FOI Response Letter 4167-2009 APPENDIX 1
Summary of change 1(i) to 1(ii)
Page Number
Details of change (Legend = [Deleted text] – [Inserted text])
Page 9
Deletions
Paragraph 3
[Despite] the [strong focus upon the logistical infrastructure] for this operation [some wrong
assumptions were made in the initial stages such as expecting officers from the] Metropolitan
Police [Service (MPS)] travel on a daily basis [which had the effect] of [significantly
increasing their daily working hours. This was] soon rectified with MPS officers being
accommodated along with other visiting officers.
Insertions
[During] the [planning stages] for this operation [and the subsequent request for mutual aid
resources contact was made with] Metropolitan Police [to discuss and agree resourcing
requirements. The early indication from preliminary enquiries with the Metropolitan Police
was that their resources would] travel on a daily basis from [London to Kent. The practical
elements] of [this were] soon [realised that this would be unworkable and was subsequently]
rectified with MPS officers being accommodated along with other visiting officers.
[Reason for change - the initial narrative by the NPIA was incorrect. This was rectified
following the meeting with Alan Horton]
Page 10
Deletions
Paragraph 1
Due to the lack of face to face contact and personal briefing during the operation from the
Silver Commander to the [Bronze Commanders], wrong interpretation was placed on some of
Silver’s aims [and Bronze’s on occasions were forced to use their initiative and implement
tactics to fill this lack of Silver guidance]. Whilst Bronze Commanders [recognise that this is
their role in a spontaneous incident, comment was highlighted that Bronze Commanders had
no] ownership of the development of their respective tactical plans [as these had] been
[‘sorted’ before] the [respective Bronze] Commanders [had] the [opportunity to formulate
their own plans].
National Policing Improvement Agency
Insertion
Due to the lack of face to face contact and personal briefing during the operation from the
Silver Commander to the [Basic Mobilisation Unit (BMU)], wrong interpretation was placed on
some of Silver’s aims. Whilst Bronze Commanders [were engaged and had] ownership of the
development of their respective tactical plans [the insertion of BMU Commanders provided
another dynamic which may have] been [resolved had] the [BMU] Commanders [attended]
the [event pre-briefing facilitated by Kent Police].
[Reason for Change - V1(i) talks about face to face contact between Silver and Bronze, when
in fact it was face to face between Silver and Basic Mobilisation Unit Commanders.]
Page 10
… Another aspect which impacted upon the lack of strategic overview was a perception by
Paragraph 3
officers that media management was not fully considered [when in fact it was]. A more pro-
active approach [by Kent Police] towards [this] [appropriate resourcing of the media
management role] may have reduced [the unnecessary intrusion officers felt from the media]
[this perception and provided enhanced support to the policing operation.]
[Reason for Change - clarity added regarding the focus upon media management]
Page 10
[On the initial reception day for arriving officers, it was recognised that there were a variety
Between
of problems associated with the use of mobile telephones within the communications
Paragraphs 3 &
structure. There are inherent problems associated with this approach towards
4
communications and a suggestion that a decision should have been made in the very early
stages of the operation not to attempt to use this as part of the communication structure did
not materialise.]
[Reason for Change - removal of a entire paragraph as this was factually incorrect in the
draft report]
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National Policing Improvement Agency
Page 10
Bronze Commanders raised a number of significant issues surrounding the lack of attention
Paragraph 4
paid to the establishment and understanding of effective command protocols. This was at its
into
most prominent with the insertion of [Basic Mobilisation Unit (]BMU[)] Commanders into the
Page 11
resourcing plan. This role which is advocated in the Police National Mobilisation Plan (PNMP)
Paragraph 1
effectively inserts an additional layer of command into the process. This role was not
understood by many and as a consequence did not add any value to the command and
control process. Equally, there were a number of BMU Commanders who were reluctant to
accept command decisions and directions from a Bronze Commander who was junior in rank.
This [is an] issue [which should be] [was] addressed at the pre-event briefing for all
Commanders[.][;however, owing to the lack of attendance by BMU Commanders at the pre-
event briefing they were not present to hear this instruction]
Page 11
…. Consideration [should also be] [was] given [by Kent Police] to [ensuring] [ensure] that
Paragraph 4
appropriate resilience [is] [was] built into the command structure [but the fact is that the
Force ran out of] [. There were no] trained and accredited officers [in place] to perform [the
role of Deputy Silver throughout the operation and as such this may have undermined]
[these roles. This had the potential to undermine]the command infrastructure in the event
that the nominated Silver Commander was taken ill or could not carry on in the role.
[Reason for Change - the initial emphasis was upon the Deputy Silver Commander, when in
fact Kent ran out of all trained Public Order Commanders]
Page 13
… Those Commanders [that] [who] attended the pre event briefing spoke positively of the
Paragraph 3
information and detail shared by Kent Police.
Page 14
There were further issues highlighted within the Control Room environment which appeared
Paragraph 2
to have a negative effect upon the management of the policing operation. Officers at the
debrief highlighted that they felt the communications staff were not appropriately trained to
work within such a dynamic environment [and] [which does differ considerably to the call
centre environment in which these staff usually work. It was also felt] that more staff were
required to be trained in the use and maintenance of Atlas Ops….
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National Policing Improvement Agency
Page 15
The briefing strategy and approach raised a number of significant comments from
Paragraph 1
participants as a area for improvement. Mindful that this operation witnessed the largest
mobilisation of policing assets in 2008 the commitment from [forces] [non Kent Police
indivduals] providing mutual aid to [release key individuals to] attend the pre-event briefing
was sadly lacking. Kent Police invested heavily to ensure that attending forces were
adequately briefed and provided with a tour of the geographic location prior to the
commencement of the operation. This investment was undermined by a number of forces not
[sending key representatives] [being represented] which meant that the initial impetus, style
and tactical briefing were lost. [It was subsequently felt] [The subsequent outcome of this
resulted in a feeling that] that the standard of limited briefing for officers deployed to the
event was poor. Officers felt that there was no initial overview of why they were deployed to
Kent. The strategic overview was missing and Commanders felt that they were not
adequately sighted upon the tactical plan. [On realising that a number of mutual aid forces
were not represented at the pre-event briefing Kent Police should have addressed this at
subsequent briefings once mutual aid forces arrived for their deployments.
{Paragraph inserted}]
Page 15
… Officers [also] felt that a focused briefing addressing the specific issue of suitable and
Paragraph 2
appropriate legislation would have been valuable. [Despite the fact that this may have been
valuable there is a professional responsibility upon all forces to ensure that officers
understand and can make effective use of appropriate legislation. Receiving forces, in this
case Kent Police, have an expectation that officers providing mutual aid are properly and
adequately trained to carry out the role required of them.]…
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… [Feedback from the structured debrief would suggest that this assumption was mainly
Paragraph 3
expressed from officers whose own force area has an airport and is granted Section 44
powers of search under the Terrorism Act 2000.] This [perceived blanket power to stop and
search] was not the case as the Silver Commander felt that the information, intelligence and
circumstances did not justify the granting of a Section 60 authority to search power.
Page 17
It was reported that there was a reasonable lack of female officers deployed to this event
Paragraph 1
which in turn had knock on effects for PSU’s in carrying out searching. [There is national
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National Policing Improvement Agency
good practice whereby forces have made very effective use of both dedicated Black and
Minority Ethnic (BME) Serials or dedicated all Female Serials based upon the profile of those
being policed, which in turn has raised confidence and maximised the effectiveness of the
policing operation.]
Page 17
[A] [It was felt that a] lack of continuity of [PSU] officers at the campsite resulted in the
Paragraph 2
protestors receiving different messages and styles from police officers. [Good practice would
suggest seeking to establish] [This was a deliberate tactic by the Silver Commander who was
keen to avoid familiarity and complacency at the camp site. The Silver Commander had
implemented a well established and resourced Site Liaison Team which supports the good
practice in the area of establishing] nominated site liaison officers and teams at such a
significant location.
Page 20
… The quality of data received from officers also contributed towards unnecessary
Paragraph 1
difficulties. This is illustrated in the submission of some 8,000 search forms conducted
throughout the event under Section 1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), of which only
2,000 were readable. [The poor quality of submitted search forms should have been
identified earlier in the operation and addressed at subsequent daily briefings thereby
rectifying the issue. The fact that so many forms were submitted in such poor quality also
raises questions regarding the effectiveness of supervision and also the overall knowledge of
police powers which was felt to be lacking.]
Page 24
Crime related arrests were supported by process teams but not traffic related arrests which
Paragraph 2
did not demonstrate a holistic approach towards prisoner handling. [It is fair to say that Kent
Police did not anticipate the level of activity generated by the roads policing tactical approach
which was hugely successful in terms of its overall effectiveness.]
Page 25
Although some negative comments were passed in relation to the dissemination of Silver’s
Paragraph 4
policing intention and tactics, the tactical plan was recognised as being good with no breach
to Kingsnorth Power Station. [Some comment was made that officers did not feel that they
knew and understood the whole policing plan. It was not necessary or desirable for all
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National Policing Improvement Agency
officers to know the policing plan as this may have undermined the tactical approach. The
Silver Commander ensured that where necessary officers understood the plan as it related to
their area of operational deployment.]
Page 28
Kent Police and hosting forces for future Camps for Climate Action may wish to consider the
Paragraph 6
introduction of an [observer] [a shadowing] programme to accommodate [visiting] officers
(Point 8)
who [have requested and been granted permission] [are seeking] to [attend events]
[develop their professional competence in a command role in a dynamic public order
environment]. This programme should be appropriately documented and agreed with
[visiting] officers so that they fully understand their role
APPENDIX B
Summary of change 1(ii) to 1(iii)
Page Number
Details of change (Legend = [Deleted text] – [Inserted text]
Cover Page
change of owner from ‘CInspector Moody’ to ‘Chief Superintendent Alan Horton’
Contents Page
Contents numbers updated
Page 4
Removal of Graham Wright’s name, title and contact details from preface page.
Page 35
Correction to spelling of ‘officers’ in phrase ‘experienced tactical officers.’
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© NPIA (National Policing Improvement Agency)
