officer should still be able to contact colleagues within the Police
Service and should still continue to receive appropriate medical and
welfare support.
AFOS’ AUTHORISATION
7.109 An officer’s authorisation to operationally carry a firearm should not
automatically be removed, and nor should they be automatically excluded
from firearms training or other related duties.
7.110 An evidence-based assessment should be made by the police force, in
conjunction with the independent investigative authority, the force
professional standards unit and the provider of occupational health advice,
as to when officers should be permitted to resume operational duties,
including duties or roles in which they have regular access to firearms.
7.111 Any decision to remove an officer from operational firearms duty should be
regularly reviewed (at least monthly) by the chief officer responsible for
firearms policy, in consultation with the investigative authority.
7.112 Officers who have discharged their firearm must complete a mandatory
occupational health post incident support programme provided by their
force.
MEDIA RELEASES
7.113 Subject to any operational reasons, a cooperative and open media
strategy should be adopted. The media strategy should be formulated in
consultation with the independent investigative authority. A clear factual
account of the incident should be provided at the earliest opportunity. Care
must be taken to avoid compromising any subsequent judicial
proceedings. Consideration should be given to the appointment of a
specialist media officer who has knowledge of the Police Service’s use of
firearms, such as the nature of training given to officers, the guidelines
under which officers may discharge firearms and the kind of firearms
carried.
7.114 Precautions should be taken to protect the officers and their families from
unwanted publicity. The PIM must ensure that, where practicable, the
Principal Officers are informed of all media releases prior to their
circulation and he or she may make representations on their behalf. This
action may assist in prompting officers to consider their families and
others likely to be affected by a media release and allow them to make
early arrangements to cater for any foreseeable problems.
7.115 No information that might unintentionally identify officers concerned with
the incident should be passed to the media. In addition, sensitivity should
be exercised in the completion of internal force publications or reports
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concerning the incident. Care must always be exercised when using
communications systems, including mobile phones.
7.116 Officers involved in the incident should avoid discussing the detail with
personnel not involved in the incident, unless there is an operational
imperative to do so. This is to prevent the possibility of uninformed
rumour and to protect the identity of those involved.
PROGRESS OF THE ENQUIRY
7.117 The Police Reform Act 2002 requires that all interested persons should be
kept informed of the progress of the enquiry. Procedures should be put in
place to ensure that regular updates are provided, and the host force
should consider the provision of an ongoing PIM or Force Liaison Officer
(either full or part-time) to facilitate this. Procedures for providing updates
may include a meeting with officers involved in an incident, as soon as
practicable after an incident, and, in any event, providing the officers with
terms of reference of the investigation within forty-eight hours.
7.118 It will be normal for the independent investigative authority to brief the
force concerned as to the current status of the investigation, usually not
later than twenty-eight days after the incident.
DOCUMENTATION AND DISCLOSURE
7.119 The originals of all documents and statements generated as a result of an
incident must be handed over to the force professional standards
department or independent investigative authority at the earliest
opportunity.
7.120 The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 requires that all
material obtained in the course of an investigation that may be relevant to
the investigation is retained for disclosure purposes.
6. POST INCIDENT RESPONSIBILITIES
OPERATIONAL FIREARMS COMMANDER
7.121 • Remains operationally active until stood down;
• In the absence of the Tactical Firearms Commander, ensures that the
scene is protected and that evidence is preserved until the arrival of
the IIO;
• Should ensure that the weapon(s) or perceived weapon of the subject
is located and secured in situ, unless it is dangerous to do so;
• Ensures a weapon safety check is carried out by officers;
• Liaises with the IIO and, where necessary, with the involvement of the
scenes of crime officer, supervises the unloading of the weapons and
identifies which weapon was carried by each officer.
TACTICAL FIREARMS COMMANDER
7.122
• Remains operationally active until stood down;
• Ensures that the scene is protected and that evidence is preserved
until the arrival of the IIO;
• Considers the safety of the public, police personnel and the immediate
welfare of casualties;
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• Considers which officers are to be treated as Principal Officers (in
conjunction with the ACPO officer or delegated senior officer, IIO and
PIM);
• Ensures transfer of AFOs to relocation point and assists in identifying
Principal Officers;
• Establishes the facts of what has taken place and ensures that all
relevant information is recorded;
• Informs the force control room and the Strategic Firearms
Commander;
• Determines the rendezvous point (RVP) for incoming resources;
• Briefs and formally hands over to the IIO;
• Briefs the Strategic Firearms commander.
STRATEGIC FIREARMS COMMANDER
7.123
• Remains in a position to maintain command until the strategic
intention of the operation is achieved, or they are relieved;
• Continues to be available to the Tactical Firearms Commander if
required;
• Informs ACPO officer or delegated senior officer of the incident;
• Ensures all relevant information is recorded.
ACPO OFFICER (OR DELEGATED SENIOR OFFICER)
7.124
• Ensures investigation and welfare procedures are implemented;
• Appoints PIM;
• Appoints IIO;
• Ensures that Principal Officers are identified;
• Considers referral to the independent investigative authority;
• Subject to referral to the independent investigative authority, agrees
the media strategy;
• Ensures all relevant information is recorded.
INITIAL INVESTIGATING OFFICER
7.125
• Has early dialogue with the independent investigative authority to
agree responsibilities and key actions;
• Opens a policy log and ensures all relevant information and decisions
are recorded, including issues of anonymity;
• Agrees initial terms of reference with ACPO officer or delegated senior
officer;
• Identifies and preserves evidence;
• Ensures effective scene management;
• Considers which officers are to be treated as Principal Officers (in
conjunction with the ACPO officer or delegated senior officer, PIM and
Tactical Firearms Commander);
• Identifies and considers relevant national guidelines;
• Liaises with the Tactical Firearms Commander as to initial action at the
scene;
• Liaises with chief officers as to media policy;
• Liaises with and consults the PIM;
• Makes early contact with the appointed investigator from the
independent investigative authority;
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• Carries out those enquiries deemed urgent and those that may assist
in the collation of evidence which may be lost prior to the arrival of the
investigator from the independent investigative authority;
• Agrees initial objectives in relation to forensic evidence;
• Makes early contact with the pathologist (where appropriate);
• Liaises with the scientific support coordinator.
POST INCIDENT MANAGER
7.126
• Opens a policy log and ensures all relevant information and decisions
are recorded, including issues of anonymity;
• Considers which officers are to be treated as Principal Officers (in
conjunction with the ACPO officer/delegated senior officer, IIO and
Tactical Firearms Commander);
• Establishes immediate contact with the Principal Officers and ensures
that they are given immediate support;
• Considers whether to assign a member of the PIM team to each
Principal Officer;
• Advises all relevant members of staff that post incident procedures
have been implemented and explains the PIM role;
• Meets the Initial Investigating Officer or any representative from the
independent investigative authority;
• Takes measures to ensure the physical and emotional wellbeing of the
staff involved;
• Considers the attendance of a doctor or health adviser;
• Ensures access to telephones to enable officers to contact relatives or
friends;
• Informs the following departments and agencies to attend if required
–Occupational Health and Welfare Unit
–Doctor or Force Medical Examiner (FME)
–Staff Associations as appropriate;
• Ensures that any necessary forensic procedures are dealt with as early
as possible and that officers are fully informed of the relevance of the
procedures (for example, the seizure of exhibits);
• Secures early legal advice/representation if requested;
• Maintains dialogue with the IIO and addresses issues with them,
including press releases and the progress of the investigation to update
staff involved;
• Advises Principal Officers of their responsibilities regarding the
discussion of the incident with colleagues;
• Facilitates the process in which officers provide initial accounts and
ensures these (where made) are provided to the investigator, see
Providing Accounts (7.91 – 7.100).
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