

FOI Response Letter 4167-2009 APPENDIX 1



Summary of change 1(i) to 1(ii)	
Page Number	Details of change (Legend = [Deleted text] - [Inserted text])
Page 9 Paragraph 3	<p><b><u>Deletions</u></b></p> <p>[Despite] the [strong focus upon the logistical infrastructure] for this operation [some wrong assumptions were made in the initial stages such as expecting officers from the] Metropolitan Police [Service (MPS)] travel on a daily basis [which had the effect] of [significantly increasing their daily working hours. This was] soon rectified with MPS officers being accommodated along with other visiting officers.</p> <p><b><u>Insertions</u></b></p> <p>[During] the [planning stages] for this operation [and the subsequent request for mutual aid resources contact was made with] Metropolitan Police [to discuss and agree resourcing requirements. The early indication from preliminary enquiries with the Metropolitan Police was that their resources would] travel on a daily basis from [London to Kent. The practical elements] of [this were] soon [realised that this would be unworkable and was subsequently] rectified with MPS officers being accommodated along with other visiting officers.</p> <p><i>[Reason for change - the initial narrative by the NPIA was incorrect. This was rectified following the meeting with Alan Horton]</i></p>
Page 10 Paragraph 1	<p><b><u>Deletions</u></b></p> <p>Due to the lack of face to face contact and personal briefing during the operation from the Silver Commander to the [Bronze Commanders], wrong interpretation was placed on some of Silver's aims [and Bronze's on occasions were forced to use their initiative and implement tactics to fill this lack of Silver guidance]. Whilst Bronze Commanders [recognise that this is their role in a spontaneous incident, comment was highlighted that Bronze Commanders had no] ownership of the development of their respective tactical plans [as these had] been ['sorted' before] the [respective Bronze] Commanders [had] the [opportunity to formulate their own plans].</p>

	<p><b>Insertion</b></p> <p>Due to the lack of face to face contact and personal briefing during the operation from the Silver Commander to the [Basic Mobilisation Unit (BMU)], wrong interpretation was placed on some of Silver’s aims. Whilst Bronze Commanders [were engaged and had] ownership of the development of their respective tactical plans [the insertion of BMU Commanders provided another dynamic which may have] been [resolved had] the [BMU] Commanders [attended] the [event pre-briefing facilitated by Kent Police].</p> <p><i>[Reason for Change - V1(i) talks about face to face contact between Silver and Bronze, when in fact it was face to face between Silver and Basic Mobilisation Unit Commanders.]</i></p>
<p>Page 10 Paragraph 3</p>	<p>... Another aspect which impacted upon the lack of strategic overview was a perception by officers that media management was not fully considered [when in fact it was]. A more proactive approach [by Kent Police] towards [this] [appropriate resourcing of the media management role] may have reduced [the unnecessary intrusion officers felt from the media] [this perception and provided enhanced support to the policing operation.]</p> <p><i>[Reason for Change - clarity added regarding the focus upon media management]</i></p>
<p>Page 10 Between Paragraphs 3 &amp; 4</p>	<p>[On the initial reception day for arriving officers, it was recognised that there were a variety of problems associated with the use of mobile telephones within the communications structure. There are inherent problems associated with this approach towards communications and a suggestion that a decision should have been made in the very early stages of the operation not to attempt to use this as part of the communication structure did not materialise.]</p> <p><i>[Reason for Change - removal of a entire paragraph as this was factually incorrect in the draft report]</i></p>

## National Policing Improvement Agency

<p>Page 10 Paragraph 4 into Page 11 Paragraph 1</p>	<p>Bronze Commanders raised a number of significant issues surrounding the lack of attention paid to the establishment and understanding of effective command protocols. This was at its most prominent with the insertion of [Basic Mobilisation Unit (]BMU[)] Commanders into the resourcing plan. This role which is advocated in the Police National Mobilisation Plan (PNMP) effectively inserts an additional layer of command into the process. This role was not understood by many and as a consequence did not add any value to the command and control process. Equally, there were a number of BMU Commanders who were reluctant to accept command decisions and directions from a Bronze Commander who was junior in rank. This [is an] issue [which should be] [was] addressed at the pre-event briefing for all Commanders[.];[however, owing to the lack of attendance by BMU Commanders at the pre-event briefing they were not present to hear this instruction]</p>
<p>Page 11 Paragraph 4</p>	<p>.... Consideration [should also be] [was] given [by Kent Police] to [ensuring] [ensure] that appropriate resilience [is] [was] built into the command structure [but the fact is that the Force ran out of] [. There were no] trained and accredited officers [in place] to perform [the role of Deputy Silver throughout the operation and as such this may have undermined] [these roles. This had the potential to undermine]the command infrastructure in the event that the nominated Silver Commander was taken ill or could not carry on in the role.</p> <p><i>[Reason for Change - the initial emphasis was upon the Deputy Silver Commander, when in fact Kent ran out of all trained Public Order Commanders]</i></p>
<p>Page 13 Paragraph 3</p>	<p>... Those Commanders [that] [who] attended the pre event briefing spoke positively of the information and detail shared by Kent Police.</p>
<p>Page 14 Paragraph 2</p>	<p>There were further issues highlighted within the Control Room environment which appeared to have a negative effect upon the management of the policing operation. Officers at the debrief highlighted that they felt the communications staff were not appropriately trained to work within such a dynamic environment [and] [which does differ considerably to the call centre environment in which these staff usually work. It was also felt] that more staff were required to be trained in the use and maintenance of Atlas Ops....</p>

## National Policing Improvement Agency

<p>Page 15 Paragraph 1</p>	<p>The briefing strategy and approach raised a number of significant comments from participants as a area for improvement. Mindful that this operation witnessed the largest mobilisation of policing assets in 2008 the commitment from [forces] [non Kent Police individuals] providing mutual aid to [release key individuals to] attend the pre-event briefing was sadly lacking. Kent Police invested heavily to ensure that attending forces were adequately briefed and provided with a tour of the geographic location prior to the commencement of the operation. This investment was undermined by a number of forces not [sending key representatives] [being represented] which meant that the initial impetus, style and tactical briefing were lost. [It was subsequently felt] [The subsequent outcome of this resulted in a feeling that] that the standard of limited briefing for officers deployed to the event was poor. Officers felt that there was no initial overview of why they were deployed to Kent. The strategic overview was missing and Commanders felt that they were not adequately sighted upon the tactical plan. [On realising that a number of mutual aid forces were not represented at the pre-event briefing Kent Police should have addressed this at subsequent briefings once mutual aid forces arrived for their deployments. {Paragraph inserted}]</p>
<p>Page 15 Paragraph 2</p>	<p>... Officers [also] felt that a focused briefing addressing the specific issue of suitable and appropriate legislation would have been valuable. [Despite the fact that this may have been valuable there is a professional responsibility upon all forces to ensure that officers understand and can make effective use of appropriate legislation. Receiving forces, in this case Kent Police, have an expectation that officers providing mutual aid are properly and adequately trained to carry out the role required of them.]...</p>
<p>Page 16 Paragraph 3</p>	<p>... [Feedback from the structured debrief would suggest that this assumption was mainly expressed from officers whose own force area has an airport and is granted Section 44 powers of search under the Terrorism Act 2000.] This [perceived blanket power to stop and search] was not the case as the Silver Commander felt that the information, intelligence and circumstances did not justify the granting of a Section 60 authority to search power.</p>
<p>Page 17 Paragraph 1</p>	<p>It was reported that there was a reasonable lack of female officers deployed to this event which in turn had knock on effects for PSU's in carrying out searching. [There is national</p>

## National Policing Improvement Agency

	<p>good practice whereby forces have made very effective use of both dedicated Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) Serials or dedicated all Female Serials based upon the profile of those being policed, which in turn has raised confidence and maximised the effectiveness of the policing operation.]</p>
<p>Page 17 Paragraph 2</p>	<p>[A] [It was felt that a] lack of continuity of [PSU] officers at the campsite resulted in the protestors receiving different messages and styles from police officers. [Good practice would suggest seeking to establish] [This was a deliberate tactic by the Silver Commander who was keen to avoid familiarity and complacency at the camp site. The Silver Commander had implemented a well established and resourced Site Liaison Team which supports the good practice in the area of establishing] nominated site liaison officers and teams at such a significant location.</p>
<p>Page 20 Paragraph 1</p>	<p>... The quality of data received from officers also contributed towards unnecessary difficulties. This is illustrated in the submission of some 8,000 search forms conducted throughout the event under Section 1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), of which only 2,000 were readable. [The poor quality of submitted search forms should have been identified earlier in the operation and addressed at subsequent daily briefings thereby rectifying the issue. The fact that so many forms were submitted in such poor quality also raises questions regarding the effectiveness of supervision and also the overall knowledge of police powers which was felt to be lacking.]</p>
<p>Page 24 Paragraph 2</p>	<p>Crime related arrests were supported by process teams but not traffic related arrests which did not demonstrate a holistic approach towards prisoner handling. [It is fair to say that Kent Police did not anticipate the level of activity generated by the roads policing tactical approach which was hugely successful in terms of its overall effectiveness.]</p>
<p>Page 25 Paragraph 4</p>	<p>Although some negative comments were passed in relation to the dissemination of Silver's policing intention and tactics, the tactical plan was recognised as being good with no breach to Kingsnorth Power Station. [Some comment was made that officers did not feel that they knew and understood the whole policing plan. It was not necessary or desirable for all</p>

## National Policing Improvement Agency

	officers to know the policing plan as this may have undermined the tactical approach. The Silver Commander ensured that where necessary officers understood the plan as it related to their area of operational deployment.]
Page 28 Paragraph 6 (Point 8)	Kent Police and hosting forces for future Camps for Climate Action may wish to consider the introduction of an [observer] [a shadowing] programme to accommodate [visiting] officers who [have requested and been granted permission] [are seeking] to [attend events] [develop their professional competence in a command role in a dynamic public order environment]. This programme should be appropriately documented and agreed with [visiting] officers so that they fully understand their role

### APPENDIX B

Summary of change 1(ii) to 1(iii)	
Page Number	Details of change (Legend = [Deleted text] – [Inserted text])
Cover Page	change of owner from 'CInspector Moody' to 'Chief Superintendent Alan Horton'
Contents Page	Contents numbers updated
Page 4	Removal of Graham Wright's name, title and contact details from preface page.
Page 35	Correction to spelling of 'officers' in phrase 'experienced tactical officers.'